Report 76 — The prosecution’s closing arguments
Almost 2.5 years after the Lundin Oil trial began in September 2023, the time had finally come for closing arguments. The week of 17 March 2026, as well as the following week, was reserved for the prosecution, who maintained that they had met their burden of proof.
Introduction
Lead prosecutor Henrik Attorps began by noting that an unusually long trial, lasting approximately two and a half years, was coming to its end. However, while lengthy by Swedish standards, its duration was not exceptional when compared to similar international cases, he noted. The case concerned events connected to the second Sudanese civil war, which he said was often described as one of the most overlooked conflicts in modern history despite its devastating consequences, including millions of deaths as well as widespread displacement, famine, and disease.
Attorps highlighted the international reactions to the conflict in Sudan, particularly that of the International Criminal Court, which has tried and convicted a number Sudanese perpetrators and indicted others, including former president Omar al-Bashir. However, the situation in southern Sudan, central to this case, was never referred to the ICC and has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny. The prosecutor then noted that the trial has covered developments from the early 1990s through 2019, including the rise to power of the Sudanese regime in 1989.
Notably, Attorps described the case as being unique in that it addressed the economic drivers of armed conflict. The Sudanese regime, in need of revenue to sustain its war against the SPLA, turned to oil resources in the south. At the same time, a Swedish oil company, Lundin Oil, sought to expand into new territories for commercial gain. According to the prosecution, this led the company to cooperate with a regime widely criticized by the international community for its human rights record. Lundin Oil’s entry into southern Sudan was framed as part of a broader pattern in which control over natural resources fuels conflict. The prosecution drew parallels to historical and contemporary cases of corporate complicity in international crimes, including the Nuremberg trials and more recent cases in France, the United States, and the Netherlands, connecting this case to growing efforts to hold corporations and their leaders accountable for their actions.
Attorps then reflected on the breadth of material presented during the trial, including reports from United Nations bodies, NGOs, journalists, and academic researchers. “The trial has taught us about Sudan’s history, the civil war, and the regime from various perspectives,” he said. The court had learned about the regime’s use of the divide and conquer method and the ensuing proxy wars. Attorps added that the trial had also covered geophysics, remote sensing, and even a beginner’s course in business administration thanks to the recent expert witnesses. However, the court had also heard the alternate history presented by the defence teams, which in the prosecution’s view went against the UN reports, academic research, and the company’s own internal documents.
Attorps then addressed the testimony of the trial’s 32 plaintiffs, emphasizing that “[a]bove all, we have heard stories from the people who were affected.” Throughout the trial, their stories had been preserved “so the most forgotten war will not be forgotten.” He described their testimony as “memorable and awful,” in which they had related experiences “that make you wonder how people have the strength to go on.” Many of the plaintiffs had been children at the time of the events they described. Attorps highlighted the testimony of Sara, the first female plaintiff to testify, who described being abducted by the militia and then attacked by aerial bombardment from the regime. “She described how she was about to go mad when she saw a mother who had been killed alongside her newborn baby. How she tried to escape to the swamp with her brothers when they were killed. How she then walked and told the forces that they could kill her too. That she was then abducted by them.”
He also mentioned the child soldier who was seen on Swedish television meeting Ian Lundin along the all-weather road: Gatkuoth Liah Diu. Gatkuoth was ten years old and out together with his mother and four siblings when they encountered a military helicopter. At first, they thought it was a good thing – until it started firing at them. On the stand, Gatkuoth recounted how his mother tried to protect him and his siblings. He later woke up, injured, and had to lift his dead mother’s body off himself. After this, he became a child soldier in his father’s militia.
Attorps then turned to the testimony from the former company employees and others with direct knowledge of the situation. These included security personnel and Lundin Oil representatives who described the conduct of the Sudanese military and the relationship between the company and the regime. He talked about how Ken Barker broke down when talking about how he met a woman who had fled without any belongings, who reminded him of his grandmother, but also how Barker, without any emotion, could retell his report where he described how the regime committed ethnic cleansing. Attorps said that this had been a pattern for the witnesses who were active within the company: they cared about what they had seen themselves but easily dismissed others’ accounts.
The prosecution strongly rejected the defence’s argument that the events were too distant in time and too complex to assess, noting that Swedish courts have previously adjudicated cases involving crimes committed decades earlier and in distant locations, such as Rwanda and Iran. These precedents demonstrated that such cases could be effectively investigated and prosecuted.
Attorps wrapped up his introduction by outlining the structure of the prosecution’s closing arguments. After first addressing the evaluation of evidence, they would briefly discuss the existence of an armed conflict and its nexus to the alleged crimes, then examine the relationship between the company and the Sudanese regime, including the regime’s dependence on oil revenues. This would be followed by an analysis of the level of intent, the defendants’ roles and influence within the company, and a chronological account of the alleged crimes. They would conclude with specific claims, including those relating to financial gains.
Evaluation of evidence
Before addressing the evaluation of evidence, the prosecutor stressed that the evidence must be assessed as a whole and warned against relying on limited observations. For example, the fact that civilians may later have used infrastructure built by Lundin Oil did not say anything about the conditions under which it was built, and information obtained under controlled circumstances may not reflect the broader reality. The prosecution then divided the evidence into several categories: external reporting, security reporting from other companies, internal corporate documents, technical evidence such as satellite imagery, testimonies from victims and witnesses, and statements from the defendants.
External reporting was presented as a central part of the evidence. This includes material from United Nations agencies, humanitarian organizations, human rights groups, advocacy organizations, journalists, and academic researchers. The prosecution argued that the breadth and consistency of these sources supported their reliability, as they collectively described similar patterns of violence, including attacks on civilians, aerial bombardments, and forced displacement. Attorps reminded the court of the testimony from the many witnesses from various NGOs and media outlets.
The prosecution then examined security reporting from other companies operating in the region, particularly Talisman whose reports were described as being more detailed than Lundin Oil’s. Attorps also noted that the evidence, including witness testimony, indicated that information had been exchanged on an ongoing basis between the companies. This, according to the prosecution, suggested that knowledge about the situation in Block 5A was readily available. In contrast, Lundin Oil was shown to have had limited capacity to gather information independently itself. Due to their reliance on PetSec, the government-controlled security, company personnel had restricted movement and limited contact with the local population. Their observations were largely confined to specific operational areas, and during periods of inactivity they had no presence in the region. As a result, the absence of observed violence as reported by the company could not be taken as evidence that no violence occurred, according to the prosecution.
The prosecution then addressed the technical evidence presented in the form of satellite imagery and remote sensing analysis. Expert analyses, like Erik Prins’s ECOS report, indicated reduced human activity and signs of destruction in areas affected by oil operations. Prins’s findings were said to be consistent with other evidence and had been subject to peer review. Therefore, his report should carry evidentiary value, the prosecution argued.
The prosecution then turned to the testimonies of the plaintiffs, beginning with a discussion of credibility and reliability. Expert testimony from Torun Lindholm and Anette Carnemalm explained how memory functions, particularly in relation to trauma. While details such as timing and location may be uncertain, core experiences can be remembered with considerable accuracy even after long periods.
The prosecution also considered cultural and practical factors affecting the plaintiffs’ testimony, including limited education, lack of written traditions, and challenges related to translation. These factors may have affected the level of detail and references to time in their testimonies but should not undermine the overall credibility of the witnesses. The prosecution pointed out that many of the plaintiffs had participated in the trial at great personal risk and without any expectation of financial compensation.
Recurring themes in the plaintiffs’ testimonies were highlighted, including descriptions of life in rural communities before the conflict, the onset of violence, repeated attacks involving aerial and ground forces, and displacement. Their accounts of the patterns of the methods of warfare used by the regime were highlighted, including the use of helicopter gunships and bombers followed by ground invasions, attacks that occurred, during harvest periods, and the destruction of food supplies and livestock. The prosecution also addressed the issue of military targets, noting that witnesses had consistently reported that rebel forces were not present in their villages when they were attacked.
The prosecution argued that roads were built during ongoing hostilities and that areas along these routes were subject to attacks and depopulation. The fact that the infrastructure may later have benefited civilians did not alter the assessment of the circumstances under which it was constructed. Testimonies from former local employees described close interaction and coordination between the company and the Sudanese government, and the prosecution described these accounts as consistent with the documentary evidence and other witness statements. Allegations of witness influence were also addressed. While acknowledging that organizations had assisted the plaintiffs in participating in the investigation process, the prosecution argued that such involvement was both legitimate and necessary in cases of international crimes. They further rejected the defence’s claims that certain plaintiffs had been improperly influenced or promised compensation.
The prosecution then talked about each plaintiff’s testimony and its reliability, assessing them overall to be reliable witness. Some of the plaintiffs’ stories were supported by photos of their injuries. Although they occasionally confused dates and years, this could be explained by the trauma they had experienced, as well as cultural aspects of understanding time. Some plaintiffs mixed up what they had seen themselves and what they had been told, which the prosecutor explained was due to a “collective memory” which they said was more common in cultures less reliant on written accounts.
The prosecutor then shifted focus to the company-affiliated witnesses, noting that many had preparatory meetings with the defence. The passage of time had also affected their recollections, but they generally appeared loyal to the company and to the defendants. Key witnesses described a continuous flow of information within the company, including awareness of the security situation, government control, and the allegations about the link between oil operations and the conflict, though such accounts were often downplayed or reframed. Several witnesses, particularly those who had held management and advisory roles, demonstrated limited insight into on-the-ground conditions and seemed to have relied on narrow or filtered information. Reports expressing concern about the security situation from HSE staff and external sources were frequently dismissed as speculative, while the conflict itself was consistently characterised as tribal, even in the face of information indicating Sudanese military involvement. Overall, their testimony suggested that inconvenient information was discounted and that the company accepted the limited information they received, which the prosecution described as reflecting the Sudanese regime’s position.
The defendants similarly avoided directly implicating one another, often gave indirect answers, and referred to “what I know today” rather than what they knew at the time. They denied knowledge of much of the security reporting despite evidence that they received regular internal communication, dismissed internal analyses as speculation, and maintained that the Sudanese military acted as a neutral or peacekeeping force, portraying the violence as primarily driven by tribal conflicts.
In conclusion, the prosecution maintained that the evidence when assessed as a whole demonstrated a consistent and coherent pattern. External reporting, technical evidence, corporate documents, and witness testimony collectively supported the allegations that the defendants knowingly contributed to crimes committed in connection with the company’s oil operations in Block 5A.
Armed conflict and nexus
The prosecution then turned to their argument that a non-international armed conflict existed between the Government of Sudan (GOS) and the SPLA, maintaining that the intensity and duration of the violence, as well as the use of military force, clearly met the required threshold, and the SPLA’s organisational capacity further confirmed this. While the overall assessment focused on the main parties to the conflict, local militias were relevant in determining their connection to it. The central issue was the nexus between this conflict and the alleged crimes. The prosecution submitted that there was a clear connection, including acts carried out by the military and regime-allied militias, reflecting a strategy of proxy warfare and shifting alliances. Oil played a key role, with military operations aimed at securing control over Block 5A to enable oil exploration and generate revenue. Internal reports further indicated that military presence and territorial control were necessary conditions for the company’s operations.
In conclusion, the prosecution maintained that a non-international armed conflict had existed, that there was a clear nexus between the conflict and the alleged acts, and that the charges therefore constitute aiding and abetting serious violations of international humanitarian law.
Lundin Oil’s contractual partner – the Sudanese regime
The prosecution relied on extensive documentary evidence and testimony from numerous experts and witnesses. Rather than addressing each witness individually, they highlighted key common findings regarding sources and context. Witnesses generally expressed high confidence in established NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and similar organisations, while noting that UN reporting tended to be more cautious due to access constraints. Information from conflict zones is inherently affected by bias, translation issues, and the conditions under which it is collected, making source evaluation and triangulation essential.
Overall, the prosecution argued, the evidence had shown that Sudan during the relevant period was governed by a fundamentalist military regime that relied heavily on control of oil resources to sustain its economy and war effort against the SPLA. There was broad consensus that oil significantly intensified the conflict, particularly from the late 1990s, and shaped both military strategy and political dynamics. The regime employed tactics such as divide-and-rule and proxy warfare, supporting militias and exploiting local divisions to weaken opposition. Witness testimony further demonstrated that civilians were systematically affected: they were displaced through attacks, destruction of their homes and livelihoods, and indiscriminate violence, including aerial bombardments using Antonov aircrafts. Civilians living in areas not controlled by the government were often seen as supporting the SPLA and thereby became targets. Humanitarian access in those areas was frequently restricted, worsening conditions on the ground.
Finally, the evidence highlighted the central role of key regime figures in controlling oil operations and coordinating security. The company became dependent on government-controlled security, including Petroleum Security (PetSec), which influenced both the information available to the company and the conditions for the company’s operations.
Introduction to the assessment of intent
One question that has been debated and highly anticipated is which form(s) of intent the prosecution would claim. It was surprising to some that the prosecution chose to only claim one form of intent: reckless intent. Under Swedish case law, reckless intent means that a person is aware of the risk of a certain consequence or circumstance stemming from their action but is indifferent as to whether it actually occurs. It marks the boundary between acting with intent and acting negligently: while the perpetrator may not necessarily desire the outcome, they are aware of the risk and proceed regardless. Reckless intent represents the lower threshold of intent in Swedish criminal law.
The prosecution argued that Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter were aware of the significant risk that the Sudanese military and its allied militias would commit crimes against civilians in connection with securing Block 5A, and that they had reason to expect this outcome. The level of risk was heightened by the nature of the Sudanese government, the company’s contractual partner, given the regime’s publicly known conduct and the ongoing civil war, as reflected in due diligence and risk assessments prior to the 1997 EPSA.
Despite this, the defendants did not refrain from acting. To the contrary, the company demonstrated a high tolerance for risk, embracing a business strategy of operating in high-risk environments. Statements from company representatives indicated a willingness to disregard political and ethical considerations in pursuit of oil exploration and accept the associated risks. This approach was central to the prosecution’s assessment that the defendants acted with conditional intent.
The defendants’ participation in the company’s actions in Block 5A
The prosecution argued that Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter had exercised decisive control over Lundin Oil’s operations in Block 5A. Although the activities were formally carried out through subsidiaries, the real decision-making had taken place in the head office in Geneva, where strategy, finances, and operations were controlled. According to the prosecution, the leadership had functioned as a coordinated management team that remained continuously informed about developments in Sudan through regular reporting and meetings. This had enabled them to make informed and timely decisions, particularly on matters involving security and operational priorities. Ian Lundin, as CEO, held ultimate responsibility, while Schneiter had played a key role in operational and technical decisions.
The prosecution further maintained that, as the operator, Lundin Oil had held primary responsibility for proposing and implementing work programs and budgets, as well as maintaining contacts with the Sudanese government. In practice, Lundin and Schneiter had the final say over these work programs before they were presented for formal approval, giving them substantial influence over where and how operations were conducted.
Finally, the prosecution emphasized that high-level contacts with Sudan had been managed and undertaken by the company’s leadership. Even if day-to-day communication had been handled by other employees, these individuals lacked independent decision-making authority. Overall, the prosecution’s position was that Lundin and Schneiter had had both the authority and the practical ability to direct the company’s actions in Sudan.
Chronological overview of the evidence supporting the indictment
The prosecution then went over all of the events in chronological order, starting with Omar Al-Bashir’s seizure of power through a coup d’etat in 1989. In 1991, Lundin Oil began its cooperation with the Sudanese government and in 1997 Ian Lundin signed the EPSA for Block 5A.
The company’s operations in Block 5A began in 1998 and gradually became increasingly dependent on the protection provided by the Sudanese military. During 1998, the company did not investigate reports of militia leader Paulino Matiep’s alleged cooperation with the Sudanese regime, nor did it raise concerns about this with the government. At the same time, the discovery of oil at Thar Jath significantly increased the strategic and economic importance of Block 5A. Following a series of security incidents, Ian Lundin initiated a review of security arrangements, which led to an agreement in late 1998 that the Sudanese military would take over responsibility for security. Despite resistance to military presence in the area, the company continued to pursue solutions involving armed forces.
In May 1999, Sudanese government forces entered Block 5A, an event the prosecution argued did not come as a surprise to the company. Internal reports indicated that the oil discovery had motivated the military’s intervention and that cooperation existed between the army and allied militias. The HSE had also previously recommended the company use military protection, anticipating problems since the SSDF did not want the military in the area. This event marked the beginning of prolonged fighting in the area, during which civilians were repeatedly affected by attacks, displacement, and violence. The prosecution argued that this demand had to have come from Ian Lundin, and they noted that it was remarkable how vague the witnesses’ recollection of this incident had been, which the prosecutor supposed was due to loyalties toward the company. However, all company-affiliated witnesses had said that they were not involved and that Ian Lundin had previously been involved in security issues. After the attack on Thar Jath, it became even riskier to operate in the area. The finding of oil also made the company even more motivated to have security arrangements that would allow its operations to continue. Despite clear indications that the Sudanese regime lacked full control of the area and that military operations would require the use of force, the company continued to demand military protection.
At the same time, the company planned infrastructure projects, including the all-weather road through areas not controlled by the government. Internal assessments acknowledged the regime’s lack of control and noted that a significant military presence would be required. Keith Hill advised against building a road through the Jikany area if doing so would require the number of soldiers indicated by internal reports. Nevertheless, agreements were concluded and the company committed to financing and building the road, which depended on military operations to secure the area.
Throughout 1999 and 2000, reports from witnesses, NGOs, and internal sources described ongoing attacks, including aerial bombings and ground assaults that affected civilians. Although the company became aware of such reports, it did not take meaningful steps to investigate them or alter its course of action. Instead, it continued to engage with the Sudanese government and to press for conditions that would allow its operations to proceed. The prosecution argued that Ian Lundin was aware of the significant risk that military efforts to secure the area would lead to crimes against civilians yet accepted this risk in pursuit of profit. This approach, including continued demands for military protection and the decision to proceed with projects in contested areas, was said to have shaped the subsequent course of events throughout the period up to 2003.
The prosecution argued that the company was aware of allegations of crimes and had prepared to respond to NGO criticism already in late 1999. Christine Batruch started working as a corporate social responsibility (CSR) consultant in 1999 and assumed responsibility for the company’s CSR work in early 2001. She received continuous internal reporting, including information about bombings, the military’s presence, and fighting in the area. Despite this, the company focused on countering negative publicity and reassuring shareholders rather than reassessing its operations. When reports such as those by Christian Aid and other sources made allegations about the regime’s attacks on civilians, the company dismissed or downplayed them. While internal communications acknowledged indications of burned villages and military activity, these did not lead to meaningful investigation or changes in conduct. Instead, alternative explanations were put forward, and the company relied heavily on limited or indirect information, often aligned with the government’s narrative. The measures taken, such as internal reviews and site visits, were limited in scope and did not involve thorough or independent investigations into the allegations.
The prosecution argued that during 2001, the company intensified its operations following the confirmed discovery at Thar Jath, which increased the strategic and economic importance of Block 5A. Exploration plans expanded, with Alexandre Schneiter leading the development of seismic programs. A central issue concerned the planning and construction of roads to Nhialdiu, MOK, and, later, to Leer. According to the prosecution, these roads were necessary to enable seismic operations and access to oil prospects. Internal documents, including maps sent by Schneiter in 2001, explicitly included MOK in the planned seismic program. Further internal reporting, such as Ken Barker’s reports, indicated that the road construction was directly linked to these planned activities, demonstrating that the projects were not incidental but operationally driven.
The requests for roads originated from the military and were communicated internally within the company, according to the prosecution. Despite this, the company-initiated procurement processes for all-weather roads toward Nhialdiu and MOK. Internal reports described the purpose of the roads as supporting seismic operations, and discussions within the company addressed the type of road needed, indicating active decision-making at the leadership level. At the same time, this internal reporting acknowledged that the relevant areas were not under government control and that military operations would be required to secure them. They also highlighted the threat posed by Peter Gadet and the likelihood of armed conflict. Despite this, the company continued planning and approving both the seismic program and the associated infrastructure. Following increased violence in late 2001, including attacks in Nhialdhiu, internal reports explicitly referred to displacement and “cleansing” of areas. Nevertheless, this did not lead to changes in the company’s plans. Instead, preparations and planning continued, including coordination with security providers and the military regarding how to secure the areas for operations.
The prosecution further argued that the company and the Sudanese government agreements reached agreements regarding these roads. Even if formal contracts were unclear, subsequent actions documented by the evidence presented, including the construction of the road, the forwarding of invoices to the company by the Sudanese government, and the company’s expressed willingness to pay, demonstrated that the company had committed to financing the infrastructure. Internal and external communications, including contacts with partners, confirmed that both the company and the regime understood that the roads would be built and funded.
Overall, the prosecution argued that Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter had exercised decisive control over the company’s operations and, despite being aware of violence and risks to civilians, had continued to direct and approve oil activities, including infrastructure projects such as road construction into contested areas that required military force to be secured. By maintaining cooperation with the Sudanese government and demanding military protection, Lundin and Schneiter contributed to the conditions under which crimes against international law were committed and are therefore responsible for aiding and abetting them.
The defendants’ explanation does not alter the conclusion that the charges have been proven
The prosecution described the defendants’ explanations as conspiracy theories that involved actors such as the SPLA, the Christian right, and the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. These claims were put forward despite the lack of concrete support for their arguments and despite being inconsistent with the overall evidence. The prosecution emphasized that although investigating crimes in conflict zones was inherently difficult, factors like victims having contact with one another did not mean that they were part of a conspiracy. The prosecution pointed out that it is not unusual for victims of serious crime to meet in support groups, noting the example of organisations that still support victims of the Holocaust. Although the defence had had the opportunity to thoroughly question witnesses, they had not been able to show that the witnesses were part of any conspiracy. In particular, Attorps noted the defence’s questioning of the journalist Julie Flint and their ultimately unsuccessful efforts to slander her with rumours of love affairs to show that there was no evidence to support the defence’s claims.
Despite extensive efforts by the defence, they had not presented any independent witnesses, such as civilians, former militia leaders, or researchers, to support their version of events. On the contrary, testimony from the company’s own employees and other witnesses supported the prosecution’s account, including descriptions of the Sudanese regime’s conduct, its use of military force against civilians, and the connection between oil operations and the armed conflict. The prosecution also pointed to the fact that it was highly improbable that such a wide-ranging conspiracy could have been maintained over time, particularly given shifting alliances in the conflict. Overall, the prosecution maintained, the defendants’ statements had been contradicted by the evidence.
Special claims
Focus then shifted to the special claims made by the prosecutor, the first one being the claim that the company should forfeit the economic benefit gained through the sale of Block 5A. Relying in part on Jodi Anhorn’s analysis, the prosecution agreed that the value of Block 5A had been built up over time, primarily through the discovery at Thar Jath, but disagreed with key aspects of Anhorn’s conclusions, especially his characterization of infrastructure such as the all-weather road as non-essential to oil extraction. Instead, the prosecution maintained that the road had been crucial in enabling testing and operations beyond the dry season, thereby contributing to generating value for the company. They also argued that value had been continuously generated not only through exploration but also through the ongoing fulfilment of the company’s obligations under the EPSA with the Sudanese government, including negotiations for favourable cost recovery. The identity or financial strength of the buyer, Petronas, was considered irrelevant to the calculation of criminal profit, meaning the entire gain from the sale should be treated as proceeds of crime. The prosecution made an analogy to sales of narcotics, where the price can shift dramatically due to supply and demand: it does not matter if a drug dealer sells to a buyer who is ready to pay more than market value. The same applies to the sale of Block 5A.
Relying on the expert evidence from Mikael Runsten, the prosecution emphasized that the corporate group as a whole constituted the relevant economic unit, meaning the forfeiture claim should be directed at the parent company. The prosecution also rejected the defence’s witness Mats Lindqvist’s claim that the economic benefit was smaller because the profit was used to repay loans. Instead, the prosecution argued, the financial analysis showed that the loan repayments strengthened the group’s financial position and enabled them to make further investments, which also was reflected in the company’s own communications. Finally, applying financial valuation methods, Runsten concluded that the economic benefit of the transaction amounted to at least SEK 2.383 billion, and when adjusted similarly to statutory interest, approximately SEK 2.7 billion. On this basis, the prosecution argued that the court should grant the forfeiture claim of the full amount of approximately 2,4 billion SEK.
With this claim made, Attorps then turned to perhaps the most anticipated point of the day: the prosecution’s sentencing request. He began by explaining their assessment of the severity of the alleged crimes and what punishment they believe the crimes merit. Attorps argued that the prosecution had demonstrated how Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter had contributed to the Sudanese regime’s crimes against civilians over an extended period. The defendants’ actions enabled and sustained a joint project with the regime in which military force was used to secure territory for oil operations, with devastating consequences for large numbers of civilians whose lives continue to be affected to this day. Despite having several opportunities over the course of this period to act different, such as invoking force majeure or opposing the use of military force, they instead chose to prioritize the project’s significant profit potential and maintained their support for the regime’s conduct.
Given the gravity, duration, and impact of the crimes, the prosecution assessed the offences as constituting gross violations of international law, with Ian Lundin bearing the greatest responsibility due to his senior position and longer involvement. This, they announced, warranted the maximum fixed-term sentence of ten years in prison for Lundin. Alexandre Schneiter’s role, though central, justified a lower sentence of six years.
The prosecution further requested that both defendants be detained in connection with the announcement of a verdict, arguing that there was a concrete risk of flight. This additional request came as a surprise to many. Finally, they also argued that Ian Lundin and Alexander Scheiter should be subject to business prohibitions and that the company should pay the maximum fine of 3 million SEK.
With this, the prosecution handed over the case to the court. Next to come: the plaintiffs’ closing arguments.
