Report 46 – Part III of Alexandre Schneiter’s testimony
The concluding week of Alexandre Schneiter’s testimony saw the defense’s rebuttal to the prosecution’s case as well as the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ case.
The ethics of working with the government
Karl Harling, one of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, questioned Schneiter on the company’s philosophy in regard to cooperating with dictatorships that violated human rights. Schneiter stated that the company’s primary criteria for involvement in any country involved assessing the technical, economic, and social aspects of the area. Factors like law, corruption, sociopolitical climate, international presence, and sanctions were also considered. According to Schneiter, the company did not have any limits for regimes it cooperated with, operating similarly to other oil companies.
Schneiter agreed that Sudan was a dictatorship but noted that when the company signed the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) in 1997, there was optimism for the country’s future, with a visible presence of international organizations, NGOs, and the UN. Schneiter argued that, although there was a civil war, there was a movement towards democratic values in Khartoum.
Harling then raised the issue of human rights violations committed by the Sudanese government. Schneiter responded that he did not witness any human rights abuses during his time in Sudan. When asked if he had received the email by the board member and Swedish politician Carl Bildt sent to Ian Lundin on 19 June 2001, on which Schneiter was copied, he testified that he could not remember. The email regarded reporting of the government’s indiscriminate bombings against civilian population (Click here).
Schneiter stated that if one reviewed the full correspondence between Bildt and Lundin, one would gain a completely different picture of the situation. During their questioning, the defense did just that. In response to Bildt’s email, Lundin wrote that he had asked the Khartoum office manager, Dr. Alan Bagi, to confirm or deny the reports of indiscriminate bombings, and forwarded Bagi’s response to Bildt. Bagi said that while the government had resumed bombings of military targets as a response to the SPLA attacking Raja and Deim Zubeir, “the areas of war activities and the ones controlled by SPLA have a heavy presence of media, NGOs and UN this why I am inclined to deny these allegations.”
The defense suggested that Bildt had received his intel from an EU press release on 12 June 2001, which read as follows: ”[T]he European Union is increasingly concerned by the renewed military activity by the SPLA; particularly in Bahr al-Ghazal in Southern Sudan, and by the Government of Sudan’s resumption of aerial bombings in response to this offensive.”
Tribal conflicts
Throughout the proceedings, the defense has maintained that the fighting in Block 5A was due to tribal conflicts (Click here). When Harling asked what this conclusion was based on, Schneiter testified that while he was not directly involved, he knew that the company had significant intelligence in the area and relied on local and international sources to assess the situation. He dismissed claims of forced displacement or helicopter gunships being used in Block 5A, stating that he never received any information indicating that, and that the only bombing he was aware of was an isolated incident in Thar Jath (Click here to read more about this).
Harling pointed out that almost thirty plaintiffs had testified about how their lives were shattered and how the government attacked them with Antonov planes and helicopter gunships. The common theme of all these testimonies was that people had been living in peace until the company arrived. When asked how it felt to hear these stories, Schneiter responded that the tribal conflicts caused a lot of suffering, which was sad but not connected to the company’s operations.
Commercial Considerations
Asked whether the company’s decision to remain in Sudan despite the nature of the situation was driven solely by commercial interests, Schneiter stated that the company was motivated by a desire to work in a peaceful environment, though it had duties to its partners. It was quite clear that he did not want to suggest that the company’s primary reason for staying in Sudan was a commercial interest. He stated that the company had suspended operations in Sudan but wanted to remain involved in case peace talks led to a stable environment for local development.
When asked by Thomas Bodström, another of the plaintiffs’ attorneys, whether he regretted any actions during the period in question, a question that Bodström also posed to Ian Lundin (Click here), Schneiter stated that it was a difficult question but that he thought the company did its best given the circumstances. He emphasized that although the company did not produce any oil, it made significant efforts to support local development.
Schneiter’s Role and Public Statements
Bodström questioned Schneiter about his role in Sudan, citing his titles such as Exploration Director and COO as well as project coordinator for Sudan and board member of Sudan Ltd. Schneiter clarified that his responsibilities were primarily technical, and he was not involved in the operational management in Sudan. That responsibility lay with the company’s operations manager, Ken Barker.
When asked if he was aware that the company paid to build an airstrip in Rubkona, which the government allegedly used to carry out bombings with Antonov planes that carried no military markings, Schneiter said that the airstrip was left over from the Chevron days and belonged to the government. The company had no influence over what actions the government took.
In response to this, Bodström referenced an interview in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter in which Schneiter said that the company was protesting the government’s use of the company airstrip. It appeared as though the defense team was blindsided by this interview. Glimpses of confusion could be seen on their faces, and they were all absent from the cafeteria, their usual place to spend the breaks, during the break shortly after. Presumably they were reading the article. Schneiter himself appeared uncomfortable.
He stated that he did not remember the interview and that it was most surprising as he had never given statements to the media as he lacked the expertise to comment publicly on such matters.
The prosecution had previously asked Schneiter if he was authorized to give public statements on behalf of the company Christine Batruch’s memo “CSR Strategy for Sudan 2001” from 25 January 2001 stated that he did have that authority. Bodström pointed out that only three people from the company were interviewed in the article, and all of them were authorized to do so according to Batruch’s memo. This, Schneiter thought, was a coincidence.
Bodström questioned why no one from the company’s press department reacted to this article if Schneiter’s statement in it was not only false, as he claimed, but neither had he given it, nor was he authorized to do so. It was after all Dagens Nyheter, he said, one of the biggest newspapers in Sweden. Schneiter did not know and said that he found it very bizarre. At this point, Judge Tomas Zander interrupted and asked if the article made clear that it was referring to the airstrip in Rubkona, to which Bodström replied that it was just referred to as the company’s airstrip.
Schneiter’s management role in Sudan
Schneiter’s defense team sought to communicate that he was not responsible for operational decisions in Sudan. They emphasized that Schneiter’s responsibilities were primarily related to global exploration. Furthermore, they argued that decisions regarding the company’s presence in Sudan and its interactions with the government were made by other senior officials, particularly Ken Barker and Tim Sarney, who had direct responsibility for operations in Sudan.
As evidence for this, the defense displayed a fax dated 15 February 2000, which stated that Ken Barker, acting as general manager, had the overall responsibility for the entire operation in Sudan. The document regarding Sudan Ltd.’s reporting structure showed that the HSE reported to Ken Barker and not to Schneiter. Moreover, the person with overall responsibility for company operations was the company’s operations manager, Tim Sarney, according to Sarney’s employment contract. Schneiter testified that he was not Tim Sarney’s boss. They were at the same level, he said, with responsibility for different areas. The reporting structure showed that Barker reported to Sarney, not to Schneiter.
The Khartoum Operations manager and Exploration director did have functional reporting to Schneiter in 2001, though. This, Schneiter explained, did not mean that he had any say over them. They only contacted Schneiter for advice on technical matters.
In the defense’s view, information provided by Ken Barker to OEPA at a JMC meeting in October 2000 ultimately led to the allegation that Schneiter at this meeting had encouraged the government to take action to secure the area for the company’s operations, based on the assumption that Barker was acting as Schneiter’s subordinate. Asked about this, however, Schneiter testified that Barker could not be seen as his subordinate and that it had been the prosecution that described Barker as such. To further bolster Schneiter’s position, the defense displayed a document from November 2001, in which Barker, the operations manager at the time, was listed next to Schneiter in the hierarchy, not below him. This did not change until Schneiter became the company’s COO, which according to the defense happened in September 2002.
In his weekly report dated 3 December 2000, Ken Barker wrote that HSE Doug Maclean was mobilized to expedite the joint seismic program. According to the defense, this showed that seismic matters were handled by the local office.
Who approved the work program and budget?
Whether or not the company’s work programs and budgets were approved at the OCM meetings or by OPEA at the JMC meetings had been a point of contention between the prosecution and Schneiter (Click here). According to Article 10(2a) of the EPSA, the partners had the power to review and recommend the work program and budget. When asked what this meant, Schneiter said that they presented the already approved work program at the JMC meetings so that OEPA was given the possibility to comment and, if necessary, review the work program and budget back to the OCM. The OPEA had no voting rights on the company’s budget and work program.
The prosecution had previously referenced Schneiter’s police interview on 16 March 2017 where he stated that the work program and budget were approved at the JMC meetings. Schneiter testified that this was incorrect. He said that people are sometimes imprecise but Article 10 of the EPSA clearly stated that the JMC had no voting rights. The defense referenced statements Schneiter made on 20 April 2000 and 15 December 2016 where he stated that the work program and budget was approved by partners at the OCM meetings and were submitted to the JMC for comment afterwards. This, Schneiter said, was correct.
The company’s interest in MOK
The company’s interest in MOK is one of the charges in the indictment against both Schneiter and Lundin (Click here).
At the OCM meeting on 16 October 1997, the company identified several prospects, with MOK being a primary area of interest. At that stage, the company was working with the old maps from Chevron, the previous operator in the region, and had a general interest in MOK. Schneiter testified that, with limited knowledge of the area, the company’s initial plans were vague. The meeting minutes showed that Sarney noted during the meeting that some prospects would likely be ruled out upon conducting seismic surveys, a point Schneiter corroborated, explaining that the company’s understanding of the area was still quite undeveloped.
By February 1998, geological analysis revealed that MOK had been downgraded from the top priority to the fourth priority, though it remained a potentially valuable prospect. Schneiter stated that as the Chevron data was reprocessed, it became clear that the structure initially thought to be a single, large structure in MOK was not a large structure but a cluster of 10-12 separate structures. This revealed MOK to be a complex and risky lead. At the JMC meeting on 11 May 1998, MOK was identified as a deep and poorly defined trend with steep dips, making it less attractive compared to other prospects.
At the TCM meeting on 26 October 1998, MOK was no longer listed as a lead with drilling potential and was instead categorized under “other trends.” Upon the defense’s questioning, Schneiter stated that MOK was one of the worst-ranked trends at this stage. While it remained an area of potential interest, Schneiter asked why the company would focus on MOK when it had other, more promising prospects available.
The defense asked Schneiter how he would have reacted had he suspected that the company’s suggestion as where to conduct seismic would lead to the suffering of thousands of people. Schneiter said that first of all, their suggestion did not lead to the suffering of thousands of people, and secondly, he would have reacted very strongly if there was even a possibility that their work program could lead to something like that, but that was not the case.
Seismic Acquisition and Work Program Adjustments
Throughout the company’s operations, the work program was not fixed but rather subject to amendments as new data emerged, according to Keith Hill’s statement in the minutes for the 16 October 1997 OCM meeting. At the JMC meeting on 1 December 1998, the work program presented proposed to include 250 km of seismic acquisition. Schneiter clarified that this was a proposal for the length of the seismic lines, not their exact locations. He explained that changes to the seismic lines were often made late in the process, based on new discoveries from raw data processing. The defense illustrated this by showcasing the document “Final Report Supervision of Field seismic operations 2D land seismic survey Block 5A 1999-05-02.” According to this document, the Dubai office (the technical office) made a late decision to alter the seismic line length despite having approved the original line four days earlier.
In terms of operational decision-making, Schneiter emphasized that the local office had autonomy in making on-the-ground decisions. For instance, on 1 March 2000, a fax from Ken Barker informed the recipients, including Schneiter, that operations in Block 5A were suspended, prioritizing staff safety. Schneiter affirmed that it was the local office’s responsibility to make such decisions.
Security reports
The defense displayed the summary of the report called “Significant Incidents Affecting IPC SL Operations” which the prosecution had discussed at length during its questioning of Schneiter (Click here). The defense stated that the list did not describe any war crimes, Antonov bombings, attacks with helicopter gunships, forced displacement of civilians or burned villages. Schneiter agreed that this was accurate. When asked if the HSE would have included any war crimes on the list if they had received such reports, Schneiter said that of course they would have.
Schneiter’s role as project coordinator
The prosecution had suggested that Schneiter in his role as project coordinator prepared the handouts for the JMC meetings. According to an email Schneiter sent to Tim Sarney on 13 September 2000, he wrote that he had “passed on” his part of the presentation to Keith Laurie, the Company’s chief draughtsman, and asked that Sarney do the same with his part so that Hill could prepare the presentation. Schneiter said that this demonstrated what he had been saying all along: that the different departments sent their parts of the presentation to the drafting department who prepared the handouts, and then each person presented their own part of the presentation at the meeting. The defense asked if that meant that he as project coordinator did not collect all the material from all the departments and did not have direct contact with Laurie regarding the other departments, to which Schneiter responded that that was correct.
Only operating in a peaceful environment
Schneiter maintained throughout his testimony that a peaceful environment was essential for the company to resume operations in Block 5A. The defense displayed the 2001 work program which stated that the company would only award a contract once the all-weather road to Thar Jath and Jarayan were complete and the security situation stable.
During the JMC meeting on 4 October 2000, Tim Sarney noted that while peace discussions between the government and local factions were progressing, there were no credible guarantees for peace in place. At the same meeting, Schneiter held a presentation for OEPA stating that the company would proceed with the contingency plan and conduct 3D seismic acquisition in Thar Jath because the security situation in and around Block 5A was sufficient. When asked how these statements fit together, Schneiter stated that his message to OEPA was that the company’s operations would remain suspended, while what he had said about seismic acquisition merely represented the company’s philosophy, not a firm decision.
In the “Summary of trip to field 15th and 16th” report from Ken Barker, dated 16 October 2000, he wrote that he hoped that the political settlements reached over the past few months would endure. The defense asked if he was talking about a political solution that caused the company to be able to mobilize again, not a military solution. Schneiter said that that was correct. Barker wrote that the road looked good and did not mention any war crimes. In his weekly report dated 22 October 2000, regarding the same trip, Barker wrote that he met with the general commanding the area who was fairly optimistic about the current period of peace holding.
In an email from Christine Batruch dated 18 July 2001 and sent to, among others, Schneiter, she wrote that the trip she and Carl Bildt had taken to Nairobi, Khartoum and Cairo was successful from her perspective because the company managed to convey their interest in contributing to peace to the government in Sudan.
The all-weather road to Leer
The prosecution had suggested that the reason the company hurried up the construction of the all-weather road to Leer was due to the alliance between the SPLA and SPDF to stop the extradition of oil by the government, which was reported about in Swedish media (Click here). According to the “Sudan Update- 26 December 2000” report by Rickard Ramsey, the Sudanese army general had emphasized how essential the company’s development of Leer was for security.
Schneiter has always maintained that the all-weather road to Leer was first and foremost a community development project and that it was likely listed as a security issue in internal reports because community development was important to satisfy the local population and Peter Paar so that they did not join the SPLA (Click here). To support this, the defense displayed Ramsey’s summarizing comment in the above-mentioned report which stated that security in Leer quickly had to be followed by development. He further stated that Leer was the priority area for development as far as the military and Peter Paar were concerned, possibly because the area was the most likely to swing away from alliances with the government. In an unsigned report from early 2001, an unnamed employee, who the defense suspected was Tim Sarney, wrote that the company needed to “satisfy some of the aspirations of the local population in Leer to show that Leer will benefit from our presence in order for the current peace accord to hold.” It was further stated that if a faction in Leer decided that they wanted to see the company and the army leave the block, operations would cease within days.
The independence of the local office
There had previously been a dispute between the prosecutors and Schneiter over whether the local Khartoum office became independent in September 2001 or in early 2002 (Click here). The defense displayed the 2002 budget, published on 15 September 2001, in which Schneiter’s name was not mentioned as it usually was. During the TCM meeting on 24 October 2001, the new Exploration Director, Eloi Dolivo, and not Schneiter, presented the upcoming 2D seismic program. Schneiter said that that was because the local office was now independent and he was no longer involved.
According to the TCM and JMC handouts on 24 and 25 October 2001, seismic acquisition in the MOK area was listed as a number one priority area. Schneiter’s actions during the JMC meeting constitute one of the charges in the indictment against him as he allegedly told the government to conduct war crimes in order for the company to conduct seismic acquisition in MOK (Click here). Schneiter said that this was handled by the local office and that he was not involved. The defense pointed out that no all-weather road to MOK or Nhialdiu was in the work program and budget. When asked if it was possible for the local office to undertake the construction of a road to Nhialdiu without it having been included in an approved budget, Schneiter said that it could not.
The defense’s supplementary statement of facts
On 19 March 2025, the defense presented additional evidence to the court. The defense also questioned the credibility of various sources used by the prosecution, particularly the ECOS report “European Collision of Oil in Sudan” which they argued had been manipulated to support the NGO’s allegations against oil companies. To support this argument, the defense displayed photos claimed to have been taken in Thar Jath. A similar photo, or possibly the same one, was later published in another ECOS publication and described as having been taken in Rier, not Thar Jath. These pictures were used by ECOS to support the claim that an attack on Rier, which was located in Block 5A, took place on 22 May 2002. The defense, however, suggested that such an attack never took place because the location where the pictures were taken could not be verified.
The confusion between Rier and Thar Jath has come up before. In the police interview with the plaintiff George Riak Kurithoi, dated 29 May 2023, he stated that Thar Jath and Rier were the same place. However, it was unclear from the defense’s presentation whether they had a map or alternative documentation showing that Thar Jath and Rier were in fact different places. The defense submitted that ECOS deliberately published manipulated pictures to support their allegations against the oil exploration, which meant that any allegations should be reviewed critically.
The defense further suggested that these manipulated photos were part of a propaganda campaign in cooperation with the SPLA rebels. Julie Flint, a British journalist who traveled to the area in 2001, filmed the SPLA transporting weapons and ammunition which caused the defense to suggest that she had helped the rebels. The defense questioned how these people could be considered unbiased journalists. The prosecution objected to this, noting that the defense’s presentation felt less like a supplementary statement of the facts and more like the defense making things up.
Furthermore, the defense highlighted inconsistencies in reports written by Jemera Rone, the author of the Human Rights Watch report “Sudan, Oil and Human Rights” from 2003. In the report, she concluded that the oil exploration in Southern Sudan resulted in forced displacement and murder of the Nuer people. However, in a letter written in 2000 to the United States secretary of state, Colin Powell, she claimed that that the ongoing tribal conflicts in Southern Sudan resulted in violence, death, and destruction of villages. The defense viewed this as a discrepancy.
Next week
In our report next week, we will cover the testimonies of the first witnesses.
