Report 45 – Part II of Alexandre Schneiter’s testimony
“Had there been many other times in your career, or later, when you received information that the government that oversaw your protection committed indiscriminate bombings against the civilian population?”
This week and the following Tuesday morning saw the conclusion of the prosecution’s questioning of Alexandre Schneiter. During the course of the week, he was questioned about military and rebel activity in Lundin Oil AB’s Block 5A, the company’s plans, which allegedly aided and abetted grave violations of international humanitarian law, and Schneiter’s personal involvement in these issues.
Military presence in Block 5A
Throughout Schneiter’s testimony, the army’s securing of Lundin Oil AB’s operations and what exactly that meant had been a point of contention, and this week was no different. Schneiter said that the government provided the company with a small neutral guard force to secure their operations against attacks by militia leaders (Click here).
According to the document “Military Security Allocated to the IPC Operations” authored by the company’s security officer Rickard Ramsey, dated 18 January 2001, in 2001 there were two military companies by the company rig site, two in the city of Bentiu, three along the all-weather road, and one battalion in the town Rubkona, as well as 150 soldiers each in the villages of Adok and Leer. The army was stationed in and beyond Block 5A with the purpose of securing the block for the company. The prosecution observed that based on this description, it seemed that the army was not just a neutral guard force defending against potential attacks. Schneiter said that the numbers of soldiers in the reports were not fact, only estimates, and that when he had visited the block in April 2001, he saw very little military activity.
The prosecution was not of the opinion that a neutral guard force should be acting offensively. They displayed the Health, Security and Environment (HSE) daily reports dated 27 and 30 January 2001, which reported that the government-allied SSIM leader James Leer and SSIM commander Peter Paar were on their way to attack militia leader Peter Gatdet after the latter had attacked the GNPOC Tamur rig site in Block 4. Gatdet was put on the defensive. The latter report also described significant troop movements which the HSE concluded were due to the military seeking to secure areas to the west against Gatdet and retake lost territory. The prosecution asked if there were any discussions within the management team about government-allied militias attacking Gatdet. Schneiter did not recall any such discussions but thought this was a question of tribal fighting. The defense has continuously stated that the conflict in and around Block 5A was due to tribal conflicts (Read more about this here). The prosecution suggested that this was not simply a question of tribal conflict as the military was involved. Schneiter testified that the government was merely defending against one person (Gatdet) who had been troublesome for everyone.
On 27 February 2001, a “Sudan Update” report written by the HSE coordinator, J.J. Glendinning, stated that between 1 000 and 1 500, possibly more armed troops were on their way west to attack Gatdet from the north while SSIM and the military were to attack him from the west and the south. Glendinning referred to this as a “major offensive.” When asked how this fit the picture of tribal conflict, Schneiter responded that it was difficult for him to speculate as he was not involved in security issues, but his recollection was that Gatdet was the problem, and that the army mostly responded defensively to his attacks. Despite his lack of involvement in security issues, Schneiter did compliment the government’s efforts to secure the block, according to the minutes of the JMC meeting on 4 October 2000. This, Schneiter said in court, was simply a matter of courtesy.
In a comment in the same report, Glendinning stated that “[I]t was already known that SSIM and the army were involved but to bring the SSUM out in its entirety further emphasizes the seriousness that the government puts on Gatdet and his ability to either re-start full blown fighting in the area or stop IPC [the company] from operating.” The prosecution commented that once again the HSE drew a direct connection between the military’s actions and the company’s oil operations. They further asked if this was not information that reached Schneiter. Schneiter said that he was not a recipient of the report and that his understanding was that all the local (in Block 5A) factions were at peace and that it was Gatdet who was the cause of the conflict.
Schneiter’s involvement in security issues
According to the March 2001 monthly report sent by Schneiter to partners, there was a shortage of troops in the block. According to the weekly report by the company’s operations manager, Ken Barker, dated 15 April 2001, Schneiter had had a meeting with the Sudanese army and Petroleum Security where he was assured that more troops would soon be deployed. When asked why he was at this meeting despite having stated that he was not in involved in security issues (Click here), Schneiter replied that he had been informed of the troop shortages and passed this information onwards as a courtesy. He testified that this was likely the first and last time he had a meeting with either Petroleum Security or the army.
According to by Ken Barker’s weekly report dated 15 April 2001, however, Schneiter and Dr. Alan Bagi had a meeting with the head of Petroleum Security to discuss why HSE (Glendinning) had been refused permission to go into the field when they had been given verbal assurances that the problem would be fixed within two weeks. The prosecution asked Schneiter why he was at this meeting when he claimed to not have been at all involved. Schneiter replied that while he had no memory of this, he probably tagged along to the meeting because Ken Barker, who otherwise would have joined Bagi, was on vacation.
Reports of war crimes
In an email sent 19 June 2001 to Ian Lundin by Carl Bildt, the former Swedish prime minister and a member of the Lundin Oil board of directors, on which Schneiter was copied, Bildt wrote that “Although the blame at the moment should be put on SPLA we should not be seen as defending the government. They have launched into tirades and measures that might well make things worse,” and that “the resumption of what is in effect indiscriminate bombings [by the Sudanese military] against population concentrations must be condemned. The week before last they narrowly missed a large group of people waiting for the announced arrival of UN deliveries for emergencies.”
When confronted with this email, Schneiter stated that he did not specifically remember the email correspondence but that all allegations were investigated by the company. To this, prosecutor Henrik Attorps replied: “You say that you don’t really recall. Had there been many other times in your career, or later, when you received information that the government that oversaw your protection committed indiscriminate bombings against the civilian population? How can you not recall?” Schneiter said that the prosecution took everything out of context and that they needed to look at the whole correspondence and not a single paragraph to truly understand. This was a recurring sentiment of Schneiter’s throughout his testimony, and the prosecution had previously replied that they had read through the evidence during their opening statement and therefore did not have the time to do so again. Schneiter concluded by saying that while he did not deal with these issues, if anything that he saw as unacceptable had come to his knowledge, he would have reacted.
To illustrate his point about Peter Gatdet being troublesome for everyone and that the army was only defending against his attacks, Schneiter pointed out that in a 14 February 2001 report by Ken Barker, which the prosecution had displayed, movements of a significant number of people following Gatdet’s attack on the village of Koch were reported and it was suggested that they were either fleeing the fighting or seeking the military’s protection.
Throughout his testimony, Schneiter repeated that all allegations of war crimes were taken very seriously by the company. “How can you say that you were taking it seriously when you don’t seem to know anything about what was happening?” Attorps pressed him. He listed several reported attacks that the prosecution had gone through over the past few weeks and emphasized that Schneiter, who was part of the company’s senior management, had not even read the Christian Aid report. He pointed out that Schneiter had testified that he had not received intel about a 100 km radius of military control,that the company hired Christine Batruch without knowing prior qualifications were (Schneiter had previously testified that he personally did not know her qualifications), and that Schneiter had said that he had no idea that the government had intended to bomb Koch (Click here). Attorps concluded by asking: “How can you say that you [the company] took this very seriously, and how can you comment on it [how seriously it was taken] when you [personally] don’t know anything about it?” Throughout this Attorps sounded angry, revealing how seriously he has taken this case and the gravity of the alleged crimes.
In response, Schneiter commented: “Nice speech.” He clarified that it was not true that the management knew nothing; in fact, the management was very involved. It was he personally who had not been involved as security was not his area of responsibility. He added that he would like to remind the court that the company had no influence over the mentioned events and that the company’s activities had been suspended for around 80% of the time they operated in the block. When the activities were suspended, the company engaged in a lot of community work and peace advocacy, he said. In contrast to Attorps, Schneiter sounded calm in his response, bordering on indifferent.
The all-weather road to Leer
In 2002, the company began constructing an all-weather road to Leer. When asked about this, Schneiter had no recollection of the army having an interest in this road being built but stated that he clearly recalled that the road was very positive for the local population. When he visited the block in April 2001, he saw a lot of trucks and civilians on the dry season road which connected to Bentiu, where the locals could trade. Previously, Leer only had a dirt road which was only usable a few months of the year, so the population saw great benefit from a road they could use all year long. He also did not remember the government sending the company requests to build the all-weather road to Leer but added that he would not necessarily know if they had done so.
According to a report by J.J. Glendinning on 21 February 2001, the road was an important security question for the army and the Sudanese Minister for Energy and Mining. The army general stated several times that he wanted the road to be built as soon as possible. This was illustrated by Ken Barker’s report from 27 May 2001 in which the Leer Road was listed as a high priority under the heading “Security.” It was further reported in both Glendinning’s report and HSE Doug Maclean’s report to Schneiter on 16 February 2001 that Maclean had a meeting with the army regarding the company’s planned operations and the road to Leer.
According to the handouts for the OCM meeting on 10 July 2001, Schneiter had said that the all-weather road to Leer had been discussed with the government and partners and had become a major priority that should be built in 2002. When asked what these discussions with the government concerned, Schneiter replied that he was not involved as they were conducted by the local office.
Schneiter testified that he did not know that the road was discussed as a security issue, but he suggested that the reason for this was that it would positively influence the local population’s opinion of the company and said that having the local population on one’s side was a security matter. It was especially important to keep James Leer and Peter Paar from joining the SPLA rebel group. He also stressed that the road was built as a community development project at the request of the governor of Leer.
The prosecution had a different theory as to why the road was a security priority. According to a weekly report by the company Rapport Research & Analysis Limited on 2 May 2001, there had been discussions between the SPLA and SPDF. On 28 May 2001, Swedish media (Tidningarnas telegrambyrå and AFP) reported that the discussions between them had led to an agreement and that the rebel groups had stated that they together would stop the extradition of “our” oil and natural resources by the fascist government in Khartoum.
According to an email sent by Schneiter to Lundin on 18 May 2001, the all-weather road to Leer was not included in the 2002 work program and budget. However, directly following the agreement between the SPLA and SPDF, it became one of the highest priorities for the company in Sudan. Regarding this, the prosecution asked: “Do you really not remember why it [the construction of the all-weather road to Leer] became so urgent?” Schneiter replied that he believed it was urgent for community development reasons.
In a confidential report from early August 2001 entitled “Sudan Block 5A Risk Assessment,” Ken Barker wrote about an attack by the SPLA, with support from Peter Gatdet’s militia, on Heglig Construction Company, the company that carried out the road construction. Following this attack, the Sudanese army carried out a major operation that involved several hundred troops and five helicopter gunships in the area. Barker stated that this was a “clean-up operation of some scale and I would not care to comment on the breach of any humanitarian principles that may be involved. It is beyond reasonable doubt that there is some displacement and cleansing going on.” Confronted with this report, Schneiter could not recall if he had received this information but did not think that Barker had meant that the company did not care about the breach of any humanitarian principles – that was only how he expressed himself in English.
Barker further stated in the report that the attack on Heglig increased the likelihood of additional incidents, which would leave the company’s entire operations vulnerable. He wrote that it was necessary to increase the company’s security and that the company should suggest that the construction of the all-weather road to Leer be expedited to the final quarter of 2001. Once again, the Leer Road was being directly tied to security. Schneiter said that he was not involved in this issue. The prosecution pointed out that he said he was not involved in community development either, yet he had heard that the road to Leer was important to keep James Leer and Peter Paar from joining the SPLA. Schneiter was therefore asked if the fact that the community development program now included a focus on increased security had reached him. Schneiter repeated that he was not involved. Regarding the all-weather road to Leer, he commented that according to the OCM meeting in October 2001, the road was in the budget for 2001, so the construction of the road had been planned beforehand.
The independence of the local Khartoum office
According to Schneiter, the local office in the capital city, Khartoum, became independent from the Geneva office in September 2001, meaning that all work on the Sudan assets was conducted from Khartoum. According to the draft for the 2002 work program, however, the plan was for the Khartoum office to become independent in early 2002. Schneiter himself stated in the minutes from the 25 October 2001 JMC meeting on that the Khartoum office would be fully independent by January. When questioned about this, Schneiter maintained that the local office became independent in September and suggested that the reason he had said January was because the Khartoum office was missing a geologist.
When asked why Schneiter, the head geologist for Sudan, Antoine Fabre, and the geophysicist Per Schruffer were present at the TCM and OCM meetings in May and October 2002 if the local office had become independent by then, Schneiter testified that he was still the chairman for the JMC, and as he was travelling to Khartoum anyway, it was only natural that he attended the TCM and OCM meetings as well.
The approval of the work program and budget
The handouts for the JMC meeting on 11 July 2001 stated that Schneiter requested and received approval from the Sudanese Oil Exploration and Production Authority’s (OEPA) for the company’s revised budget. A point of contention during the previous weeks of Schneiter’s testimony had been whether the company’s work programs and budgets were approved at the OCM meetings or by OEPA at the JMC meetings (Click here for more about this issue).
The prosecution asked if this was yet another mistake made by the author of the minutes. Schneiter claimed that it was. The same mistake was made at the JMC meeting on 25 October 2001. As Schneiter pointed out, though, in the minutes for the JMC meeting on 25 October the person whose initials were “AEK” stated that the JMC had no voting mandate. This was specifically stated regarding a discussion about Ken Barker succeeding Schneiter as a JMC member. It may have meant that the JMC had no voting rights to approve its members, or it may have meant that it had no voting rights to approve the work program and budget.
The plan for seismic acquisition in 2002
In the email Schneiter sent Lundin on 18 May 2001, he wrote that that the plan for 2002 was to collect more 2D seismic data in preparation for a drilling campaign in 2003. Schneiter wrote that they [the technical department] were planning to conduct in-field seismic in already-existing areas and more 2D seismic further south to find as many drillable prospects as possible. When asked if Schneiter was involved in this work, he said that he may have been involved from time to time but that Antoine Fabre and Per Schruffer were “very knowledgeable.” The prosecution pointed to a paragraph in the handouts where Schneiter wrote “[…] or I can be convinced.” The prosecution thought that this meant that he was personally involved. Schneiter, on the other hand, stated that as the head of the technical department he likely wanted to understand any big expenses.
The plan for 2002 was outlined at the JMC meeting on 11 July 2001, which constitutes one of the charges in the indictment against Schneiter. The handouts for the meeting showcased the company’s exploration strategy for 2002 in the Thar Jath and MOK trends. They further stated that 2D seismic acquisition would be conducted in the MOK trend. MOK was in the Nhialdiu area, the area to which the company is accused of having constructed a road used by the army to commit grave violations against international humanitarian law, partly for the purpose of clearing the area for the company’s oil exploration. Schneiter testified that the map was very generic and that it was the Thar Jath trend that was the prosperous one. The MOK trend was a very deep, problematic, and risky structure, and therefore not of great interest. The prosecution pointed out that one of the areas with planned seismic was dubbed MOK trend. Was it just called MOK for fun or had the company planned to conduct 2D seismic there in 2002, the prosecution asked. Schneiter responded that the areas on the map were large and that the names they had been given did not necessarily reflect where MOK was actually located.
The prosecution referenced the draft for the 2002 2D seismic budget, which included Block 5A and MOK, and which was last saved onto Schneiter’s profile on 6 August 2001. Schneiter testified that it was not true that they were planning to conduct seismic in MOK and that the prosecution should not focus on the names the prospects had been given, because they could have been given any name.
In a report dated 2 August 2001, Doug Maclean wrote that he had received the seismic maps and that he agreed with Schneiter’s swampland breakdown, but that the last time he saw the MOK area it was wet, so he wanted to revise the terrain ratio there. The prosecution asked if seismic acquisition around MOK was included in the maps Schneiter had sent to Maclean. Schneiter thought that it was not clear which maps were being referred to but that at this stage they were looking at everything in the field. MOK could have been included on the maps because it was only later that they decided exactly seismic would be conducted.
The JMC meeting on 25 October 2001 constitutes another one of the charges in the indictment against Schneiter. According to the 24 October 2001 JMC and TCM handouts, conducting infield seismic in all the company’s existing leads was the number one priority.
The prosecution asked how the company would be able to implement the plan in areas controlled by rebels or close to rebel-controlled areas, despite knowing about the rebel activity in the block and having read the White Book (Click here for more background on this). Schneiter testified that they did not consider it because the technical department ignored everything that happened above the surface (Click here).
The prosecution and Schneiter could not agree whether the company had planned to conduct seismic on all the leads included in priority number one. The prosecution suggested that conducting infield seismic in MOK and other leads was the number one priority, as shown by the handouts. Schneiter disagreed and said that while he was not involved in the planning, the TCM handouts stated that there were other priorities within priority number one and that seismic in Adok was one of those priorities. The prosecution displayed the revised “2001-2002 seismic campaign” dated 21 November 2001, and the revised “2002 seismic campaign infill over leads” from 12 January 2002, both of which included seismic lines over the leads MOK, B, B1 and B2 as priority number one. Schneiter testified that there were a lot of seismic lines drawn across the maps and that seismic would not be acquired at every place those lines were drawn. MOK, he said, was a very risky prospect. The prosecution, however, thought that MOK was indeed a priority as it was stated as such, and that the all-weather road to Nhialdiu was built as a result.
The all-weather road to Nhialdiu
A 28 October 2001 weekly report written by Ken Barker reported under the heading “Security” that the military was demanding a road to Nhialdiu before they could secure the seismic in the MOK lead, B1 lead, B2 lead and B3 lead. The prosecution asked why the military would express itself like this if the company had no intention of conducting seismic in MOK. Schneiter did not know and suggested that they ask Antoine Fabre or Ken Barker. He said that what puzzled him was why they would need a road to MOK when it was located in a swamp. While the prosecution did not comment on it, the implication was rather that a road to Nhialdiu would be built to clear the area for seismic in MOK.
The all-weather road to Nhialdiu was never included in the 2002 work program or budget. A plan to construct 6 km of the all-weather road to Nhialdiu was, however, included in the handouts for the TCM and OCM meetings on 29 May and 30 May 2002. It was also included in several other internal documents and tenders (Click here for more), including the document ”Summary of Block 5A infrastructure and direct security costs” from March 2002 (when Schneiter was out of office), which reported discussions regarding an all-weather road to MOK for about 800 000 USD, and a daily report which was sent to, among others, Schneiter which reported that company personnel went down the all-weather road to Nhialdiu which they found to be in such terrible condition that Barker promised to tell Heglig to fix it. Schneiter had no answer to why Barker would engage himself in issues related to the Nhialdiu road.
Furthermore, Robert Archer, a consultant who helped the company with the road construction to Nhialdiu, testified in an interview conducted by Lundin Oil’s defense team in 2014 that there had been discussions within the company regarding a contract for the all-weather road to MOK. A December 2001 security report from the neighboring oil company Talisman stated that an all-weather road to Nhialdiu through a disputed area under Peter Gatdet’s control would be built, and that Lundin Oil would build the first 10 km of it. Schneiter said that he did not know Robert Archer and that perhaps whoever wrote the Talisman report should have attended an OCM meeting because then they would know that there was no budget or approval by partners for an all-weather road to Nhiladiu.
The security situation around the all-weather roads
The prosecution displayed several internal reports of attacks in which the military used Antonov planes and helicopter gunships and sabotage, sometimes with landmines, on villages along the all-weather roads to Leer and Nhialdiu. The security condition in Block 5A was continuously classified as black in 2002. The daily report dated 16 September 2002 stated that “any further work on that road before the peace agreement would be suicide and would jeopardize the life of those innocent people.” In a report dated 19 September 2002, Barker wrote that he was fully convinced that the government would never fully control the area “despite completion of the current clearing processes that results in the displacement of large numbers of civilians from the area.”
Daily HSE reports from March 2002 reported that the military was securing the area around Leer for the construction of the all-weather road and that the military had retaken Nhialdiu. Schneiter pointed out that the company’s operations were suspended at this time and testified that they had always made it very clear that they would “never ever resume operations” unless there was peace.
To illustrate the complex and problematic situation in Sudan at the time, Schneiter pointed out that the very people who wanted the road to Leer to be built were now sabotaging it. He said that this was due to the shifting alliances in the area. It does beg the question though, if the reason the road to Leer was listed as a security priority was to please James Leer and Peter Paar, as Schneiter claimed, why was it still a security priority once they had changed sides and were actively sabotaging it?
The prosecution asked if a community development project that caused this much conflict was really worth it. Schneiter said that the company had committed to build the Leer Road during a period of peace. Once it had been included in the work program and budget, they had a duty under the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with the Sudanese government to complete it. If they could not complete it, they would suspend operations. They had suspended operations at this point, but the construction to Leer continued.
Next week
In our report next week, we will cover the final week of Alexandre Schneiter’s testimony in which he was questioned by the plaintiffs’ attorneys and his defense attorneys.
