Report 44 – Alexandre Schneiter takes the stand
Was the Sudanese civil war made worse by the oil exploration in Block 5A? Who was responsible for the company’s actions? The 6th and 7th weeks of 2025 saw the second indicted private person, Alexandre Schneiter, take the stand in the Lundin Oil trial. The prosecution’s questions largely centered around Schneiter’s and Lundin Oil’s activities between the years 1997 and 2000. They only touched on one of the charges in the indictment, the JMC meeting on 4 October 2000, but thoroughly discussed the events that led up to the other points in the indictment, which will be covered in our next report.
Alexandre Schneiter’s opening presentation
Before the prosecution could begin questioning him, Schneiter announced that he would like to begin with a presentation of his own. Aided by a PowerPoint presentation, he covered the work he performed for Lundin Oil AB between 1995 and 2003. His presentation took up most of the first day. It is unusual for a defendant to hold a presentation of their own, especially as Schneiter’s defense team had already held an opening presentation that lasted several weeks. No objections to this were made, though, as the court already knew that he was going to give the presentation.
Before beginning, however, Schneiter commented on the discussion of memories, which has been a theme throughout the proceedings. He said that while he too had trouble remembering what exactly happened nearly thirty years ago, the greater issue for him was differentiating between what he knew at the time and what he knows today. Therefore, his presentation would, to the best of his ability, cover what he knew during the time Lundin Oil was present in what is now South Sudan.
In 1999, three years after Lundin Oil signed the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with the Sudanese government, Schneiter was made the company Explorations Director, which meant that he was responsible for all the company’s assets worldwide. He stressed, however, that he never had any responsibility for security issues or road construction. His leadership role in the company exclusively concerned technical matters and he never had a leading role in the company’s operations in Sudan.
Schneiter’s responsibility for Block 5A
Schneiter explained that at the time, the company had projects in thirteen different countries all over the world and that he was responsible for the technical evaluation for all of them. He was therefore a very busy man. It would have been impossible for him or the offices in Geneva to control all the projects in these countries, he said. Therefore, local offices were set up in each country and they had the primary responsibility for those assets. To demonstrate his point, he displayed two lists from a Joint Management Committee (JMC) meeting in the summer of 2001, which showed that the local office in Sudan had a larger staff than the Geneva office. Once the local management had assumed responsibility for Block 5A, the technical department’s involvement was limited to acting as technical consultants should the need arise.
The question of who had chief responsibility for the company’s Sudan assets was later addressed by the prosecution. They asked why, if the technical office had no responsibility for these assets, had Schneiter stated in the company’s annual report for 2001 that Lundin Petroleum’s core assets were Block 5A and 5B and the technical department was responsible for them. In the report, Schneiter had also stated that the company maintained an office in Khartoum to oversee Block 5A operations. In response to the question, Schneiter said that it was a very generalized comment, that the local office were the ones responsible for the Sudan assets, and that he wasn’t certain that he had written those words or if he’d simply signed the document.
The prosecution stated that they found it hard to understand how Schneiter, who was the sub-surface team’s boss, who was at the top of the responsibility list for the Block 5A team, and whose area of expertise was seismic issues, had no involvement whatsoever in the company’s priority prospects. Moreover, he was both the project coordinator for Sudan as well as the company’s chief representative at the OCM, TCM and JMC meetings which were all specifically about the Sudan assets.[i] Schneiter replied that if the technical staff all worked on the same assets, they would not be able to conduct a very successful operation. Furthermore, he strictly reviewed technical data in his role as both project coordinator and company representative as his colleagues from other departments would present their own areas at the OCM, TCM, and JMC meetings.
He was questioned about the OCM meeting on 16 October 1997, during which the company had presented four major areas of interest for oil exploration based on seismic maps from the technical department. Although he was present at the meeting, Schneiter said that he had no involvement whatsoever in the preparation of these maps and that the only reason he attended the meeting was to gain an understanding of the work. He did not participate in any other OCM, TCM, or JMC meetings during 1998 and 1999. He also stated throughout the week that the technical department exclusively looked at what was beneath the earth and never concerned themselves with the surface.
One of the four major areas of interest for the company was the MOK area in Nhialdiu. This is important because the all-weather road to Nhialdiu, the construction of which the company is accused of having participated in, is alleged by the prosecution to have been used by the army to attack villages. Schneiter had several explanations as to why this did not indicate guilt on the company’s behalf or his own. Firstly, the maps they used during that period were mostly taken directly from Chevron, the previous company operating in the block, and were therefore not indicative of the company’s plans once it had collected its own seismic data. Secondly, once the seismic maps were presented at the TCM meetings they would be sent back to the technical department with feedback. It was at this stage that it would be made clear to the technical department if any of the areas they had identified as prosperous for oil exploration were located underneath a village. If that was the case, there would be no problem for the department to revisit the maps and move those lines. This was of interest as the prosecution displayed seismic maps based on the technical department’s work on which the MOK area had been identified as an area of interest. Schneiter stated that should their preliminary plans include seismic lines over an area such as MOK, the seismic lines would be moved, and no oil exploration would be carried out in the area. Thirdly, the MOK area was not deemed to be a promising area because it would require them to drill too deep to extradite the oil, which was costly. The prosecution said that the technical personnel nevertheless seemed to want to conduct a smaller collection of seismic data from the area as it was identified as a major prospect. Finally, Schneiter said that the area dubbed MOK on the map was not in fact the real MOK area; the geologist who drew the map had simply chosen to name it that. In other words, according to Schneiter, the real MOK area was not located where the seismic lines had been drawn. He stressed that the technical department had no idea what was above the surface.
The prosecution asked if Schneiter’s role as the project coordinator required him to be more well informed on the situation in the block as he now was responsible for presenting the work to partners. Schneiter replied that it was not necessary because if the partners had any questions at the meetings, whoever was responsible for that area would answer them. On 18 January 2000, the company’s security coordinator, Dick Deery, published a report called ”Threat to Seismic operations” regarding the expected security issues in conjunction with the collection of 2D and 3D seismic data in the block. The prosecution asked if such a report would have been of interest to Schneiter as he was set to become the project coordinator for Sudan the very next month. Schneiter answered that, project coordinator or not, security was not his area of responsibility.
Schneiter’s management role
The prosecution asked what it meant to be a part of the company’s management. Schneiter said that for him personally it meant that he was responsible for all the sub-surface work worldwide. Everybody in management had their own area of responsibility based on their expertise which they were trusted to handle.
When asked how members of the management team interacted, he said that initially their interaction was rather informal. Lundin Oil was a small company and everyone in the management team travelled a lot, so interactions typically depended on who was in the Geneva office at a certain time. When Ashley Heppenstall became the CEO, weekly management meetings were introduced, but he could not remember if these weekly meetings had been introduced during the Block 5A period.
Schneiter was also asked about his role as part of the management team for Lundin Sudan Ltd. He stated that the role was merely a formality, and that the Sudan Ltd. management was not at all active.
Schneiter’s responsibility for security
The question of Schneiter’s involvement in the security of Block 5A returned several times. He consistently maintained that the general manager and the Health, Security and Environment (HSE) unit were responsible for security and operations in the area. The prosecution asked who in the management was responsible for operations in Sudan. After having repeated the question three times without receiving a direct answer from Schneiter, the prosecution changed strategy and asked to whom the general manager, Keith Hill, reported. Schneiter responded that Hill reported to him while they were both in the Dubai office, but that this was very much during the initial stages of the project when they were working with the technical aspects of the assets. After Hill became the general manager for Sudan, he continued reporting to Schneiter, but only on technical matters. Regarding HSE matters, he would instead report to different people depending on their expertise.
Schneiter maintained that he had no involvement whatsoever in security issues and that while he must have seen some of the Operations Manager, Ken Barker’s, weekly reports on the situation in Block 5A, if he received them, he would have focused exclusively on technical matters. The prosecution pointed to the 13 May 1997 JMC meeting minutes which noted that the company had met with Brigadier General Asin Ibrahim to discuss security, consisting of a large military. Schneiter was present at this meeting. Asked about this, Schneiter testified that he was there as a guest and that it was Keith Hill and resident general manager Dr. Alan Bagi who led the meeting. He had a vague memory of this having been a courtesy meeting to introduce themselves. The prosecution pointed out that it said in the report that they discussed security matters and asked what Schneiter recalled of this. He reiterated that this was a courtesy meeting and pointed to the paragraph in the report which stated that the focus areas of the meeting were development programs for the region, which is what he thought the meeting was probably about.
Similarly, the proposed agenda for the TCM and OCM meetings on 25 July 2000 stated that Schneiter and Tim Sarney would discuss the security situation. The prosecution wondered why this was the case if, as Schneiter claimed, he had nothing whatsoever to do with security. Schneiter said that he did not know why his name was listed there but that it was definitely Sarney who discussed security, which could be seen in the minutes from the meeting.
The government’s approval of Lundin Oil’s work programs
A recurring topic throughout the week concerned whether or not the Sudanese government approved the company’s work programs. According to Chapter 4, point 3.8, in the EPSA, the company was to draft each year’s work program in consultation with the minister [for Energy and Mining]. According to Chapter 10, the work program was to be reviewed at the JMC meetings and then recommended to the minister. If the minister or the JMC suggested changes to the program, the company was to make a new proposal according to Article 9 of the JOA (Joint Operating Agreement). The prosecution had the impression that the work program was to be determined in accordance with the minister’s views. Schneiter said that the work program and budget were approved at the OCM meetings and then sent back to the OCM for approval again, after comments by the JMC. The work program and budget were therefore not approved by the government. The prosecution wondered why both the minutes and handouts for the JMC stated that the budget was approved at the JMC meeting. Schneiter said that sometimes people make mistakes, and that whoever wrote the minutes must have misunderstood. Regarding the handouts, he stated that the company used the same handouts for OCM, TCM, and JMC meetings, which was why it appeared odd. At the end of the day, he said, it didn’t matter what was written in the EPSA and JOA, but what actually happened during the meetings. The prosecution then asked why Schneiter had said that the JMC meetings were to approve the following year’s work program and budget in his 2017 police interview, to which he responded that he too must have made a mistake.
Schneiter’s knowledge of the human rights situation in Sudan
The prosecution asked Schneiter about the company’s understanding of the political situation in Sudan when they signed the EPSA. He said that he personally only knew that there was a civil war outside of the area they were signing the EPSA for and that Omar Al-Bashir was president, but that he, Schneiter, wasn’t focused on the politics of the country. His use of the term “civil war” stood in contrast to Ian Lundin, who in his own testimony declined to refer to the conflict as a civil war (click here).
Schneiter stated that he personally took no part in reviewing NGO reports. This was not because he was indifferent to the situation in Block 5A, but because there were experts within the company who were far more adept at understanding these reports than he was, as this was not his area of expertise. He did read the “White Book” from May 2001 by Lundin Oil AB’s Corporate Social Responsibility advisor, Christine Batruch, which investigated the claims made by Christian Aid’s report, “Scorched Earth.” His conclusion based on what he described as “the unreliable and biased sources” used in “Scorched Earth” was that the report was wrong. He did not deny that there were conflicts in the area but affirmed that the company had no influence over them and that they suspended activities at the first sight of instability.
In 1999, what became known as the Harker delegation, led by John Harker, Special Envoy for the Canadian Government, reviewed the Canadian oil company Talisman’s operations in the Heglig oil field. Schneiter said that while he now knew that this had happened, at the time he was not aware of it. The Harker report stated that Nhialdiu had very likely been bombed and that his sources told him that the civilians had fled due to the fighting between the army and the militia leader Peter Gatdet. The “Sudan update” report by Rickard Ramsey on 28 August 2000, similarly, reported that around 70 000 internally displaced people had fled the fighting to the south and that more were likely to come. On 5 August, John Noble, the security manager for Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a consortium of UN agencies including UNICEF and World Food Programme, described fighting between Peter Gatdet and the SSIM commander Peter Paar which had resulted in a large number of burnt huts in and around Nhialdiu, and that when OLS flew towards Nhialdiu, they saw burnt huts in every direction. Schneiter said that he had never seen this report, nor would he have.
Christine Batruch concluded in her report “Update on December 1999 report on Lundin Oil AB operations in Sudan”, dated 22 May 2000, that it was irrefutable that security in the area was compromised and that the reports of bombings near the company’s rig site and increased casualties since the beginning of the year made it difficult to refute that the situation in the oil area was getting worse. In the same report, she further wrote that civilians and civic institutions like schools and hospitals were being targeted as part of the government’s response to increased rebel activity in the area, and that the local population lived in a constant state of insecurity. Asked about this report, Schneiter stated that he had not received this report or the information in it.
On 16 February 2000, the government bombed a military facility close to Thar Jath. An HSE incident report dated 21 February 2000 stated that the real target was not a military facility, but a village called Koch. The prosecution asked Schneiter if he knew that a village was the government’s intended target. Schneiter had no recollection of this and stated that he had not read the incident report but that based on other documents he had read, he believed that no one knew what the actual intended target had been. Schneiter had, however, heard about this incident and recalled that the management took it very seriously, though he personally was never involved in any discussions regarding it.
A summary of a report called “Significant Incidents Affecting IPC SL Operations” concerning June 1999 to June 2000 was included in the handouts for the TCM and OCM meetings in July 2000 and the JMC meeting on 4 October 2000. The prosecution read through a rather long, though not extensive, account of security incidents listed in the report. These included an attack on the Highland camp by the prominent militia leader Paulino Matiep in late June 1998, causing 250 000 US dollars in damages; a helicopter that was shot on its way to the rig site on 5 June 1999; fighting between the SSDF and the military in Adok; and confrontations between the SSDF-commander Tito Biel and Matiep, both on 23 March 2000; reports that the SSDF received support from the SPLA and that all the southern militias had joined together against the government, but by 25 July 2000 the government had secured alliances with Tito Biel and Matiep against Peter Gatdet; and that Block 5A was stated to be in “condition black.” There was a notation on 30 September 1999 that the military was clearing areas south of Bentiu and that helicopter gunships were being used to do so on a daily basis. The original report – not the summary – was last saved Schneiter onto his computer on 14 July 2000.
Schneiter said that while he received this list, he did not read it. It was only sent to him because he was the project coordinator and all he did was collect information from the different departments. The prosecution asked how, after knowing about two security incidents in 1998, one in 1999, the bombing close to Thar Jath in 2000, and that Christine Batruch was hired specifically to look into reports about human rights violations, as well as knowing that the company was suspended for security reasons, he in preparation for a meeting regarding the situation in the block, did not read a 10 page document titled “Significant Incidents Affecting IPC SL Operations.” Schneiter said because it wasn’t his task to do so. He only knew the summarized version of this list which was presented at the OCM meeting in the handout. He finally stated that the list did not solely concern incidents in Block 5A.
The military entering Block 5A
The prosecution displayed a draft letter dated 21 January 1999 from Keith Hill to the Sudanese Minister of Energy and Mining, Awad Ahmed El-Jazz, and to the head of the Sudanese Oil Exploration and Production Authority (OEPA), concerning difficulties in the company’s operations due to security issues regarding the conflict between Tito Biel and Paulino Matiep. According to the letter, Keith Hill, Dr. Alan Bagi, OEPA and El-Jazz’s office had settled on several points to avoid security problems, including that the Sudanese military were to enter Block 5A, despite Biel not being willing to accept the military’s presence. Asked about this, Schneiter did not want to comment, saying that it was not proper considering that he had not been involved, and because it was an unsigned draft letter that may or may not have been sent. The prosecution asked if he knew during the indictment period about the reports that stated that the government and Paulino Matiep were cooperating. In the “Post Incident Report Thar Jath #1 Rig site May 3, 1999” dated 17 May 1999, by Dick Deery, it was stated that there was “obvious collusion” between the two. Schneiter said that even today he was not sure that Matiep and the government ever colluded.
A supplement to the Post Incident Report noted that the company had requested that its operations going forward be guarded exclusively by the military. According to the KPA, the local police and local factions were to be responsible for security in Block 5A. Schneiter testified that he had no recollection of being involved in these discussions. He was out of work between mid-May and sometime in October 1999 due to a serious illness which had him fighting for his life. He stated that the company was taken by surprise after the Thar Jath incident and that it demonstrated that the local police and militia were an unreliable guard force.
The prosecution further referenced several reports from March and April 1999 that described tensions between SSDF, Tito Biel’s branch of SSDF, and the Sudanese army. Asked about this, Schneiter did not know why the prosecution mentioned the army at all as to his recollection, the army was not present at all in the block at that time. The only conflict was due to tribal fighting, he said. The prosecution agreed that there was no military presence in the block at the time. However, according to several reports and an email from HSE’s Stephen Day to Dick Deery, the SSDF was very worried that the military would enter the block. Should the military enter, SSDF would view this as a breach of the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA). Schneiter said that he had not received this information. He further pointed out that Stephen Day’s email said that the military would not enter the block if the situation remained peaceful. As far as Schneiter was aware, the military had not entered the block prior to the Thar Jath incident on 2 May 1999 where two company guards were killed by the local militia, nor did he think that the army had breached the KPA by doing so as the situation was not in fact peaceful. At the time in question though, he had no knowledge of this as he was not sent nor copied on any of the security reports. He said that now he understood that it wasn’t possible to operate in the block with the local police and local militias in charge of security because they were unreliable.
According to the Post Incident Report, Paulino Matiep’s forces entered the block on 2 May 1999 and on that same night fighting broke out there between Tito Biel’s forces and the government. In interviews with government representatives, Matiep’s entry into the block was cited by the government as a reason for their decision to enter the block, despite their, according to Dick Deary, “obvious collusion.”
In a report by Dick Deery dated 17 May 1999, Deery stated that the fight for oil may have been the deciding factor causing the military to enter the Block 5A. He further stated that the tension prior to the Thar Jath incident came down to SSDF’s worry that the government would enter the block, and that all parties, including the government, knew that the military entering the block could lead to fighting in the area. Asked about this report, Schneiter testified that it was unlikely that he had received it and that it therefore would be very wrong of him to speculate about it. Moreover, he said it was important to remember that the local tribes were fighting each other, causing the company guard force to be attacked. The government had the ultimate responsibility for security in the country and it had been made clear that the local police and militia could not be relied on for that purpose. The military entered the block as a defensive force to secure the peace in the area, he said.
JMC meeting on 4 October 2000
According to the minutes for the JMC meeting on 4 October 2000, at which the OEPA government representatives were present, Schneiter and the Operations Manager Tim Sarney had said that the security situation in Block 5B (which they were acquiring) seemed to have improved a lot and that the government was “doing a great job to secure the area for the next year’s operations”. Asked about this assessment, Schneiter testified that he could not remember whether he or Sarney had said it, but that whoever said it must have been referring to the efforts for a peace agreement, and that the statement was just a courtesy, not a command asking for any type of force to be used.
In the handouts to the meeting, the company presented the advantages and disadvantages with the situation in Sudan. The prosecution asked Schneiter about this list, which stated that the company saw the newly formed alliance against Peter Gatdet as something positive. Schneiter said that this was a matter for the local office. The prosecution then asked: if the company saw the alliance against Gatdet as positive, did that mean that his presence in Block 5A and nearby areas was negative? After all, it was stated in the handouts that the contract would only be awarded when the all-weather road was complete, and the security situation was stable and sufficient to resume normal operations. The contingency plan would be carried out when the security situation in and around Block 5A was stable enough to proceed with operations. Schneiter said that the company would always make it very clear that a peaceful environment pursued by peaceful means was necessary to resume operations. When the prosecution asked why they did not state that peace through peaceful means was important in the handouts, Schneiter said that he was sure it was made clear when presented.
The all-weather road
The prosecution proceeded to ask about the all-weather road: what did Schneiter know about the plans for it and what was the purpose of entering into the “Security and Road Agreement” with the government? Schneiter explained the difficulties of operating in the Thar Jath area due to flooding during the rainy season and that the company therefore needed an all-weather road to operate all year long. He also remembered that there were some concerns regarding using the old Chevron Road as it went along the dry land, which meant that there were more villages in that area. Chevron was the company that had previously operated in the block. Schneiter testified, however, that at the time, he had absolutely no idea about the “Security and Road Agreement”, nor did he have any involvement whatsoever in said agreement as the discussions regarding it took place during the summer of 1999, when he was too ill to work.
The prosecution asked Schneiter if, to his knowledge, the all-weather road had anything to do with the Sudanese army’s ability to secure the company’s operations. Schneiter replied that he wouldn’t know as he had not been involved. The prosecution then asked him what the purpose of the Security and Road agreement was. Schneiter began by pointing out that he now knew that the agreement had neither been implemented nor signed by either party. The prosecution pointed to Schneiter’s police interview on 17 May 2021, where he said that following the Thar Jath incident, the Security and Road agreement was developed to define how to best protect the company’s operations. The prosecution understood this to mean that the agreement was about how security would be provided for Block 5A to ensure the company could continue operating. Schneiter responded again that he was not part of these discussions. The prosecution also referenced a presentation that Joe Cyr, the attorney who represented Schneiter and Ian Lundin during the investigation phase, gave the prosecutor’s office in 2015, in which he stated that the Security and Road agreement had been executed. Schneiter said that he was not involved in this presentation.
The all-weather road was further discussed at the OCM meeting on 19 October 1999, and it was stated in the minutes that everyone agreed that it was a critical project to improve both accessibility and security in the block. The prosecution asked Schneiter to explain how the road could improve the security situation. Schneiter said that from his point of view, without knowing all the details, the road was important from a safety perspective, which he saw as being included in the term security. The handouts from the OCM meeting stated that the company had gone beyond the 1999 seismic budget due to increased security costs, including payment of equipment for the army, by 644 000 US dollars. Schneiter said that this was handled at the local office and that by “the army they likely meant neutral guard force.”
At the TCM meeting on 25 July 2000, it was stated that the construction of the all-weather road to Thar Jath and Rubkona had been delayed due to the security situation but that the minister was going to use his influence to speed up the construction. When asked what minister and what influence this referred to, Schneiter replied that he could not recall but that this was during the rainy season so no construction could be carried out. This lead prosecutor Henrik Attorps to ask Schneiter if he meant that it was the rainy season that the minister would use his influence to speed up? Schneiter’s defense attorney, Olle Kullinger, protested at this, saying that Attorps was crossing a line, but Judge Zander ruled that Schneiter could answer if he wanted to. Schneiter said that he meant that security issues were not the only reason for the delay.
Oil and war
The UN Special rapporteur, Leonardo Franco, published a report on the human rights situation Sudan on 14 October 1999. The report contained a chapter dedicated to the conflict in the oil zones. Schneiter said that he had not read the report but that given what he now knew, he was unsure if Franco had actually visited the area, and he knew for certain that he had not visited Block 5A, which the company regarded as a very serious issue. He added that as he understood it, the report was not actually written by Franco but rather by his secretary and mostly concerned blocks 1, 2 and 4.
The prosecution asked how the company viewed the connection between oil exploration and the situation in Block 5A in 1999, seeing as two oil rigs had been attacked in less than six months, the first one being the company’s own. Schneiter said that the company’s rig had not been attacked and that he couldn’t comment on the second oil rig as he didn’t even know where it was or what had happened. He said that there were some undesirable things happening in the block but that the company had no influence over them.
A report from 25 October 1999 by the company’s consultant, Philip Weeks, stated that operations had been suspended due to security issues and that the army was pushing hard into the area to secure it for future operations. Schneiter was not aware of this report but said that surely it referred to the neutral guard force whose job it was to protect the operations and the road, not the military. The prosecution asked if “pushing hard into the area” was part of the guard force’s job. Schneiter said that he could not comment on that sentence but surely the prosecution did not believe that a consultant would describe the army pushing into the area as something negative. These were good people whose only intention was to work in a peaceful environment, he said.
In response to the Franco and Harker reports, Christine Batruch wrote the ”Report on Lundin Oil AB Operations in Sudan” dated 22 December 1999. In this report, she wrote that the company staff, representatives for two NGOs, and representative for the British government such as the British Ambassador Richard Makepeace, tended to believe that the conflict in the area was primarily due to traditional tribal rivalry. These sources were listed in “Appendix 2- Institutions visited in Sudan” of the report. Furthermore, Batruch stated in her police interview on 30 December 2015 that she had spoken to these sources in person. They recognized, however, that the discovery of oil may in the short term have had a temporary destabilizing effect in the region as government forces had moved into Block 5A in violation of the KPA to protect oil personnel. They did not believe that the fights were over the control of oil resources though. The footnote to this stated that “the disturbing fact is that due to IPC activity the government came into Block 5A in violation of the peace agreement.” However, Batruch also noted that the government had previously dispatched troops to the area because of scrimmages, meaning that one could also interpret it as the SSDF having been the first to breach the KPA. In the report, she further stated that it was difficult to both prove or disprove the allegations, but one could not refute that the tribal fighting was made worse by the government’s presence in the area.
Asked about Batruch’s report, Schneiter stated that he had not had any involvement at all with it. He further pointed out that the report also stated that there was absolutely no proof that the allegations were true. Furthermore, he said, it was rather different to review a situation in hindsight over 20 years later than try to make sense of it as the events were unfolding, as the company did at the time.
In his report, Harker observed that the civil war was not fundamentally about oil but that it must also be acknowledged that oil was a key factor. Oil had led to displacement and insecurity as well as intensified fighting – not just between the government and the rebels but amongst the southerners themselves, he wrote. Schneiter said that this report concerned blocks 1, 2 and 4. In one of her reports, Christine Batruch concluded that the Harker report represented one of the most honest and fair attempts to represent the situation in Sudan and that it concluded that “Sudan is a place of extraordinary suffering and continuing human rights violations, even though some forward progress is recorded, and the oil operations in which the Canadian company is involved adds to more suffering.” Schneiter pointed out that the report concerned Talisman and that no sanctions had been imposed on them.
Positive consequences of the company’s presence
Schneiter stated that the company had made tremendous social contributions such as funding scholarships, giving social development contributions of 150 000 US dollars per the EPSA agreement, creating opportunities for local employment, and developing the community with, among other things, housing, schools and training centers. During his trip to one of their oil rigs in April 2001, he said that he neither saw nor heard any evidence that the claims of forced displacement made by the Christian Aid report from March 2001 were true. Schneiter pointed out that the company needed the local population as they made up 80% of their workforce and the company was therefore not disposed to displacing them. He concluded by saying that the company did everything in its power to help the local population.
The defense’s criticism of the prosecution
Before the prosecution’s questioning continued on Thursday 6 February, Alexandre Schneiter’s defense announced their objection to the prosecution’s way of formulating their questions. Schneiter’s attorney, Olle Kullinger, stated that they wanted to point out this problem because it was impossible for the court to have the full picture without having read the preliminary investigation. He added that the prosecution did not give a fair picture of what they considered to be discrepancies in Schneiter’s testimony by taking statements that he made during his police interviews and presenting them outside of their context. Judge Tomas Zander stated that he thought it was important to avoid a debate by giving the defense their turn to point out any problems with the prosecution’s questioning during their own cross examination. Schneiter’s other defense attorney, Per E. Samuelsson, said that Zander had a duty to decide whether a question is improper. The defense considered the prosecution’s questions to be improper because Schneiter had given the same answer to questions several times, but the prosecution’s tactic was to only point to the one time where it could appear to be a discrepancy without informing the court of the other times, which the defense felt was misleading. Samuelsson emphasized that the court had an obligation to forbid improper questions. Prosecutor Henrik Attorps said that the prosecution had always been very clear that Schneiter has expressed himself differently than he had in the examples they brought up. He further stated that he thought it was disrespectful to accuse the prosecution of deliberately asking misleading questions. Zander thanked the defense but did not find the prosecution’s questions to be improper and asked them to continue the questioning.
Next report
In our next report, we will continue to cover Alexandre Schneiter’s testimony.
[i] The OCM meetings were established for the Operating Committee, which exercised overall operations and control of all matters pertaining to the consortium’s joint operations and joint property, to meet with the company. The TCM meetings were instead meetings with the Technical Committee that advises the Operations Committee in certain questions. The JMC meetings were organized to meet with Joint Management Committee which purpose was for the Sudanese government through OPEA to supervise the company’s performance.
