Report 41– Ian Lundin takes the stand

“Anyone who claims to understand the roots of conflict in Africa is fooling themselves.”

This declaration by Ian Lundin could be a fitting theme for the first week of his testimony, or perhaps a question that lead prosecutor Henrik Attorps posed more than once during the hearings: “How could you not know that – you were the CEO?” The examination of the former CEO and Chair of Lundin Oil could well be described as a drawn-out tug-of-war between Attorps, who repeatedly tried to pin down the defendant down on his managerial responsibilities and what he knew about the conflict in southern Sudan, and Lundin, who through the 10+ days of his testimony calmly and coolly pushed back on the prosecution’s questions.

The anticipation was palpable in the corridors of Stockholm District Court on the morning of 11 December 2024. Journalists, TV reporters, NGO representatives, and others following the Lundin Oil trial gathered outside Courtroom 34 to watch Ian Lundin, the company’s former CEO and president – and the first defendant in the case, take the stand. Members of Lundin’s family were reportedly also amongst the crowd. Shortly before 9:15, a court security employee came out with a list of those who had reserved seats in the courtroom; everyone else was directed to an overflow room where they could watch via livestream. The courtroom’s public gallery was fully packed as Ian Lundin took his seat, flanked by his attorneys. After months of listening to the plaintiffs’ testimony, in which they described the horrific violence and loss they had experienced, everyone was eager to hear how Lundin would respond and what he could – and would – say in his defence.

The morning began with a brief moment of surprise when Lundin began by announcing that he would testify in English. He went on to explain that although Swedish was his mother tongue, he was born in France, grew up abroad, and only lived in Sweden for a brief time. Because he wanted to be as concise as possible when talking about things that happened a very long time ago, he would speak in English. He added that he was a Swiss citizen. It was unclear to the audience whether the prosecution had expected this, but the courtroom translators adapted accordingly. Lundin notably did not appear to need translation from Swedish and throughout the trial has not used the translation system.

Those hoping for a dramatic courtroom showdown, however, were likely disappointed by the rest of the morning’s testimony, which was devoted to a methodical description of the company’s internal organizational structures, management roles, and corporate restructuring. Prosecutor Henrik Attorps, who led the questioning for the prosecution, walked Lundin painstakingly through IPC’s work and operations, asking him to explain the corporate structure and the roles of the senior managers. They went through various exhibits previously shown during the prosecution’s opening arguments, including board meeting minutes, annual reports, and screenshots from the company’s website listing its senior leadership during different years. The list of senior managers included Lundin’s co-defendant, Alexandre Schneiter, whom Lundin said he had known for a very long time, since their younger years.

Lundin briefly described his early years: he and his family moved around due to his father’s work in the oil industry. He lived in France, Portugal, and briefly in Sweden before moving to Switzerland where he completed high school. He attended university in the United States, studying to become an engineer, and then went to work for an oil company in Greece. In 1984, he began working for the oil group IPC as a drilling engineer in Egypt and shortly thereafter moved to Dubai. He lived in Dubai for twelve years, during which time he got married and had two children, both of whom he noted were present in the courtroom. In 1989, he was appointed CEO of IPC and later CEO of Lundin Oil following the merger.

Lundin as CEO

Asked about his role as CEO, Lundin described himself as “the type of CEO that delegated a lot of responsibility and work to the people I trusted. At the same time, I would get involved a lot when needed and be present in situations where I was required.” He went on to describe internal communications and delegation of authority within the company as quite informal, with information often being shared verbally, adding that “[M]y management style is borne of innovation and letting people just get on with their job.” In his account, the different departments operated very independently. This was especially true for their projects in remote areas, such as in Sudan, where decisions had to be made on the ground, sometimes quickly. He pushed back on questions asking him to identify who was responsible for what, saying that it depended on the time period and the topic in question, and that the concept of one person ‘reporting’ to another did not reflect the reality of how they worked.

This description laid the ground for Lundin’s subsequent responses to the prosecution’s attempts to get him to describe the company’s internal hierarchy and pin him down on who reported to whom. The afternoon session became a bit more intense as Henrik Attorps asked about each of the members of the management team, trying to show who was ultimately responsible for decision-making. Many questions focused especially on reporting processes and who received the regular security reports from the Sudan operations. Lundin continued to push back, however, repeatedly emphasizing that the company did not have a formal hierarchical structure but rather was flat and employees worked in teams. The internal organizational charts that the prosecution displayed did not accurately reflect the situation in reality, he said. He continued to take issue with questions about who reported to whom, repeating that the term ‘reporting to’ did not describe the relationships. He claimed not to know to whom Keith Hill reported, saying that it “could have been Alex.” If not Alexandre Schneiter, asked the prosecution, then who? “I wouldn’t know,” replied the former president and CEO.

Early involvement in the Sudan project

Lundin’s descriptions made clear his position, which he would stick to throughout the 10+ days of his testimony: that the vast bulk of the responsibility for the Sudan project lay with the local office, and that they made their own decisions. He described this as being in line with his views on business management, saying “That’s the nature of business, you give people responsibility. They have to get on with their jobs and make decisions and can’t always go back and ask for specific approval.” He later noted the particular challenges of working in remote areas in a time before email and other modern forms of communications became widespread. “[W]e were working in remote areas. Sudan is a good example of a very remote area. Communications were very limited. Decisions had to be made on the ground.”

Asked specifically about his role in the Sudan project, he stated that he was involved early on when the company negotiated and signed the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with the Sudanese government. Once it was signed, however, his involvement became limited to what he described as “government relations” and some involvement in the company’s community development program. Henrik Attorps tried to press him on what exactly government relations involved and what contacts he had with the Sudanese government. Again, Lundin did not provide concrete answers, saying only that the EPSA was a standard agreement that laid the framework for the relationship with the host government and that he was generally involved in managing that. He further added that he did not have a formal relationship with any specific person within the government, but rather would come to Khartoum to meet with a minister when necessary. He could not recall how many such meetings he had, saying that it changed over time, with more meetings towards the end when the relationship with the government became difficult due to the government’s increased demands on the company.

“What did you do to understand the situation in Sudan?”

Things got even more heated as Attorps delved into questions about Ian Lundin’s understanding of the political situation in southern Sudan at the time and what sort of due diligence or background research the company had done before investing in the country. Lundin framed his interest in Sudan as stemming from a desire to help the country develop. He described Khartoum in the 1990s as a fascinating and diverse place, with a mix of people and cultures and a variety of potential investment opportunities for international companies. Although he knew the ruling party was the National Islamic Front, he himself found Khartoum to be a “very tolerant” society and said that he had never seen any hostility toward anyone, regardless of ethnicity or religion or sex. He said he saw many women working. He also observed many internally displaced people in Khartoum, which led the company to start a drop-in center for homeless children, which later became an orphanage.

Asked what the company did to investigate the situation in Sudan, Lundin replied that they did standard background checks on each country they were considering, including checking what legal frameworks were in place – specifically international sanctions imposed on the country. They also read reports and talked to others in the diplomatic community. Attorps drilled down, asking specifically what Lundin knew about the ongoing civil war. Lundin, however, declined to call it a civil war, instead saying he had heard media reports about a rebel movement and ongoing conflicts in the southern part of the country. “How could you not try to learn about this?” pressed Attorps. Lundin replied that he recalled that there were many discussions in Khartoum about how to achieve peace and that the political charter that preceded the Khartoum Peace Agreement was in place, which he saw as positive signs. He further claimed that he never heard the government refer to the conflict as a civil war either. At this point, Attorps displayed the aforementioned political charter, to which the government was party, and read a brief excerpt, which declared that the charter’s aim was to put an end to “the war.” “Well, I wasn’t party to this agreement,” retorted Lundin. “They didn’t describe it like that to me.”

He repeated that the company did not meddle in the internal politics of the countries where they worked, describing the company as a service provider in some ways. When considering where to work, they looked at the country’s legal framework – if the government was functioning and if they could operate there legally in terms of sanctions. The most important thing, he stressed, was that when the company went into a country, they had to be accepted by the local population. Working in a natural resource industry, they could not operate without the acceptance of the local community. Lundin Oil’s intention, he asserted, was to work with them to help develop the country and reduce poverty.

Day 2

The second day of the hearing saw all six members of the prosecution team present in court, which caused a slight delay in the proceedings as court staff had to set up an extra table to accommodate them. Once the hearing was underway, Henrik Attorps picked up the questioning right where he had left off: trying to understand what due diligence Lundin had done before investing in Sudan – and specifically in the troubled southern part. Lundin began by again describing the general situation as he perceived it from visiting Khartoum, saying that he saw a big push from foreign investors with a significant presence on the ground from international companies. He also noted that within the diplomatic community, there was a desire to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict and a position of constructive engagement. But what about the southern area, pushed Attorps, where the company was commencing operations? He pointed out that Lundin had acknowledged hearing about a rebel movement in the south and had talked about the ethnic diversity in the country. “Without finding out anything about the situation in the area where you were considering involvement […] how could you know it was possible to operate there securely?”

Lundin, however, stuck to his statements about not being politically oriented, that they saw many other companies actively in the country, and that their main concerns were about being accepted by the local community, helping the country develop, and carrying out their operations in a peaceful environment. “Like I said, we couldn’t influence the situation, but we could make sure that there was no opposition to us in that area and that we would be welcome.”

“Anyone who claims to understand the roots of conflict in Africa is fooling themselves”

Attorps continued to probe, asking what exactly Lundin did to assess the situation in the south. Lundin responded that they had carried out scouting visits and talked to a lot of people to try to understand the situation. The diplomatic community, he said, including the UN and UNICEF, was very positive towards foreign investment in Sudan. More importantly for the company, there were many other companies operating in the country – not just in the oil industry but in others, including cement, power plants, and other types of infrastructure. “But what did they say about the political situation in the south? Please try to answer my question,” requested Attorps.  

This entreaty, however, did not result in much more clarity. Lundin gave a brief, evasive reply about the history of the SPLA movement, saying it went back to the 1970s and was likely connected in some way to the Cold War: “the Cold War conflict between East and West,” he clarified, adding that Sudan “was a very typical African country.” “So apart from this Cold War connection, that it was a conflict between the East and West, did you find out anything else that you feel the Court should be aware of?” asked Attorps rather dryly.

Lundin again mentioned the political charter, saying that he thought it was a positive development. Attorps immediately pounced on this: “How can you know if it’s a positive development when you don’t know anything about what the conflict is about?” “Well, the roots of the conflict don’t really matter if you have an agreement to carry out activity,” replied Lundin. But didn’t Lundin see a need to assess whether the charter was in fact a realistic step towards peace or to try to understand the underlying issues, wondered Attorps. “I think anyone who claims to understand the roots of conflict in Africa is fooling themselves,” was Lundin’s response.

Attorps was not deterred, saying “I don’t think we need to talk about the whole of Africa, but if you are considering undertaking quite major investments in the southern area of Sudan, one would try to make a reasonable attempt to understand the situation. Did you try to look into it at all?” Lundin only repeated that they tried to understand the general situation in the country.

The attack on Chevron

Attorps then asked about the other international companies that Lundin mentioned as operating in southern Sudan. Although no one had previously been operating in Block 5A itself, Chevron had worked in the area in the late 1970s and early 1980s before deciding to pull out of the country following an attack on one of their facilities. When Lundin claimed not to recall the details of the attack, Attorps confronted him with his 2017 police interview in which he explained that one of the reasons Chevron left Sudan was because three of their workers had been killed by the SPLA – a statement which Lundin then acknowledged making. In light of that, Attorps continued, knowing that an oil company operating in the area left after its employees were killed by the SPLA – what was Lundin assessment of the situation there? “Well first of all, these three workers that were killed – it was not in Block 5A,” replied Lundin. This seemed to take Attorps aback, and he burst out, “So is that your response – that they weren’t killed in Block 5A?!” Lundin, however, said only that this was why it was important for the company to ensure that there would be a peaceful environment for their operations.

Lundin’s thoughts on the political situation in Sudan

Attorps then asked whether Lundin aware that Sudan’s then-president, Omar Al-Bashir, had seized power via a coup d’etat. Did that affect the assessment about the political situation and the level of support for Al Bashir throughout the country? Lundin demurred again, repeating that all they could do was talk to people to learn more, and from those discussions, the company felt they would be welcomed and supported and could operate in a peaceful environment. Lundin referred vaguely to a “higher-level assessment” that he was not involved in, saying that the company also met with local leaders, though he was unable to recall any of their names or who from the company met with them, also he suggested it could have been Keith Hill. Lundin noted that he himself had met with Dr. John Garang and that Alexandre Schneiter had also gone on scouting trips to the area and had very positive reports, although he could not elaborate on why they were positive except to say that they had not received any reports of conflict in the area.

Attorps then attempted to ascertain how much Lundin knew about the sanctions the United States had placed on Sudan and the allegations that Sudan was supporting international terrorism. Lundin responded that things were very unclear, some American companies did work in the country, but he didn’t recall knowing about the sanctions until after the EPSA was signed in 1999. Attorps noted pointedly that Lundin had specifically said that part of the company’s due diligence process was to check the legal framework, including any applicable sanctions.

Lundin’s knowledge of the UN reports on Sudan

The prosecution then shifted to what Lundin knew about the United Nations’ work on Sudan, including the fact that the UN appointed a special rapporteur for Sudan as early as 1993, which Lundin said he did not know about until much later: “I was not really aware of how the UN worked.” Here, Attorps reminded him that he had named talks with the UN and UNICEF as part of the due diligence the company did, to which Lundin replied that he only talked to the UN people in Khartoum, not the special rapporteurs.

Attorps then asked about Lundin’s father Adolf, whom Lundin described as an avid reader who read reports about the economic and political situations of various countries. He himself, he said, took a more general interest and only read particular reports if he thought they were important. He said that he discussed everything with his father, including Sudan, and that if his father had had any indication of a conflict or issue that could affect the company, he would have told him.

Here, the prosecution went systematically through the UN reports they had discussed in their opening presentation, summarizing each report’s findings and asking Lundin if he was aware of the information each contained. The first UN Special Rapporteur report from 1993 described “indiscriminate and deliberate aerial bombardments by government forces of civilian targets in SPLA-controlled areas” and a “policy of depopulating areas controlled by the SPLA.”  Subsequent reports from 1994 and onwards reported similar human rights violations committed against the civilian population. Lundin stated that he did not recall the reports and had not been aware of the information – although he did point out that one of the reports did not mention its sources.

As Attorps detailed the third such report, Judge Zander broke in, wondering if the Court was going to listen to the prosecution’s opening statement all over again, and told Attorps to ask Lundin questions instead of reading from the reports. Attorps agreed to keep his summaries short but noted that they needed to ask Lundin about each specific report, otherwise he would not know which one they were talking about.

Lundin, however, maintained that he knew only there was some conflict in the south involving the SPLA and that he understood that human rights violations may have been committed, but he did not know whether by the government or by the other warring parties. Knowing even this much, pressed Attorps, how could he not have tried to understand the situation more fully? Lundin acknowledged that perhaps he did not have a clear picture of things – but also that media reports about it often had dubious sources. “But this is not the media, this is a special rapporteur of the UN who was asked to study the situation in Sudan,” Attorps pointed out. And if information in the media was so limited, why didn’t Lundin look to other sources to get information? Lundin insisted that they had information. They had heard there was a conflict and suffering, but as Lundin explained, “[T]here are different reasons why people suffer from conflict, there are food shortages and drought, there are lots of different reasons why people suffer.” He pointed out the wording of a UN General Assembly resolution that Attorps presented, which referred to continuing indiscriminate aerial bombardment by the Sudanese government against civilians. Lundin’s point, however, was that the resolution mentioned violations being committed by all parties.

The final report Attorps referred to was from Operational Lifeline Sudan (OLS) and dated February 1997 – three days before Lundin Oil signed the EPSA with the government of Sudan. OLS reported government bombing in southern Sudan that was causing massive displacement of the local population. Lundin’s response was that the area was too undefined: southern Sudan was a large area and although he had not seen the report, he did not see how it would have affected them in the first place. Attorps pointed out that the company was entering into an agreement with the Sudanese government – did the reports of violations committed by the government not affect their perception of their counterpart to the agreement? “[I]n an area of conflict there are human rights abuses, and we cannot be the judge of that,” replied Lundin.

“So we really had no knowledge of what was in Block 5A at that time.”

It became clearer from Lundin’s testimony that the scouting visits he had mentioned as part of their due diligence occurred after the company entered into the EPSA with the Sudanese government. Before signing the EPSA, the company had not visited Block 5A. They also had not received any reports of insecurity of conflict in the area. Asked again what they knew about the security situation specifically in Block 5A, Lundin answered that this was before they did any scouting visits. “So we really had no knowledge of what was in Block 5A at that time.”

He again referred to the “general understanding” they had of the situation. “Aside from this general understanding,” pushed Attorps, “had you in any way gathered knowledge about the situation in Block 5A before signing the EPSA?” Lundin repeated that there was a major international consortium already working in the area, referring to GNPOC in Heglig and Unity, in Blocks 1, 2, and 4. “But I’m talking specifically about Block 5A,” said Attorps. “Well Block 5A was adjacent to that area so there was no reason to believe it would be any different,” replied Lundin. This stood in noticeable contradiction to his earlier claims that the UN reports describing violence in southern Sudan were too vague to be reliable because southern Sudan was such a large area that if the report did not specifically implicate Block 5A, he did not see how it could be relevant to them.

Asked what he knew about the local population living in the area, Lundin admitted that his knowledge was very limited. His understanding was that the area was sparsely populated, especially given that much of Block 5A was the Sudd swamp – the largest swamp in the world, he added. Attorps asked where he got that information about the area being sparsely populated. From other companies previously operating in the area, was Lundin’s response. He noted that the technical department would have looked at the potential impact of their operations on the local environment and population.

And how did Lundin, who had stressed the importance of being accepted by the local population, survey them to know that the company would be accepted, asked Attorps. Lundin mentioned the scouting visits that they carried out before beginning “any real activity in the area.” Attorps, though, pointed out that these visits were done after the company signed the EPSA with the government. “So, before you signed the EPSA, you hadn’t really done anything to make sure that you were accepted by the local communities, is that accurate?” “No – well, we don’t really do that before we undertake any activities,” was Lundin’s response.

Next report

In our next report, we continue to cover Ian Lundin’s testimony.