Report 58: The first week of witnesses after the summer break

The third year of the trial against former Lundin Oil executives Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter began on 12 August 2025 after a six-week summer hiatus with rather a hodgepodge of witnesses. First to testify was the second-to-last of the trial’s 32 plaintiffs, followed by a former manager at Christian Aid who discussed the organisation’s “The Scorched Earth” report, which has been a hot button in the trial. The week concluded with Eloi Dolivo, a geologist and former Exploration Manager for Lundin Sudan.

The testimony of Chuong Kot Ruongdu

The first day of trial after the long break still had a feeling of summer vacation, amplified by the unusual start time of 3:00 p.m. The time was set to accommodate the plaintiff, who appeared via video link from the United States. The corridors of Stockholm District Court were quiet in the late summer afternoon and only the courtroom regulars were present as Judge Thomas Zander reconvened the parties and welcomed Chuong Kot Ruongdu to the hearing. One of the court’s two Nuer translators made his reappearance; the translators had not been seen since December 2024 when the last of the plaintiffs testified. Alexandre Schneiter was also present in person, while Ian Lundin participated via link.

Martina Winslow, leading the prosecution’s examination, began as usual by asking Chuong Kot Ruongdu when and where he was born. However, this first question led to several minutes of back and forth trying to understand the exact location, which turned out to be in Bentiu, near Nhialdiu. Chuong Kot was clearly eager to get to the heart of his story, frequently referring to “the events” that forced his family to flee, even as Winslow attempted to get him to describe his childhood and family situation. It was a “regular village life,” he said. “We had cattle and farmland; we had a very good life. Everyone had a very good life before all the events took place.” Here, Winslow appeared to give up on her planned questions and instead just asked him to tell his story, which he promptly did.

Chuong Kot’s story was similar to those of the thirty plaintiffs that preceded him. The quiet village life he and his family had enjoyed ended abruptly in 1997 with an attack by the Sudanese military that forced them and their fellow villagers to flee. He clarified that because he was a child at the time, he had been told by his parents and elders that it was the Sudanese government that attacked them. The family fled with what belongings they could carry across the river to a village called Dorgan. This new place, however, did not prove to be any safer – it too was attacked by ground troops the following year. Chuong Kot recalled that from 1998 to 1999, “there was war all the time in Dorgan.” The family was constantly on the move, fleeing from one place to another trying to find safety. He described Dorgan as being across the river from Bentiu. The fighting intensified in 1999, with the Sudanese military attacking not only with ground troops, but also by air and even coming up the river on boats.

Chuong Kot was the youngest of his siblings and when they were attacked, his older sisters would take his hand, and they would run away together. People fled with their cattle and whatever they could carry. Chuong Kot imitated the sound that the Nuer used to signal danger – a sharp “wee!” that even young children knew meant that it was time to run. They saw people running towards them and knew an ambush was coming. He fled together with his mother and sisters and cattle, but it was night and they had to cross the river. Chuong Kot lost track of his family, and it was only by grabbing onto the tail of a cow that he was able to get across. When he reached the other side of the river, he was told by others that his mother and one sister were dead, and his other sister had been captured. He later learned from others who had been captured but escaped that his sister was still alive, although she had been raped by her captors. He would not see her again until 2005.

During this time, the area continued to be attacked by ground troops and Antonov bombers, forcing the civilians to flee continuously from one area to another. “This is how we were living during this time,” he recounted. Chuong Kot and his remaining sister were taken care of by other community members that had fled with him. He was later informed that his father had also been killed in an attack and other family members affected. He also heard that the government was building roads to construct an oil pipeline. First, they would have the military move the inhabitants out of the area, then they would build roads, with bases along the roads. Once a pipeline was built, they would establish a base camp. The pipeline, he recalled, started in a place called Heglig.

Following a short break, Winslow had a chance to ask some clarifying questions, including exactly what Chuong Kot had experienced himself and what he had been told by others. He emphasized that he had witnessed the air attacks himself and recalled having to flee. “Even though I was little at the time, it’s not something I can forget.” The only detail he did not know was the exact date of the attack, but his mother told him what year it was. The children knew the difference between Antonov aircraft and helicopter gunships, and people would refer to them as such. He explained, “One is close to the ground – DRRR! – and one drops barrels bombing civilians: this is the difference.” To Winslow’s follow up question, he reiterated that he had personally seen Antonovs during an attack in 1999. He and his sister had gone out to retrieve the calves one evening and saw an Antonov drop bombs, then turn and fly away. He and his sister were able to hide under a tree, but when they came out, they saw killed and injured people and cattle. “If something horrible happens, even if you’re young, you remember that.”

Winslow also walked him back through the attack in which his mother was killed and his sister abducted, trying to establish details. He recalled that his older sister saw his mother’s body, but he did not because he was so young and in the Nuer culture, children are protected from seeing dead bodies. Pressed by Winslow to clarify if he had seen with his own eyes people killed or wounded, he made clear that he had, adding a description of how he knew that it was not just the actual bombs, but also the resulting shrapnel that killed people.

After a few questions about the extent of his schooling, Winslow wrapped up her direct examination by reminding Chuong Kot about his 2016 interview with Swedish police and prosecutors, which was conducted in English with a Nuer translator. This last question was likely an effort to pre-emptively address any questions about discrepancies between his responses then and his present testimony.

The hearing continued the following afternoon with a few brief questions from Chuong Kot’s attorney, Percy Bratt, who asked about the number of cows the family lost. Those that were not killed during the bombings were taken by the government troops. Bratt also elicited additional details about Chuong Kot’s father’s death, which led to the plaintiff describing yet a further attack in which his half-sister and uncle were killed. He explained that he had not mentioned this attack in his police interview because they told him to only talk about events that he himself had experienced.

Then it was time for the Lundin defence, led by Thomas Tendorf, to cross-examine the plaintiff. After a series of yes/no questions establishing the facts Chuong Kot had described the previous day, Tendorf pointed out that his testimony diverged from the information he had provided in his police interview, which was that he lived in Bentiu from 2000-2005 and went to school. Chuong Kot said that the police interview transcript was incorrect – that the police wrote the wrong information and that there were other errors. In another alleged discrepancy, the police interview information suggested that his sister had been abducted and raped in a separate event from that in which his mother was killed, and that his mother was not killed in a bombing. Chuong Kot again explained, saying that the bombing was a separate incident.

Alexandre Schneiter’s defence attorney, Per Samuelsson, then took up the questioning, suggesting that the family had fled to Nhialdiu because the SPLA was there. He also pushed the plaintiff on his earlier statements to the police that his sister was abducted on a different occasion than the attack that killed his mother. Chuong Kot denied this, repeating that they were all together and stated that the interpreter during the police interview got things wrong and was later replaced.

Samuelsson also asked about the plaintiff’s statements about a pipeline in Nhialdiu. Chuong Kot repeated that the reason the government displaced and killed people was to build a pipeline and roads to the oil areas. It was because of the pipeline construction, which came from Unity State, that they killed people.

This led to the prosecution following up on re-direct, presumably because it had previously been established by both parties that at the time in question, there was no pipeline in the area. Chuong Kot explained that when oil was discovered in Heglig, they built the first base there and then built roads towards Bentiu. First, they built roads, and later, when they had established the base camps, then they built pipelines – but first it was the road construction. This seemed to satisfy the prosecution, who had no further questions.

Testimony of Mark Curtis

The second witness of the week was Mark Curtis, formerly the Head of Policy at Christian Aid. The aid organisation’s 2001 report “The Scorched Earth” has been a source of much debate during the trial. Its research and interviews with civilians have been cited by journalists and others reporting on the dire human rights situation in southern Sudan, and much maligned by the defence, who have repeatedly questioned the accuracy and reliability of its sources – and of its authors. As the first Christian Aid employee to testify, the expectation was that Curtis would be able to address these issues.

The hearing began with a small bit of amusement after Judge Zander informed Curtis that he would have to first take the witness oath. Without further prompting, Curtis went ahead and recited the standard oath that those familiar with American – and, apparently, British – legal proceedings would recognize (“I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.”) Zander thanked Curtis but noted politely that Swedish courts had a different oath that needed to be administered.

Martina Winslow, once again the lead prosecutor, went through the usual introductory questions about Curtis’s background. After that, though, she got straight to the point, asking about his role in the Scorched Earth report. Curtis testified that when he joined the organization in 2000, the report had already been written and gone through “many iterations” over the course of several months, perhaps even over a year. He stated that as Head of Policy at Christian Aid, he contributed to reviewing it and that he needed to be happy with it before it could be published. However, the field research in Sudan had already been done by that point. Asked again who had final responsibility for the report, he said it must have been the overseas director. Curtis was also not involved in commissioning the field research. His understanding was that most of it had been carried out by a freelance journalist named Julie Flint, but he had not been involved in that process. Nor could he remember who Paul Savage was or his role in the report. Curtis did explain that the purpose of the report was “to expose what was going on in that part of Sudan and the complicity of the oil companies” in order to raise public and political awareness and to change things “for the benefit of the people of that region.

Asked about how Christian Aid carried out quality assurance checks of the report’s conclusions and how they ensured the information was accurate, Curtis gave rather vague responses, saying that “a lot of people” in the organization reviewed it before publication and that there was “a long back and forth between the various people involved.” He acknowledged that “it was clearly regarded as a sensitive report that needed to be very carefully researched and written and agreed upon within the organization” and repeated that it had gone through many drafts before reaching a point where everyone was satisfied with its accuracy. Winslow asked if he felt today that the report’s conclusions still held up and were well-founded. Curtis again noted that he hadn’t read the report in many years and did not know enough about the current situation in Sudan or what had happened since the report was published, but at the time of publication, he was “certainly happy” with the accuracy of its conclusions. “Otherwise, it would not have been published.” He recalled that the report was met with “quite a lot” of publicity, especially in Sweden, and that he and the head of Christian Aid’s Africa desk travelled to Stockholm to do media interviews.

Here, the focus of the questions turned to the Lundin Oil board meeting that Curtis and Dan Silvi, the head of the Africa desk, attended. The prosecution made much of the fact that they had participated by telephone. Winslow asked several questions trying to understand why they had joined by phone rather than attend in person, but Curtis could not recall the circumstances or whose idea it had been. He recounted that he and Silvi had essentially just read out a prepared statement to the board, which reiterated the report’s findings, and that was it. Pushed by Winslow, he recalled that at the time he felt it was a bit odd reiterating what was in the report when he knew the board already knew what it said but added that they felt “reasonably happy” that the board was willing to listen to them. After further attempts to get the witness to recall the circumstances around the meeting, Winslow finally read aloud from his police interview, in which he stated that the company had refused to have contact with them despite their efforts, and that finally they were asked by the board to give a presentation, which they wanted to do in person but had to do over the phone. Despite this, Curtis could not recall his sentiments at the time but acknowledged that if he had said that at the time of the police interview, it must have been what he remembered. Winslow continued to ask about the company’s response to the presentation and to the report’s findings, but Curtis could not remember these details.

At last, the prosecution ceded the floor to Percy Bratt, who asked Curtis to elaborate on what he meant by “the human rights situation” the report was trying to improve. Curtis repeated that the report raised questions about the complicity of oil companies in major human rights abuses and that it was intended to expose this, raise awareness, and create international pressure to change this. Asked how he would have wanted the oil companies, and Lundin Oil in particular, to have responded to the report’s allegations, Curtis referred only to the recommendations made in the report.

On cross-examination, Alexandre Schneiter’s defence counsel, Per Samuelsson, immediately picked up the line of questioning about the circumstances of Curtis’s presentation to the Lundin Oil board. He displayed an email message from Christine Batruch, the company’s Head of Corporate Social Responsibility, in which she explained that the reason Curtis was invited to participate by teleconference rather than in person was that given the board’s international composition, it was difficult to get everyone in one place at short notice.

Samuelsson then turned to the statement that Curtis had read at the board meeting, which had been entered into evidence. His questions made clear that Curtis had never been to Sudan, nor seen the all-weather road referred to in the statement or met the individuals quoted. Curtis explained that his statement was quoting the report, which led Samuelsson to ask who the source was for the original statements in the report. Curtis again stated that Christian Aid had commissioned Julie Flint to do the research on the ground in Sudan and that she had been responsible for writing at least the first draft of the report. He did not know if she had seen the oil road. Nor did he know who Peter Gadet or John Sudan were, or other details that have previous come up in connection with the report. The final few questions were about Curtis’s meeting with the Swedish Foreign Ministry in connection with his media tour. Although Curtis could not recall the meeting, he was reminded of it by his police interview transcript and said that in that meeting, he would have presented the same issues mentioned in the report. He could not remember the Ministry’s reaction.

Testimony of Eloi Dolivo

The third and final witness of the week was Eloi Dolivo, a geologist and former Exploration Manager for Lundin Sudan from June 2001 to March 2002. The hearing with Dolivo, who testified in person, was likely the reason for Alexandre Schneiter’s physical presence in court this week as Dolivo, his former colleague, was also called as a witness by the Schneiter defence team.

The prosecution’s early questions, this time led by Karolina Wieslander, were about Dolivo’s knowledge of Sudan and Lundin Oil’s operations when he began working at the company in the summer of 2001, first at the Geneva headquarters. He said that he knew very little about the country and mostly received technical information regarding the geology and operations in Block 5A. During his time in Geneva, Alexandre Schneiter was his supervisor and Dolivo’s role, as he understood it, was to “guide and supervise the operations and the budget” and be responsible for a small local team of geologists and an engineer. He described the Geneva office as having a “flat” organizational structure, similar to how Lundin and Schneiter previously described it, “with very good communication between various departments.” He added that at Lundin Oil he first encountered the concept of corporate social responsibility, which was “rather unique” at the time. Wieslander asked what this “good communication” looked like in practice, to which Dolivo responded that it was “conversations during breaks, during lunch – going to lunch with colleagues.”

Once on the ground in Sudan, Dolivo and his team were following the end of the work program and budget for 2001, and preparing for the following year’s plan, which was already in draft form. Tim Sarney, the technical manager was Dolivo’s supervisor, and reported in turn to Ken Barker, the general manager in Khartoum. He believed that Ian Lundin would have been Ken Barker’s supervisor. Schneiter knew what Dolivo and his team were doing “but he wasn’t directing it. Tim Sarney was.” Dolivo testified that he kept Schneiter and other technical colleagues in Geneva updated mainly via emails. The updates were usually about daily operations, where they were drilling or acquiring seismic, or new studies they were doing. Asked why headquarters would need this information, Dolivo explained that Lundin Geneva was financing the project, so they needed to know the progress and if the project was within budget and following the work program. The technical office mainly needed to know details about the seismic acquired.

The prosecution continued its efforts to show that the company’s leadership was more involved in the Sudan operations than they claimed, showing a fax from Ken Barker to Ian Lundin showing direct contact between Geneva and Khartoum, as well as a management chain in which Dolivo reported to Schneiter on “functional reporting.” Dolivo acknowledged this, but noted that in reality, it was much less formal and more of an idea exchange with more experienced colleagues about technical issues.

Several questions addressed how the project’s work plan was developed. Dolivo’s responses were often quite technical, but said that especially initially, the Sudan operations had been planned and managed from Geneva. He was the first “exploration manager” to be on site in Khartoum and had the project continued, he would have had more influence regarding the seismic aspects. Although he represented the company at TCM meetings, JMC meetings were more of a “company management level.” Schneiter would have signed off on the proposed work program before presenting it to the TCM and OCM meetings.

Following the morning break, Henrik Attorps took over the prosecution’s questioning, which focused on the JMC meeting on 25 October 2001 at which both Schneiter and Dolivo were present. Schneiter, as the consortium’s representative, had voting rights.

The 2002 draft work program was also a major topic of discussion, as the prosecution has argued that it included plans for seismic work in areas that the Sudanese regime did not control. A fax from Ian Lundin to Ken Barker indicated that the Geneva office would prepare the budget and work program, which would then be carried out in Khartoum. Dolivo was a bit sceptical, saying that he recalled having had more influence over the plans and drafted some of the parts based on his experiences in Khartoum. He noted that he had more influence from Khartoum than he had had while in the Geneva office. Further questioning clarified that his influence was likely over the parts regarding the geological model and more technical components. Dolivo said that he had the authority to change where the lines showing planned seismic went, though he did not since he did not see a need to change the planned program.

The prosecution’s questions attempted to probe more into the company’s internal processes for developing and approving work plans and which managers signed off on them. They also displayed a by-now-familiar map showing seismic and the MOK area. The defence has previously argued that the MOK area was not deemed to be a promising area for drilling, while the prosecution maintains that the company’s work plans continued to include planned activity in the MOK area, which would have required the government to take control of that area. The prosecution questioned Dolivo about internal communications, including faxes, stating that the maps, which included the MOK area, were to be sent with Tim Sarney to Khartoum and that the security manager also needed the maps to develop a security plan for the seismic work. Dolivo said that he had been involved in discussions about where the lines on the map should be drawn but could not say how the ultimate decisions were made, nor could he recall having  seen the final maps. As Attorps continued pressing him on who in the company had the authority to decide on the routes of the seismic and approve priority areas, Dolivo maintained that it was a joint work between the Geneva office and Khartoum and much was done as a team. Ultimately, though, he said that Schneiter would have had the final say.

The prosecution’s final questions were about Dolivo’s contact with the company since he left. He said that the company had asked him for a meeting in Geneva in June 2025, but he had refused. He had not seen Alexandre Schneiter since 2008.

As the prosecution’s examination concluded, Dolivo, whose testimony had been quite focused on technical details and explanations, asked to address the court. This stirred interest in the courtroom, and everyone leaned closer as Dolivo began: “From what I understand of my work with Alexandre Schneiter and my 44 years of industry experience – if Alexandre Schneiter is declared guilty, I should be declared guilty for the period I worked for Lundin. It was a teamwork – .” But here, Judge Zander broke in, telling the witness not to continue.

Schneiter’s defence, led by Per Samuelsson, held a short examination which began by clarifying that Dolivo had been a consultant for Lundin Sudan and then went back to the maps, which Dolivo explained further.

Dolivo also testified that security issues had not been part of my duties or responsibilities. “I was asked what I needed, and they would say yes we can or no we can’t [accommodate that request]. But I was not involved in security discussions.”  Asked whether security issues had been discussed at the July 2001 JMC meeting, he could not recall.

The defence returned to the company’s internal management structure, and Dolivo explained that operational aspects and decisions were made in Khartoum. Geneva was informed but the decisions were made in Khartoum. He said that the company worked like a team, “like a football team,” – a description harkening back to Ian Lundin’s characterization of the company’s work style. “It was team work, we didn’t have one person calling the shots.” Dolivo’s work with the technical department in Geneva was also very informal. He shared information and data with the Geneva office mostly via email. While Schneiter was copied on these emails, it was mostly just to keep him in the loop. “I didn’t get instructions for him – it wasn’t like that.”

Dolivo also testified that he did not recall Schneiter being involved in security issues either – his role was purely technical. This too mirrored Schneiter’s description of his responsibilities. The defence asked specifically about Schneiter’s relationship with Ken Barker, to which Dolivo replied hesitantly, “I would say diplomatically that it could have been smoother.” Asked to elaborate, he said that the relationship was “tense” at time as the two men sought to define their respective roles in the project, with Barker taking over management of the project that Schneiter had previously led.  The defence asked, rather speculatively, whether Barker had ensured that Schneiter was kept in a technical role. “I would say so, yes,” replied Dolivo. “Ken made sure that [Schneiter] had a purely technical role, and he would manage the rest.”

A fax from Ken Barker dated 13 August 2001, which Dolivo received while still working in the Geneva office, stated that the 2002 budget would be prepared in Khartoum and included instructions for budget process. The budget template itself showed that it would be prepared by Dolivo and reviewed by Ken Barker. Dolivo could not recall the details but agreed that the description in the fax must be correct. He had shared the draft budget with Schneiter, “but to check if I had missed any technical aspects.” The formal approval came from Ken Barker.