Report 51 – The testimony of Nils Carstensen and Nils-Arne Kastberg
This week’s report covers the testimony of Nils Carstensen and Nils-Arne Kastberg. Nils Carstensen is a journalist from Denmark who was involved with the production of the report “Hiding Between the Streams” by Christian Aid and has extensive knowledge regarding Sudan. Nils Arne-Kastberg is an international expert in human rights and child protection in emergencies and is the former head of UNICEF’S humanitarian section and the Director of the Emergency Programme in Sudan between 1998-2003. This week’s testimonies offered vital insight into Sudan’s humanitarian crisis during the period in question, highlighting the extensive efforts made by international organisations to deliver aid and document the situation on the ground.
The hearing of Nils Carstensen
Nils Carstensen was mainly heard about his involvement in the production of the report “Hiding Between the Streams” and his observations and knowledge of the situation in southern Sudan between 1997 – 2003. During his testimony he described how Sudan was under military rule from the early 1990s to 2003, a period marked by disregard for human rights and international law. The conflict in southern Sudan, driven by control over oil-rich areas, was intensified by the government’s “divide and rule” strategy. He outlined widespread violence, including indiscriminate attacks, aerial bombings, and ground offensives carried out by the military. He described how civilians bore the brunt of the conflict, especially as humanitarian aid remained largely inaccessible in the affected regions
Carstensen begins by describing himself as both a journalist and a humanitarian aid worker. He developed a long-standing involvement with Sudan that began in 1996 with a visit to Khartoum and Juba. His work with DanChurchAid, a Danish NGO, took him across Sudan multiple times a year for over a decade. When asked by the prosecution specifically about DanChurchAid, Carstensen explained that it is a medium-sized international NGO with roots in the Danish church, but it operates independently and autonomously, with its own board and leadership. Although he did not consider himself a Sudan expert, he had significant experience with conflict zones and a strong focus on civilian protection during war.
Humanitarian missions and field work
From 1996 to around 2011, Carstensen made frequent visits to both government- and rebel-held areas in Sudan, including Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and regions in the south. He stressed that Sudan’s different regions faced unique circumstances, and that understanding them required attention to local context. One of his most important missions took place in March 2002 in Western Upper Nile (now Unity State), a region heavily affected by war and linked to oil development. This trip resulted in the report “Hiding Between the Streams” and he noted that the violence he witnessed there resembled what he had seen earlier in the Nuba Mountains and later in Darfur. He described the general pattern of warfare as highly destructive, with widespread human rights violations committed by both government forces and opposition groups
Regarding humanitarian access, Carstensen explained that during that period, the Sudanese government often blocked international actors from entering the most affected areas. Government restrictions meant that Carstensen’s team had to enter covertly, flying under radar from Kenya and landing without official permission. The team consisted of people with various backgrounds: a human rights expert, a journalist, a documentarian, representatives from local civil society, who documented the impact of violence on civilians. After landing in Wicok, they met briefly with SPLM commander Peter Gadet, who gave them permission to operate in the area. Carstensen recounted that after spending the first night there, they set off toward an area called Chotchar, having heard from church contacts that a large number of displaced people had gathered there. They began interviewing displaced people which revealed consistent patterns: villages were bombed by Antonov planes, then attacked by helicopter gunships and militias on horseback, with civilians, especially children, killed, abducted, or forced to flee. Every person the team interviewed had lost something, their homes were gone, livestock wiped out, and farmland abandoned. Carstensen described the situation as one of total destitution. The people they met also had no shelter, no food, no clean water, and no access to healthcare. Their first priority as a team was to assess urgent needs and determine whether a small-scale relief operation could be launched.
In the Chotchar area, Carstensen estimated that he personally spoke to around 50 individuals, but that the actual number of people they interacted with was much higher as they often met in groups. Testimonies described mass displacement, systematic violence, and civilian suffering. From this information, the team identified at least 68 individuals killed, 21 children abducted, and 23 still missing. Their conservative estimate was that between 50,000 and 70,000 people had been displaced in early 2002 for the specific area between Nhialdiu, Rubkona County, and Bahr el Ghazal.
Regarding the translation, Carstensen explained that the team was supported by Sudanese colleagues who acted as translators and cultural guides. Carstensen said they always double-checked translations and even knew some of the local language themselves, which helped them stay fully engaged and ensure accurate understanding. After returning to Nairobi, the team reviewed the interviews and translations with independent interpreters to confirm their reliability. As for how people were selected for interviews, Carstensen explained that the team was careful and transparent. They did not select specific individuals, but sought a diverse mix of individuals: men, women, the elderly, and occasionally children, though they approached traumatized children with caution. They tried to interview women as they often had better insight into family situations. Most interviews took place in open areas, as no formal buildings remained. Only two interviews were suggested to the team: one with a group of village chiefs, and another with an individual who had previously worked for a Chinese engineering company linked to the oil industry in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) region. Carstensen said he treated this person’s claims with caution due to the individual’s ties to the Sudanese government. In terms of content, the chiefs’ account aligned with others, and the former oil worker focused on what he had witnessed while working in the area, especially in relation to ammunition and military presence.
When asked about the difference of interviewing women by the prosecution, Carstensen explained that women were often more forthcoming during interviews and generally had deeper knowledge of family and household conditions. This, he said, stemmed from their central role in caregiving as they were responsible for preparing food and managing what little remained in terms of resources. He also spoke about the emotional differences in testimonies. Women gave detailed and vivid accounts, while men were generally more reserved, though some, like a father who lost seven children, were visibly traumatized. Survivors recalled events in consistent ways; while they lacked clocks, calendars, or phones, they could place events relative to seasons, days of the week, or the harvest period. The consistency across their testimonies gave the team confidence in the reliability of their accounts.
When discussing why the attacks occurred, Carstensen emphasized that attacks appeared deliberate, with civilians clearly being the targets. The pattern of air and ground assaults matched tactics used elsewhere in Sudan by the government and interviewees often believed the violence was intended to clear the land for oil exploration. Though Carstensen was cautious in drawing firm conclusions, he pointed out that the correlation between attacks and oil activity was too strong to ignore. The area in question had been relatively peaceful until oil exploration began. Then, suddenly, roads were built, airstrips were constructed, and the government’s ability to project military power into previously inaccessible regions increased dramatically. This, he believed, shifted the dynamics of the conflict. In his view, it was not merely speculation but a pattern: military activity and violence increased significantly around oil-rich areas. Another factor he identified was the changing landscape of alliances. Peace agreements had collapsed, and rebel leaders such as Peter Gadet had switched sides. The Sudanese government struggled to maintain control and security around key oil fields. Carstensen believed that these shifting alliances and the threat they posed to government interests in the region likely prompted a preemptive show of force.
Lastly, Carstensen clarified that while there had been sightings of armed individuals around Wicok where the team had landed and met Peter Gadet, there were no clear indications of rebel military presence in the villages they visited. Crucially, Carstensen emphasized that among the displaced civilians they interviewed, there was no evidence that rebel fighters were embedded in the population or had been targeted in the attacks. The violence, according to every account they collected, had been directed at unarmed civilians.
The plaintiff’s counsel
After the prosecution concluded, the plaintiffs’ counsel had the opportunity to question Carstensen. They began by addressing criticism that the testimonies collected by Carstensen and his team might be SPLA propaganda. Carstensen firmly rejected this. He argued that if such claims were accepted, it would mean dismissing the voices of women, children, elders, and chiefs as if they were actors fabricating stories. “That would mean all these people were actors and liars,” he stated. Based on what his team observed and consistently heard, there was no sign of manipulation or scripting. The accounts were authentic, not coordinated propaganda.
Next, Carstensen was asked whether the displaced people they interviewed had been forced to flee more than once. He confirmed this, explaining that repeated displacement was common: people would flee as far as they could in the first wave of violence, only to be forced to move again as the conflict caught up with them. Over time, they learned that placing as many natural barriers as possible, rivers, marshes, streams between themselves and the attacking forces offered better protection. It became a survival strategy. “The more streams and rivers they could place between themselves and the enemy, the safer they were,” Carstensen explained. This insight inspired the title of the report and reflected not just geography, but the displaced population’s method of protection and adaptation.
When asked how enemy forces were able to reach such difficult terrain, Carstensen pointed to the roads and bridges built for oil exploration. These all-weather roads made previously inaccessible areas vulnerable to attack. Even if the roads were built for civilian or commercial use, they had clear military consequences as government forces and heavy weapons could now access areas once considered safe. Carstensen said that community leaders, especially local chiefs, often highlighted the link between oil infrastructure and increased insecurity.
Finally, when asked if any locals viewed the roads positively, such as development or better access to services, Carstensen said no one expressed such views. In fact, there was a strong sense of betrayal. He recalled one woman who initially felt hopeful when she saw lights from an oil company camp nearby. She thought it might bring electricity or progress. But instead, violence erupted, and she was forced to flee her home. Her initial optimism turned into deep disappointment.
The defense’s cross-examination
The defense began by asking Carstensen about his connections with the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC). He said he had worked with both the original SCC in Khartoum and the New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC), which became active as access to southern Sudan from Khartoum diminished. While he didn’t recall meeting specific individuals, he noted that over the years he had met hundreds of Sudanese pastors, so some names were not familiar.
When asked about the trip in March 2002, Carstensen explained that the trip to Sudan was organized on behalf of DanChurchAid and Christian Aid, in cooperation with Sudan Operation Mercy (SOM). These organizations had previously participated in advocacy efforts highlighting the humanitarian impact of oil exploration in Sudan, relying on earlier reports from groups like Christian Aid, Human Rights Watch, Médecins Sans Frontières, and journalist. While he couldn’t recall exact documents, he confirmed they shaped the mission’s context. He named individuals from SOM and SRRA as local partners during the trip. They helped with interpretation and logistics. Carstensen joined the mission late, so he wasn’t involved in all planning steps but believed both men coordinated the trip from Nairobi.
The group relied on permission from local authorities such as SPLA/SRRA authorities to access conflict zones. When the defense asked whether it was problematic to rely on one party to the conflict, Carstensen acknowledged this was a complex issue. However, he said efforts were made to stay independent, especially in how interviews were conducted. Interpreters’ translations were later double-checked by Nuer speakers. No significant errors or manipulation were found, though he admitted some language confusion between Nuer and Arabic was possible. On the concern that SPLA-affiliated personnel might have influenced interviewees, Carstensen said this was a real risk, and something he had encountered in places like North Korea. However, he stressed that in this case, access to the area would not have been possible without the involvement of local authorities. Still, he insisted that the emotional depth and spontaneity of testimonies indicated that people were not coerced.
Carstensen further noted that while the interviews were not conducted in the presence of armed SPLA soldiers, the group did encounter armed personnel around Wicok, part of General Peter Gadet’s forces. Some armed men were nearby for security but not involved in the interviews. Responding to the account of an earlier witness, Diane de Guzman, ) suggesting that armed guards followed the group, Carstensen said this was probably true, but they were not part of the interviewing team. When asked about the fighting in the area, Carstensen explained that they heard artillery fire around Nhialdiu and later witnessed celebrations, suggesting that the SPLA had retaken the area. These observations were mentioned in their mission report, not as firsthand battle evidence but as context for displacement and local conflict. Lastly, he confirmed that during the field mission, they did see armed individuals, but distinguishing between civilians and fighters was often difficult. Many civilians owned weapons like AK-47s, but government-aligned forces, with uniforms and state-issued weapons, were easier to identify. Carstensen did, however, emphasize that the region was chaotic, making clear identification nearly impossible.
Re-examination by the prosecution
The prosecution did have some additional questions and asked Carstensen about the presence of SPLA soldiers during his field mission. He clarified that armed SPLA personnel were present but only for perimeter security. They did not participate in interviews and were kept about 50 meters away to ensure they were not visible or within hearing range of the civilians being interviewed. This distance was maintained to avoid any intimidation or influence on the local people’s testimonies. The prosecutor also asked about infrastructure linked to oil development in the area. While Carstensen emphasized that this was not his field of expertise, he confirmed observing significant changes in infrastructure, including the construction of all-weather roads, particularly between Nhialdiu and Bentiu. These roads made the region more accessible, not only for civilian use but also for military movements, which altered the security dynamics.
Lastly, Carstensen mentioned the construction of a bridge that crossed a river that had previously acted as a natural barrier protecting local populations from potential attacks. The bridge made the civilian population more vulnerable to military incursions. However, Carstensen could not recall the exact location of the bridge and more detailed documentation was needed.
The hearing of Nils-Arne Kastberg
Nils-Arne Kastberg was heard about his knowledge of the situation in South Sudan including Unity State and Block 5A 1998-2003 and the warfare of the Sudanese military and his contacts with the representatives of the Lundin companies, including Christine Batruch and Carl Bildt. Through the hearing, Kastberg described how southern Sudan, between 1998 and 2003, suffered under a military dictatorship that disregarded human rights, with the government and its militias systematically attacked civilians, including indiscriminate bombings with Antonov aircraft. He also explained that disputes over oil exploration in Block 5A led to a “divide and rule” strategy, and that Carl Bildt and Christine Batruch were informed in 2001 about civilian-targeted warfare. He highlighted the extreme vulnerability of civilians due to restricted humanitarian aid access.
Background, work in Sudan, and Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS)
Nils-Arne Kastberg outlined his extensive humanitarian career, with a focus on his work in Sudan from 1998 to 2003. His career began with early unarmed service at Sida (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency) and a formative volunteer mission in Sudan. After completing his training, he worked at UNHCR managing refugee issues, participating in significant operations related to displaced populations in Africa. He was later stationed in southern Sudan and worked in various regions including Asia, Europe, and Central America, contributing to international humanitarian coordination efforts and the development of UN policies such as Resolution 46/182 regarding the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance.
Following this period, Kastberg continued his work with and later representing Sweden in international fora and supporting post-conflict recovery efforts in Europe. In 1998, he joined UNICEF as head of humanitarian operations during a major famine crisis in southern Sudan, where he frequently deployed to support emergency responses and negotiate access with key parties on the ground. This work was closely tied to Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), a long-running UN initiative he had been involved with since the late 1980s. Kastberg described significant operational challenges, particularly regarding infrastructure and access, which often required reliance on air transport and regular negotiations with the Sudanese government. The Sudanese government’s authorization was essential for flights into southern Sudan, and obtaining permissions was a continuous challenge.
Kastberg’s role involved direct contact and negotiating access of humanitarian aid with both the Sudanese government and SPLA, which led at one point to him being called “Mr. Access.” When asked by the prosecution, Kastberg described Sudanese national security as highly organized, with rapid awareness of foreign activity. Dialogue with them was possible but sensitive. While the SPLA had limited capacity, especially in holding key cities, they controlled large rural areas and were engaged in disarmament initiatives, particularly targeting child soldiers. However, their resources were limited, and information on their transport or military capabilities remained vague.
When asked by the prosecution, Kastberg estimated he visited Sudan several times a year during this period and worked closely with UN colleagues who maintained continuous engagement in the region. Negotiations with opposition groups, such as the SPLA, were ongoing and often took place both within Sudan and abroad, continuing up to 2003. He traveled extensively throughout the country, aiming to secure access to numerous locations, though many areas remained difficult to reach due to both internal UN bureaucracy and government restrictions. The Sudanese government generally restricted humanitarian movement to areas under its control and was unwilling to grant access to rebel-controlled zones. While some progress was made over time in gaining access, the process remained complex. It was further complicated by the presence of irregular armed groups aligned with the regime, later formalized as a national paramilitary force. Kastberg recalled a particularly difficult period from February to May 1998, when flight permissions were largely denied. Limited permissions began to be granted only after several months, leading some organizations to operate without formal clearance and in such cases, UNICEF had to accept responsibility for their unauthorized operations.
The situation for humanitarian work in Sudan (1998–2003)
Kastberg described the broader context of humanitarian operations in Sudan under Omar al Bashir’s government, emphasizing ongoing political discussions regarding southern Sudan’s self-determination. He explained that the civil war led to renewed conflict. The SPLA, led by John Garang, emerged as the main opposition force. However, the SPLA itself was unstable, with internal divisions and ethnic tensions.
Human rights violations were widespread during this period. Kastberg noted that the government had limited understanding of and respect for human rights. Efforts by the UN were made to raise awareness among military and political leaders about the idea that national sovereignty is grounded in the population’s rights, not just state authority. He explained to the prosecution how he had stressed the importance of treating civilians with dignity to maintain national unity and international legitimacy.
Humanitarian consequences of the conflict were evident early on, including mass displacements. Kastberg referenced the Christian Aid report “The scorched earth: Oil and war in Sudan” which played a key role in highlighting these issues. Humanitarian work focused on civilian rights to food and health and when asked by the prosecution about examples of government disrespect for human rights, Kastberg cited government tactics like aerial bombings using Antonov planes, which reportedly targeted civilians to instill fear. Though he didn’t witness these acts firsthand, numerous accounts supported these claims. Kastberg described how in parallel the SPLA posed its own challenges. Communication was maintained mainly through its Nairobi office and negotiations involved pressing SPLA leadership to uphold agreements, particularly around human rights and child protection. The SPLA agreed to demobilize hundreds of child soldiers, many of whom were displaced rather than active fighters. UNICEF and partners like Save the Children launched a campaign to support this process. However, violations persisted, including the sexual exploitation of girls by SPLA members and Kastberg emphasized that human rights abuse by both sides remained a consistent concern.
Kastberg pointed out that armed groups often emerged in connection with oil pipeline development from northern to southern Sudan. These groups exploited the instability to gain resources, further complicating the conflict. Local populations suffered severe consequences as northern Sudanese forces sought to establish control over oil-producing areas, which included the Nuba Mountains and parts of Unity State. Kastberg noted how the complicated shifting alliances in Sudan, which the government exploited to create security zones favoring oil extraction, further deepened the conflict.
He also emphasized the importance of humanitarian workers recognizing the negative consequences of their actions, consciously avoiding harm, and applying the “do no harm” principle to their work.
The Sudan situation and Lundin oil contacts (1998–2003)
Kastberg was asked about how information on Sudan’s oil regions and conflict zones was gathered between 1998 and 2003. He explained that, under UN Resolution 46/182, mechanisms were created to support humanitarian work and prevent political interference. Kastberg described how the situation was continuously reviewed and humanitarian coordinators were flown in to assess conditions. Detailed descriptions were provided by the reports by Special Rapporteurs and ongoing assessments also included using input from NGOs, local communities, and eyewitnesses from affected areas, covering southern Sudan broadly, not just oil-producing zones.
When asked about the reliability of the information gathered under these mechanisms, Kastberg emphasized that all reporting should be taken with a grain of salt. While the reliability of such information varied, Kastberg emphasized the need to balance perspectives and avoid letting any one source shape the humanitarian response. There were entities acting as “megaphones” and “shock absorbers.” Reports of human rights abuses were based on multiple accounts, and though some details were indirect, there was enough consistency to consider them credible.
Regarding Lundin Oil, Kastberg recalled limited contact. He received a call from Lundin’s Geneva office from Christine Batruch but had no strong memory of the purpose of the call. He also reached out via SMS to Carl Bildt, then under public scrutiny for his role with Lundin, to discuss the difficulty in assessing the consequences of business operations in the area and that it was better to understand detailed information before making public statements about corporate responsibility. Kastberg described how Bildt appeared receptive to understanding what had occurred in Block 5A and surrounding areas, but Kastberg did not see any further public statements from him for several weeks. When asked how Kastberg reacted to Bildt’s responses, Kastberg stated that he thought that Bildt’s remarks seemed personal and suggested it was inappropriate to comment publicly without full knowledge. He had no other significant contact with Lundin or its representatives after that period.
On the impact of oil development on the region, Kastberg stated that he believed it contributed to civilian displacement. Conversations with those collecting local data indicated populations were fleeing as oil operations expanded. Reports linked bombings and helicopter attacks to mass movements and humanitarian crises, particularly during droughts or periods of famine. However, he had not discussed these matters in detail with Carl Bildt or Lundin representatives. Regarding international knowledge of Sudan and southern Sudan during the period, Kastberg noted varying levels of attention. International interest fluctuated, and the situation in southern Sudan did not always receive sufficient attention.
The plaintiffs’ counsel
The plaintiffs’ counsel asked Kastberg to reflect on the conflict and development phases in southern Sudan, particularly regarding the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. Kastberg explained that the agreement was intended to allow southern Sudanese people to vote on whether to remain part of Sudan. It also addressed natural resource sharing, but the agreement was never fully implemented. Only in 2005 did progress lead to an actual referendum. The peace process lacked legitimacy because it was not fully embraced by all key factions, particularly the SPLA.
The counsel asked about the role of oil extraction in creating conflicts, emphasizing the need for caution, and inquired about Kastberg’s stance on oil companies and extraction activities between 1999 and 2003. Kastberg emphasized the need for extreme caution. He advised oil companies to wait before beginning operations, to remain neutral, and to secure agreements from all parties involved. This was nearly impossible because the central government in Khartoum did not control the areas where oil was located, and local populations were ethnically and politically distinct from the northern elite. Kastberg stated he was neutral in his humanitarian work, aiming to assist all parties.
When asked about Antonov bombings, livestock losses, and plundering, Kastberg noted that while he couldn’t give precise details, displaced people often lost their livestock, which was essential for livelihoods and social structures. The loss of animals represented a major loss of wealth and stability for these communities. The plaintiff’s counsel also inquired about humanitarian access and aid delivery obstacles. Kastberg explained that flight permissions from the Sudanese government were often denied or delayed, which severely restricted aid and increased mortality, especially among children. Access constraints directly impacted civilian survival.
Lastly, the plaintiff’s counsel asked about communication with Carl Bildt and asked about Kastberg’s impressions concerning oil extraction. Kastberg said Bildt’s lack of public response suggested he needed more information about the situation in Sudan. Kastberg had no specific views on Lundin Oil itself and believed Bildt’s later comments appeared defensive and uninformed about the impact of oil development on civilians.
Supplementary questions from the prosecution
The prosecution followed up on Kastberg’s recollection of contact with Christine Batruch from the Lundin company. When asked if there was anything more to add, Kastberg remembered vague discussions and that she seemed interested in learning more about displacement and conflict, though she made no formal requests. However, due to the time that had passed, Kastberg couldn’t confirm exact details while under oath. He did however express concern that there was a lack of awareness about how the conflict between parties had affected the civilian population.
The prosecution continued and asked if they had discussed in more detail the causes behind the displacement of people. Kastberg responded that generally, when food aid was delivered to refugee areas, the aid was enormous resources valuable to local populations and could be used as power. He emphasized the need for caution in managing these resources to avoid favoring certain parts of the population. He stated that the same applied to oil extraction in conflict zones. Having traveled extensively and been in many areas, Kastberg noted that the extraction industry tends to become a cause of conflict. He felt a responsibility to issue warnings accordingly.
The prosecution then read aloud excerpts from a police report and asked if Kastberg remembered having been interviewed by the Swedish police. Kastberg confirmed being interviewed by police in 2013, though he remembered little about it. During the interview, Batruch’s name was mentioned and documents were referenced, including a map and written material. According to the transcript, Kastberg had told police that Batruch reportedly asserted there was no civilian population at the oil field. Kastberg explained that he had told her the same concerns he had expressed in court: entering a conflict zone with significant resources would inevitably lead to escalated conflicts. Kastberg reiterated that he had no further contact with Batruch and found it surprising that she or others from the company didn’t pursue more information, especially given the humanitarian risks. He stressed the responsibility of companies in sensitive areas to understand the local context.
Final questions from the plaintiffs’ counsel
The plaintiff’s counsel asked one additional question regarding the Khartoum Peace Agreement and its conditions for establishing lasting peace. Kastberg explained that the agreement included promises of a federal government, self-determination, freedom of religion, and the integration of rebel forces into a unified national army. These issues were eventually addressed more thoroughly in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005. However, the 1997 agreement failed in part because the SPLA and its political wing, the SPLM, never signed it. Only minor rebel groups led by Riek Machar were involved, limiting the agreement’s scope and legitimacy. Though the agreement sounded promising on paper, it applied only to a small portion of southern Sudan.
Cross-Examination
The defense for Ian Lundin began by questioning Kastberg about his role as head of UNICEF’s humanitarian operations from 1998 to 2003 and whether he had ever visited Sudan, specifically Unity State. Kastberg clarified that he had never visited the oil-producing areas in Block 5A, meaning his knowledge of those zones was not based on firsthand experience. The defense continued and asked whether UNICEF had field offices in southern Sudan at the time. Kastberg explained that while there were locations where UNICEF worked, they were not permanent offices, only temporary access was negotiated to conduct short-term operations in places like Rumbek, Malakal, Equatoria, and the Congo border area. Kastberg noted that UNICEF’s operations required more on-the-ground presence and close collaboration with local NGOs. However, foreign staff presence was limited due to security risks, foreigners were targeted, and UN staff deaths often led to withdrawal of aid operations.
The defense then asked how UNICEF gathered information about conditions in the field, to which Kastberg explained that UNICEF relied on Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), and communication relied mainly on radio links. Kastberg emphasized the role of the Sudan Council of Churches as a particularly trustworthy source, more so than SPLM or SPLA organizations, whose reports he treated with caution. The defense referenced a police interrogation transcript indicating UNICEF’s reliance on SPLM for data about displacement. Kastberg acknowledged this but reiterated that all information from such sources was carefully verified, often taken “with a grain of salt” and cross-checked for accuracy.
When asked about the causes of displacement, Kastberg said these were mostly due to fighting and insecurity. While they collected personal accounts from displaced people, it was often difficult to determine precise causes or identify perpetrators. Information was supplemented by Human Rights Council reports and steering committee updates. Kastberg also emphasized that internal conflict, including splinter factions of the SPLA and government-backed militias, was the primary reason for displacement in areas like Unity State. However, he could not confirm details about how military incursions happened or exactly which groups were responsible.
The defense pointed out the challenges in identifying exact reasons for displacement. Kastberg agreed, saying that displaced people’s testimonies were often vague or incomplete, and noted the difficulty of fully understanding why people fled, especially since in 1996 the definition of “refugee” was broadened to include those fleeing generalized violence, not just direct persecution. Therefore, exact descriptions of incidents and identification of perpetrators were often elusive.
SPLA access to aircraft and humanitarian flights
The defense continued and questioned whether the SPLA had access to aircraft. Kastberg replied that he believed they did, although he lacked exact details. He explained that some aid organizations chose not to coordinate with Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), preferring to act independently and that many of these groups prioritized saving lives at any cost, even flying into areas at the risk of being shot down. This posed problems for humanitarian operations, as these independent actors sometimes flew in close proximity to UNICEF or UN planes without permission, complicating coordination. Kastberg couldn’t confirm whether SPLA directly used the same aircraft as these independent groups but pointed out that many people considered SPLA’s cause to be legitimate, fighting for independence, and therefore SPLA had access to its own flight resources. He did not have detailed insight into how this worked.
When asked if weapons were transported by air, Kastberg said he was quite sure this happened, though not under OLS, which strictly forbade non-humanitarian cargo. He recalled that there were often tense discussions with individual organizations that wanted to serve as an arm of the rebels, but Operation Lifeline Sudan remained strictly humanitarian. He explained that aid agencies were criticized for flying into southern Sudan, so they had to be transparent about their flight plans and obtain flight permits. Maintaining credibility was vital. Any breach or suspicion of weapons transport could severely damage the overall humanitarian effort.
Information, sources, and contact with Lundin
The defense continued and asked about Kastberg’s communication with Carl Bildt and Christine Batruch. Kastberg said he had shared information with them in the interest of improving understanding, particularly about the severe consequences humanitarian workers were seeing. When asked if he had taken part in the internal reporting produced by company personnel, Kastberg confirmed that he had not. He reiterated that any information he received, including from SPLA, was treated with a “large grain of salt.”
The defense pointed out that Kastberg had never been to Block 5A, witnessed any fighting, or spoke with anyone claiming to be a victim of conflict in Block 5A, and asked on what basis he formed his conclusions about the situation there. Kastberg admitted that he had not but noted that information had been shared with him by Leonardo Franco, the Special Rapporteur. The defense followed up and asked about sources. Kastberg explained that whenever they flew into areas where displaced people had arrived, they gathered information on where these people came from. Reporting was regular and coordinated through several sources. His conclusions were based on information received through these aid operations.
Pressed on the lack of firsthand witnesses, Kastberg emphasized that reports from aid agencies, UN bodies, and interviews with refugees were the primary sources. He noted that displaced people often provided accounts of attacks or fighting, though these were sometimes vague or affected by trauma. Regarding how these claims were verified, Kastberg stated it was extremely important to UNICEF to know where displaced people came from. They relied on the secondary verification through the Human Rights Council, which conducted formal interviews and assessments. UNICEF itself did not do in-depth verification of individual testimonies. Kastberg said statements by displaced people were generally accepted, although detailed fact-checking was handled externally.
Challenges, risks, and ethical considerations
The defense returned to Kastberg’s statement regarding the risk of humanitarian aid fueling conflict. He stressed that all actors, including companies must follow the “do no harm” principle when operating in conflict zones. When the defense brought up a report from Christian Aid, Kastberg, while maintaining some skepticism about certain details, agreed with the report’s overall claim that government forces engaged in warfare in parts of Unity State, causing significant displacement. The defense asked if Kastberg was familiar with Lundin Oil’s response to the Christian Aid report. Kastberg confirmed he had read it but felt it overlooked several key issues and therefore should be treated with some reservation.
The defense then asked about Kastberg’s response to criticism that aid prolonged the conflict by sustaining people’s lives. Kastberg agreed this was a common critique but that it often was a result of aid keeping people alive longer. When asked if aid went to SPLA soldiers, Kastberg acknowledged this was a frequent criticism and an ongoing challenge for aid workers. Regarding whether humanitarian aid could exclude SPLA soldiers, Kastberg explained that SPLA forces often misused resources and it was a constant struggle to prevent armed units from diverting humanitarian aid. However, he recounted visiting rebel-controlled areas where fighters had better resources and food than the civilians for whom the aid was intended.
Re-examination by the prosecution
During re-examination, the prosecutor asked Kastberg further questions about fighting in Equatoria and Block 5A, particularly whether battles had taken place within Block 5A. Kastberg explained that while his understanding wasn’t highly detailed, most of the fighting led to the displacement of civilians, not directly in oil drilling zones but in nearby residential areas. When asked to differentiate between oil zones and Block 5A, Kastberg stated he didn’t have specific information about Block 5A itself but was familiar with surrounding roads and settlements. His focus had been on displacement patterns, not detailed mapping of oil extraction sites. He referred to bombings near the old Chevron Road as examples of violence in the region. Kastberg listed several towns in Unity State, such as Panyijar, Rubkona, Bentiu, and Leer etc. where fighting had taken place.
The prosecutor also asked whether any organizations supported the SPLA with aid or weapons outside of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) coordination. Kastberg said he had no direct knowledge of such actions but noted there were ongoing concerns within OLS about certain groups possibly aiding the SPLA beyond official humanitarian channels. These cases were discouraged, and any reports were forwarded to donors.
Next week
As the following hearing was conducted behind closed doors due to confidentiality concerns, there will be no report covering the witness’s testimony presented during that session. The decision to hold the closed-door session was at the prosecution’s request, citing the need to protect sensitive information related to the security of foreign nationals. The court approved the request in accordance with Chapter 21, Section 5 of the Swedish Public Access to Information and Secrecy Act (OSL) which permits proceedings to be held privately when necessary to safeguard international interests and the safety of individuals.
Our next report will cover the testimony of John Harker and Paul Savage.
