Report 50 – The testimony of Carl Söderbergh and Johan Brosché
During the third week of witness testimonies, the Court heard the witnesses Carl Söderbergh and Johan Brosché. Carl Söderbergh is a public law layer who worked for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Khartoum, Sudan from 1994-1996 and was the Secretary General of Swedish Amnesty International from 1999-2007. Johan Brosché is an Associate Professor at Uppsala University in peace and conflict studies who has done extensive research about Sudan since 2005. Both witnesses provided key insights into the armed conflict in Sudan, its background, and the impact of oil companies’ activities. They also discussed the Sudanese government’s warfare tactics, the situation for civilians, and the knowledge of international actors and researchers about the situation in Sudan at the time.
The testimony of Carl Söderbergh
Carl Söderbergh testified about his knowledge of the non-international armed conflict in Sudan and its background and the impact of oil activities on the conflict, about the situation in Sudan during the period 1994-2003, the ability of civilians in Sudan to speak freely to representatives of the Sudanese government during 1997-2003, about the report writing process within Amnesty International, and his contacts with representatives of the Lundin companies regarding the situation in Sudan.
The prosecutor began by asking Carl Söderberg about his background, including both his academic and professional journey. Söderberg started by detailing his educational background, explaining how he studied at Princeton University, Cambridge University, and Harvard Law School, earning degrees in international relations, law, and human rights. He then continued by describing his early work at Minnesota Lawyers for Human Rights, where he collaborated with the Center for Victims of Torture. Following this, he worked for the UNHCR, supported by Sida, as a legal protection officer in Islamabad and Khartoum. In 1990, he became the Secretary General of Amnesty International’s Swedish section, a role he held for eight years while leading fact-finding missions to locations such as Gaza, the West Bank, Afghanistan, and Nepal. Afterward, he transitioned to academia for a time, and for the past 16 years he has served as Head of Policy at the Minority Rights Group.
Work and the situation in Sudan (1994–1996)
Söderberg described his work as a legal officer with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Sudan from 1994 to 1996 as primarily focused on supporting individual asylum seekers, many of whom were detained. He collaborated closely with local lawyers to help detainees access legal aid and worked with Sudanese authorities to secure safe passage for refugees crossing borders. In particularly severe cases such as the arrest, torture, and murder of a refugee by the police, he provided support to victims’ families and pursued legal justice on their behalf.
In response to questions about the geographic scope of his work, Söderberg stated that while based in Khartoum, he frequently visited various field offices across the country. When asked specifically about the Western Upper Nile region, Söderberg acknowledged having limited direct involvement in the area but noted that one of his core responsibilities was drafting situation reports for UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, requiring him to have broad knowledge of conditions throughout Sudan. He explained that due to the civil war, responsibilities were divided among UN agencies, with UNHCR focusing on international refugees while other agencies based in Juba handled internally displaced persons.
Söderberg characterized Sudan’s political and security situation at the time as deeply repressive. He described the country as isolated under a military dictatorship governed by radical Islamist ideology. International presence was minimal, with many Western diplomats and UN personnel having withdrawn. He also noted that Osama bin Laden was residing in Khartoum at the time, which significantly affected the surroundings and social climate. According to his account, fear was used as a deliberate strategy: so-called “ghost houses” were established in residential areas, including one near the UNHCR representative’s home. Residents, including UN staff, could hear screams and gunfire from these buildings. In his reports, Söderberg documented widespread torture, inhumane detention conditions, slavery, racial tensions between northern and southern Sudanese, child soldiers, and the presence of jihadist training camps near civilian areas.
Regarding overall security, he confirmed that Sudan was in a state of civil war. The government deliberately destabilized southern regions by manipulating inter-ethnic rivalries and alternately supporting or abandoning local warlords to maintain instability. The civilian population suffered immensely due to the scorched-earth tactics employed by the government, including forced displacement, aerial bombardment with barrel bombs, and the deliberate destruction of crops to induce famine and deprive armed opposition groups of support.
As for the underlying causes of the conflict, Söderberg pointed to the legacies of British colonial rule, which created inequalities by marginalizing southern Sudanese while favoring the north. He highlighted deep-rooted racial tensions and historical patterns of exploitation that were later used by successive governments to maintain power. He also acknowledged that natural resources, particularly oil, played a role in the conflict, even though active extraction was not underway during his time there. The regime, he said, sought to secure control of oil-rich areas, often displacing local populations in the process.
Amnesty International and “Sudan: The Human Price of Oil” report
In his capacity as Secretary General of the Swedish section of Amnesty International during the period in question, Söderberg detailed the organization’s involvement in the “Sudan: The Human Price of Oil” report, published in May 2000, which addressed corporate accountability in conflict zones. Although he did not personally participate in the fact-finding mission that led to the report, he confirmed his familiarity with the process, having been involved in eight prior missions. He explained that investigators sought information from a variety of sources, often near conflict zones, and sometimes collaborated with external experts. The investigative and drafting process typically took between four and eight months to ensure both factual accuracy and careful wording.
According to Söderberg, the purpose of the report was to highlight the responsibility of foreign oil operations in relation to human rights, using precedents such as Shell’s operations in Nigeria to draw parallels. Amnesty aimed to pressure companies operating in conflict zones to assess risks and avoid contributing to human rights abuses, including hiring individuals or armed forces involved in atrocities or the use of child soldiers.
In Sweden, these efforts led to the formation of the Swedish Amnesty Business Group, modeled on similar initiatives in the UK and the Netherlands. Söderberg credited Ulf Karlberg, a prominent Amnesty member and former CEO of AstraZeneca, with initiating the group. Comprised of individuals with business backgrounds, the group was structured within Amnesty’s thematic framework and focused specifically on corporate responsibility. Regarding Lundin Oil’s activities, Söderberg recalled being aware that the company operated in Block 5A, a region where civilians were forcibly displaced amid ongoing conflict. Given the ongoing conflict, he stated that he believed that Lundin bore responsibility for ensuring it did not employ militias or other security forces implicated in human rights violations and emphasized the need for the company to carry out due diligence in its hiring and operations.
Söderberg also recounted his initial interactions with Lundin Oil following the release of the report. He stated that the company, reacting to media coverage, requested a meeting with Amnesty. The first meeting was attended by Ian Lundin and other Lundin employees, while a subsequent meeting included former Swedish prime minister and Lundin Oil board member Carl Bildt. According to Söderberg, the atmosphere in these meetings was hostile, with Lundin representatives showing no willingness to engage in constructive dialogue. They categorically denied the report’s findings, yet did not raise any specific objections or factual inaccuracies. He noted that these meetings marked the first direct contact between Amnesty Sweden and Lundin Oil. Additionally, he mentioned discussions with Christin Batruch, the head of the company’s corporate social responsibility team, about developing educational materials on business and human rights. However, after Lundin Oil’s withdrawal from Sudan, the company did not continue the project despite the ongoing relevance of the materials.
Media, Amnesty’s methods, and engagement with Lundin Oil
On May 3, 2000, the same day Amnesty International published its report, Bengt Nilsson’s documentary “Tron, hoppet och oljan” (Faith, hope and oil) was broadcast on Dokument Utifrån. The following day, Swedish television’s Morgon program featured a segment in which Söderbergh and Magnus Nordin, the former CEO of Lundin Oil, participated. Prosecutors later presented two clips from this segment and questioned Söderbergh about his statements and meetings with Lundin representatives. In the clips, Söderbergh was asked to comment on Nilsson’s documentary and the role and responsibility of companies operating in regions like South Sudan.
When asked about meeting people from Lundin Oil, Söderberg confirmed that he likely met Ian Lundin around May 4, 2000, amid intense media activity surrounding the report, though he could not recall whether the meeting took place before or after the SVT broadcast. Regarding his statements in the SVT segment and their basis, Söderbergh explained that they were founded on vetted information from Amnesty’s International Secretariat. He rejected portrayals of the conflict as tribal, emphasizing that the Sudanese regime deliberately manipulated ethnic divisions to maintain control over oil-rich regions through systemic violence. While Lundin later claimed to support Amnesty’s recommendations, Söderbergh recalled that the company’s initial reaction was hostile and dismissive.
Regarding Lundin’s claims that Sudan allowed freedom of expression, Söderbergh described such statements as painful and insulting based on his personal experiences in Khartoum. Although Amnesty investigators were not allowed into Block 5A, they gathered credible information from nearby areas, conducting private interviews with stringent precautions to prevent re-traumatization of victims and ensure accuracy in their reporting. Söderbergh contrasted this approach with Bengt Nilsson’s SVT documentary, which he criticized as a PR effort orchestrated by Lundin Oil. He explained that Amnesty was always careful to avoid interviewing victims in the presence of security forces or using interpreters affiliated with any side in the conflict. The organization prioritized female interpreters and sought out individuals from affected groups—never from rival groups—to ensure neutrality. They also took extensive measures to prevent re-traumatization during interviews. He questioned whether Lundin Oil exercised similar caution.
Furthermore, Söderbergh criticized the SVT documentary, noting that it was funded and facilitated by Lundin Oil, which provided the interpreters used and conducted interviews in the presence of armed groups. He accused the film of lacking journalistic integrity and potentially endangering civilians, particularly those interviewed on camera in militarized contexts. He also recounted how SVT producers later apologized to him and provided an opportunity to voice his criticism of the film.
Söderbergh also affirmed that Amnesty did not explicitly call for companies to leave Sudan and instead maintained a neutral stance on sanctions and boycotts. However, he firmly upheld the report’s findings: the Sudanese government forcibly displaced civilians from oil zones to facilitate extraction, and oil companies bore responsibility for ensuring they did not contribute to human rights abuses—particularly by avoiding the hiring of individuals implicated in atrocities, including child soldiers.
Regarding the Dokument Utifrån segment, in which Bengt Nilsson referred to tribal conflicts as the cause of the violence, Söderbergh dismissed such portrayals as simplistic stereotypes that obscured the Sudanese regime’s deliberate displacement of civilians to facilitate oil extraction. He described the instability in the region, including intra-Nuer clashes, as a calculated strategy by the regime to drive local populations out.
When asked about Carl Bildt’s involvement in both Lundin Oil and the Amnesty Business Group (ABG), Söderbergh described it as brief and controversial. Bildt attended one ABG meeting before resigning, amid internal debate over political neutrality. Söderbergh found Bildt’s comparison of Sudan to the Balkans simplistic and inappropriate given Sudan’s complex situation under an Islamist regime that supported figures such as Osama bin Laden.
Additionally, Söderbergh criticized Lundin Oil’s lack of due diligence—entering depopulated areas without questioning why civilians had fled and ignoring Sudan’s designation on the U.S. terror list. He concluded by characterizing Lundin Oil’s understanding of Sudan’s political environment as naïve. He expressed disbelief that the company failed to recognize the implications of operating in a country listed as a state sponsor of terrorism and hosting figures such as Osama bin Laden. He further condemned Lundin Oil’s apparent disregard for the reasons civilian populations had vacated areas where the company began its oil operations and underscored the need for corporate accountability when business activities indirectly contribute to human rights violations.
Plaintiffs’ counsel cross-examination
After the prosecutors concluded their questioning, the plaintiffs’ counsel began their questioning. When the counsel asked about Amnesty International’s shift toward focusing on business and human rights, Söderbergh explained that it was likely prompted, at least in part, by the high-profile Shell Oil case in Nigeria. While Amnesty had traditionally concentrated on state actors, this marked a shift toward holding businesses accountable in conflict zones.
Regarding Carl Bildt’s simultaneous role on the boards of both Lundin Oil and the Amnesty Business Group (ABG), Söderbergh acknowledged that it had been a source of internal debate. He personally viewed it as problematic due to the risk of perceived political bias but understood that some members saw potential value in dialogue. He emphasized being mindful of reputational risks and the importance of maintaining neutrality.
Defense cross-examination by Ian Lundin’s counsel
During cross-examination, Söderbergh confirmed that he moved to Khartoum in 1994 and remained there until 1996, working primarily in eastern Sudan. His role included monitoring conditions north of the conflict zones, but he did not contribute to Amnesty reports concerning South Sudan. These reports were instead developed within the framework of Amnesty International’s International Secretariat (IS).
When asked about Amnesty’s report “Sudan: The Human Price of Oil” and its production, he clarified that it was produced within the framework of Amnesty International’s Secretariat (IS), led by Anette Weber. He explained that Amnesty Sweden, like other national branches, strictly followed IS guidance to ensure consistency in public communication.
In addressing standards of information gathering, Söderberg emphasized the importance of proper methodology and proper procedures, including conducting interviews in private, using independent interpreters, clearly stating the purpose of the interview, and asking open-ended questions. Failure to adhere to these practices could compromise the credibility of the findings. In such cases, additional interviews and alternative sources must be gathered to construct a comprehensive and accurate understanding of the situation. This principle was described as universally applicable across all reports, aligning with Amnesty’s commitment to accuracy and the ethical guideline of “do no harm”—ensuring that interviews do not retraumatize individuals. When asked about specific sources such as Julie Flint, Söderbergh expressed general trust in the thoroughness of their colleagues at the IS, though he could not personally vouch for the reliability of specific sources.
Lastly, when pressed about not having firsthand knowledge of events in Sudan after his departure, Söderbergh acknowledged that his views were based on Amnesty reports rather than personal observation. But he confirmed that while Amnesty investigators had not been able to access Block 5A directly, they had gotten as close as possible, relying on interviews from surrounding areas. He reiterated his trust in IS’s methodology and verification controls.
Alexander Schneiter’s defense
After Ian Lundin’s defense finished, Alexander Schneiter’s defense began its cross-examination, questioning Söderbergh on his understanding of the Sudanese government’s strategies. He explained that his knowledge was based on extensive reading, discussions with military officers, and analyses. Regarding the government’s use of power tactics, he stated that that the Sudanese government was known to employ manipulative power tactics—something widely recognized and documented. However, he admitted that he had no direct experience working in southern Sudan, so his insights were based on years of reading, analysis, conversations with other defense experts, and general media and scholarly reports.
The defense then presented a clip from Bengt Nilsson’s documentary, challenging Söderbergh’s earlier statement that civilians appeared to be interviewed while surrounded by armed forces. The clip did not visibly show any armed personnel in the brief section referenced during questioning. However, Söderbergh maintained that while no military presence was evident in those two seconds shown, the overall footage suggested that armed forces were nearby. He pointed out that other scenes clearly showed military movement and expressed interest in reviewing additional footage from Bengt Nilsson.
Regarding email correspondence related to Christine Batruch’s communication with Amnesty, including messages to Carl Bildt and discussions with Ulf Karlberg, Söderbergh confirmed that she had had close contact with Karlberg but did not recall specific references to this issue. He remembered Lundin Oil extending an invitation for Amnesty to visit the area but believed the plan never progressed beyond initial discussions, particularly after Lundin Oil withdrew from Sudan.
Addressing questions about Amnesty’s investigative methods and the reliance on secondary sources, Söderbergh emphasized that the absence of direct interviews with affected individuals did not necessarily invalidate the report. He explained that Amnesty’s approach depended on the feasibility of locating witnesses and ensuring their safety. If direct interviews were not possible, the organization aimed to construct an accurate picture using information from other sources, such as humanitarian organizations working in the area. While he admitted that he had no firsthand knowledge of the methodology and was not directly involved in the report’s preparation, he expressed trust in Anette Weber’s work, while also recognizing that no investigative process is entirely free from the possibility of error. Nonetheless, he cautioned against speculative doubts regarding the report’s findings.
The final questions from the defense focused on the appropriateness of Amnesty’s report using sources and interviewing individuals such as Peter Gadet. Söderbergh defended the practice, stating that interviewing all sides in a conflict was a standard and appropriate method in human rights investigations. He maintained that interviewing key figures —including the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)—could provide valuable insight into the dynamics of a conflict, as long as these perspectives were not the sole sources relied upon in a report.
The testimony of Johan Brosché
Johan Brosché was questioned about his knowledge of the non-international armed conflict in Sudan and its background and the impact of oil activities on the conflict, and his knowledge of the Sudanese government’s warfare in connection with the armed conflict. Through his testimony Brosché discussed how during the period 1997-2003, a long-standing non-international armed conflict was taking place in Southern Sudan and that from the early 1990s to 2003, Sudan was ruled by a military dictatorship that did not respect human rights or international humanitarian law. He also described the conditions in and near Block 5A, how they were over control of oil exploration areas and how the Sudanese government applied the “divide and rule” strategy in and around Block 5A. He also further detailed how the Sudanese government’s warfare in the context of the armed conflict involved the Sudanese military and regime-led militia groups systematically attacking civilians.
Johan Brosché is an associate professor at Uppsala University (UU) in peace and conflict studies and at Stockholm University (SU) in international relations. His dissertation, “Masters of War: The Role of Elites in Sudan’s Communal Conflicts”, which he defended in 2014, focused on the Sudan conflict.
Brosché explained that he spent approximately six months conducting research in Sudan. His first visit was in 2007, when Sudan was still unified. However, by the time of his dissertation, the country had split into Sudan and South Sudan, creating challenges for his research as his areas of focus were now divided between two nations. He conducted fieldwork in both Sudan and South Sudan, with key locations including Khartoum, Juba, Malakal, Bor, the Nuba Mountains, and eastern Sudan, although his primary focus was on Khartoum and Juba.
Research and knowledge about Sudan
When asked about his dissertation, Brosché explained that it focused on communal conflicts, exploring why some disputes between local groups escalate into violence while others remain non-violent. He found that such conflicts generally do not turn violent unless political factors or external actors become involved. His research compared three regions of Sudan, and concluded that increased politicization led to greater involvement by elites in society, raising the likelihood of violence. In Western Upper Nile, government bias intensified tensions by supporting one faction, further fueling hostilities. He argued that the Sudanese government deliberately manipulated these dynamics, contributing to the outbreak of violence. His research initially covered 1989 to 2012, focusing on Darfur and eastern Sudan. However, after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement granted South Sudan autonomy, he shifted his focus to Greater Upper Nile. Beginning in 2005, he examined how the South Sudanese government influenced conflicts but clarified that his dissertation did not cover communal conflicts in Greater Upper Nile during the late 1990s or early 2000s.
Since defending his dissertation, Brosché has continued to research Sudan extensively, publishing articles on election-related violence and peace agreements, co-authoring a book on Darfur, and producing up to 15-20 works related to Sudan. While some of his publications address broader themes, Sudan remains central to his research. Regarding his research methods, Brosché emphasized the challenges of evaluating sources in peace and conflict studies where biased narratives are common. He underscored the importance of critically analyzing sources and triangulating information. He has collaborated with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and stated that he considers Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the Crisis Group to be reliable sources.
The prosecution questioned why researchers found it easier to access conflict zones with assistance from rebel groups rather than with the Sudanese government, despite the government’s tight control over certain areas. Brosché explained that the government was responsible for most violations and civilian deaths during the wars and used its control over information to manipulate perceptions of the conflict. He noted that the government frequently misrepresented violence as tribal clashes rather than acknowledging the role of state forces. Researchers working with rebel groups had different perspectives but often had greater access to firsthand accounts in rebel-controlled areas, whereas in government-held regions, information was severely restricted. Brosché also described the Sudanese government’s divide-and-conquer strategy, which involved controlling resources and manipulating ethnic groups to prevent them from unifying against the state, leading to increased violence and weakening traditional conflict-resolution mechanisms. Additionally, he highlighted how the Sudanese regime systematically dismantled local resolution structures, replacing them with leaders who lacked grassroots legitimacy.
Human rights in Sudan and the impact of oil
The prosecution asked Brosché to elaborate on the Sudanese government’s stance on international human rights and humanitarian law between 1989 and 2005. Brosché asserted that throughout Omar al-Bashir’s rule, there was a blatant disregard for international humanitarian law, with numerous attacks on civilians, systematic executions, and the use of starvation as a weapon of war. He highlighted the role of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) in documenting one-sided violence, noting that such abuses occurred every year. He further emphasized that these violations were well-documented and widely recognized within the academic community.
The prosecution also inquired about the Sudanese government’s use of airstrikes, cooperation with militias, and treatment of civilians. Brosché explained that the government employed a combination of airstrikes, militia groups, and army forces to carry out operations. He noted that the government and militias often collaborated, with militia groups executing attacks on behalf of the regime. He also described widespread violations against civilians, including systematic rape and forced displacement during these operations.
Brosché then discussed the discovery of oil, which gave the Sudanese government hope that oil revenues could strengthen the country’s economy. However, he clarified that the oil fields were located in areas within what is now South Sudan, creating significant tension. When asked about how oil was perceived in South Sudan, Brosché explained that the population viewed oil extraction negatively, believing that it primarily benefited the northern regime. Many southern Sudanese saw oil resources as being siphoned off to fuel the regime’s war efforts, reinforcing historical oppression and resource exploitation by the north.
Next, the prosecution inquired about oil’s role in the peace negotiations leading to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and its significance in the discussions. Brosché explained that the CPA was a landmark agreement and a case study for the UN. It addressed multiple critical issues, including border delineation. He highlighted that wealth-sharing, particularly the sharing of oil revenues, was one of the most contentious aspects of the negotiations. Given that oil accounted for 90% of South Sudan’s revenue, the stakes were exceptionally high. Brosché noted that disputes over oil played a central role in Sudan’s civil war and continued after the CPA, particularly regarding the fees Sudan charged South Sudan for transporting oil via its pipeline. When asked how control over oil fields was established, Brosché elaborated that the Sudanese government frequently displaced large populations from resource-rich areas. He explained that military forces, militia groups, helicopters, and airstrikes were employed to drive civilians out and secure control over oil-rich regions, which aligns with accounts given by many of the plaintiffs.
The Khartoum Peace Agreement
The prosecution asked Brosché about the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. He described it as an atypical peace deal in that it was not signed between two opposing factions but rather was an agreement involving parties aligned with the government. He pointed out that Riek Machar, who was involved in the agreement, was backed by the Sudanese government rather than the SPLA. While the government portrayed the agreement as a peace initiative, Brosché noted that it did not lead to de-escalation of hostilities, and fighting persisted.
The prosecution then questioned Sudan’s efforts to maintain control over southern Sudan’s oil fields following the Khartoum Peace Agreement. Brosché explained the shifting allegiances during this period, noting that the government supported both Riek Machar and Paulino Matiep but ultimately favored Matiep for his perceived stability. He emphasized that shifting loyalties were common in such conflicts, as Sudan’s government prioritized control over the oil fields and used both military forces and militias to achieve this goal. He compared these tactics to the government’s actions in Darfur, where the government deliberately incited tribal conflicts to maintain control. However, he stressed that internal conflicts and limited military resources made it increasingly difficult for the government to maintain dominance over the oil-rich regions.
When asked about how the local population viewed the government’s attempts to control these areas, Brosché explained that displacement was the regime’s primary means of securing the oil fields. He noted that most local communities opposed oil exploration, as they feared that the northern regime would exploit the resources for its own benefit. He argued that displacement was a major driver of violence, allowing the government to take control of oil-rich areas without resistance from local populations.
Source Criticism and credibility of reports
The prosecution asked Brosché about the reliability of reports from organizations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Crisis Group (ICG). Brosché described HRW as a highly respected human rights organization and emphasized HRW’s rigorous fieldwork methodology, which includes conducting interviews with various witnesses, and noted that the organization enhances its credibility by refusing to accept government funding. Similarly, he praised ICG for its detailed conflict analyses and deep local knowledge, stating that both organizations are widely trusted in academic circles, despite occasional disagreements.
Regarding reports from the UN Special Rapporteur and the Canadian report by John Harker, Brosché acknowledged that he had not studied the UN Special Rapporteur’s findings in depth but considered them reliable due to the institution’s reputation. He mentioned that Harker’s report aligned with other sources and reinforced his prior understanding of the situation. When asked about the legitimacy of Amnesty’s report authored by Anette Weber, Brosché stated that he had not encountered any criticisms of its accuracy or reliability. While some researchers expressed concerns about Amnesty’s reliance on the SPLA for access to certain regions, he emphasized that no one disputed the reported abuse by the SPLA. He noted that if the report had contained significant inaccuracies, it would have sparked a major controversy—but no such issues had emerged.
Finally, regarding Christian Aid´s reports, Brosché admitted he was less familiar with the organization but had not heard criticism of its work. He pointed out that Christian Aid’s reports were widely cited by researchers and experts and that there were no claims suggesting their findings were biased or influenced by SPLA propaganda. While some concerns had been raised about local organizations being too closely aligned with the SPLA, Christian Aid’s work was generally regarded as accurate and credible.
The plaintiffs’ counsel
After the prosecutors concluded their questioning, the plaintiffs’ counsel took over. They began by asking about the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Describing its methodology, Brosché explained that researchers and assistants were assigned to specific regions, becoming subject matter experts. They collected data from various sources, including news articles, radio broadcasts, and organizational reports, to determine casualty figures within defined calendar years. Violence was categorized into state-based violence, non-state conflicts, and one-sided violence targeting civilians, allowing for a comprehensive global overview of violent incidents.
The plaintiffs’ counsel then asked whether it was possible to operate in Sudan at that time without being aware of the totalitarian nature of the regime in the 1990s. Brosché asserted that Sudan’s government during that period was openly totalitarian, and its abuses were widely known. He stated that it would have been virtually impossible to work in Sudan without encountering information about the regime’s conduct. Whether a company ignored or failed to seek out such information remained unclear, but he emphasized that anyone familiar with Sudan at the time would have understood the situation.
When asked about tribal conflicts, Brosché acknowledged the presence of inter-communal violence in southern Sudan but stressed that such conflicts were often exacerbated or deliberately instigated by the government. He argued that these efforts were part of a broader strategy to secure control over oil-producing regions. While government officials denied direct involvement, Brosché maintained that both the Sudanese military and militia groups played active roles in these operations.
Regarding the credibility of security reports, Brosché recalled reading a report commissioned by Lundin Oil through a law firm approximately four to five years before the trial. While he had initially expected it to contain meaningful insights, he testified that he was ultimately disappointed, stating that the report failed to present new findings. Instead, it largely critiqued existing sources while relying on information from pro-government actors. According to Brosché, the report’s methodology was superficial, based on brief visits and limited observations. He argued that the absence of observed abuses during a short visit to an area did not necessarily mean such abuse did not occur. Furthermore, while the report criticized other investigations for interviewing conflict actors, it engaged in the same practice. From an academic standpoint, he assessed the Lundin report as lacking credibility, noting that the authors applied stricter standards to reports critical of the company than they did to their own sources.
Defense cross-examination
The defense began by asking whether Brosché had conducted specific research on Unity State between 1997 and 2003. He confirmed that he had. When questioned about whether his knowledge of oil extraction in the area was speculative rather than based on direct evidence, he stated that his comments were grounded in his research and studies. As for Lundin Oil’s operations, he stated that he had no insight into the company’s commercial activities.
The defense then turned to Brosché’s media presence since 2013, referencing publications on platforms such as X and Facebook. Brosché responded that in all these contexts, he had spoken cautiously and never as a legal expert, but as a Sudan specialist. On social media platforms such as X and Facebook, he had made certain posts but could not specify how many. According to him, his public reactions were to correct inaccuracies that contradicted his understanding of the situation in Sudan. The defense asked whether this indicated that he had taken an early stance against Lundin, but Brosché explained that he only reacted when narratives did not reflect reality on the ground.
The defense also referred to a 2012 debate article, asking what it concerned. Brosché responded that he had written a rebuttal to an article by Ian and Lucas Lundin published in the newspaper Dagens Nyheter, which he believed contained factual inaccuracies. He emphasized that he wrote solely as a peace and conflict researcher and never made claims about Lundin’s legal culpability.
Additionally, the defense noted that Brosché had been interviewed by police in 2011 regarding potential connections between oil companies and war crimes, including forced displacements. Brosché acknowledged that this had taken place 14 years earlier and stressed that he had never presented these connections as proven fact, merely relaying what he was told. One example he mentioned concerned a conversation at a hotel in Juba with a man who claimed that Lundin Oil had assisted the Sudanese government in purchasing weapons from Ukraine. He did not investigate the claims further, instead seeing his role as passing on information he heard. Another anecdote he shared involved possible financial payments to militia leaders like John Garang or Riek Machar. Again, he emphasized that he had merely heard this and never asserted it as fact.
The defense then questioned him about source criticism, specifically concerning Amnesty’s report. Brosché admitted that he had not conducted a detailed review of the report’s sources but had read the report generally. While acknowledging that ideally all sources should be examined in depth, ideally by tracing each reference back to its origin, he explained that this was not always feasible in practice. However, he acknowledged that the repetition of a claim by multiple sources does not inherently make it more reliable. On Annette Weber’s use of sources, he remarked that interviewing both sides of a conflict is the optimal method for achieving a balanced picture. This triangulation of sources strengthens the reliability of findings.
Finally, the defense referenced an article in Dagens Nyheter that suggested Sudan’s most violent period coincided with Lundin’s presence. Brosché stated that the article made general statements based on available databases but could not specify whether its conclusions aligned precisely with the period of Lundin’s operations. The defense then inquired about the structure of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. Brosché explained that the database relies on sources such as news reports, Amnesty International, and HRW. When asked whether events were recorded with geographic coordinates, he confirmed that they were, though the precision varied. As the defense pressed aggressively for specific figures, such as the number of incidents or SPLM attacks, Brosché reiterated his general knowledge and acknowledged the potential for underreporting of incidents. As the defense persisted in demanding precise statistics, Judge Tomas Zander intervened, noting that the witness had already addressed the question and that further inquiries were unnecessary. With that, the cross-examination came to an end.
Next week
In our report next week, we will cover the testimony of Nils Carstensen and Nils-Arne Kastberg.
