Rapport 67 – John Davidson, John Asworth & Robert Archer 

Gavel on a dark background

The testimony of John Davidson 

John Davidson served in the British special forces unit for 15 years and founded Rubicon in 1999, a UK based security company. Prior to founding Rubicon, he worked for Rapport and was contracted to work for media companies. He has worked in the Democratic republic of Congo, leading a project for copper mining, worked with crisis management for an oil company in Albania and his company was retained by Deloitte’s insurance market and EU development bank to produce risk analysis in hostile environments.  

Rubicon was contracted by Lundin Oil in 1998 or 1999 for their seismic operation. He worked together with Mawiki and Mitch Michaelson who were contracted to Lundin as HSE for the seismic operation.  They would provide daily reports to the project manager at Lundin Oil, which was Ken Barker in the Khartoum office, and the director of operations at Rubicon in London, Lance Linsey, received a weekly report. The set up in Sudan was unusual, he said. Normally everyone would work together in the same place, which was usually in the operational area. However, a direct line was set up between the headquarters in Khartoum and the operational area of Block 5A, which was of a distance of 800km.Davidson testified that he was in touch with Tina Batrouch at the Lundin office in Geneva to discuss the company’s community development project, hearts and minds. This was something he was passionate about. He did not take part in security reporting and he didn’t know what information made its way to the Geneva office. 

In spring of 2001 the Christian Aid report was published, however, Davidson had no memory of the report. He couldn’t remember if anyone at Rubicon produced an analysis regarding the allegations but believed they might have done it as part of their job. The reports produced by Rubicon were mainly for insurance purposes, he said. They had to cover various areas, some that might not be connected to the work. When asked by Weislander if he recalled a Rubcon report from November 2001, in which he references another report they wrote in May 2001 in regards to Christian Aid allegations, he couldn’t. The prosecutor sought leave to display his interview with Swedish police where he said that he was aware of the Christian Aid report and that Rubicon had written a report on it. Davidson told the court that it was likely one of his analysists who had written it. 

Davidson was asked about Petroleum Security and what their role was in Sudan. He told the court that they were intelligent individuals, and they acted as interpreters and liaisons between them and civilians and them and the military. Davidson was unable to answer any questions as to how they made security assessments for the people in the field but said that PetSec was with them any time they left the camp. HSE staff would often come across military soldiers at times, however, didn’t know what PetSec and the military spoke about. The purpose of the military was to secure the operation, and they did so by guarding the well sites. Davidson told the court that due to the nature of the work, HSE staff would only go along the all-weather road between the operational site and the camp, saying there was no need to go anywhere else. Therefore, there was no need for PetSec to plan or make security assessments for other areas. Around the operational area was flat land and he told the court one would occasionally see cattle, women carrying things on their heads, smoke from villages and children playing, however, he told the court he didn’t know anything about people outside of these areas. 

Any seismic activity required separate security assessments because the teams would venture out further. Davidson testified that they took “great care” to inform civilians in relevant areas about the seismic operation. This was a part of the hearts and minds project he said, and it was conducted by HSE staff and guard force. Reports regarding the security situation and militia activity were sent to the London office and Davidson said he likely received them but he couldn’t recall the content. 

The relationship between HSE staff and PetSec was initially frosty, he said, and it took some time to gain their trust. The prosecution asked whether he trusted them as interpreters and he explained that you have to trust the people you work with, “Im sat here today in the same situation. You never know but you have to trust the people you are working with”. In response to this, the prosecution sought leave to discuss Davidson’s answer to the same question in his police interview years earlier in which his response indicated a different opinion. Davidson explained that he likely spoke about a particular incident. He had been at a spontaneous meeting with militia commanders which became quite intense and loud. He had noticed that PetSec staff wasn’t interpreting his questions, however, he believed that was for the purpose of not escalating the situation.  

The prosecution raised questions regarding the “buffer zone” around the seismic operational area. Davidson explained that “buffer zone” is a military term referring to the protection of something, saying “you want to set up as many onion rings around it [the operational area] so it gives you enough time to evacuate”. Without a buffer zone, one wouldn’t realize there is an issue until the problem has already arrived. He told the court that this didn’t necessarily require military. This area was under militia control, and he said they were the eyes and ears for the operation. The buffer zone would have be beneficial against attacks that might’ve come from a distance. Gadet had mortars that had a range of 10 kilometers and once it exploded it had a radius of 100 meters. These could be fired from a distance and only required two people to operate. 

Davison was then asked to elucidate his recommendation of building another road to the west which would move the military out of range and create a buffer zone. This strategy would enforce this buffer zone and allow the military to observe any incoming threats prior to them being on their doorstep. Roads allowed the company to move equipment and troops but the significance for Davidson was to move the military out of the way from mortar attacks. He had made a further recommendation to put pressure on the government in order to “flood” areas south with troops. He explained that this was a military strategy to show strength without engaging in battle or conflict. He emphasized that the recommendation was simply a show of strength. However, Barker shut it down quickly.  

Davidson went to Sudan in October 2001, for 10 days to collect information for a security analysis for insurance purposes. There was a need for thorough insurance analysis because of events around the world such as 9/11 in New York. The prosecutor raised the August attack against Heglig in 2001 as a more localized event as a possible reason for Davidsons trip, an incident he remembers being briefed on. The preparation was mainly briefing on how to travel, what visas were required and brief background “desk analysis” information. This information was provided to him by his analysts. He didn’t receive any information from Lundin Oil prior to arriving but once there his task was to investigate the situation.  

He sought to speak to as many people as he could in the time he was there. He spoke to Glendenning, Barke, Sarney, Ramsey and representatives from PetSec and the Sudanese military commander. The actual report was largely written by his analysts back in London, “Im not an academic”, but he signed off on it prior to it being published. The final report stated that the most significant threat to the operation were militia groups, Peter Gadet specifically. Gadet had managed to circumvent the military forces protecting the pipeline and attacked it. His reputation for indiscriminate attacks was a threat to the operations because of the possibility of attacks against the operation. When asked about the report claiming that some attacks carried out by the SPLA were against oil operations, Davidson placed responsibility on his analyst, although he said it was fit for purpose at the time. Upon returning from his trip to Sudan, he sat down with an analyst and dictated his part of the report which they then incorporated in the final report. He said that the analysts did a deep dive into the situation in Sudan on Lexis Nexis. 

Davidson is a friend of the Lundin family and therefore told the court that he had met many of them since. 

Percy Bratt, attorney for a number of plaintiffs, held a short examination and asked him if he would classify the regime in Khartoum as an Islamic military dictatorship, Davidson told the court that he couldn’t answer that because he was not an analyst. Bratt asked him if he ever reflected on whether the army violated human rights of civilians but he responded, “they were already there when he came”. 

Ian Lundin’s defense attorney, Torgny Wetterberg, commenced his cross examination by clarifying dates and places of his testimony. Rubicon had people in Sudan for the seismic work in 2001, his own 10-day trip resulted in the report which was discussed by prosecution. The director of operations, Lance Lindsey, in the Rubicon office in London received weekly reports from his employees about what was happening with the operation, what was planned and if he required anything to do his job. Wetterberg asked him if Maweka would have reported information about civilians being displaced or harmed because of Lundin Oil’s operation, “absolutely. In fact, if that happened, he would’ve called the main office immediately”. He never received such information. The questions moved to the Hearts and Minds project undertaken by Lundin Oil. Davidson testified that the company was “very keen to develop this”. He was involved in the development projects and had several conversations with Batrouch about it. 

Davidson never saw civilians being displaced, nor did he see burned villages. He was asked about the military and testified that they were defensive and static, their main purpose was to guard operational areas and well sites. There was a huge amount of people wearing flip flops, t shirts, shorts or a military top or military pants, all armed with weapons. You wouldn’t know who they were. He noted that incidents happen when people have access to alcohol and weapons, indicating that violence in villages and towns were locals fighting each other occasionally. The military had brand new uniforms and shiny boots, which Davidson said was an indication that they were not front line soldiers. He further suggested that it was likely they would not have been able to protect the operation from a larger attack, “I would not have liked to test it [the qualification], they were static military, not front line troops”. He went on to say that peace was “hugely important”. 

The testimony of John Ashworth 

Martina Winslow commenced the examination in chief on Wednesday morning. John Ashworth is sitting in front of Judge Thomas Zander and his fellow lay-judges, with the four prosecutors to his left and Ian Lundin’s defense team to his right. He is a catholic priest who spent forty years in Sudan in various roles, advocating for peace between the regime and the rebels. When Judge Zander had finished his introduction and Archer had taken his oath, Winslow asked him to describe how he came to end up in Sudan. 

Archer begins by wishing everyone good morning, his voice carries strong in the court room, “in Africa we always start by greeting”. During his time in Sudan, he was a pastor in Bentiu, the principal of a secondary school and engaged in humanitarian and advocacy work for the purpose of promoting peace in Sudan. Archer described the churches as ecumenical and that they were grassroot organizations advocating for peace. He arrived in Bentiu in 1983 as a catholic priest. He had been assigned to Malakal and was then appointed to Bentiu. He lived in Bentiu town, but they travelled around to various chapels. He explained that the Catholic model is to have a central congregation and small chapels up to 100 kilometers away.  

Ashworth explains that he became involved in the church’s humanitarian work through Sudan Aid, which was developed by the development and relief branch of the church. He moved to Khartoum in an effort to coordinate aid for people and towns in need, “The people were marginalized, vulnerable and oppressed by the regime in Khartoum. They were poor and we helped as much as we could”. In 1995, Archer was asked to become the coordinator of the ecumenical consortium, coordinating aid efforts to South Sudan, Nuba mountains and the Blue Nile. He told the court that this was the first time he went to rebel controlled areas. His main purpose in the role of coordinator was to develop the process and capacity of the work to ensure it was sustainable. In 1999 he became Sudan Focal Point for Africa, a role in which he would collect information about what was happening in the country and to its people. The locals felt the war was forgotten “it was important to give them a voice”. The information would be collected by various sources, he testified, but the main source was the church. Civilians would report incidents to them, and they would observe incidents from where they operated. This information would be passed on to people in Europe who would collate, analyze and pass it on to international organizations and embassies, anyone who was interested. He took over the role after Nils Castersen, a Danish church worker. He acted as the focal point for Africa until 2005 or 2006, at which point the comprehensive peace agreement was signed and he no longer felt he was needed there. 

Between 1999 and 2006, Ashworth was stationed in Nairobi until 2001 but visited Sudan about nine times a year, for three weeks each time. Due to the nature of his work, he travelled widely in South Sudan, Nuba Mountains, Blue Nile and Khartoum. It was important to maintain good relations with all parties for various reasons. He told the court that travel permits were required to travel around certain areas and on the side of his humanitarian work, he was lobbying for peace and believed that good relations and exchange of information was the most effective way to achieve this. They maintained relations with the regime by visiting the embassies and officials and they did the same with the SPLA. They would occasionally receive information from these parties as well, however, he maintained that they would ensure that intelligence was considered in light of biases each side had.  

Ashworth told the court that he didn’t return to Bentiu after his first time because it was under the control of the government and he had no access. While the town was under siege by the government, he testified that churches and international organizations were barred for “security” reasons. Ashworth expressly used inverted commas while saying this to the court, explaining that it was a hot zone for the war. Around 1999 unity state, which he said was the Greater Upper Nile are during his time there, was under government control by proxy. Machar’s militia faction had direct control of the area initially and Matiep took control later, however, both factions were government-allied at the time of control. Ashworth told the court that he had been told off by Machar once, for calling his forces a militia. 

When Winslow asked him to describe Paulino Matiep, Ashworth expressed the need to declare a personal interest prior to answering the question, “he sentenced me to death one time”. He went on to explain that rebel fighters joined the army at the end of the first civil war in Sudan. Those who didn’t remained in the bush, and he said they were mainly Nuer fighters. Matiep defected from the regime at one point and joined the Nuer rebels who were at the time fighting the regime independently from the SPLA. When oil exploration began in the country in the 70s, the rebels saw this as another example of the regime attempting to expand their influence into their territory. The practical impact for the rebels was that the airstrips and roads built in connection with the oil operation made it easier for the army to gain access to their areas, which had previously been near impenetrable, especially during rainy season. He explained that the people in the south found the employment practices were biased towards the north Sudanese. 

Ashworth expanded on the various milita groups, telling the court that Matiep was a Nuer leader and travelled to Ethipoia to speak with and gain resources from Garang. The meeting was unsuccessful and Matiep returned and fought against the government parallel to the SPLA. Multiple defections occurred after this time, from both sides. Winslow asked him to speak on the the issue of tribes fighting each other. This is a point raised by witnesses and both Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneitres defense teams. Ashworth provided more nuance to the conversation by explaining that the word ‘tribal’ has different meanings to different people, especially for people who don’t live in that context. He testified that Nuer and Dinka tribes were not fighting each other when he arrived in 1983. He categorized it as tensions between nomadic pastoralists, which included people of both tribes, and more settled agricultural people. He told the court that Nuer and Dinka were like brothers and sisters and they were very intertwined. Ashworth said that conflicts started in 1991 when the SPLA split. The main reason for the split was that one side wanted independence and the other wanted a unified democratic Sudan. After the split, people followed their leader. The conflicts that followed brough much violence between the different groups, which built hate for each other. Ashworth continues by telling the court that term has now become a term used by government to avoid responsibility. The conflict between tribes is a result of the national political dynamics which are often the result of intentional interference by people in power. 

The prosecutor asked him to elucidate on what he meant by intentional interference and political manipulation. Ashworth explained that it was beneficial for the regime to ensure that the rebels were split rather than one unified group. If the various groups remain small, the government can offer support and resources to them, and they will fight for them instead of against them. He also explained that by having allies, they also had multiple names which was a good propaganda tool. 

In his role as Focal point for Africa, Ashworth produced monthly reports for five years. These reports covered the military, political and humanitarian situation in Sudan and were passed on to a wide international network of governments, churches, NGOs, diplomats and journalists. He would facilitate a forum where this information would be presented. Ashworth told the court that the churches were grassroot organizations and were present in places other organizations could not access because of the security situation. The majority of their information was collected from ordinary people who came to church. They also received some information from NGOs, representatives from SPLA and the regime. As mentioned previously, the latter were considered less reliable because of their obvious biases. The reports would be looked over by multiple people and they would ensure to double check the information against other information as well as consider the context. If there were uncertainties, that would be noted. Ashworth did not used an interpreter often as he speak English, Arabic and Nuer. 

The prosecution asked Ashworth about a report regarding bombing of civilians, dated 30 October 2000. They had been receiving reports about systemic bombings against civilians for a while and Ashworth said that some church leaders decided that they would write a report about it. Ashworth told the court that after speaking to army soldiers and commanders, they spoke of southern Sudanese people as the “enemy”. It was also clear that the army treated southern Sudanese people poorly whether they had a connection to the military or not. A bishop in South Sudan had famously said “is it a crime to be south Sudanese in Sudan” and Ashworth said it seemed to be true. He continued, it was clear that the army used a “scorched earth tactic” to remove civilians from the oil fields. The fighting on the ground was mostly done by militias allied with the regime. A report about bombing s of civilians, dated 10 February 2001, divided the incidents by geographical areas. This report was produced in an effort to compile scattered reports and make it more cohesive, including details of when, where and what happened. Ashworth said he would receive the rare satellite phone call reporting bombing as they happened. The most common way to report such incidents was by way of radio and if one had no radio, the information would be written down and walked to him. Pastors walked from all over to deliver reports of such incidents, Ashworth said. 

Subsequent reports in May-June 2001, provided information about incidents involving Antonov planes circling villages, the army destroying villages and bombs being dropped from planes. In a report spanning over January to April 2002, he wrote “villages destroyed by government”, which Ashworth clarified meant “villages burned to the ground”. The sources of these reports were the same as his other reports. Some of these reports were further compiled in 6 monthly reports, he believed these reports were mainly for the information that was hand delivered to him because of the time in between the incident and the information reaching him. 

Percy Bratt asked a handful of questions about the KPA. Ashworth didn’t believe that the KPA ever had the capacity to bring peace. The two sides had two completely different goals and John Garang, one of the most visible rebel commanders, never became a signatory to the agreement, severely undermining its impact. Ashworth couldn’t speak to motives, but said that from what they heard on the ground, the government believed that the oil operation would result in revenue for the regime. The churches were of the opinion that this fueled the war. 

Anders Sjögren, attorney for other plaintiffs, asked about the later peace-making efforts. Ashworth told the court that the churches called to meetings in an attempt to reconcile the rebel forces. They spoke to village alders, chiefs and women, using both traditional Nuer and Dinka peace making measures as well as contemporary church related measures and techniques. He said that Machar and Garang reconciled in 2002. He believed the regime was not happy about this as it was contrary to their divide and conquer policies, but this was an analysis they made. Ashworth told the court that he has seen churches and cathedrals destroyed by bombs and ground actions. One such incident was in the Nuba mountains where a church school was bombed and 22 children died. 

Defense’s cross-examinations 

Olle Kullinger, Alexandre Schneiders counsel, commenced the cross-examination by diving into the deposition given by Ashworth in March 2005 for the Talisman matter. Kullinger wanted to assert that because the deposition was closer in time than the police interview and his hearing, that would take precedent should there be any differences in testimony. Ashworth noted that the deposition was done in a very aggressive manner. Kullinger sought to clarify where his church received financial assistance from. The New Sudan Council of Churches (NSCC) was a consortium of churches of which one of the churched was Sudan’s Presbyterian church. A meeting was held with the NSCC and the SPLA in Kieko between 21-24 July 1997, which was discussed in the book “Come let us reason together” published in 1998. At that meeting the two parties suggested a number of joint resolutions. Ashworth told the court that the church was struggling to maintain their space within south Sudan as it was dominated by SPLA and they believed the meeting was to protect that space and ensure that the church could continue their support, religious and humanitarian services. He said he had sent a representative but that the view of the church was not necessarily in line with Garang and his faction of the SPLA, the resolution was more of an acknowledgement that they were engaged in an armed conflict alongside the fact that the church wanted to continue their work in the country, “Church believed in freeing the poor and oppressed and we recognized that SPLA had an armed conflict and the two are different”. 

Kullinger then focused his cross-examination on the bombings and allegations of chemical weapons used against civilians and the audience could immediately feel the tension rise in court room 34. The style of questions used by Alexandre Scnheiters defense this day seemed like an attempt destabilize Ashworth and thereby discredit his testimony. He questioned Ashowrth’s sources, how the information was certified and the overall credibility of his reports, the underlying questing being “did these incidents happen at all?”. Ashworth’s responses didn’t falter, however, and he remained clear and concise both in tone and information, which added to his credibility as a witness. He told the court that the reports about chemical warfare had not been credibly supported and that they had chosen not to investigate the claims further. Kullinger pressed on, displaying a letter by James Nhinru, a pastor who made allegations of chemical warfare in a letter. Ashworth told the court that what we saw on the screens in the courtroom was a Christmas letter to his family and that it was not as rigorous as a report. This was an opinion or belief of the pastor, but that was not necessarily what had happened. He emphasized again that they did not pursue the allegations of chemical warfare because they did find any evidence of such incidents occurring, nor did they have capacity to look for it. Kullinger showed the court documents which supported the claim that chemical weapons had not been used. The soil had been tested, and they had not found any evidence of the use of chemical weapons. There was an edge to Ashworth’s voice when he responded that it was a “good decision to not pursue the claim then” He further challenged Ashworth’s testimony by positing that Daniel Eath was, who provided information about bombing incidents, was a central figure in SPLA’s “propaganda machine”, however Ashworth responded that the SPLA weren’t organized enough to have a propaganda machine, however, it was no secret that Eath had a good relationship with the SPLA and again, sources were cross-checked.  

Kullinger asked Ashworth about the credibility of a number of sources he had mentioned, which Ashworth answered by giving brief background as to the relationship and credibility of said sources. Tensions rose even further when the defenses questions moved to the bombing incidents and why they had cosen to report on them, arguing that those allegations had come about in the same way as the allegations of chemical weapons. Ashworth told the court that the sources were many and credible. He himself had seen buildings damaged by bombs and photographs of bomb craters. Kullinger then asks a series of questions about whether Ashworth, who holds a physics degree, ever conducted any calculations on the likelihood of bombs dropped from Antonov planes hitting their target. At this point Ashworth was seemingly annoyed with the questions posed by the defense counsel, asking him “are you asking me questions or are you grandstanding?”. Judge Zander intervened and confirmed wither any calculations were made and Ashworth denied having made any. On an earlier question by defense, he had testified that the purpose of the reports was to advocate for peace. They had not been produced for the purpose of being evidence in court. 

Ian Lundin’s defense team had no further questions. 

The testimony of Robert Archer 

Robert Archer was a director at John Smith Projects from 1985 and was contracted to work for Lundin Oil as a consultant. David Johnson started working at John Smith projects and brought with him a year and a half of experience working with Lundin Oil. When Johnson was finished with his rotation in Sudan, Archer was asked to step in for three months. His first three-month rotation started in 2001 according to his police interview. Archer agrees, “if that could be proven in writing, then yes that could be it”. Archer went on three rotations in Sudan. He was copied into Johnsons work prior to going to Sudan and he therefore knew that his role in Sudan was to observe the appointment of contractors in Block 5A. His work was mainly in Khartoum, and he very rarely travelled out in the field. The weekly reports Archer produced for John Smith Projects were essentially a weekly diary containing the daily work carried out and any relevant observations. 

When Archer left for Sudan, he was briefed by Johnson who told him that there was an ongoing conflict in the country and that he should take advice from Lundin Oil themselves as to how to best operate in those conditions. In Sudan, Sarney and Barker briefed him on the rules of engagement and working and their security specialist, whom he couldn’t recall, would provide a security briefing. His direct line manager was Sarney and Barker was the head of operations in Sudan to his knowledge. 

Archer recalls that his first two trips to Sudan were relatively uneventful. The local security situation in Khartoum became a problem during his third trip and he had to leave the country because of it. During his first trip he visited Block 5A once for the purpose of improving and forming relationships with local villagers. He couldn’t recall what village they visited, but they flew into Ruhshona and travelled by Jeep along the all-weather road to the village. He doesn’t recall much from the trip other than being introduced to the leader of the village, “I believe I was only there as a part of the PR exercise”. Archer told the court that he wasn’t required to provide any technical expertise. “It was for my benefit as well”, he said. He needed an understanding of the people present so he could take that into consideration when the contractors were to be appointed. 

Archer testified that he worked on many roads but couldn’t tell the court when he worked on what road. For the tender process, him and Johnson would be provided with a standard  list of previous contractors. If there was a new contractor, Archer and Johnson would check the necessary requirements. An open panel would be held where the tender reports and conclusions were presented, a process he was suspicious of. He never knew everyone who was there and he had been under the impression that the decision was made by the company, but he accepted this as the norm and did his job in presenting his conclusions. 

Archer was unable to recall the road to Nihaldiu and only recognized “MOK road” by name, explaining he would’ve likely done a site visit but that nothing had been noteworthy. He noted that security might have been higher during these roads, but it wasn’t his job to ask questions about security. The MOK road was partially financed by company and partially financed by the regime but Archer told the court that he was not involved in finalizing the contract, nor in any discussions about the financials, and therefore didn’t have much to add. He believed the decision is likely to have been made by the “Lundin management” although he noted that “management” was used as a general term, he wasn’t aware of who specifically made the decisions. 

The plaintiffs’ counsels had no questions for Archer, so Ian Lundin’s defense attorney, Torgny Tendorf commenced his cross-examination of Archer. He explained that he was not involved in the process after the tender report was written and that he couldn’t answer questions about the finalized contract. At the time he was still reporting internally to Lundin Oil in 2003 as was evidenced by the inspection report he authored in February of that year. The report named Archer as the inspector for the road to MOK, however, he couldn’t remember doing so. The information in the report was given to him, he said, but he couldn’t remember by whom. Documents indicated that the first half of the MOK road would’ve been financed by Lundin Oil and the rest of the road by the regime, but Archer couldn’t elaborate on that point. 

Alexandre Schneitre’s defense team were interested in Archer elaborating on an incident he  spoke of in his police interview. He told the court that while going to inspect a road there had been two armored vehicles accompanying them. He had found this strange but couldn’t elaborate more on the matter, 

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