Report 71 – The Testimony of Carl Bildt
Thursday 15 January 2026 marked the appearance of the Lundin Oil trial’s perhaps most highly anticipated witness: former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt. Bildt, who was prime minister from 1991-1994, then Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2006-2014, joined Lundin Oil’s board of directors in 2000 in the wake of several media and NGO reports connecting the company’s operations in southern Sudan to serious human rights violations.
Bildt takes the stand in Courtroom 34
Well before 9:00 on Thursday morning, a large crowd of media and other interested observers gathered outside of Courtroom 34 in Stockholm District Court, eagerly awaiting the arrival of the day’s witness, Carl Bildt. The nearly three-year long trial has seen only a few rare days where court security staff have had to manage access to the courtroom: on this particular day, it seemed that more people than ever were waiting for a chance to get a seat inside. The public gallery seats in the back of Courtroom 34, usually only sparsely populated by a few dedicated trial observers, quickly filled up and those left outside were directed to an overflow room where the hearing would be live-streamed. Notably, four plaintiffs who had testified earlier in the trial were present in the courtroom, sitting next to their respective attorneys. The two defendants, Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter, appeared as usual via link.
Shortly after 9:30 a.m., Bildt entered the packed courtroom and took his seat at the witness table in the front. As he welcomed the witness, presiding judge Thomas Zander remarked on the unusually large audience as he went through his usual introduction of the various parties to the case. He then explained to Bildt that the prosecution had called him as a witness to testify about his knowledge of the situation in and around Block 5A; the company’s activities; Bildt’s knowledge of methods of warfare employed by the Sudanese regime; the content of documents and meetings that Bildt had written, received, or participated in; and Bildt’s contact with the Sudanese government and other organisations as part of his role as a board member of Lundin Petroleum and Lundin AB. Zander, as he often does at this point, noted that much time had passed since the events in question and the court understood that it could be hard to remember what had happened so long ago. With that, Carl Bildt swore the witness oath and the hearing was underway.
The prosecution’s examination
Ewa Korpi began the prosecution’s examination by asking Bildt if he knew why he had been asked to join the Lundin Oil board. Bildt was rather evasive about his understanding of why he had gotten the assignment and instead explained why he accepted it: “I accepted because I believed it was an interesting company that was operating all over the world with operations that required broad experience on the board.” His role was not specifically linked to the project in Sudan, he said – he had the same responsibilities as any other board member, which included taking responsibility for decisions made by the board. He believed that his added value was his knowledge of the different countries in which the company had operations. Asked if his qualifications for the role included experience in conflict resolution, Bildt said no, although “[y]ou would have to ask Adolf Lundin about that.” Often throughout this early part of his testimony, Bildt repeated that his role and responsibilities and the role and responsibilities of the Lundin Oil board were like those of the board of any other company
Bildt described his knowledge of the Sudanese civil war and the situation in Block 5A as fairly limited at the time he joined the board. He had not visited Sudan, though he had been to the neighbouring countries and had knowledge about the region and Sudan generally, and he stressed again that Sudan was just one of the company’s many projects around the world. He could not recall what if any information he got about the country when he became a board member, adding that it was only later that he had cause to read human rights reports about Sudan.
The prosecution then inquired about Bildt’s understanding of the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA), which Bildt described as “a part of the complex dynamics that were going on in the complicated conflict.” He said he had only general knowledge of the situation and at the time saw no need to do a “deep dive” because his focus was on the company’s current and future operations. The KPA included a particular condition that the Sudanese army could not go south of the Bahr el Ghazal river – a key point in the prosecution’s argument that the army breached the KPA by entering the block after oil was discovered at the Thar Jath site, but Bildt said that he did not have any specific knowledge about this, or about the different parties’ views on the presence of the army in Block 5A – specifically that this was a controversial issue. He stressed that Block 5A was “a huge area” so it was impossible for the company to know what was happening in every part of it. “We could only know what was happening in the area where the company had its operations.” This proved to be a recurring theme in Bildt’s testimony – that the company’s focus, even when it came to broader security issues, was on the areas it could directly observe.
The prosecution asked several questions trying to establish Bildt’s knowledge of the situation in southern Sudan before he joined the board, including what he knew of various peace initiatives as well as about security issues that the company had faced. He did not recall details about the attack on the rig at Thar Jath but said that based on his experience working in conflict areas, he thought the company had experienced “remarkably few” security incidents. “[The number of incidents] was not non-existent but it was remarkably low.” Asked about the 1999 Wunlit Peace Conference, he said he did not remember knowing about it at the time but read about it later. “I am quite well-read on the entire conflict,” he mentioned, adding that “[O]n my bookshelf at home, I have a number of books that mention it.”
The prosecution noted a series of security issues and fighting that took place around that time – in particular, incidents connected to the construction of the all-weather road. Bildt’s view was that the road construction was not a security problem – “[it] was not viewed as a problem in any way.” Here, the prosecution displayed a lengthy security log listing a number of incidents along the road. Bildt jumped in to comment more generally on the conflict – “the north-south conflict” – and said that the list of incidents reflected different Nuer factions fighting one another in areas “much farther away.” He added that what was important was that civilians fled to the company’s area.
The prosecution proceeded to read through the list of incidents, asking if Bildt had been informed about them when he joined the board. He said he had not, nor had he been told about any problems with securing the block or the road construction area. He reiterated that as a board member, he had not been involved in operational issues, only issues that “had a significant impact on the business.” The suspension of the Sudan project operations did not, in his telling, seem to be an issue that rose to this level. Nor did he know about reports classifying the security situation in the block as “condition black,” but added that he did not see reports that the army was present in the area as strange. “Their interest in having the road open wasn’t particularly strange either.”
The questioning then turned to Christine Batruch, whose report rebutting the NGO allegations had just come out when Bildt joined the Lundin Oil board in May 2000. He testified that he did not recall discussing the report with her at that time but said that he must have read it later. Batruch’s report laid out four possible strategies for the company to pursue in its Sudan operations, the first being “business as usual.” The second option was to pull out of Sudan completely, the third to continue operating but cooperate more closely with NGO regarding the human rights situation, and the fourth was a temporary withdrawal. The prosecutor attempted to ask Bildt specifically about Option 1, but Bildt insisted on being permitted to read through the other three options. “These are four hypotheses,” he emphasized, “not a description of what happened but what could be. They are four HYPOTHETICAL options.” He testified that he did not recall the board discussing these options or Batruch’s presentation but said that the approach that the company ultimately took reflected Option 3 in many ways.
“The Scorched Earth” and UN reports
Following the morning coffee break, the hearing then turned to Christian Aid’s “The Scorched Earth” report, which Bildt did clearly remember. “This was the most important report during the chain of events. Subsequent reports were copy-pasted from the Christian Aid report. We took it very seriously.” He referred to Batruch’s work, saying that a lot of effort was put in place to check the statements and allegations contained in the report. Ultimately, he concluded, the company had “significant difficulties” with it. “We could not relate what they said with the realities of people in the company.” Christian Aid was “closely linked to the south in the civil war,” according to Bildt, which was why they had to use “a large pinch of salt” when listening to what they said. Moreover, he said, the report had confused the two roads and instead described events connected to the old Chevron road, “which passed through a very complicated area.” Although Christian Aid had presented many details, “when we tried to correlate it, almost nothing was applicable to our area. They criticized the wrong road,” Bildt concluded.
Korpi, however, did not dwell on this and moved on to the Lundin Oil board meeting that Mark Curtis from Christian Aid attended. This, Bildt did remember, although he said he did not participate in the meeting himself. “But I remember we took [the report] very seriously, we invited him and tried to understand the details.” Here, the prosecution asked if Bildt was given any particular role on the board after the report came out – perhaps a role to manage the response, Korpi suggested. “I answered questions from journalists – what do you mean, a role?” was Bildt’s reply. Korpi continued to probe, asking if he was tasked with responding to the media criticism of the company. Bildt denied that this was a specific role and instead criticized the media’s level of knowledge about Sudan and the conflict at the time. “People could spell Sudan, that was the extent of their knowledge.” Nor did he have a role in the company’s investigation, he added. “It was about very detailed information about what happened on the ground, and I had nothing to do with that. My role was to take it seriously, and the company did.”
Moving on to UN Special Rapporteur Gerhard Baum’s report and statements about the impact of oil extraction on the human rights situation in southern Sudan, the prosecution displayed an email from Christine Batruch to several people, including Bildt, Ian Lundin, and Alexandre Schneiter, describing how she and Ian Lundin met with Baum to address his allegations about the oil road and present the company’s view of the situation. Bildt described this as “fairly natural” and a sign of how seriously the company took the human rights reports and their dialogue with international representatives. He said that the company had tried in vain to get Baum to visit their area, but he never did.
Asked if the board ever discussed Baum’s allegations that the regime conducted indiscriminate bombings against civilians, Bildt was somewhat evasive and emphasized that Nhialdiu, where the reported bombings occurred, was “quite far to the west.” Although it was technically within Block 5A, the company did not have any activities there and had no way of checking what was happening there. Moreover, he said, it was where one of the militia leaders was headquartered so “undoubtedly many things happened there.” He reiterated that the company had no reason to look into Baum’s reports of attacks in Nhialdiu because it was not in their area. “We knew there was fighting going on. Upper Nile – it was not in our area, or maybe it is but it’s far away. We had no presence there.” As such, he did not think this was something the board would have discussed and he had no recollection of any such discussions.
The prosecution noted that Batruch’s 2001 “white book” was focused on responding to “The Scorched Earth” allegations and did not address the Harker report, Baum’s oral statement to the UN, the Amnesty International report published during that time period, or other reports. Bildt’s explanation was that the Christian Aid report was the only one with any details about “things happening in our area.” The Harker report, for example, was about the Heglig area – “a completely different area,” so the company saw no reason to do a “deep dive” into that. As for the Baum report, it was on a “very general level.” The prosecution pointed out that Harker described the methods of warfare used by the Sudanese regime – methods that were reportedly used in Block 5A, but Bildt did not see this as being relevant to Lundin Oil. Did the board or company management discuss their engagement with the regime considering the serious allegations about how they were managing the war, even if this particular report was about a different area? No, responded Bildt, maintaining that they were very focused on the Christian Aid report “because that was about our area and there was a high level of detail.” Bildt also testified that he had not heard any reports of bombing in Lundin Oil’s area of operations. After he made several references to “our area” the prosecution asked what he meant by that, to which he explained: “Rubkona, around Bentiu, the road going to Thar Jath – what can be seen and heard from those areas. Those are the main areas.”
Bildt’s emails to Lundin Oil management
The prosecution then displayed emails Bildt had sent to company management, including to Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter, in June 2001, in which he observed that “[t]he Sudan situation is deteriorating at the moment,” with recent SPLA successes likely to result in the regime responding “in increasingly unacceptable ways.” He added that although he had not yet heard of problems in the oil fields, foreign oil companies and their operations would be next on the SPLA’s target list. In another email sent the following day, 19 June 2001, Bildt warned that the company should not be seen as defending the government, which had launched into “tirades and measures that might well make things worse[.]” In a paragraph by now well-known to those following the trial, he wrote: “The resumption of what is in effect indiscriminate bombings against population concentrations must be condemned. The week before last they were [sic] narrowly missed a large group of people waiting for an announced arrival of a UN delivery of emergency food.”
Bildt’s explanation was that this was a very different situation with many changes, one of which was that the George W. Bush administration had recently taken power in the United States, leading to its reengagement in the Sudanese peace efforts. Referencing his involvement in peace talks, he described what happened as: “Once you get momentum in a peace process, there can be a backlash as parties want to gain power.” These attacks reflected a final surge at the end of a lengthy peace process. He added that they occurred near Bahr el Ghazal – “very far away.” Asked if his predictions of SPLA attacks on oil operations had materialized, Bildt replied, “No, I don’t think so” and added that the company saw a large influx of refugees to their area.
Two months after Bildt’s email predictions, Ken Barker wrote about an SPLA attack on the neighbouring Heglig area, describing a “major army operation to clean up the area,” with troops being flown in, helicopter gunships – and human rights violations, including “cleansing” in the area. Bildt’s response to this was, again, that Heglig was “quite far away.” He noted that Heglig had been attacked on several occasions and that it was an SPLA propaganda victory. The situation there was “more complicated.” Did the board or Bildt discuss this? No. Bildt tried to dismiss Barker’s report as a plan for the worst-case scenarios: “He’s saying what could happen if things go wrong.” The prosecution highlighted the last sentence, where Barker expressed “no doubt” that there was cleansing going on. Even if it was just Barker’s opinion, was this opinion passed on and discussed internally? “But this was about Heglig – it was quite far away,” Bildt maintained.
Another report mentioned internally displaced persons. Did Bildt know whether the company looked into the situation of the IDPs – where they had fled from or why? Bildt did not know and suggested they had likely fled due to fighting in their area, “but fighting could be about anything – grazing, local conflicts…” Had the company discussed the flight bans imposed by the Sudanese government on certain areas, the consequence of which was that food assistance was prevented from reaching civilians in those locations? “Again,” repeated Bildt, “this is far away.” He pointed out that they had instead met the “entire humanitarian community” in Nairobi. Lokichogio housed one of the biggest relief operations “and they asked for my help in a number of respects, including the flights, and as a result I raised it with the government when I met them in Khartoum.” He did not recall any flight bans in Block 5A. Touching on the topic of Bildt’s meetings with the Sudanese government and president, the prosecution asked whether Bildt had any official mandate to negotiate with the government on the company’s behalf. No, was his only response.
The prosecution then asked Bildt about a statement he made that “aerial bombings are useless.” Bildt’s explanation was that he meant that they were useless from a military perspective since they could not ensure precision bombing when flying at higher altitudes. What about the civilian perspective, asked Korpi. “Well obviously it isn’t good to be bombed,” said Bildt, adding that he did not think this was a particularly noteworthy statement in the first place. Aerial bombings had “zero accuracy” so the chances of a bomb dropped from what essentially was a cargo plane actually hitting a military target were completely random.
Road construction
Road construction through areas not controlled by the government was the next topic the prosecution took up, but Bildt said he did not know what they meant by this. “The possibility of building roads through areas not controlled by the government were limited and this wasn’t happening in this area. Maybe in other parts of Sudan.” The prosecution pointed out that the road from Thar Jath was in a disputed area, to which Bildt replied that it was in an area controlled by Riek Machar and his armed forces, who were allied with the Sudanese army. “It would have been impossible to build the road if the area was contested.”
In perhaps the understatement of the year, Korpi responded: “Well our opinion is slightly different,” but with the direct examination already pushing well into the usual lunch recess, she had no time to pursue this and moved on quickly to asking Bildt about violence connected to the road construction in Block 4. “Something in Block 4 – is that relevant?” queried Bildt. Fighting over roads in disputed areas seemed pretty relevant, opined the prosecution, but Bildt insisted that “anything in Block 4 is not relevant.” Even presented with a list of attacks that took place in Wankai in connection to the road construction, Bildt’s only response was that he did not know where Wankai was.
The prosecution’s final questions were about Bildt’s knowledge of various plans the company had. He did not know about the MOK area or the plans to build a road to Nhialdiu, which the army had requested. Shown additional reports mentioning plans for the Nhialdiu road, Bildt could not recall having any discussions about it, but pointed out another part of the report that mentioned efforts to achieve peace. “Trying to achieve peace – this is what the company was trying to do,” he said, adding: “Roads were good for peace, development was good for peace. Development would improve after roads.”
After a final question about the extension of the all-weather road to Leer and the violence it allegedly caused, which Bildt said occurred after Lundin had sold the concession, the prosecution’s direct examination concluded.
Questioning by the plaintiffs’ counsel
When the hearing resumed after lunch, it was time for Thomas Bodström, counsel for one of the groups of plaintiffs, to question Bildt. Bodström, also a former politician (Minister for Justice from 2000-2006), had clashed with Bildt in the past, perhaps most notably in 2010 following the news that Lundin Oil was being investigated for international crimes, when as a member of parliament he called on Bildt, then Minister for Foreign Affairs, to take a “time-out” from his post given his connection to the company. Bildt’s response at the time? “I think Thomas Bodström should calm down.”
Bodström’s examination in the courtroom, however, was not nearly so confrontational. He began by noting that Lundin Oil operated in both democracies and dictatorships and asked if there was anything a company should consider when operating in dictatorships – any differences. Bildt mentioned codes of conduct and human rights principles that were applied in the same way in all countries. “But are there reasons to believe that there could be more human rights violations committed than in a democracy?” asked Bodström. “Well now we’re talking about political science and philosophy here,” was Bildt’s rejoinder. He noted that at the time Lundin Oil took the initiative to have a code of conduct, not many companies had one and they worked with Amnesty International to develop it. Asked about Amnesty’s criticism of Lundin’s operations in Sudan, Bildt could not remember what they had said but added that “this was a bit outside their scope. I don’t remember if they even had a presence in Sudan.”
With regards to the UN reports and Gerhard Baum, Bildt again noted that Baum had not followed up on the company’s efforts to get him to visit their area. Bodström asked if the fact that Baum had not gone to the area meant that the company did not need to listen to his criticism, but Bildt felt this was too much of a generalization. Bodström’s final question was whether Bildt believed that Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter took the human rights reports seriously and read them. “Well the code of conduct became a matter for the board, so I would say so,” replied Bildt.
Anders Sjögren, Bodström’s co-counsel, took over and continued the line of questioning about the UN reports; in particular, Special Rapporteur Leonardo Franco’s statement that “the oil issue in Western Upper Nile lies at the heart of the conflict.” Bildt could not remember if he had read that particular report but said that the statement was clearly incorrect. “The conflict had been going on for thirty years before oil was even discovered – that’s obviously inaccurate.” He added that the report was about another province: “Western Upper Nile is a different province, it was not where Lundin operated.” Sjögren questioned this assertion, but Bildt maintained his position that to his knowledge, the company did not operate in Western Upper Nile. “It’s a huge area.” Nor did he agree with Franco’s claim that oil had exacerbated the civil war, explaining instead that it was driven by other factors and the conflict had been going on for a long time.
Sjögren then displayed an email Bildt sent to Egbert Wesselink from PAX responding to certain allegations Wesselink had made about Lundin’s role in the conflict. In his response, Bildt wrote: “You are right to point at the different reports saying that oil is exacerbating the conflict in Sudan. I believe that’s right. Conflicts over real or perceived natural resources have always been part of the conflicts over Southern Sudan. Now, there is the hope that there are substantial quantities of oil, and that naturally influences the situation.” Bildt’s first reaction was to say: “I think it’s very well-worded.” He clarified that what he meant in the email was that natural resources mattered – the water issue was even more important and if he were writing the email now, he would add grazing areas to the list. Oil, however, did not change the nature of the conflict. Both the Khartoum regime and the SPLA and SPLM were interested in seeing continued oil production and no one on either side, he emphasized, had asked the company to leave the country. Sjögren pointed out that Bildt himself wrote that oil was exacerbating the war. “Well of course there was a dimension of this that was relevant to peace, but the water issues were even more interesting, which I also write,” Bildt replied.
Bodström returned to ask the final questions: “You said the conflict started thirty years ago, long before oil exploration. During the time oil was being extracted, the conflict was ongoing. Is there any aspect of oil exploration that could have affected the conflict?” Bildt’s response was yes – that oil increased the possibilities of peace. “It’s why we got a ceasefire in 2005, because they wanted oil. The south had interests in oil too because they were going to build their own state. […] Unfortunately, South Sudan is still one of the most oil-dependent states in the world. It’s a promise and a curse. They knew they couldn’t use the oil if they didn’t end the conflict.” He acknowledged that perhaps it was a bit much to say that there were no negative consequences of oil exploration – “oil unfortunately had an effect on South Sudan in that it brought corruption – but that was a later development and in the south, not the north.”
But what about the reports describing the negative impact on the local populations? “I can only speak to what I know, places I know,” said Bildt, adding that “It was also a propaganda war,” and one had to read these reports “with a pinch of salt.”
The defense’s examination
Torgny Wetterberg led the Lundin defense’s brief examination, touching on Bildt’s travel to Sudan and what he could observe flying over the Lundin area, which Bildt said was flooded at the time of his visit. The defense also asked about Bildt’s impressions of Christine Batruch and her work; he described her as “very competent,” noting that she was responsible for the company’s community development work and later developed the code of conduct. Here, Bildt noted that the code of conduct required all employees to report to the board any violations of the company’s ethical principles.
Bildt was also asked about his trips to Sudan and his meetings with various Sudanese and international leaders. From these meetings, the company gained an understanding of how the different actors viewed the conflict. Some, he said, considered the company’s presence to have a “stabilizing effect” in the area – “to have Western ears and eyes in the area.”
Finally, the defense asked Bildt to comment on a memo Bildt sent to Ian Lundin in which he gave various assessments of the conflict, including that both sides knew that they could not win the war militarily, which Bildt saw as a factor that increased the likelihood of achieving peace. The memo also noted that Bildt had not spoken to anyone who wanted the company to leave Sudan, although some from the south wanted their operations to be temporarily suspended.
The prosecution’s redirect
Following this short examination, the prosecution asked for a short redirect, which lead prosecutor Henrik Attorps conducted. His first question addressed Bildt’s earlier assertion that the company was not operational in Western Upper Nile. “Where do you think Block 5A was located?” Attorps asked silkily – a loaded question that anyone familiar with courtroom dramas would recognize as a sure sign of a coming zinger. “The bulk of the activities were in Unity State,” replied Bildt, who perhaps also foresaw his error because he added: “It’s possible that Block 5A was partly in Upper Nile – you can check a map.” There was no need for the prosecution to check a map though. “There are other names for Unity State,” Attorps informed him. “It’s also called Western Upper Nile. Did you know that?” No, was the response. “So, if I tell you that Western Upper Nile is the same thing as Unity State, would that change your answer about Franco’s report?” “No.”
The prosecution’s questions then turned to Bildt’s involvement in internal discussions about which areas in Block 5A were suitable for operations, or about areas where they could conduct seismic, but Bildt testified that he was not involved in such discussions. All he knew about the planned extension of the all-weather road to Leer, he repeated, was that Riek Machar was interested in it because Leer was Machar’s home village and he wanted a road there. Bildt said that he was not aware that the company was involved in co-financing the road but added that even had he known about it, he would not have thought it unreasonable: “It was part of general development efforts.”
Attorps asked again about his knowledge of fighting connected to the road construction in 2002, but Bildt could only remember an incident in which shots were fired at a helicopter. An internal security report from September 2002, written by Ken Barker and addressing resumption of operations, described the current security situation in Block 5A as “unacceptable,” and referred to an ongoing “clearing” process. This did not jog any memories of further details for Bildt, but he explained that in 2002 the political landscape changed dramatically when Riek Machar, who until then had been allied with the regime, switched sides and reconciled with John Garang and the SPLA. This resulted in operations being suspended because the conditions of the KPA had been breached. Machar’s defection meant that the regime would have to take the areas he controlled back from him and they did not have the forces needed to do so. Bildt suggested that this was what Barker was referring to in his report.
In their final questions, the prosecution returned to the Christian Aid report and Bildt’s statement that it was the most important because other reports just copied and pasted it. Bildt reiterated that Christian Aid were the only ones who claimed to have been in the Lundin area and others only got their information from a distance. Attorps pointed out that others, including John Ryle, had visited Nimne, and Danish Church Aid’s report “Hiding Between the Streams” described a field visit to Chotchara. Bildt, however, did not know where Nimne was. When informed that it was east of the all-weather road, he described that area as “mostly desolate all the way to the Nile.” Chotchara was also in Block 5A, Attorps noted, but Bildt said this too was “not really in the Lundin area.” Attorps sought to clarify what exactly Bildt meant by this, asking: “When you talk about ‘your area,’ do you mean just the road, Thar Jath, and Rubkona?” “Yes,” Bildt responded. Block 5A was huge. “Where the company actually was and could see what was happening was a much smaller area.”
With this, the long-awaited hearing with Carl Bildt came to an end. Judge Zander thanked him and asked his standard question about whether the witness wanted to submit any claims for compensation. This apparently surprised Bildt, who laughingly asked, “You can claim compensation?!” He did not, however, claim any.
