Report 70 – Testimony of Magnus Nordin

The Lundin Oil trial’s first witness of 2026 was Magnus Nordin, the company’s former Deputy Managing Director. After welcoming the witness to Stockholm District Court, Judge Tomas Zander noted Nordin’s special protection under the Code of Judicial Procedure 36:6, given his prior status as a suspect in the investigation. This provision granted Nordin the right to refuse to answer questions that could expose him or close relatives to criminal suspicion. After Nordin had sworn the witness oath, the presiding judge meticulously reiterated this provision verbatim, reflecting the court’s consistent attention to procedural formalities throughout the trial.

Corporate Structure and Decision-Making Processes

Prosecutor Karolina Wieslander opened the examination by reviewing Nordin’s various roles within the organization before getting into questions about the company’s internal structures. The picture Nordin painted of an informal corporate structure mirrored the descriptions that Ian Lundin and Alexandre Schneiter gave in their own testimonies. Nordin portrayed Ian Lundin’s role as CEO as that of a “coordinator” rather than an authoritarian leader – someone who facilitated rather than dictated decisions. Like the two defendants, Nordin described informal management meetings without written protocols. They would sometimes address “corporate formalities” but otherwise did not make major decision. Instead, the company relied on weekly meetings attended by approximately fifteen people from various departments and specialties. These regular meetings, according to Nordin, operated on a general level: the information shared was often broad and situational, such as weather conditions affecting operations, rather than granular operational details. Nordin explained this by saying, “[O]il drilling is specialized,” adding that more detailed technical meetings would have occurred elsewhere. 

Asked where critical decisions were actually made, Nordin indicated that formal decisions requiring board action were taken by Lundin Oil’s board. He explained that before committing to partners or host countries, board approval was necessary. This mirrored Ashley Heppenstall’s descriptions. Once commitments were made to partners, the company could not simply change its position. Regarding Adolf Lundin’s role, Nordin was unequivocal: “Adolf Lundin was the decision maker at the office, without a doubt.” The prosecutors inquired how collaboration looked between the executive management in Geneva and those running operational activities. Nordin claimed to have difficulty answering this as he didn’t know what reporting from a “country manager” looked like. He explained that the operator was responsible for daily operations and for preparing budgets and work programs for the coming year, which were discussed before decisions were made about what parts to implement

Early in the proceedings, Scheiter’s defense attorney Per E. Samuelsson broke in to ask why the prosecution’s questions were so general, explaining that for his client’s sake they wanted to know more concretely what Schneiter was alleged to have done around the year 2000. “My criticism is directed at the prosecutor interpreting general answers as concrete answers,” Samuelsson clarified. The presiding judge said he did not believe the prosecutors had interpreted anything but reminded the witness that the trial concerned a specific period and a specific company during that period.

The “8-dagar” Program  

A substantial portion of the prosecution’s questioning focused on Nordin’s participation in the Swedish Television program “8-dagar” (Eight Days), which was broadcast on 12 September 1999. Nordin testified that he was initially contacted by a producer from the program “Aktuellt” who indicated they wanted to discuss “how things are going for the company in Libya and Sudan.” He said that consented to the interview under the impression that he would be asked about broader economic and investment matters rather than the security policy questions he actually received, although he also noted that it was not wrong of the interviewers to ask such questions.

Prior to the interview, Nordin received a call from the journalist informing him that “another colleague was coming.” A team arrived at the office and began asking detailed questions about the security situation in Sudan in relation to a documentary. Only then did Nordin realize he would be appearing on “Åtta dagar” rather than the economics program – information that had not been disclosed to him. “They had not mentioned this, nor had they mentioned that they would ask questions about a documentary film they would show. I also didn’t get to see the film,” Nordin recalled. Despite this, Nordin contacted Adolf Lundin before the interview to update himself on operational matters, as he admitted knowing little about the day-to-day operations.

The documentary that he was asked about presented serious allegations against the Sudanese government and international oil companies. It depicted government forces as conducting a “scorched earth” campaign in southern Sudan, with attacks that resulted in burned villages, civilian casualties, and mass displacement – in effect, systematically clearing the areas around the oil fields. The program included testimonies from aid workers and witnesses, as well as interviews with rebels claiming that oil was “stolen goods,” and evidence of attacks on villages, including a burned hospital. One interviewee described being attacked from the air with Antonovs, followed by combat helicopters, and then the army accompanied by combat vehicles came out from the city in an offensive against the people, burning down their village. Those interviewed in Sudan claimed the explanation for the war was oil and that the government wanted to clear the area of civilians.

The documentary also featured interviews with Talisman’s CEO, who claimed that oil revenues contributed to peace and prosperity and stated that: “North of Bentiu there is nothing, no one lives there.” The CEO added that the company relied on Sudan’s military for security. The documentary, however, noted that filmed images indicated the opposite and listed a number of villages that had been attacked. It also showed bullet casings that weapons experts confirmed were Chinese cartridges made for Russian machine guns, suggesting that it was the Sudanese army that had fired them. The SPLA claimed in the segment that “the oil companies have blood on their hands,” and the program posed the question of what price the world community should pay for oil. In another interview, Peter Gadet said the company must be stopped.

In his interview, Magnus Nordin denied that the company had received reports of abuses and dismissed allegations that the company hired militias as “pure fantasy.” He argued that the oil companies’ presence contributed to stability and development in Sudan, saying that Lundin Oil had not received any reports from the UN about that type of activity. Asked if the company’s actions would be impacted if people were being scared away or murdered due to oil operations, Nordin replied that it would definitely affect them. He maintained that their purpose was to supply the world with oil under calm and safe conditions and that a large portion of investments benefited the local population, with the government free to spend the money as they saw fit. When the interviewer pointed out that oil revenues were used as security for loans to buy weapons from China, Malaysia, and Russia – weapons used in attacks against civilians – Nordin responded that was “only half the truth, if even that,” and that a large part of investments benefited the local population. Asked what the company would do if it was true that people were being murdered, Nordin answered: “If it’s true, then it’s harder to murder people if there are oil companies on site.”

After the full segment was played in court, the prosecution asked Nordin why, in his interview, he had described the reports of violations as “exaggerated,” citing the company’s contacts with Sudan’s government. Nordin replied that his statement was based entirely on the information he had at the time and what had been discussed at JMC meetings and similar fora. When the prosecutor pressed him, reiterating that he had specifically answered that the company’s cooperation with the Sudanese government suggested that the reports were exaggerated – which sounded like a concrete message the company had received from the government – Nordin answered that his response was based on the information he had at the time and that when the interview was conducted, he had not seen the relevant segment of the documentary which he was being asked to address. Asked if he had considered requesting a pause during the interview to actually watch the segment, Nordin simply answered, “No.”

The prosecutor then asked if the company had any other information than what the government said about the situation. Nordin replied that at the time of the interview, he was not aware of any UN report that specifically dealt with these issues. Asked to clarify if the company’s source of information was the Sudanese regime, Nordin responded: “I’m not referring to a concrete government source, I’m referring generally to the Sudanese state.” He added that it was a general response: Sweden had diplomatic relations with the Sudanese government and he would have answered the same had the question concerned Malaysia or Libya. He stressed that “[It was] not a concrete answer to a concrete question about a concrete situation in Sudan.” The prosecution continued: “But Sudan is not Malaysia – it’s a different type of country where there’s a different human rights record, so given that, how is it that, even if it’s general, you can trust their government?” Nordin responded: “I’m not saying anything about the government, I’m saying we keep ourselves informed and updated. We do that generally by following world events and reporting. It’s nothing specific to Sudan.”

Remarkably, Nordin testified that after the segment, the documentary and its allegations were “not at all” discussed within the company. He did not believe anyone else had seen it either. “We had no reason to question whether the situation on the ground was any other way.” Asked if he just dismissed the allegations – “Wasn’t this something you wanted to look into?” – Nordin replied, “Not more than what was already being done.” The prosecution asked who within the company was responsible for verifying the segment, but Nordin did not know. He reiterated that there was “nothing new” in the segment that led to any further investigation. “I was completely confident, I had no reason whatsoever to question anything, but it was interesting to see the segment again now.”

It did emerge from his testimony that the Lundin Oil shareholders had a chat discussion, which Nordin followed, and in which there was a detailed breakdown of what was said in the documentary. It turned out that a person identified in the documentary as an oil analyst was in fact a church representative, which Nordin said did not help the program’s credibility. The prosecution asked whether this meant that the company was aware of the allegations in the documentary, to which Nordin responded: “It’s not impossible that the company knew about it, but I didn’t know about it.”

The prosecution then referred to a segment in the documentary in which the SPLA’s John Garang stated that he wanted to create obstacles for the oil operations, asking Nordin whether this was something that the company had discussed. She reminded him of the attack on Thar Jath in 1999, which had occurred before the documentary was aired. Nordin apparently remembered it as being later, but said that although he knew about the attack, he did not have any detailed knowledge. He had reviewed internal reports about what happened to the company’s employees and recalled that people were injured and evacuated, and that there was “some kind of shooting,” but his recollection was that overall it had all “gone quite well.” He could not remember whether the attack affected the company’s operations on the ground.  

Judge Zander then questioned Nordin about his statement that prior to the interview, he thought the questions would be about economics and not security, observing that, “It seems to have been some type of ambush.” Nordin confirmed: “That’s how I remember it, yes.”

Media Statements and the Company’s Response to Criticism

The prosecutor then addressed two articles from the Swedish newspapers Dagens Industri and Finanstidningen in which Magnus Nordin downplayed the risks and conflict around Lundin Oil’s Sudan operations and portrayed the oil companies’ presence as a stabilizing rather than a driving factor in the civil war. In Dagens Industri, he said Lundin Oil was “lying low” in Sudan but attributed this to the rainy season, not the civil war, and added that the company had upcoming plans to resume drilling. He said that there had not been any direct threats to Lundin’s concession area and emphasized it would be “completely unacceptable” for a Swedish company to be the cause of any violence. He described the blocks as very sparsely populated, with scattered villages in the northern areas, and said that despite the long-standing tensions in the area, the situation seemed to be calming down, with the warring parties engaged in more intensive talks.

To Finanstidningen, Nordin outlined the company’s plans to carrying out new drilling despite protests in Canada. The debate surrounding Talisman’s operations in the area had become very polarized, but Nordin portrayed the oil extraction industry as having helped calm the situation in Block 5A. He said the company had a much brighter view of the situation than what the Canadian media had conveyed. Asked about the basis for his claims, Nordin replied that his description was based on satellite images, reports from the ground, and signs of increased agricultural activity in the area. At the same time, he testified that internal discussions about the situation on the ground were likely ongoing at the time.

The prosecution asked again about Nordin’s conclusion that the situation in Block 5A had calmed down. Nordin could not recall any concrete meetings or reports in which this was discussed, “but it may have been that there were talks with Sudan during this time, and that in the quarterly report there was a comment about all the concession areas, including Sudan.”  

In Nordin’s recollection, it was at this point that Christine Batruch was brought in to handle media and the company’s work with community initiatives in Block 5A. However, he disagreed with the portrayal of her being hired due to the media storm. He recalled that Adolf Lundin knew Batruch’s father and that she had a background in human rights, which fit well for “mapping and looking more closely at the criticism directed at all oil companies in Sudan.” Asked if he knew whether any other candidates had been considered for the CSR position, he said he did not remember but did not believe so. Here, the prosecution read aloud from Nordin’s police interview, in which he was clearer that there were no other candidates and the decision was based more on her being available and Adolf Lundin knowing her father.

Asked about his interactions with Batruch, Nordin said that their work sometimes overlapped as he worked with investors globally and she with external analysis. “There were informal discussions, I definitely had reason to talk with her, but no regular conversations. One issue that came up was, in addition to Sudan questions, the development of a code of conduct for the company,” Nordin recalled. However, he did not recall having any discussions with Batruch about whether the company should continue working in Sudan.

Batruch’s report from December 1999 stated that the conflict’s causes were rooted in tribal disputes and that according to the British government, oil company personnel, and NGOs, the fighting in the area was not about oil. She also wrote that the oil discovery could have a “destabilizing short term effect” because government troops would come in to protect the oil. Here, the prosecution pointed out that Batruch’s report came out in December and on 2 December the same year, Nordin told Finanstidningen that his impression was that the oil discovery had made the situation calmer. Nordin, however, did not see a contradiction between what he said to Finanstidningen and Batruch’s report, saying that the language was quite general.

Knowledge of UN and NGO Reports

The prosecutor then turned to UN Special Rapporteur Leonardo Franco’s report that came out towards the end of 1999 or early 2000, which concluded that “the oil issue in Western Upper Nile is the core of the civil war.” Shortly thereafter, the Harker report was published in February 2000, followed by the Amnesty International report in May 2000. Nordin said that he recalled the Amnesty report well, as well as a discussion with Amnesty’s executive director. Nordin pointed out that the criticism did not call on the company to leave the country or abandon its Sudan operations. Nor was there any concrete evidence regarding the Lundin areas. The prosecution continued to ask whether the company’s leadership had discussed these reports or tried to investigate the allegations. Nordin replied: “I don’t remember any clear meetings, I have no concrete memories of Amnesty’s report or meetings about it.”

The “Gomorron Sverige” Interview

The prosecution then turned its focus to another filmed news segment. Prior to its airing on Swedish TV (SVT), Nordin and journalist Bengt Nilsson had traveled together to Sudan. Recalling the trip, Nordin testified that he and Nilsson had discussed the Dinka and Nuer tribes at the Lundin Oil offices and plans for Nilsson to accompany Nordin on a visit to Lundin’s rig. Nordin explained that at that time, he was responsible for handling global issues, so when a Swedish journalist wanted to travel to the area, it made sense for them to visit Block 5A together. The two had previously worked together on other features on the company’s operations in Oman, and Nordin estimated that he had met Nilsson approximately twice a year for the past ten years. Nordin also recalled a shareholders’ meeting around this time when “there was quite a lot of talk about Sudan” and a representative from the area had addressed the meeting. As such, he felt well-prepared for the interview.

In an aired discussion following the film clip, Carl Söderberg from Amnesty International emphasized that oil companies bore heavy responsibility for the human rights situation in southern Sudan. Amnesty claimed that the Sudanese government had conducted a terror campaign in the oil areas to drive away the civilian population and that oil contributed to financing the war. Söderberg criticized Lundin Oil’s leadership for downplaying the situation, noting that  freedom of speech did not exist in Sudan and that journalists were tortured, and said that oil companies needed to convey to both the regime and the opposition that their security forces should not include perpetrators of human rights abuses.  

In the interview, Nordin defended Lundin Oil by pointing out that oil was a relatively new factor in a war that had been going on for a long time. The company had no armed forces of its own and could not rule out the presence of child soldiers in the area, but still they had tried to influence local authorities. He noted that they followed UN conventions, engaged with the government, and supported Amnesty’s recommendations that human rights organizations should be able to work in the area. He also emphasized the company was not yet making any profit in Sudan and therefore could not be contributing to financing the regime.  Söderberg also said he experienced it as “a mockery of the victims” when Ian Lundin said the regime wasn’t particularly oppressive.

Söderberg countered by replying that oil had contributed to the war – the oil fields were discovered in the 1950s and had been a factor in the war since. Asked if the country was a democracy or dictatorship, Nordin was reluctant to say either way but said that he felt that people could now be more openly critical of the regime. Amnesty objected to this characterization, particularly about Ian Lundin’s description of “freedom of speech existing in Sudan.”

After the segment was shown, in response to a question about who in the company engaged in these discussions with the Sudanese government, Nordin could not recall and said that he himself had not been involved aside from one meeting with Sudan’s finance minister about how revenues from oil should be used. The prosecution pointed out that Nordin, in the filmed interview, had referred to an ongoing dialogue with the regime about Western values and human rights, and specifically said that the company followed UN conventions. Nordin replied that such an ongoing dialogue with the government was needed for the company to be able to continue operating but could not remember concrete instances.

Here, pushed by the prosecution to explain his firm statements in the interview, Nordin became visibly upset. If he was being asked to review his performance in TV interview, he argued, then he wanted to watch the entire segment again. Even after the prosecutor reformulated the question to ask why Nordin’s portrayal in the interview of the company’s engagement was so different than what it was in reality, Nordin was still so upset that he seemed to have difficulty answering the question, instead asking to be able to read through Batruch’s entire report before responding. Eventually, Judge Zander announced that it was time for a break.

Christian Aid’s “Scorched Earth” Report

Magnus Nordin remained on the Lundin Oil board until May 2001. Christian Aid published its “The Scorched Earth” report in April 2001. Nordin remembered the report as well as the company’s counter-report that addressed perceived inaccuracies in The Scorched Earth. He testified that he had probably read “parts of it” and parts of the company’s report.

It was also around this time that former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt joined the company’s board of directors. Nordin recalled that the Christian Aid report was discussed at one of the board meetings, and Mark Curtis participated by phone. Nordin described Curtis’s participation as a sign that Christian Aid wanted to engage in a dialogue with the company and believed that it would have been Batruch’s responsibility to follow up on this, although he could not remember the details of what transpired during the meeting.

Asked if the company took the report seriously, Nordin said that they always took reports seriously, explaining: “I’ve always perceived that the company wanted to have a dialogue and an understanding of what the report authors’ agenda was and their interpretation and recommendations.” The Christian Aid report led to extensive mass media attention in Sweden on the company and Sudan during spring 2001. “I counted sixty consecutive days when the Lundin company was on the cover of one of the four national newspapers,” Nordin recalled.

Shortly thereafter, Bengt Nilsson traveled to Sudan at the company’s invitationv. Nordin described the human rights reports as “a combination of false facts and lies” and therefore saw it as positive that the company wanted to convey its own view of the situation. Although he could not recall the exact reasoning behind Nilsson’s visit, he said that he would definitely have supported it.