Report 69 – Testimony of Ashley Heppenstall
Lundin Oil Operations in Sudan (1998-2003)
Ashley Heppenstall testified over several days in December 2025 regarding his role in Lundin Oil and Lundin Petroleum’s operations in Sudan between 1998 and 2003. He provided detailed insights into corporate decision-making, financial structures, security incidents, and the controversial operations in Block 5A during Sudan’s civil war.
Witness Background and Legal Context
Ashley Heppenstall appeared before the court represented by new counsel. Some important procedural matters were addressed first: Heppenstall had previously been under suspicion in connection with the case, but the investigation was discontinued in 2018. As such, the court informed him that despite being called as a witness and swearing the witness oath, he retained the right to decline to testify or to answer any questions that might implicate him personally. The court also informed Alexandre Schneiter that he had to right to object given the potential conflicts of interest as Schneiter’s current defence counsel, Per E. Samuelsson, previously represented Heppenstall during the investigation phase. However, Schneiter did not have any objections. With these legal issues addressed, Judge Zander led Heppenstall through the witness oath.
Heppenstall’s career with the Lundin group of companies spanned more than two decades. He first joined IPC in 1993 and moved to the head office in Switzerland in 1996, where he remained until 2005. Following a merger between IPC and Sands Petroleum in 1998, he became Chief Financial Officer of the newly formed Lundin Oil. In May 2002, he was promoted to CEO of Lundin Petroleum, a position he held until 2015 when he stepped down from executive management while remaining on various boards within the Lundin corporate family.
Corporate Structure and Management Culture
When asked to describe Lundin Oil’s organizational structure, Heppenstall characterized it as distinctly informal compared to traditional corporate hierarchies. He emphasized that individuals within the organization were given a high degree of autonomy to fulfill their responsibilities. There was no formal reporting structure in the conventional sense, though everyone understood their specific roles and areas of responsibility. The culture was entrepreneurial, with communication happening through various informal channels including phone calls, in-person discussions, impromptu office meetings, and written correspondence when necessary.
The management team during the relevant period consisted of several key figures. Ian Lundin served as Chief Executive Officer and was Heppenstall’s direct superior. Adolf Lundin, Ian’s father, served as Chairman of the Board. Heppenstall himself handled all financial matters as CFO. Alexandre Schneiter managed technical and exploration activities, initially as Exploration Manager and later as Chief Operating Officer. They also had a legal counsel in the Geneva office, though Heppenstall could not recall the exact timing of his involvement. Tim Sarney held responsibility for drilling operations. The company also maintained operations in multiple countries, each with their own local management structures.
When pressed by prosecutors about whether this group constituted “senior management,” Heppenstall was somewhat evasive, stating he did not view it that way but rather saw everyone as having their individual roles. However, when confronted by the prosecution with the company’s annual reports from 1998 onwards, he acknowledged that these individuals were consistently listed as senior executives. The company had a benefit scheme for staff, including stock options distributed based on contribution to the business, though Heppenstall could not recall specific details about how these were allocated proportionately. The prosecution displayed a letter from Heppenstall and Ian Lundin to the compensation committee in which they requested approval for 2003 year-end bonuses, especially for the senior management, and 2004 salaries. The letter described 2003 as a very successful year for the company, mainly due to the sale of the company’s Sudan interests.
Office Locations and Communication
The Geneva office served as the company’s headquarters, though the exact configuration changed over time. Until spring 1999, Ian Lundin worked from Dubai while Heppenstall and Adolf Lundin were based in Geneva. In April 1999, the technical office relocated from Dubai to Geneva, bringing Alexandre Schneiter and his team of geologists and geophysicists. Heppenstall testified that there were actually three separate office locations in Geneva, all within walking distance of each other. He and Alex Schneiter did not share the same office space, though Heppenstall shared an office with Ian Lundin.
Communication between offices and team members was frequent but informal. Pressed by the prosecution on how he kept his supervisor, Ian Lundin, informed, Heppenstall said that he consulted Lundin from time to time on issues that he thought Lundin needed to be informed about, but repeated that it was a very informal workplace and that he felt he had access to his supervisor. While he had authority to make many financial decisions independently, certain matters required Ian’s approval. Heppenstall’s contact with Alex Schneiter was more limited, as they worked in different domains: Heppenstall focused on financial matters while Schneiter handled technical exploration issues. Heppenstall did acknowledge that Schneiter’s operations typically spent money rather than generated it, which required financial oversight of budgets and expenditures. Asked who Schneiter’s supervisor was, Heppenstall could not recall but said he believed Schneiter reported to Ian Lundin. He did not know how the two maintained contact.
Role Changes in May 2002
A significant restructuring occurred in May 2002 when Heppenstall was promoted from CFO to CEO. At the same time, Alex Schneiter transitioned from Vice President of Exploration to Chief Operating Officer. Heppenstall described this as Schneiter being “phased in” to the COO role, which gave him technical responsibility for the entire company and made him Heppenstall’s number two. This represented an increase in Schneiter’s level of responsibility compared to his previous position. The COO role was a new position within the company, so Schneiter was not replacing any other employee.
When Heppenstall became CEO, he took over all responsibilities that had previously fallen to Ian Lundin, including reporting to the board of directors. Regarding the Sudan project specifically, Heppenstall’s main recollection of that time was that operations were then suspended, so only limited active management was required. However, Ian Lundin remained involved in the Sudan project, particularly with advocacy work for peace. Heppenstall recalled that Ian, along with Christine Batruch and Carl Bildt, were very involved in Sudan during 2002, specifically in working toward a peace agreement.
When questioned about communication structures after becoming CEO, Heppenstall showed some confusion or lack of clear recollection. He could not remember specific details about how Ken Barker, the general manager in Khartoum, reported to management during this transition period. When shown his own 2017 police interview where he stated that Barker continued to report to Ian Lundin and that Heppenstall was copied on correspondence, Heppenstall said he did not recall those details but did acknowledge that Barker started communicating more with him after he became CEO. The prosecution also asked why Schneiter in 2002 began receiving the internal security reports from Sudan, but Heppenstall did not know. Nor could he remember whether he spoke with Schneiter about the security situation in Sudan or how they worked together more generally, aside from not having formal meeting structures.
Sudan Project Structure and Decision-Making
The Sudan operations were conducted through a special purpose company called Lundin Sudan Ltd. Heppenstall explained this was standard practice for the group, primarily for tax purposes and to facilitate potential asset sales. The structure allowed the company to sell the subsidiary entity rather than transferring the underlying assets directly. Lundin Sudan Ltd was a subsidiary of the parent company, sometimes with additional intermediate holding companies in the ownership chain.
Heppenstall served as a board member of Lundin Sudan Ltd., but he emphasized that this board was not the actual decision-making entity. Real decisions were made at the senior board level of Lundin Oil AB (and later Lundin Petroleum). According to company documents from October 2001, the CEO, CFO, and exploration manager had responsibility for strategic management of the company, including the Sudan company. Heppenstall described this as self-explanatory, saying day-to-day management was the responsibility of the management team.
The local general manager in Khartoum played a crucial operational role. Keith Hill served in this capacity until approximately January 2000, followed by Ken Barker. Heppenstall testified that these general managers reported to Ian Lundin as CEO during the initial period. After Heppenstall became CEO in May 2002, Barker reported to him instead, though Heppenstall had limited recollection of the specific reporting mechanisms. He believed Barker used various communication methods including meetings, written reports, and phone calls, but could not recall details.
When asked about weekly reports that Barker reportedly sent to Geneva in a standard format, Heppenstall acknowledged there may have been such reports but claimed to have no memory of their format or content. He similarly could not recall whether there were regularly scheduled meetings or conference calls with Barker, despite the general manager being based in Khartoum while management was in Geneva. This pattern of claimed inability to recall specific communications and reporting relationships was consistent throughout Heppenstall’s testimony.
Financial Management and Budget Processes
As CFO, Heppenstall had extensive responsibilities for financial reporting, coordinating with auditors, tax matters, cash management, budgeting, and financial analysis. He testified that he did not recall being involved with insurance matters. His finance team was based in Geneva, and while he had significant autonomy, certain issues required discussion with Ian Lundin for approval.
The budget process was complex and operated on multiple levels. Heppenstall explained that budgets were prepared in a “bottom-up” fashion, with each department preparing their estimates, which then flowed to Geneva for consolidation and approval. Level 3 budgets were the most detailed, prepared locally in Sudan. Level 2 budgets provided summary information by category and were also prepared in Khartoum and reviewed by local management. Level 1 budgets were the most aggregated, showing total expenditures by month and quarter, and this was the level Heppenstall typically reviewed.
The approval process involved multiple parties. First, budgets needed approval from the parent company board, which would typically occur in November or December each year. However, Sudan operations also involved partners under a Joint Operating Agreement, which meant partner approval was also required through the Operating Committee (OCM). Heppenstall could not clearly recall whether board approval typically preceded or followed partner approval, stating it could happen in either order depending on timing and how everything “hung together.”
Within approved budgets, the general manager had authority to act. Heppenstall recalled there was a delegation of authority, though he could not remember Barker’s specific spending limits. When shown documents indicating general managers could exceed the budget by approximately 10%, he confirmed this sounded correct. If expenditures needed to exceed this threshold or if unbudgeted items arose, approval had to be sought from both the board and the partners.
Documents from November 2001 showed Heppenstall’s direct involvement in budget matters. In one fax to Eloi Dolivo in the Khartoum office, copied to Barker, Ian Lundin and Alex Schneiter, Heppenstall wrote about reviewing a request for budget increase. When asked why Ian and Alex were copied on financial matters, Heppenstall claimed not to recall what the document was about or why they were included. Similarly, another fax dated 27 November 2001 discussed approval processes for items that might exceed budget, with Heppenstall stating Geneva would like to approve any such items before they went to partners, similar to the process for unbudgeted items.
Cost Recovery and the EPSA Agreement
The operations in Sudan were governed by an Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with the Sudanese government. Heppenstall testified that cost recovery provisions were standard in such agreements, allowing companies to recoup their expenses from future production. However, cost recovery was only relevant if oil and gas could actually be produced, so he would not characterize it as important during the budget preparation phase under normal circumstances.
When asked what requirements existed for a cost to be subject to cost recovery, Heppenstall said this would be stipulated in the EPSA provisions. He did not believe cost recovery was connected to the budget approval process. He could not recall whether the host country needed to approve costs for them to be eligible for cost recovery in Sudan’s specific case, though he acknowledged there were provisions defining what costs qualified.
The prosecution raised questions about whether separate agreements could be made for sub-projects or for carrying out works in more costly ways beyond what was in the EPSA. Heppenstall responded that he guessed such arrangements were possible, but he was not aware of any. This line of questioning appeared to relate to specific projects like road construction, which became a significant focus of the testimony.
The Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA), SPLA, & John Garang
When asked about the Khartoum Peace Agreement (KPA), Heppenstall acknowledged he had heard of it but had difficulty providing details. He believed it was some sort of agreement signed prior to the EPSA but could not recall the details or parties involved. He did not remember if the government was party to the agreement. When asked if he would describe it as a peace agreement, he said he was not in a position to determine what it was.
Regarding whether the KPA was important for starting operations in Block 5A, Heppenstall said it was difficult to determine what he knew at the time versus what he learned later. This response suggested uncertainty about his contemporaneous knowledge versus information acquired subsequently, a distinction that became important throughout the testimony. When pressed, Heppenstall stated he was not aware there was a conflict in Sudan when he started working for Lundin Oil in 1998, a claim that would later be challenged by prosecutors.
Heppenstall acknowledged he had heard of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). His general understanding was that the SPLA had a mandate to seek independence from Sudan, with the Sudanese government as their counterparts. When asked if the SPLA acted peacefully in trying to seek independence, he stated he believed there were times of conflict and that there was an armed conflict involving the SPLA at that time.
However, Heppenstall claimed not to recognize how the conflict affected Block 5A specifically. He acknowledged knowing that security incidents occurred within the area but said he did not know how the conflict affected operations. This testimony was notable given his senior position and the extensive documentation of security incidents that would later be presented.
One of the most significant revelations in Heppenstall’s testimony concerned a meeting he had with John Garang, the leader of the SPLA, in 1997. This was before Heppenstall officially joined Lundin Oil but while he was still with Sands Petroleum. Adolf Lundin had asked him to attend a meeting with Garang on his behalf because Adolf was sick and could not attend. Heppenstall said he was asked only a day or two before the meeting to step in.
When questioned about the purpose of the meeting, Heppenstall testified that he received no specific instructions from Adolf about what to say or not say other than to introduce the company. His only recollection was being told to listen and note Garang’s reaction to their investment in Sudan. When asked why there was interest in obtaining Garang’s view on the investment, Heppenstall said that at the time he did not understand the context and thought it would be wrong to speculate, stating he was simply told to represent the company.
The prosecutor pressed him on whether Garang had influence over the area or whether his opinions were important regarding whether the company should enter the EPSA. Heppenstall maintained he was not aware of the context or details of Garang’s significance. However, he did recall that Garang’s reaction was very positive. According to Heppenstall, Garang was appreciative that the company had made the effort to meet with him, said that inward investment into Sudan was critical, and that he fully supported the company entering into a contract with the government of Sudan. Garang also expressed a desire to meet with Adolf, which Heppenstall said happened later.
When asked how the company kept up to date with Garang and the SPLA’s position about operations after 1998, Heppenstall claimed not to know. He did not believe this was a constant agenda item for management throughout the 1997-2003 period.
Response to Critical Reports (1999-2001)
Heppenstall recalled the period around 1999 onward when the company faced criticism regarding its Sudan operations. He remembered various reports from third parties, including Christian Aid, Amnesty International, and the Harker Report, though he could not recall the chronology. He stated these issues were discussed in detail at board meetings.
When asked if he personally read these reports, Heppenstall said he could not recall which ones he read or which parts. He acknowledged the company might have received summaries but did not remember specifically. Despite this claimed lack of detailed knowledge, he clearly recalled the board’s reaction: they took the allegations very seriously. The general feeling was that they needed to understand the facts, which resulted in hiring Christine Batruch and bringing Carl Bildt onto the board.
Christine Batruch was a lawyer in Switzerland, though Heppenstall could not recall details of her background or qualifications, including whether she had previously worked in similar situations. In general terms, her job was to address the various reports and examine the operation. Heppenstall believed she had contact with Alex Schneiter and Ian Lundin but did not know the specifics.
An email from December 2000 showed Ian Lundin stating that it would be useful if Batruch could be copied on any HSE reports. When asked why he was copied on this email, Heppenstall said he did not know. He also could not explain why Alex Schneiter was copied. He did not believe he personally received HSE reports and did not know who else might have. The email indicated Batruch would be the only contact point for NGOs and needed all information for that purpose. Heppenstall had no memory of being informed by Batruch about her work once she began her role.
Despite his claim that he did not interact directly with her, Heppenstall was very positive about Batruch’s work. He described her as always very professional, saying she did a very good job and that he was always impressed. When asked what this impression was based on, he responded “nothing specific, she was just very professional.” This assessment appears to have been based primarily on general impressions rather than detailed knowledge of her work.
The White Book and Batruch’s Findings
Heppenstall mentioned a document that came to be known as the “white book” produced by Batruch. He stated his recollection was that Batruch looked at allegations that had been made and “quite categorically” refuted the issues she could investigate. He emphasized that his mindset and that of the people around him was that they were doing the right thing in a difficult situation. He recalled discussions around that time with Carl Bildt about the situation in Sudan, and Bildt’s response was that it was ultimately very difficult, but he felt that “oil would lead to peace” in Sudan.
When pressed on what he meant by Batruch “categorically” refuting allegations, Heppenstall said he did not remember details but referred to the extent that allegations could be refuted. He could not recall what issues she could or could not investigate. He did not remember details about which reports discussed which issues or know who Batruch worked with to produce her reports and analysis. He claimed not to know whether Ian Lundin or Alex Schneiter were involved in the production of these reports.
This testimony was significant because Heppenstall appeared to have a strong general impression that Batruch had thoroughly investigated and refuted allegations, while simultaneously claiming to have no detailed knowledge of her work, methods, or findings – a contradiction that raises questions about the basis for management’s confidence in dismissing the serious allegations being made about the company’s operations.
UN Special Rapporteur Incident
In March-April 2001, the UN Special Rapporteur for Sudan made written and verbal statements about the situation in the country. Heppenstall thought he recalled the name but could not remember specifics. The Special Rapporteur gave an address before the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 2001 that levied criticism against the company. In response, Ian Lundin wrote a letter to the board of directors dated 6 April 2001.
When shown this letter, which discussed fighting around Nhialdiu and stated the main cause was intertribal rivalry, Heppenstall said it did not jog his memory. The letter noted that Peter Gadet’s forces had teamed up with the SPLA while other tribal leaders sided with the government to fight Gadet. The prosecution questioned how the main cause could be intertribal rivalry if Gadet’s forces were working with the SPLA against government forces, asking what the basis was for this characterization and what discussions took place. Heppenstall had no recollection of the letter or any discussions about it.
Email Exchange with Carl Bildt
A significant email exchange from June 2001 involving Carl Bildt revealed tensions about the security situation. In an email dated 18 June 2001 from Bildt to Ian Lundin and others including Heppenstall, Bildt wrote that the SPLA had achieved substantial success and the regime was responding in unacceptable ways. When asked if this was an opinion held by management or the board, Heppenstall said he did not recall the email, discussions, or the company’s view.
Bildt predicted there might be forthcoming attacks against oil companies. Heppenstall could not recall whether this was discussed by management or what measures were taken in response. When asked why he was copied on the email if he was not involved in such discussions, he said he did not know. When pressed about who would have been involved in these issues given that he was part of the management team, Heppenstall objected to the characterization of a “management team,” reiterating the organization was very informal with everyone having their own roles. He stated he was responsible for finance issues and it would be wrong to indicate him as being involved in security matters. He suggested he was probably copied because he was part of the board at the time.
Ian Lundin’s reply the next day, 13 June 2001, painted a different picture. He wrote about a “propaganda war” in the West and stated what worried him was that the SPLA caused death to inhabitants near the oil fields, that the military was ready to take defensive and sometimes offensive action. This email was sent to Alex Schneiter, Magnus Nordin, Keith Hill, Ken Barker, Adolf Lundin, Heppenstall, and others. Heppenstall claimed no memory of this email.
The prosecution noted that while Bildt expressed concern about the regime’s actions, Ian’s response seemed to suggest the government did not seek conflict with the SPLA, representing a different view of what was happening. Heppenstall maintained he did not remember any of this. A final email from Bildt on 19 June 2001 to the same recipients stated: “We don’t want to be seen defending the government” and suggested blame should be put on the SPLA. Heppenstall had no recollection of whether Bildt’s views were discussed by the board or any discussions on this issue.
Pattern of Limited Recollection
When asked generally about his role in the company and whether he had experienced similar criticism on other projects, Heppenstall said he did not remember anything from that time period but had experienced issues in other countries since then, mentioning some problems in Albania and Libya, though noting the Sudan situation was “pretty specific.” The prosecutor suggested that perhaps because the situation was so specific, he might have recollections, but Heppenstall maintained he had no recollection of these discussions.
This pattern continued when asked about security reports. In August 2001, Ken Barker sent a security assessment regarding an attack on GNPOC’s block by Gadet. Heppenstall could not recall this. A risk assessment by Barker after the Heglig incident included analysis of potential threats and risks against Block 5A, describing the Heglig operation as a “propaganda success” and stating he “would not care to comment on any breaches of human rights.” Heppenstall did not remember receiving or reading this content.
When asked if he received reports from Barker generally, Heppenstall said he might have gotten reports, especially after becoming CEO, but did not remember specifics. When asked how he received the reports, he referred back to testimony from the previous day, stating he could not recall details of how and when they were sent. When Barker’s practice of writing weekly reports in the same format that he would send to Geneva was described, Heppenstall acknowledged there may have been such reports, but he did not remember the format, details, or anything specific about them.
Sale of Lundin Oil to Talisman
The summer of 2001 saw the sale of Lundin Oil to Talisman, with the company becoming Lundin Petroleum. Heppenstall was intimately involved in this transaction, probably leading it in terms of negotiations and closing the sale. All of Lundin Oil was sold except for certain smaller parts that were “carved out,” including Sudan, Russia, Libya, and Iran. The main assets Talisman wanted were in the UK and Malaysia.
When asked why some parts were carved out, Heppenstall explained the fundamental reason was that Talisman wanted to buy the UK and Malaysian assets specifically. Other smaller exploration assets like Albania were also sold, though he could not recall all details. Regarding Sudan specifically, Heppenstall testified there was no discussion of selling those assets. From his perspective, the transaction focused on the UK and Malaysia. They never considered Sudan to be part of the transaction, and Talisman did not want Sudan, Russia, or the other carved-out assets. When asked why Talisman did not want Sudan, Heppenstall said he did not know their reasons.
In the new structure as Lundin Petroleum, management changes occurred. As discussed, Heppenstall became CEO the following year and Alex Schneiter became COO. There were further management changes including the appointment of a Vice President of Legal and a Vice President of Technical Services, creating a new management structure. Regarding the relationship between the new parent company Lundin Petroleum and the subsidiary Lundin Sudan, Ken Barker stayed on as general manager. Heppenstall acknowledged some confusion about Barker’s reporting lines to Ian and himself but stated he became more involved in Sudan, though he could not identify a specific date when this change occurred.
Security Incidents During Operations
When asked about a weekly report from Barker dated 28 October 2001 discussing security matters, and whether he heard about requests for building a new road beyond the existing all-weather road, Heppenstall said he did not engage in such matters. When pressed about whether he would have been involved if the company considered a road project with associated costs, he said probably not, as there was no reason for him to be involved in such detailed information. He stated he most certainly would have seen the all-weather road in the budget because it was a large budget item, but as for other roads, not really.
Heppenstall added that he heard about the road to Nhialdiu later when interrogated by police but otherwise had no recollection of it. He had not heard of Robert Archer, a consultant who worked inspecting roads that had been built. When shown documents about road construction and tender processes, Heppenstall consistently claimed not to know details or not to recall discussions about these matters.
A letter from June 2002, when Heppenstall was CEO, was addressed to Awad Al-Jazz, Minister of Mining and Energy and director of OEPA, signed by Barker. The letter stated the company was prepared to reimburse the ministry for part of the road to MOK, with a disputed amount to be discussed with the contractor prior to payment. This indicated a situation where an initial price was given but later a higher price was requested. Heppenstall did not recall discussing this, though he remembered it being brought up in his police interrogation. His recollection was that when he became CEO, operations were suspended and they never paid for a road to MOK.
When asked if Barker had authority to make a promise to consider paying a higher amount without approval from someone else, Heppenstall said he did not know Barker’s specific responsibilities, but that Barker certainly would have to get approval from partners if he intended to spend more money than accounted for in the work program. When pressed on whether Barker could make such a promise before partner approval existed, Heppenstall maintained Barker would need partner approval to spend the money.
The delegation of authority documents showed Barker could approve unbudgeted amounts up to $100,000, but the road amount in question was $900,000 with the difference between expected and new amounts exceeding $100,000. When asked if Barker could have been given special authority to enter a separate agreement, Heppenstall said he did not remember details but reiterated that Barker would need partner approval to spend the money. He found it unusual that the company would enter an agreement with OEPA and seek partner approval afterward, saying it had never happened in his experience to his awareness.
Helicopter Incident
Heppenstall remembered very well the incident on 20 December 2001 when the company helicopter was shot at, recalling that he received a call from Ken Barker after Barker found out about the attack. Barker was emotional and shocked regarding the attack. Heppenstall was in Geneva at the time and Barker briefed him on the situation. Heppenstall’s recollection was that Barker was particularly concerned about the wellbeing of the person who was shot and wanted to make sure they could transport him to get medical attention.
When asked if Ian Lundin traveled to Sudan in connection with this incident, Heppenstall said he may very well have but did not really remember. Regarding consequences of the incident, the individual who was shot was treated and survived, which was the most important thing. Heppenstall remembered that at the time he felt they were gearing up operations and that things were stable and positive, so he was very shocked by the incident. As CFO at the time, he remembered that he was not part of discussions about what to do next.
The operations were suspended following this incident. When asked where the decision to suspend operations was made and by whom, Heppenstall said he did not know exactly. He believed there was a discussion at the Lundin board level but could not recall how the decision was made. He believed the matter was discussed by the board but could not be 100% sure. When asked if it could have been the board who suspended operations, he said he did not recall. When pressed about why else the board would discuss the issue, he explained it was a serious security event and it would have been normal to discuss such an event at the board level.
Based on his professional understanding, Heppenstall was uncertain where such a decision would have been made. He was sure there were discussions between the parties involved, but he was not part of them and did not know where the formal decision originated. Heppenstall recalled that Barker contacted the office – he did not recall if Barker called him directly, but because of the seriousness of the matter he took the call. Barker was very emotional and they discussed what could be done, especially to get the injured person medical attention. Heppenstall did not remember if Barker recommended employing the force majeure clause in connection with this incident or if this was discussed in management, though he acknowledged it was not discussed with him personally.
The All-Weather Road and Extension to Leer
Regarding road projects, Heppenstall said he knew about the all-weather road to Thar Jath and remembered discussions about extending it to Leer. He thought part of it was done but did not remember details. When shown the Assignment and Novation Agreement from January 2002, he recalled the subject matter. His recollection was that they were going to extend the road to Leer, that work stopped, that the government was keen for it to continue, and that at that time they wanted it for advocacy purposes, though he could not recall specific details. Ultimately, responsibility was assigned to the government.
When asked why the government wanted construction to continue, Heppenstall said he did not know their reasons and was not involved. When the term “humanitarian reasons” was raised, he explained that at that time Batruch and Bildt had pushed for a corporate social responsibility perspective in the block. In the Assignment and Novation Agreement, there was a change to contractual parties as the government stepped in instead of the company, but the company was still required to pay. Heppenstall did not remember details about why the government would step in and take on the role while the company still paid, nor did he have any idea why the company would continue paying for the road extension under these circumstances.
When asked if there would be a reason for him to be informed about this type of contractual change as CEO, Heppenstall said he had no recollection of the agreement. The prosecution’s position was that operations were suspended permanently in 2002, and they asked what Heppenstall could remember. He confirmed his recollection was that operations were suspended during this period. When asked about discussions regarding whether they would stay and whether they would be liable to pay for the road, Heppenstall did not recall such discussions.
Security Reports from Early 2002
An email from Barker dated February 2002 to Heppenstall and others in management and to partners described the security situation as “grim,” with fighting south of Rubkona. Barker described his assessment of fighting from Leer, stating generally the security situation was grim with 10,000 refugees reaching Rubkona. Heppenstall’s recollection of this time was that the situation in the block was not good. There was a feeling in the company that ultimately operations would lead to peace, and everyone engaged tried to ensure they were helping the situation, though Heppenstall said he was not involved with this directly.
When asked why Barker included partners in these communications, Heppenstall said he did not know. Barker also seemed to express the opinion that a political solution was required to operate in the area. Heppenstall did not recall specific discussions but said his recollection was that “political” referred to what was required to achieve a peace agreement. Regarding the large number of refugees and fighting, Heppenstall said he did not know the reasons or causes of the fighting. His knowledge was very general – there were factions with various loyalties, but his knowledge was limited.
When asked if he discussed these issues in police interviews, Heppenstall said he may have but did not recall. When shown the record of his 14 December 2017 interview, the court granted use of that document. Regarding a security update, Heppenstall had expressed that the hostility was between different parties, but in his current testimony he struggled to provide context. He could not give more detail beyond saying it was violent in the block after the helicopter incident. His recollection regarding fighting at the start of 2002 was that not only the SPLA and government were fighting but that tribal inter-factional fighting occurred too. When asked what he based this on, he said he did not know if that was something he knew at the time or if it was something he had been led to believe afterward – an acknowledgment about the potential unreliability of his memory.
