Report 67 – Richard Ramsey
The testimony of Richard Ramsey
Richard Ramsey served in the British Army for 22 years before joining Rapport, the company contracted by IPC (Lundin Oil). During his military career, he was part of the Intelligence Corps, where he was responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating military intelligence, as well as overseeing counterintelligence and security operations. Following his service, he was employed by Rapport and assigned to work with Lundin Oil.
Day one – Prosecution’s Examination in Chief
Ramsey testified that he knew very little of Sudan when he first arrived in December 1998. Neither Rapport nor Lundin Oil briefed him on the country. He got some information from the internet but he was “not very technologically aware.” His first impression of Sudan was that it was unstable, underdeveloped, and that there were “a number of opposition groups alongside the government.” He was aware of a peace agreement in place (the Khartoum Peace Agreement) which had been signed in 1997, and he had been told “things were peaceful.” His first task was as an analyst for Rapport staff in the field. Ramsey told the court that his first few months in Khartoum were rocky.
The Sudanese government had rejected the Rapport field staff in early 1998 chosing instead to bring in domestic security advisors to work for IPC.In 1999, Ramsey was tasked to work in the field in place of those who had been deported. Ramsey said that they had received a fax from one of the ministries stating that Captain Rati had been appointed as security advisor and HSE staff were no longer necessary. However, he was only in the field for a few weeks before Rapport was able to deploy new security staff into the country. at that point Ramsey returned to the Khartoum office. Dick Deary was one of his colleagues who had been deported in 1998, although he could not say why. A document from 2 May 1999 was shown by prosecutor Ewa Korpi, suggested that “resentment manifested from last year” and had led to the deportation of staff. Ramsey said he didn’t know what the resentment was about.
Prior to commencing full-time in the field in early 1999, he made a few field trips where he worked from the BGP barge in the Bahr el Ghazal River. He deployed into the field with Jeff Ferguson in early 1999, when Lundin Oil commenced operations in earnest. He told the court that they were building the base camp in Rubkhona at the time, and that they stayed at the Chinese ZPB drill camp until the base camp was finished towards the end of the same year.
While in Khartoum, his duties were to analyze reporting from the field, produce reports for the Lundin Oil offices, and to brief the managers in his office. He recalled Gordon Mac Donald Smith working in the office with him as the seismic manager. Ramsey received reports from Alan Packwood, David Toon, and “another guy who served in the SAS.” Dick Deary was Ramseys “back-to-back”, and they would rotate with one another. Ramsey worked with other HSE personnel, including Peep Wilson, JJ Glendenning and Ian Hood. He received reports often but could not tell the prosecutor if it was daily or weekly reporting. His own reports went to Lundin Oil with the managers on copy. It was not until they moved to the base in Rubkhona that they started to meet other field security personnel. He had contact with Mark Reading and another man named Mark at Talisman as well as Gary Long and Mark Dingley.
Ramsey told the court that intelligence was limited and that they first relied upon information from HSE personnel. The idea was to make contact with the Sudanese government, but that did not happen, he said. He met with the head of Petroleum Security a few times, but he could not remember these meetings being beneficial. When he first arrived in December 1998, he testified that Toon and Packwood told him HSE staff occasionally met with militia commanders to gain information, but he could not remember if that was considered good. He could recall that Toon and Packwood relayed that there were concerns from militia commanders about the military entering the block, and that he included this in his own reporting. This reporting practice changed as the original HSE staff left the country. He recalled Hill mentioning how he told Packwood to cease the meetings because there were “sensitivities with HSE getting close with militia commanders.” Ramsey testified that this did not occur during his time.
In Khartoum they could move freely, but they had an allocated PetSec security liaison officer in the field, Captain Rati. This changed later to PetSec stationing a unit outside their base. He could not remember if he was required to bring Rati with him but he preferred it because Captain Rati could interpret for him. When Ramsey deployed into the field full time, he took on the role of HSE field advisor, and his duties included providing Lundin Oil with security advice and reports. He was also tasked with overseeing the safety and security of the employees in the camp. He remained in this position until 2003, only returning to Khartoum briefly when the block was evacuated. Rapport started having financial difficulties around the start of 1999 and they were eventually unable to pay the salaries of field staff. This caused Ramsey to transition to work directly for Lundin Oil a few months later.
PetSec, or Petroleum Security, oversaw the security in the oil producing region. Ramsey told the court that their duties included providing security for their camp and mobile security escorts for the company vehicles while travelling along the roads. They were also a contact point between the military andthe militias. PetSec joined the operations around 2000 when the Rubkhona camp was built; however, Captain Rati came in early 1999 as an employee of IPC. Ramsey testified that PetSec reported to the Ministry of Mining, and he called them a “quasi-military organization and part of the army.”The general opinion of PetSec and Rati was positive: “They did their job to escort us, they were effective and reliable. They were not corrupt nor made demands of us.” Korpi asked how the security work was divided between PetSec and HSE, and Ramsey responded that HSE would coordinate with the contractors, vehicles, and pass necessary information on to PetSec, whereas PetSec would focus on security escorts. He remembered only having problems with them once when they became upset with him for bringing a PetSec guy with him on a recognizance trip, although he couldn’t understand why. He couldn’t remember anyone else having issues with PetSec either. The relationship and information exchange between state security and the oil company has been raised previously during the trial. Readding painted a picture of distrust and a poor relationship between the two in Block 4. Korpi asked Ramsey why this was, although he was unable to shed any light on the matter.
The reporting structure in the field was informal. They had no formal or regular meetings, but he recalled receiving daily updates from his field staff, and he reported to managers in Khartoum, Dr. Bagi and “Lundin”. Ewa Korpi, the prosecutor, asked him to clarify whom he referred to when he spoke of Lundin. He replied, “I know the names were on the reports but unless I see a report, I won’t know. Maybe Ian Lundin and Graham Hill.”
In 1999, Lundin Oil was mainly focused on finishing construction of their base camp in Rubkhona. This meant that they were rarely out in the block. Ramsey testified that he travelled along the old Chevron Road to visit the camp a few times, and he recalled some fighting in May of that year. When they moved into their camp, his main sources for security information were PetSec and Captain Bagi. He had met a soldier working in intelligence from whom he received some information. At times they would go to the local market and speak with people there or on rare occasions he would speak with NGOs, including the Red Cross, Medecins sans frontieres (MSF), and GAA.
When asked which militia commanders he knew about, Ramsey said that when he first went to Khartoum he knew of the two main commanders, Tito Biel of SSIM and Paulino Matiep of SSUM. SSM were primarily Bol-Nuer tribe and were aligned with the government, although SSIM was “more independent, shall we say.” Peter Gadet had defected from the government around 1998 or 1999, and he was SPLA aligned when Ramsey arrived. He was attacking the Talisman area and areas to the west of Block 5A. Ramsey said he couldn’t place Gadet in a certain timeline but said he couldn’t remember much about him prior to 2000. Although he did not have an information exchange with the commanders, he met a few of them briefly. Peter Paar and James Liah Diu were both allied with the government at the time of the meeting.
Korpi aimed her questions towards Ramsey’s intelligence and the security situation in the Block prior to the army being deployed into the Block in 1999. The security was then made up of local police, SSIM, and SSUM. He testified that trucks and contractors were regularly getting harassed by “rogue elements of the militia” and the joint force was sufficient. He expressed that they did not want the army to deploy into the Block because they could manage operations with the arrangement in place and they expected that issues would arise if the army was deployed. Ramsey testified that David Toon and locals told him that the militias did not want the army in the Block. It is also worth noting that the KPA had stipulated that the Army would not deploy into the south, into rebel-controlled areas, and the agreement was still in force. A document from 22 January 1999 asserted that Tito had made it clear that SSDF, an umbrella term for SSIM and SSUM according to Ramsey, would not allow the army to operate if they did not let SSDF provide security. Ramsey did not remember seeing the report. A further security report authored by Ramsey, from 2 March 1999, noted that there was a rumor of the army deploying into the area; however, Ramsey said there were so many other rumors going around. The rumor seemed credible enough that Tito prepared his forces to meet the army in Leer according to a report dated 15 March 1999. Tensions were high but Ramsey seemed to attribute little attention to it at the time.
Korpi then asked Ramsey to elucidate on what happened when the army deployed into the Block. Ramsey described it as an “invasion” of Thar Jath 1; however, he was informed of the attack after the fact as he was in the UK at the time. The guard force they had previously imploded he said. Hood was present, while Deary was in Khartoum writing a report on the incident. Ramsey assisted Deary when he returned a few days later. He couldn’t recall much of the contents of the report and told the court that he was involved with formatting. He was asked to comment on Deary’s assessment that the finding of oil was a deciding factor behind the army’s deployment into the Block, to which he stated that it was Deary’s comment so he couldn’t add to it. However, on the second day Ramsey stated he “agreed with his narration of the events and the final assessment of the joint security team being a failure,” and that they needed the military on their side. He was then asked about another point in Deary’s report: the possibility of Paulino Matiep’s militia being deployed into the Block before the army as a justification for the army to enter the Block to restrain fighting between Matiep and Tito Biel. Ramsey did not remember any discussions about that.
Who deployed into the Block and attacked the rig first remains a contested issue. Ramsey testified that his memory of the event was cloudy, but Deary’s report states that Matiep went in first, followed by the army. The conclusion after the invasion of the rig was that the hybrid task force was not sufficient and that it was unreliable; the militia who were part of it turned on the people they were supposed to protect as Matiep entered the rig site. Therefore, Ramsey and Deary opined that the army had to be responsible for security. Ramsey believed Dr. Bagi could have communicated this conclusion to the regime because he had day-to-day contact with the ministry.
Ramsey said that he was asked by management to produce a security plan for future operations in the Block, and to present it to Adolf Lundin. The prosecution presented a security report authored by Ramsey on 18 May 1999. The report raised the instability in the area and the potential of it affecting oil operations. It then asserted that the “criteria” laid down on 11 May 1999 for Lundin Oil to resume operations in the Block had not been met. The criteria include a request for “complete military control” and the number of soldiers needed to secure the operations. Ramsey recalled that the security plan requested security on the road, rig sites, and the operational area, but said that the criteria were never fulfilled and the army never provided the number of soldiers they had requested. The “actual arrangement looked very different from what we asked for.” The number of soldiers requested were estimated to hold off potential “low-level guerrilla attacks”, but would not be sufficient for a larger attack. The prosecution has argued that, based on the related information about attacks on civilians, the demands for military security in rebel-controlled areas suggest that the company knew or should have known that the consequences of their demands would impact civilians in the surrounding areas. The defense teams, however, have contended that these demands were never met and, as Ramsey testified, that the number of soldiers provided by the military was not sufficient for offensives. Ramsey told the court that there was security inside the Rubkhona base and a small PetSec camp outside the base, but none of the forces were comprised of regular soldiers. He said the army provided security for drilling locations and seismic operations but checkpoints along the road and on the river did not actualize despite their request. He could not answer why the criteria were not met but said that the military eventually provided sufficient security for operations to resume.
The Khartoum Peace Agreement was significant and absolutely necessary for Lundin’s operations, according to Ramsey, who said that “It would have been impossible to start without it, this guarantee of peace.” He emphasized the need for stability in the area for successful operations throughout his testimony and he was of the opinion that it was mostly peaceful during his time in the area, save for a few incidents. Occasionally, Reading and Dingley from Block 4 and Gary Long would come to Block 5A and they would exchange information on the “general security situation in the block.” Ramsey said he saw Reading “not more than once a year. I only saw him two or three times.” The prosecution raised that Reading had testified that he came to the camp four to five times a year, but Ramsey said because of his six weeks on, six weeks off rotations, he might have missed him.
The prosecution then asked Ramsey if he was aware of or made aware of the NGO reports that had started to come out about the military treatment of civilians. Ramsey denied ever having seen them or being aware of the incidents the reports discussed. The prosecution then referred to the diary of security events kept by Deary. The document, as Ramsey recalled it, was used as a briefing document and the information would have come from field staff, and he said that the information was likely sent to management and Geneva in weekly reports.
Ramsey testified further that he would sometimes speak to security advisors from a different security company, Rubicon, in 2002-2003. They were doing geophysical security and provided two security guys for the operational area and a third would rotate between the rig and Rubkhona.
In 2002, Ken Barker made Ramsey camp manager, working back-to-back with Ferguson. His duties in that role included ensuring the camp was maintained and kept running, overseeing HSE advisors, and coordinating supplies for the rig. At this time, his role did not encompass security in the field; however, he maintained social contact with PetSec and would infrequently receive security information. Glendenning, Ian Hood, and Graham Maweka were still on site in 2002. Ramsey and Ferguson were working on a rotating schedule, six weeks on and six weeks off, and the handover was therefore never that long. He believed he might have received security reports while in the UK, Ramsey said, but he was not sure. He told the court that he had a similar work schedule with Hood and Glendenning. Handover between all of them was always verbal. Ramsey said he met Ian Lundin a few times but seldom had direct back and forth. Similarly, Hill and Barker were mostly on the receiving end of his reports but there was not much direct back and forth. He did not remember meeting Alexandre Schneiter at all.
Day 2
On the second day of Richard Ramsey’s testimony, the prosecution asked him to expand on his knowledge of Dick Deary, who had been on the list of initial deportees but managed to stay in Sudan before he left the company. Ramsey could not explain how he managed to remain in Sudan nor why he left the company, but he told the court that Deary was “quite an emotional person” and maybe he left because of the rig attack.
The prosecutor then asked Ramsey to elaborate on the rig attack. He testified on the first day that he remembered the attack happening prior to the military being deployed. A report from 3 May 1999 asserted that Thar Jath was overrun by people native to the area andexplained that security was informed of the impending attack. Steven Day, who had arrived as HSE with Packwood after 1999, had been approached by representatives from the military who had informed him that the army was deploying into the rig site and that they would be followed by Matiep’s forces. Ramsey emphasized that this was not a memory, rather it was what he gathered from the report which was shown on the four big screens in the court room.
Schneiter’s defense counsel, Per Samuelsson, interjected at this point and asked Judge Zander whether it was appropriate to read from and ask questions about a report of an incident that Ramsey had not been present for. Henrik Attorps, who led the examination in chief on day two, said that Ramsey did help with the report and that because it showed a different version of events, he was seeking Ramsey’s commentary. Attorps argued that this document was used as a basis for the company demanding military security after the incident. Judge Zander considered it to be a relevant consideration, and, after a short recess, he granted leave for Attorps to continue his examination on the matter. Ramsey did not elucidate on the report or incident, telling the court that it was like “reading the report from fresh” and that he didn’t remember much. The post incident demands for future operations were “certainly not” made by HSE personnel, but if he was to speculate, it could have been Dr. Bagi or the government who proposed them.
Attorps’s questions seemed to have a more serious tone than the previous day. He questioned Ramsey on whether discussions were held regarding the security situation, the attack on the rig, and the subsequent decision to use the Sudanese military as security. He placed extra emphasis on the fact that Ramsey was a security advisor, that his job was to deal with the security situation, and he brought up Ramsey’s long background in military intelligence. Attorps effectively built up a foundation for the argument that Ramsey ‘should have known more’ about the situation and various security changes than he had told the court. Attorps also raised the fact that Ramsey had emphasized the importance of peace for the success of the company’s operations. In light of that, and the fact that he was previously opposed to the military moving into the block, how come he supported the company’s demands for full military control over the relevant areas and continued road construction in hostile areas. Ramsey said that the hybrid force was sufficient to meet the job requirements and that the attack at the rig was the critical factor in the subsequent decisions. “When you get the element of supposedly friendly forces going into the rig site, they look for people, murder and loot. Then a big change has occurred”. The company needed a stable force, and that was the military, he said.
Ramsey was then questioned on what, if any, investigations were carried out into the military’s treatment of civilians. Ramsey told the court that no such assessments were made regarding the treatment of civilians by military in the Block or in surrounding areas. He also denied receiving any reports regarding the displacement of civilians, despite the company’s own security reports containing such information. The overall examination concerning the treatment of civilians in the company’s operational and surrounding areas suggested a complete lack of concern for the effects and consequences of military action in and around the Block.
In the afternoon, Annika Wennerström began her examination of Ramsey. She raised security protocols from October to December 1999, discussing delays prior to the construction of the all-weather road from Rubkhona to Thar Jath 1 and a field trip being cancelled due to the ongoing security situation. Shw was particularly interested in how points in the report were worded; for example, “the army is pushing hard to secure the operational stage of the project.” Ramsey could not add anything other than saying that the area in which the rig road was being constructed was “generally unstable” at the time. He also said that the overall impression was that the military didn’t have “much capacity to protect our operations”. Wennerström asked Ramsey about letters written to OEPA and about Gadet but he couldn’t recall any letters to the government nor OEPA and he maintained that Gadet was always a threat.
Once back in courtroom 34, the focus shifted to Ramsey’s duties in 2000. Ramsey, Ferguson, and the logistics base manager moved to the Rubkhona base camp at that time, and it was at this time he became an HSE field operator. The main task of that role was to oversee safety and security of the IPC team and to report on the situation back to Khartoum. Asked if he could recall any discussions taking place regarding the consequences of bringing in large numbers of military soldiers to rebel-controlled areas for the purpose of security, Ramsey responded that he could not remember such conversations taking place.
Ramsey was also asked about an incident where a walking convoy was attacked by what he believed to be SSDF. He could not give a timeline or describe the extent of the fighting between the two at this time, saying that the militias “were fluid. Sometimes they were allied, other times they weren’t.” Regarding the weaponry used, Ramsey only saw light weapons. He never witnessed any air attacks, but he knew of the bomb dropped on the rig. He told the court that he thought the Sudanese army was behind it because they were the only ones “capable” of carrying out the attack and he guessed that they must have confused the rig with a different location. He knew the army used Antonov planes as makeshift bomber planes. The only time he observed the planes or helicopters was when they overflew the camp, he said. He was asked about when Ian Lundin and Bengt Nilsson visited Rubkhona in 2001, when Nilsson had captured a gunship on video. Ramsey said he did not remember seeing any gunships stationary in the area, saying they were never there permanently.
Ramsey recalled an ambush that occurred near Rubkhona. He had gone down to the bridge head with the IPC medic, and they had heard shooting from the south of the river. They quickly left and later they observed the army putting bodies in a pit. The operation was suspended as a result, and all staff were evacuated. Ramsey told the court that after the evacuation, intelligence from the field was limited to what the liaison officer received from the Sudanese army. A security report authored by Ken Barker placed the attack on 29 February 2000 and stated that the army had moved additional troops into the Block. However, Ramsey testified that he was unable to remember any changes. The situation remained tense, and he recalled seeing “lots of fire around 12 March” south of Bentiu. The report said that the military was “burning out” the rebels but Ramsey could not confirm the source of the information and no investigations were conducted into the effect this may have had on the civilians. Ramsey further testified that he had not been part of any discussions within the company regarding the code black and evacuations. Wennerström questioned Ramsey on the army’s strategy to secure the operational area, but he was quick to assert that he wasn’t a party to the military’s plans.
The Harker report came out in 2000 after John Harker had met with Deary in December 1999, but Ramsey told the court that he never saw it. Wennerström questioned him about how much he knew of the content of the report, the investigation into Talisman, and what measures IPC took to investigate further. Ramsey’s response was the same as it had been when Attorps questioned him about the earlier reports: he did not know about it, and no measures were taken to investigate the treatment of civilians. When operations resumed, Ramsey said he had assumed that was the result of a peace agreement between the militia and the army. However, Gadet remained a threat.
Day three
The examination in chief on day three was once again led by Henrik Attorps. He started by asking Ramsey about the bombing at Thar Jath and the report authored by JJ Glendinning on 21 February 2000. Ramsey could not remember being part of the analysis or drafting of it.
Attorps asked Ramsey about the trip he made along the all-weather road with Ian Lundin and Swedish journalist Bengt Nilsson, but Ramsey was unable to recall much about who they spoke with during the trip and what the purpose of the trip was. The prosecution once again played the video clip from Nilsson’s trip in Sudan in March 2001, where Ramsey is shown discussing SSIM and how they have switched alliances. ramsey was asked if he discussed the ongoing conflict with Ian Lundin when he visited Sudan but he believed he hadn’t.
Attorps moved on to the company’s rebuttal of the Christian Aid report, authored by Ramsey. Meta data obtained by the prosecution had revealed that Christine Batruch, Lundin Oil’s Head of Corporate Social Responsibility whom Ramsey had met many times, was the last to save the document electronically.
The company’s rebuttal to the Christian Aid report was titled “Oil in Sudan.” Ramsey told the court that he had produced some points for the report which he had given to Batruch. Attorps asked Ramsey about the investigative measures the company undertook, which people had been involved in the report, what information built the foundation of the report, and where the information came from. However, Ramsey was not able to say more than “I can’t remember.”
Rehu Mawika was a HSE security employee brought in by the UK-based security company Rubicon for Lundin Oil’s geophysical program. He had reported seeing soldiers setting fire to a hut near the staging area for the 2D program south of Thar Jath. Ramsey told the court that this had been reported to the company and that they mentioned it to the military commanders, telling them this wasn’t acceptable. The military responded to the claim by saying that the soldiers had seen a snake in the roof. A report by Glendinning from 8 May 2001 mentioned villages and civilians in the seismic area but Ramsey could not remember any conversations about that nor could he remember the report itself. He told the court that had he believed he had seen some villages on recognizance trips outside of the project areas. One wouldn’t travel further than what was required for the particular stage of operation, so when the operational area moved they occasionally saw other villages. Rasmey was asked again whether he, at this point, had reflected over the military’s actions against civilians, to which he responded that he had no memory of doing so.
Attorps asked Ramsey about Alexandre Schneitre and his role and involvement in security issues, but again, Ramsey had nothing to add. Ramsey was asked to what extent they monitored opposition and the development of relationships and alliances in the opposition. Ramsey said it was mainly the overall security situation they were able to monitor. They received information about who was allied with whom after the fact but it was not possible to monitor the developments before that. He said that this information was reported in the weekly reports. A report from the company Rapport, dated May 2001, discussed Riek Machar defecting, which was something Ramsey vaguely remembered occurring but could not say when.
The extension of the all-weather road to Leer was the next topic. Ramsey remembered that there were talks of building a road to Leer; however, he had been under the impression that the company was not going to get involved with it. “The road was not essential for the development of operations in Ther Jath.” Attorps moved on to the security situation and the coordination of security around this time. He asked twice whether Ramsey recalled the security situation and structure changing around May 2001, but Ramsey could not provide much information on the matter. The court was soon made aware of a report by Ken Barker, dated 20 May 2001, noting that El Haytan was appointed as the new security manager, taking over after Dr. Rati. Ramsey remembered him and explained that he thought El Haytan was the IPCSO (IPC security officer) and that he was responsible for the coordination of security in the whole block. Ramsey himself was localized to the Rubkhona base. When asked about impressions or opinions of Dr. Rati as the new security manager, Ramsey expressed that he felt surprise at the appointment, saying “I don’t remember being informed that he [was] now security manager.” Attorps asked Ramsey about a meeting he attended at which both El Haytan and a man named Muhammed Maktar were present. Maktar was in charge of PetSec, he said, but they had only met once or twice.
Attorps made another attempt to gain information about any investigative measures taken by Ramsey or the company into the treatment of civilians by the government. He asked Ramsey if any such measures were taken in response to Peter Gadet’s attack against Heglig in August 2001 and if the company conducted an analysis of how to continue operating safely. Ramsey said that no analysis was made, and no measures were taken. “From recollection the attack was a stand-alone attack […] this was the type of threat we were aware of. There was nothing to extrapolate from it.” Attorps pressed on, asking about Ramsay’s impression of how the army responded to the attack. “From what I was told, they pursued the Heglig attackers,” he responded. A report by Ken Barker dated 12 August 2001, mentioned the attack and furthermore contained a section where Barker wrote that he would not want to “comment on the humanitarian crisis” and that there was no doubt that displacement and cleansing was involved. Ramsey denied any knowledge of the army’s response and of the report, saying, “I was not provided the information regarding on what level this happened.” He continued by saying it was possible that the information came from the IPCSO. Ramsey was steadfast in asserting his lack of involvement in the events mentioned in the report. He also told the court that he did not participate in discussions regarding investigating these claims, indicating however that Barker might have been. “I was firmly focused on Rubkhona and the safety of employees there.”
Ramsey wrote a report about the political risk insurance update in October 2001, in which he mentioned that the Block had been calm, that 2000 soldiers were located in Rubkhona in a couple of bases along the all-weather road and at the rig sites, and that Peter Gadet had been active in Block 4, targeting operations and road constructions as they approached his area. Ramsey was unable to recall the report at all, but was of the opinion that Gadet’s attacks on the road construction was because he did not want the army in his area, and he referred back to the peace agreement. Ramsey explained that earlier, when they constructed the all-weather road, the rebels had agreed to let them start construction but that they had changed their minds and attacked the company’s locations and their security force. He said this made it evident that the company could not operate without a degree of peace in the area. The soldiers mentioned in the report were security measures aimed at protecting them from small scale attacks, but they did not have the numbers for any attacks of a larger scale.
Peter Gadet attacked Bentiu a few days after Ramsey wrote his report, but no analysis was made in relation to this attack either. “The assumption was at the time that this was a one off and that this was something he couldn’t sustain,” Ramsey explained. In response to questions about the company’s plans for 2002, Ramsey said that seismic operations were planned south of Thar Jath and that a man called Abdul Wahad had presented the outline of a seismic plan. He was not sure of the details but told the court that there was a plan to build a base camp south of the rig site and that the Chinese seismic vehicles would conduct the project.
Attorps moved on to a security report authored by Rubicon employee John Davidson in November 2001. Davidson had been in Rubkhona a month earlier and they had discussed the security situation in the Block. Davidson wrote in his report that the only solution to the issue presented by Gadet was armed forces. Ramsey told the court that he agreed with that conclusion, but he could not remember much about his meeting with Davidson.
Day four – Defense Cross-examination
Lundin defense cross-examination
Ian Lundin’s defense counsel, Thomas Tendorf, went first in questioning Richard Ramsey. He commenced his cross-examination by asking Ramsey to tell the court about the all-weather road and his work with it. Ramsey said that he visited the road weekly until construction was finished for the purposes of overseeing the progress of the project and reporting to the Khartoum office. The base camp manager, IPC liaison officer, and a PetSec escort were usually with him on these trips. He never experienced any security issues on these trips.
Ramsey testified that he flew along the road construction many times to get to the rig site. While flying along the road, one could see one to two kilometers on either side of the road. He told the court it was just bush on either side of the road. Travelling along the road by car, Ramsey said he saw occasional cattle herders, both Nuer and the people of the Bagara tribes. He explained that the local herders lived a nomadic lifestyle, generally heading to where the grass was best for the cows. The road was beneficial to civilians. When the fighting stopped, the civilians would travel along the road by foot and by buses and trucks. Tendorf clarified a statement Ramsey had made on the first day when he had said that the road construction would have had to be suspended had the locals disagreed with it, and Ramsey clarified that by locals he referred to the rebels. He did not believe there had been any issues with civilians regarding the road.
Tendorf asked if he had ever seen burned villages on his trips along or above the road, to which Ramsey responded that he never saw anything like that, nor had he ever heard about that until the prosecution showed him the Christian Aid report. Tendorf also raised that Ramsey had told the court that civilians had fled to Rubkhona to get away from fighting. They never knew exactly whether it was militia against militia or militia against army because the reports would often indicate that there was fighting but not between who, he said. Tendorf then asked if he was correct in saying that the civilians were not fleeng the army soldiers, to which Ramsey agreed.
After a number of rapid-fire questions about the need for peace and stability, it was clear that Ramsey believed that the company could not operate during instability and conflict and that apart from the incidents he had mentioned, his time there was fairly stable. Tendorf displayed a security report authored by Ramsey from June 1999 on the big screens in the courtroom. The report was about the security for Block 5A operations during the1999-2000 season and it mentioned the security corridor. Ramsey confirmed that by ‘corridor’, they were speaking about securing an area around the operations for the purpose of protecting it from small groups of bandits. The document suggested that soldiers would patrol the operational area and every crew would have further guards for operational security. Tendorf asked Ramsey if he had heard or seen the military guard force exercising violence against civilians, to which Ramsey replied firmly that he had not. He again emphasized the importance of peace for the operations to be successful.
Cross-examination by Schneitre’s defense
Once Ian Lundin’s defense was done, Per Samuelsson took the floor and commenced the cross-examination for Alexandre Schneitre. The cross focused mainly on Ramsey’s time in the Block, the attack on the rig site, and whether he was of the opinion that the attacks were directed at the rig or if there were other reasons behind them.
The hybrid guard force at the Thar Jath rig was made up of SSUM, SSIM, and local police officers. They would guard the rig and escort the convoys to and from the rig. They would negotiate with any militia checkpoint they came across, Ramsey said. Although there were tensions, there was peace in the area because of the Khartoum Peace Agreement. He was asked to elucidate on the contested rig attack in May 1999. Ramsey said it was the SSIM who initiated the rig attack and killed three PetSec guards. The defense pointed out that SSIM were Nuer and the PetSec guards were north Sudanese, exploring the possibility of the attack being motivated by ethnic or religious reasons. The court heard that Ramsey believed the attack was aimed at Sudan and not the company, saying that they attacked the PetSec staff and looted but “given that they had taken control of the rig they could’ve easily hurt the expats or Chinese, so I guess it was towards the north Sudanese.” He said that the SSIM who were part of the guard force turned on them, and they concluded that they needed the army as security after that.
After being suspended as a result of the attack, the operations commenced again in January 2001. Ramsey assumed a peace agreement of some sort had been negotiated, but he was not aware of details. The army provided security upon their return.Ramsey again said that the company did not receive the number of soldiers they asked for, but that it was not a problem.
The defense displayed a still from footage provided by Bengt Nilsson from his visit to Sudan, showing huts on the side of the road. Ramsey explained they looked like an army checkpoint. They had a few checkpoints along the all-weather road to stop harassment and to prevent militias from accessing the rig site. He said the army was a defensive measure rather than offensive measure. Ramsey could not remember knowing of or observing any offensive measures nor did they have the numbers to carry them out, he said. The defense went further by asking if the company could have had any influence over the actions of the army, emphasizing Ramsey’s military background, to which Ramsey answered in the negative. “Absolutely not, they have their own plans and strategies.” Highlighting Ramsey’s military background was a tactic used by the prosecution as well during the previous days when they questioned him about his impressions and opinions on military strategy, the security situation, and possible consequences on civilian population, although his answers noticeably did not convey the same sense of certainty then.
Samuelsson moved on to the peace agreement which existed in the spring of 2001. From a document authored by Ramsey in April of that year, the court heard that the company’s operations had re-commenced and there was a peace agreement between locals and the government. Ramsey had written that it would only require “a few dissenters” from the rebels to prevent the agreement from coming into force. Ramsey explained that the rig road (all-weather road) went through difficult terrain and even a few people could cause disruptions along the road. The militias had the numbers to do so, he said. Samuelsson then asked him whether it was realistic to “defeat” the enemy and Ramsey agreed it was not, because there could always be a militia faction ready to fight.
When asked about the daily incident log, Ramsey reiterated that it was started by Deary and HSE staff continued to update it when he left. He told the court that HSE reports, visual sightings, and reports from PetSec were the basis for the log. Anything that was reported was included in the log. The defense focused on the displacement of civilians, bombs from Antonov planes, and the burned down huts, which Ramsey said would have been reported had they been observed. The incident log further discussed ongoing fighting in and around the area, but the defense highlighted that the fighting logged did not include the government army, essentially arguing that if they logged everything that was reported that would mean that the army was not actively engaging in conflict during this time. Ramsey told the court that the rig suspended operations when a serious incident occurred.
Peace agreements in 2000 were agreed upon on local levels between the government and Machar. The company was not a part of the negotiations, Ramsey said. The agreement held for a while according to documentation shown to the court, but Ramsey said the agreement was broken when the helicopter was shot at.
Johan Reiner then took over the cross-examination, focusing on the road to MOK and the financing of the construction. Ramsey said that he never observed any road construction of that road during his time. The area was interesting for the company and therefore there might have been a need for a road, but this never came to fruition to his knowledge. He was asked if he or anyone else to his knowledge had provided the militia or government with money or resources, to which he said no.
