Report 43: The Verdict

On 14 July 2022, two years and eights months after the arrest of the defendant, after almost a year since the indictment was made and after 92 trial days with a total of 426 active hours of court time, Stockholm District Court issued its verdict concerning the mass executions in Gohardasht prison.

72 people have been heard in court throughout the trial, out of which 34 persons have been heard as plaintiffs, 26 persons as witnesses and 12 as expert witnesses or witnesses with special knowledge about a relevant issue for the case.

The Court, consisting of the trained judges Tomas Zander and Anna Liljenberg Gullesjö and four lay judges, made a unanimous decision to sentence the defendant to life in prison for murder and for a severe case of crimes against international law (war crimes) for his participation in the execution of political prisoners in Gohardasht prison between 27 July and 6 September 1988. Through the verdict, the defendant is held accountable for the death of 96 persons.

The Court also decided on the expulsion of the defendant, which means that he will be deported to Iran once he has served his sentence. The defendant will stay in detention until the verdict against him has become legally binding. In the absence of an appeal, the sentence will become legally binding at the end of the appeal period.

In the following, we will provide a detailed summary of the Court’s verdict. The verdict is introduced with a summary of the verdict, a background to the case, a description of the claims presented by the parties in the case and a description of the types of evidence that have been presented in the case, before moving into the Court’s reasoning. As the parties’ claims and the evidence submitted in the case are addressed in the reasoning of the Court, this report will not provide a summary of those chapters. Nor will this report summarize the chapter about the historical background to the case or the introduction to Iran as a country. Instead, the report will provide a brief summary on the background to the case so far concerns the police report against the defendant and the time frame of the criminal acts, and a more in-depth summary of the reasoning of the court.

BACKGROUND

The Police Report against the Defendant

Plaintiff 1, who was a political prisoner in Iran in the 1980s has written several books and articles about his time in imprisonment. In several articles that were published in 1996, he mentioned a name which many plaintiffs and witnesses in the case at hand have claimed is an alias used by the defendant, and in a book published in 2006 he mentioned the same person by the same name as the defendant with his alias within brackets.

In October 2019, the plaintiff was contacted by a, for him, unknown person who had read what the had written about his incarceration in Iranian prisons. The person showed him a picture of a man which Plaintiff 1 knew as the defendant from Gohardasht prison. The sender was a man who was residing in Sweden and who was married to a woman who the defendant considers as his daughter. The defendant had visited the family in Sweden on two previous occasion due to marital problems between the couple, as he would mediate between the two. The man told Plaintiff 1 that the defendant had received a Schengen visa and that he would travel to Sweden. Plaintiff 1 then contacted Witness 21 (Kaveh Moussavi) who previously ran the human rights programme at Oxford University who in turn contacted the law firm McCue & Partners LLP, upon which several meetings took place in London.

On 4 November 2019, lawyer Göran Hjalmarsson submitted a police report against the defendant on assignment of McCue and Partners LLP, Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 10 and Witness 20 regarding criminal acts that the defendant had allegedly committed in Gohardasht prison in the summer of 1988. The report the three plaintiffs’ written testimonies and a note about when the defendant was expected to arrive to Sweden.

The defendant was subsequently detained in his absence on 8 November 2019 and was arrested upon his arrival to Arlanda airport on 9 November 2019. He has been detained since 2019, suspected of having participated in a severe case of crimes against international law (war crimes) and murder committed between 28 July and 31 August 1988 in Karaj, Teheran, Iran.

The Time Frame

The first charge, concerning crimes against international law (war crimes), took place between 30 July -16 August 1988.

The second charge, concerning murder, took place between 27 August – 6 September 1988.

THE REASONING OF THE COURT

Jurisdiction of the Court

The Court initiated its reasoning by addressing the issue of whether it had jurisdiction over the case at hand, as the defendant had demanded that the indictment be dismissed. The defendant argued that to exercise universal jurisdiction, Swedish courts must find support for its competence under international law, and that international law in 1988 did not grant states a right to exercise universal jurisdiction over acts committed in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs). As such, the international humanitarian law (IHL) did not establish criminal responsibility for acts committed within the context of NIACs in 1988. The defendant further argued that there is no support in international law for the exercise of universal jurisdiction over the crime of murder when the crime lacks an international link.

The Court first pointed out that the 1949 Geneva Conventions state an obligation for its parties to prosecute grave breaches of the conventions. As such, the court saw itself obligated to try the issue of criminal responsibility for war crimes. The court further explained that it had universal jurisdiction over war crimes irrespective of whether the crimes were committed within the context of an international armed conflict (IAC) or a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) in accordance with paragraph 6, section 3 of chapter 2 of the Swedish Criminal Code (hereinafter “Criminal Code”) in its wording before 1 January 2022. As regards to its jurisdiction over the crime of murder, the court explained that Swedish courts may exercise jurisdiction over crimes that have been committed by someone who is present in Sweden if the minimum sentence for the crime is six months in prison, in accordance with section 3 of chapter 2 of the Criminal Code, provided that the person in question has not been brought to Sweden against his own free will. It is irrelevant, the court explained, whether the person is present in Sweden for a longer period of time of whether the person is in the country temporarily.

The court further noted that international law does not require that there is a link between the case and a state for the state to exercise universal jurisdiction to be exercised. As such, there are no formal restrictions to a Swedish Court’s competence to exercise universal jurisdiction under international law. Instead, the court explained, it is Swedish law that determines when universal jurisdiction may be exercised. In cases where there is an absence of a link to Sweden, there may still be considerations between states that are relevant. In such cases, Swedish legislation requires that the prosecutor seeks permission to prosecute the case. In the case at hand, the Government had approved the prosecution of the defendant, in accordance with section 5 of chapter 2 of the Criminal Code in its previous wording.

In conclusion, the court found that there are no formal restrictions to its competence to exercise jurisdiction at the case at hand. The issue of whether international customary law stipulated individual criminal responsibility for acts committed within the context of a NIAC is not relevant in this regard but is instead relevant for the issue of whether the defendant may be held criminally responsible for his acts.

The first charge – Crimes against International Law (War Crimes)

The Criminal Acts

The prosecution had claimed that the defendant, together with others, and in his role as assistant to the deputy prosecutor or in any other position or role, had organized and participated in the executions by:

• choosing prisoners to be brought before the committee,
• escorting the prisoners to the main corridor and guarding them there,
• reading the names of prisoners who were to be brought before the committee, escorting the prisoners to the committee and providing written or oral information about the prisoners,
• reading the names of the prisoners who were to be brought to execution,
• ordering prisoners to stand in line to be escorted to the execution site,
• escorting prisoners to the execution site, after which the prisoners have been killed through hanging, and
• participated in conducting the executions at one or more occasions.

The Law

The applicable provision in Swedish law is paragraph 1 and 2 of section 6 in chapter 22 of the Swedish Criminal Code (hereinafter “Criminal Code”) in its wording before 1 July 1995, which stipulates criminal responsibility for crimes against international law. More specifically, for grave breaches of agreements with foreign powers or customary rules relating to international humanitarian law in armed conflict.

The provision has been replaced by provisions in the Act on Criminal Responsibility for Certain International Crimes, which entered into force on 1 July 2014. The Act is not retroactively applicable, which is why it cannot be applied in the case at hand.

The relevant rules in international humanitarian law, and which have been referred to by the prosecution, is article 147 in the IV Geneva Convention, which stipulates protection against, inter alia, willful killing, torture and other inhuman treatment for civilians in war time. Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions further stipulated an additional number of protections for protected persons in war time. Its article 75 stipulates basic guarantees which require the parties to the protocol to treat all civilians humanely without discrimination in regard to their political or religious beliefs, language, gender, race or skin color. Violence against a person’s life or health, particularly through murder or torture are made forbidden through the article, which also stipulates a demand for parties to guarantee the right to a fair trial.

The Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocol I are applicable in international armed conflicts (IAC).

The Court noted that Iran had ratified the Geneva Conventions already in 1949 and is bound by this, but that it has not ratified the Additional Protocol I. However, article 75 of the Additional Protocol I had reached the status of a customary rule in international humanitarian law long before the 1988 mass executions took place, the Court noted, and is therefore also binding for Iran.

The rules of international humanitarian law are applicable from the start of an armed conflict and continues to apply until the hostilities have ceased and until peace has been reached between the states.  

A prerequisite for an act to be considered as a crime against international law (war crimes), there must be a nexus between the acts and the armed conflict. This means that the conflict must have played a considerable role for the perpetrator’s ability to conduct the act and their decision to execute it.

The Court further examined the rules that are applicable in non-international armed conflict (NIAC).

The Classification of the Conflict between Iran and the MEK

In the first step of its reasoning, the Court delved into the issue of how the conflict between Iran and the MEK should be classified.

The Court explained that an IAC is considered to exists when two or more states use armed violence of a certain intensity against each other. When assessing the intensity of the conflict, the number of confrontations and their duration, the type of weapons and military equipment used, the number of people and units involved, the number of deaths and injuries and the material damage caused are all factors to be assessed.

Without really assessing the material facts of the conflict between Iran and Iraq, the Court found that there had been an IAC between Iran and Iraq in the 1980’s, which was still ongoing during the relevant time period (28 July-16 August 1988). The Court then went on to assess whether MEK had formed part of the IAC between Iran and Iraq.

The Court found that the facts presented in the case had showed that MEK had launched attacks against Iran from Iraqi territory during the summer of 1988, that the attacks were launch with the support of and in collaboration with Iraqi forces, that MEK was in alliance with Iraq against Iran, and that MEK was given access to territory, protection and support in the form of financing, weapons, ammunition, vehicles, tanks and military education by Iraq after June 1986. The facts had further shown that MEK had an armed branch which was structured as a conventional army and that the attacks that were launched in the summer of 1988 were mutual military operations must have been preceded by mutual planning between MEK:s armed branch and the Iraqi army.

The Court thus concludes that Iraq exercised overall control over MEK:s armed branch during the attacks that were launched against Iran during the summer of 1988. The conclusion, the Court explained, was supported by the written legal opinions and oral statements of expert witnesses Jan K. Kleffner and Sally Longworth. As such, the conflict between the MEK and Iran formed part of the IAC between Iran and Iraq and was ongoing during the relevant time period. Therefore, the rules under international humanitarian law which are applicable in IACs (GK I-IV and TP I) are applicable in the case at hand.  

The Court further noted that it had been proved that Iraqi forces were directly involved in military operations by MEK on Iranian territory. This, the Court explained, meant that the armed conflict between MEK and Iran is to be considered as forming part of the IAC regardless of the level of control by Iraqi forces.

As the court found that the MEK become part of the IAC, it did not proceed to examine whether there was a parallel NIAC between the MEK and Iran and whether criminal responsibility for acts committed in NIACs were stipulated under international customary law in 1988.

Ayatollah Khomeini’s Fatwa leading to the Execution of Political Prisoners

The Court then moved on to assess whether ayatollah Khomeini had issued a fatwa in 1988 as a result of MEK:s military operation Eternal Light on 26 July, and whether a wave of executions followed the issuing of the fatwa. In doing so, the Court assessed the evidence submitted in the case which primarily consisted of resolutions, reports and memoirs.

First, the Court assessed the information about the events in international reporting between 1988-1990. The Court noted that the earliest official records of the mass executions in Iranian prisoners are dated a few months after the alleged executions took place. The UN General Assembly Resolution 43/147 of 8 December 1988 described how the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran had accessed information which indicated that a wave of executions had took place between July and September 1988. Thereafter, Amnesty International had published information about executions in Iran in their yearly report for 1989, covering the period January to December 1988. It was said that secret executions were common in Iran and that Operation Eternal Light seemed to have led to the killing of many opponents to the government; first through official hangings in cities in Western Iran and later inside the prisons, where political prisoners had been engaged in protests which coincided with the attack against the country. It further said that the victims included members and sympathizers of the MEK and other oppositional leftist groups in different parts of Iran, that many of those executed had already been imprisoned without a trial or were serving shorter sentences for minor offenses but had not been released after their sentence was served. The report said that approximately 1 200 political prisoners were executed between July and December 1988, although Amnesty International expected the correct number to likely be significantly larger. A report published by Amnesty International in December 1990 specifically described events taking place in Gohardasht prison. It also described how a committee consisting of representatives from different revolutionary government agencies subjected prisoners to an examination in July 1988 which did not seem to have to purpose to reveal the prisoner’s guilt or innocence, but rather constituted formalized interrogations aimed towards revealing the political opinions of the prisoners. Those that still opposed the government would be executed.

The Court noted that the information at hand originated from the UN Special Rapporteur and an internationally recognized human rights organization (Amnesty International) and that the information has been recorded not long after the events at hand. As such, the information has a high evidentiary value. This was further complemented by articles and books that have been written from 1996 and onwards and the testimonies of witnesses and plaintiffs.

The Court described the content of the fatwa that was allegedly issued by ayatollah Khomeini, the content of the letters between him and ayatollah Montazeri and what expert witnesses who had been heard during the trial had said about whether the fatwa should be determined as a fatwa or a hokm.

It then assessed the evidentiary value of the provided information. The Court found that there was no reason to question the authenticity of the fatwa and the letters that ayatollah Montazeri chose to publish in his memoirs. The Court referred to statements made by expert witnesses which had showed that it was widely recognized within academia that the fatwa was issued by ayatollah Khomeini with the content that is described in Montazeri’s memoirs. The Court further noted that the content of the fatwa was also supported by information recorded around the time of the executions, such as the UN Special Rapporteur’s report and the Amnesty International reports, that described the execution of MEK supporters in prisons during the summer of 1988. Additionally, the meeting between the committee’s members on 14 August 1988, which is referred to in ayatollah Montazeri’s letter dated 15 August 1988, provided significant support to the authenticity of the fatwa. The information in Montazeri’s memoirs was also supported by the fact that Amnesty International in its yearly report over 1988, years before Montazeri published his memoirs, mentioned that reports hade been made in October 1988 about ayatollah Montazeri criticizing the executions, and in November 2018 about twelve mullahs associated with ayatollah Montazeri being executed after a conflict within the Iranian leadership which had removed Montazeri as the potential successor of Khomeini as the supreme religious leader of Iran.

The Court further referred to statements made by the expert witness Jan Hjärpe, who had testified that his journals from 1988 contained information about the fatwa and that the fatwa had led to a large number of people being executed.

After assessing the content of the fatwa, the Court noted that the fatwa explicitly expressed the reason for MEK loyalists to be considered as “mohareb” and sentenced to death was because they were “waging a war against God” by engaging in military combat against in Iran together with the Iraqi Baath party. The Court further noted that ayatollah Montazeri’s letters, dated 15 August 1988, also suggested a nexus between the armed conflict and the executions, and that expert witness Jann Hjärpe had explained that the temporal proximity between operation Eternal Light on 26 July 1988 and the issuing of the fatwa suggests that the fatwa was issued as a direct reaction to MEK:s attack.

The Court also noted that several statements that were made in state-controlled media on 21 October 2013 had further confirmed the existence of the fatwa and its connection to the armed conflict. In an article published that day, it is said that the fatwa neutralized MEK.

In conclusion, the Court found that ayatollah Khomeini did indeed issue a fatwa shortly after, and mainly because of, operation Eternal Light on 26 July 1988, through which he ordered the death sentence of prisoners who sympathized with the MEK if they declared their continuous loyalty to the group. The Court also concluded that a wave of executions in Iranian prisons followed the issuing of the fatwa during the time period that is indicated in the indictment. As such, it has been shown that there was a motif for the executions, that the executions were organized, that the executions followed a certain modus operandi and that there was a nexus between the armed conflict and the executions.

The Execution of MEK-prisoners in Gohardasht Prison without a Fair Trial

The Court then moved on to assess whether MEK-prisoners had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period (30 July-16 August) after a proceeding which did not fulfill the requirements of a fair trial.

The court noted that the evidence concerning the executions in Gohardasht prison was extensive and rich in detail. Other central information, apart from the testimonies of witnesses and plaintiffs, was information that had been recorded not long after the events took place, and which described the events in prison and what took place immediately before and after the events.

The Court found that several decisive conclusions about the chain of events in Gohardasht prison could be drawn by the international reporting about the events which were made in close temporal proximity to the executions, amongst them the reports by the UN Special Rapporteur and Amnesty International which had been mentioned previously. The description of the events in the reports by Amnesty International were further confirmed by the testimonies of more or less all plaintiffs who survived the executions and that had testified in court and by the testimonies of many witnesses. The Court considered that the testimonies provided throughout the trial about the chain of events in Gohardasht prison were reliable and that there was no reason to question whether plaintiffs and witnesses had described their own lived experience.

The Court found that the facts presented in the case showed that a committee had conducted interrogations in accordance with what ayatollah Khomeini had decided in his fatwa. The Court noted that the interrogations appeared to have been conducted by persons that held the very functions that Khomeini in his fatwa had mandated to carry out the fatwa. The Court further noted that the claims of plaintiffs and witnesses about the chain of events in Gohardasht prison were supported by the information in ayatollah Montazeri’s memoirs. Several had mentioned that the executions took place during the holy month of “Muharram”, which is also mentioned in Montazeri’s memoirs.

The Court further noted that claims made by plaintiffs and witnesses that prisoners had disappeared after their examination by the Committee, and that their belongings were gathered up and handed out to their family members who were notified about their death during the following autumn indirectly confirms that a large number of prisoners who sympathized with MEK were executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. Additionally, the Court noted that several plaintiffs had made direct observations of bodies being unloaded onto trucks during the execution period and that their observations had been made at fairly short distances, in illuminated areas or in day light which meant that their observations were reliable and held a high evidentiary value.

The Court went on to assess other written evidence, apart from the international reports mentioned above, and noted much of the the large volume of written evidence that had been submitted in the case also showed that mass executions had taken place in Gohardasht in accordance with the prosecution’s statement of criminal acts. The Court mentioned information in books written by Plaintiff 1, Plaintiff 33 and Plaintiff 35 the report by Witness 23, the report of the Iran Tribunal’s Truth Commission and the Amnesty International report “Blood-Soaked Secrets”.

In conclusion, the Court found that the high evidentiary value of the testimonies of plaintiffs who had survived Gohardasht prison and the robust support given to the content of their testimonies by the written evidence meant that it was established that as a result of a fatwa, a committee had conducted examinations after which a large number of prisoners who sympathized with the MEK had been executed and that a large number of surviving prisoners were brought to experience severe fear of dying as a result of the examinations of the committee.

The Court then examined whether the death sentences had been preceded by a fair trial. The Court found that an examination of the evidence presented in the case, including international reporting about the executions and the testimonies by plaintiffs who had survived the committee’s examination, it was clear that death sentences had been issued by the committee without a fair trial. The Court concluded that the prisoners had not been given an opportunity to prepare their defense, that the charges and the sentence had not been explained to them and that they had not been given the opportunity to appeal the committee’s decision. This was supported by information by Amnesty, the UN Human Rights Commission and the administrative rules governing the Iranian revolutionary courts about the standard proceeding before Iranian revolutionary courts in the 1980s, which showed that trials would usually take place in secret inside prison, that defendants were often unaware that the proceeding was a trial and not an interrogation.  of the proceeding constituting a trial rather than an interrogation, that charges against a defendant would not be presented before the trial and that defendants were usually not given the opportunity to prepare their defense.

In conclusion, the Court found that the court system applied arbitrary proceedings which neither fulfilled the requirements under domestic legislation nor the international minimum standards of a fair trial. As such, the Court found that it has been established that the death sentences in Gohardasht prison in the summer of 1988 had not been preceded by a fair trial.

Nexus between the Armed Conflict and the Executions

For the mass executions and the causing of death anxiety to the surviving prisoners to be considered as war crimes, there must be a nexus between the acts and the armed conflict.  The Court thus examined whether there was such a nexus between the acts committed in Gohardasht prison and the armed conflict.

The Court first established that the rules of the IV Geneva Convention were not applicable as the Convention does not apply to citizens who have been captured by their own state. Instead, article 75 of the Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions applies to the MEK prisoners. It then noted that the armed conflict did not need to be the cause behind the perpetrator’s decision to commit the act in question, but that it must have played a significant role in the perpetrators opportunity to commit the act, or for the way in which the act was committed. Conversely, the acts would not have taken place if the armed conflict had not existed. The Court further noted that there does not have to be a direct connection between the armed conflict and the acts but that it is sufficient that the armed conflict is an underlying circumstance which enables the criminal acts.

The Court then went on to explain that a number of circumstances can establish a nexus between the criminal act and the conflict. That civilians who belong to the enemy party in a conflict are subjected to executions or severe suffering is a circumstance that shows a clear nexus. Such acts, the Court noted, are clearly connected to the armed conflict through the status of the respective persons in the sense that the perpetrator and the victim belong to different parties to the conflict and that the acts may be motivated by a will to punish, humiliate or find out information about the enemy party.

The Court noted that it had already found that the content of ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa clearly established a nexus between the executions and the IAC between Iran on one side and Iraq and the MEK on the other side. The Court further noted that the criminal acts had a clear connection to the armed conflict in the sense that the perpetrators and the victims belonged to different parties in the conflict and that the conflict motivated the perpetrators’ will to punish and humiliate the victims who belonged to the enemy party or to find out information to would help them determine whether the victims belonged to the enemy party.

From a legal point of view, the Court noted, the relevant acts constitute willful killing and torture of protected persons in accordance with article 75 (2a) and the deprivation of the rights to a fair trial in accordance with article 4 of the Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention. The Court explained that these rules had reached a status as customary rules in international humanitarian law in 1988.

The Victims

The Court then proceeded to examine whether the 110 persons who had been named in Annex A to the indictment had been executed and had been brought to experience severe death anxiety in Gohardasht Prison during the relevant time period.

The Court first noted that the executions took place many years ago and that no bodies or identification evidence was available to prove the death of those named in Annex A. Furthermore, the information that had been given by the official authorities to the family members of the executed had been scarce and sometimes misleading. Thus, for the evidentiary requirement to be fulfilled (essentially to prove the person’s execution in Gohardasht prison), there had to be enough evidentiary facts to support that the (executed) person in question had in fact been in Gohardasht during the relevant time period and that they had not been heard from or found afterwards.

The Court noted that it was not significant that the body of the deceased person was missing or that it could not be established exactly which day the person had died. The events that took place in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period (30 July-16 August 1988) had been proven with such strength, that it would be sufficient to prove that a person was in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period and that they were missing afterwards for it to be considered proven that the person was executed in Gohardasht prison during that time period.

In its assessment of whether the persons in Annex A had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period, the Court relied on testimonies of plaintiffs and witnesses who had been incarcerated in Gohardasht Prison during the relevant time period, testimonies by plaintiffs who are family members of persons listed in Annex A, and excerpts from books and reports about the executions.

While the Court considered the information provided by plaintiffs about the execution of their family members to be credible, the Court noted that their accounts would have to be supported by additional evidence for it to be established with the required degree of certainty that their family members were executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. Otherwise, the evidentiary requirement would not be met. This, the Court noted, was because family members of executed persons did not receive information about the fate of the executed until months after their death, at which time they were often given scarce or wrongful information about their deaths. 

The Court then noted that 22 plaintiffs and 26 witnesses who were imprisoned in Gohardasht prison at the time of the mass executions had testified in court and had provided information about their co-prisoners during their hearings. Some of those had confirmed that persons listed in Annex A had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. While some had spoken in great detail about those persons, others had merely confirmed their presence without providing much detail.  

The Court explained that while the plaintiffs and witnesses had overall provided reliable accounts and had been careful to provide correct information about their co-prisoners, many years have passed since the executions took place. Therefore, their accounts must be assessed with care. As such, the Court explained, it granted higher evidentiary value to detailed and concrete accounts about specific individuals above brief confirmations about a person’s presence in Gohardasht for which the source of the information was not clear.

The Court then referred to a number of lists which have been submitted as evidence in the case, which contain the names of persons who have allegedly been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. The lists had been compiled by released prisoners who had written down the names of the missing and smuggled them out of prison. The released prisoners had later contacted relatives of the executed and had updated the lists over the years in a collective effort. The Court explained that while it is apparent that released prisoners had placed a lot of work into compiling the lists, it could not attribute any evidentiary value to the lists as the source of the information in the lists had not been recorded.  

The Court made a similar assessment regarding lists with names of executed persons which had been compiled by plaintiffs and witnesses. They have explained that the lists have been compiled on the basis of their own observations, but also on the basis of information from relatives of the executed and by searching online. In so far that the source of the information in the lists has not been made clear, the information was not attributed any evidentiary value by the Court.

Seven persons on the list of executed persons in Annex A were family members of seven of the plaintiffs. The Court found that it had been established through hearings with the plaintiffs that their family members had been imprisoned in Iran due to their sympathies with the MEK and that they had died in prison. The Court then when on to assess, where and when they died.

Plaintiff 29, the brother of, Victim A5, had testified that his brother had been sentenced to 15 years in prison due to his political activities with the MEK and that the family’s last visit had been in Gohardasht in the spring of 1988. After months of trying to reach him, the family was finally notified in Evin prison that he had been executed. Five other plaintiffs and witnesses had said during their hearings that Victim A5 had been in Evin prison during the execution period and that he had been executed there. Another plaintiff had written in one of his books that the person in question had been moved to Evin prison in the summer of 1988 and another witness had written in one of his books that the person was executed in Gohardasht prison while he had written in another book that he was instead executed in Evin prison. Considering this information, the Court found that it had not been established that Victim A5 was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 20, the sister of Victim A6, had said during her hearing in court that her brother had been a supporter of the MEK and that he was therefore imprisoned in the 1980s. Her family was informed during the spring of 1988 that her brother had been placed in Gohardasht, where her father could later visit him. During the autumn of 1988, the father was informed in Gohardasht prison that his son had been executed there during the month of Mordad (July/August 1988). This information was confirmed by three other plaintiffs and one witness during their hearings in court. As such, the Court found that it had been established that Victim A6 was executed in Gohardasht during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 21, the sister of Victim A7, said in her hearing in court that her brother was imprisoned in the beginning of the 1980s because he was politically active with the MEK and that their family’s last visit with him was in Gohardasht prison in the spring of 1988. In the following autumn, their mother had been called to Gohardasht prison and had been notified that her son had been executed. The mother had not been told about the date of the execution, but had been given a noose, which made the plaintiff believe that her brother had been executed through hanging. In a book published by the plaintiff, she had written that their mother had been notified that the execution had been conducted by a firing squad on 10 Mehr (2 October 1988). The Court noted that the plaintiff had not been given an opportunity to explain this as the court was notified about this after her hearing. However, two additional witnesses had confirmed that Victim A7 was in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period and that he was executed there. This had also been mentioned by one of the plaintiffs in his book. As such, the Court found that it had been established that Victim A7 was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period, despite the divergent information in Plaintiff 21’s book.

Plaintiff 18, the sister of Victim A8, said during her hearing in court that her brother was imprisoned in 1989 because he sold books for the MEK and that he was transferred to Gohardasht prison from a prison near their hometown Qazvin in the beginning of 1988. Their mother had been informed in Gohardasht that he had been executed and had received his watch. Plaintiff 2 had said in his testimony that he shared a cell with Victim A8 for two years and that he was brought to the execution site on 15 Mordad 1367 (6 August 1988) never to be seen again. However, Plaintiff 2 also said that Victim A8 was known by a nickname which apart from Victim A8’s name is also present in the list on Annex A but with a different age. The prosecution had claimed that these were two different persons whom both had been executed. The Court noted, however, that Victim A8 had not been mentioned by any other surviving plaintiffs expect for Plaintiff 2 and that the plaintiff’s information about having shared a cell with the victim for two years did not add up with the information about the victim being transferred to Gohardasht six months before the mass executions took place. There was furth an apparent risk of confusion with the other person named on the list in Annex A. As such, the Court found that it had not been established that Victim A8 was executed in Gohardasht prison with enough certainty that criminal responsibility for his death could be induced.

Plaintiff 22, the brother of Victim A9, had said during his hearing in court that his brother was imprisoned in 1981 because he was politically active with the MEK, that he was transferred to Gohardasht prison in the beginning of 1988 and that their parents were called to Evin and notified about his execution in the autumn of the same year. Another plaintiff had said during his hearing that he had heard the name of Victim A9 be called in the corridor on 6 August 1367 and that Victim A9 had never been seen again. This has been confirmed by three other plaintiffs who had said that they had heard about the execution of Victim A9 during the execution period. As such, the Court found that it had been established that Victim A9 was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 19, the brother of Victim A10, had said during his hearing in court that his brother had been imprisoned during the 1980s because he was loyal to MEK and that the last visit with him took place in Evin a couple of months before he was executed in Gohardasht prison during the summer of 1988. Their mother had been called to Evin prison during the following autumn, where she had been notified about his execution and given a bag with his. In a report by the organization Justice for Victims of 1988 Massacre in Iran from 2017, it says that Plaintiff 19 had written to the UN and the International Criminal Court in 2016 to notify them that his brother had been executed in Gohardasht prison. During his hearing in court, the plaintiff had said that he had also notified human rights organizations. Furthermore, another plaintiff had said during his hearing in court that he had heard from other prisoners that Victim A10 was being held in prison despite having served his sentence, which was confirmed by another plaintiff who was not able to explain how he knew about it. The Court found that it could not be established with the necessary degree of certainty that Victim A10 had been executed in Gohardasht prison, as the last visit with his family had taken place in Evin prison while the information from other plaintiffs were essentially hearsay.

Plaintiff 30, the brother of Victim A13, had said in hearings in court that he was imprisoned together with his brother and that his brother was taken from their prison department on 30 July 1988 never to be seen again. The plaintiff had further said that he was informed about his brother’s execution when he was himself brought before the Committee on 6 August 1988. His father was called to the prison later that autumn and was given the same information. The Court noted that the plaintiff had previously been interviewed by Amnesty International for one of their reports and had given the same information about his brother in the report. The information is further supported by six plaintiffs who in their court hearings had testified that Victim A10 was executed. Two plaintiffs had also written about it in their books. As such, the Court found that it had been established that Victim A13 was executed in Gohardasht prison.

The Court then went on to assess the remaining 103 persons on the list of executed persons in Annex A to the indictment. The Court divided the names into three different lists, where the first list consisted of persons whose execution was confirmed by extensive oral evidence, the second list consisted of persons whose execution was confirmed with less oral evidence, a third list which consisted of persons whose executions were described in even less oral evidence and a fourth list consisted of persons whose executions there was no oral evidence for.

 The first list contained 34 names and the Court found that it had been established through extensive oral evidence that those persons had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. The 34 persons had all been mentioned by several plaintiffs and/or witnesses who had described them, their contacts and their disappearance in detail. The information about the persons had been detailed and unanimous. Therefore, the Court found that it had been established with sufficient certainty that the persons were present in Gohardasht prison during the execution period and that they had not been seen or heard from since. It could thus be established that the persons were executed in Gohardasht prison as described in the indictment.

The second list contained 39 names of persons about which detailed and concrete information had been provided about at least one plaintiff and/or witness who testified in court that the persons had been seen in Gohardasht prison during the execution period and that they had not been seen since. The testimonies, in combination with other evidence, such as mentions of the execution of those persons or their presence in Gohardasht during the execution period in books by other plaintiffs, led the Court to establish that they had been executed in Gohardasht during the relevant time period.

The third list contained 13 names of persons who had been mentioned by plaintiffs and/or witnesses during their court hearings, but where the information about them had either been limited to a brief confirmation of their execution without further detail or had been told to the plaintiffs or witnesses by others. In some instances, the victims had been mentioned in books by plaintiffs, but those plaintiffs had not been able to explain how they had acquired the information. The lack of precision and detail in the provided evidence, led the Court to find that the evidentiary requirement had not been met. It could therefore not be established with the necessary degree of certainty which is required for criminal responsibility to be induced that the persons in question were executed in Gohardasht prison.

The fourth list contained names of 17 people who had not been mentioned by any of the victims or witnesses who were heard in court. Neither has any written evidence which supports that they were executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period been submitted to the court. While the persons are mentioned in various lists of executed persons in Gohardasht prison, and in some of the plaintiffs and/or witnesses’ books, the scarcity of details about where the information about the execution of the persons on the list was acquired led the Court to conclude that it could not be established with the necessary degree of certainty that the persons were in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Lastly, the Court noted that it has been established that the prisoners whom it had found had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the established time period had also been brought to experience severe fear of death due to the proceedings that followed as a result of ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa.

The Criminal Responsibility of the Defendant

The Court then went on to try whether the defendant had, in his position as assistant to the deputy prosecutor or in any other similar position or role, together with others, committed the acts listed in the charge.

The Court first noted that the most credible and certain identification of a person takes place when the person has been known to the witness prior to the time of the crime and if the identification is automatic, quick and direct in the sense that the witness immediately recognizes the person.

The Court then noted that most of the relevant observations of the defendant had been made by plaintiffs and witnesses while they had been wearing blindfolds, but that plaintiffs and witnesses had given credible accounts about how they had manipulated their blindfolds, for example by pulling out threads from it to make the blindfold thinner or had made observations from under their blindfold by tilting their heads. The Court found that there was no reason to question how these observations have been made despite the blindfolds. It further noted that the defendant himself had admitted that prisoners, at least in Evin prison, were able to see things approximately one meter in front of them in order to be able to walk without falling. This, the Court noted, spoke in favor of prisoners having been able to make observations from under the blindfold by tilting their heads. Regardless, the Court noted, wearing a blindfold does negatively affect the ability to make correct observations. As such, it is central to the assessment of the plaintiffs and witnesses’ observations that they have been acquainted with the defendant prior to making observations about him conducting the criminal acts in question.

The Court then moved on to assessing the evidentiary value of the identification of the defendant by three plaintiffs who had identified the defendant prior to the publication of his picture in media, and the evidentiary value of their observations of the defendant committing the acts in the statement of criminal acts.

The court first noted that Plaintiff 1 had received a text message from the husband of the woman who the defendant refers to as his daughter and that the text message had contained an image of the defendant without any text. The plaintiff had immediately recognized the defendant. Similarly, Witness 20 had received a text message with an image of the defendant from Plaintiff 1 without any text and had immediately recognized him. Both plaintiffs had said during their hearings in court that they were absolutely sure that the defendant was the same person that they had met in Gohardasht prison. Both plaintiffs had also met the defendant in prison on several occasions both prior to the execution period and afterwards. Observations of him have been made by the plaintiffs both when wearing a blindfold and while not wearing one. As such, the Court found that the fact that both plaintiffs had immediately recognized the defendant without the presence of any external circumstances that may have influenced them to identify him, that both had been familiar with the defendant prior to the execution period and that both had observed the defendant also when not wearing a blindfold gave their identification and observations a high evidentiary value.

As regards to Plaintiff 1, the Court further found that the fact that he had named the defendant by the alias that he used in prison in several published texts after his release from prison, but before the defendant’s arrest in Sweden, and that he had given consistent accounts about the defendant’s acts in those texts further strengthened the evidentiary value of his observations.

The third plaintiff, Plaintiff 10, had immediately recognized the defendant after a picture of the defendant had been showed to him by Plaintiff 1 on his computer. However, the picture was shown to him when he was getting involved in filing a police report against the defendant and was shown to him to make sure that the report was in fact about the right person. As such, his identification of the defendant had not been entirely independent, which is why the Court found that the evidentiary value of his identification was slightly lower. However, as the plaintiff had seen the defendant on several occasions both before and after that period, including without wearing a blindfold, and had given a detailed and immersive account of his observations during his hearing in court, the Court considered his identification to have a high evidentiary value, albeit slightly less than the previous two plaintiffs.

Regarding the identification of the defendant and observations made about him by other plaintiffs and witnesses who had identified him after a picture of him was shown on news outlets and social media after his arrest, the Court noted that the publication of the defendant’s photo had to be taken into account when assessing their identification of him. Unless plaintiffs were already familiar with the defendant during the execution period, their identification of him was to be given a low evidentiary value.

The Court then assessed the information given by an additional 13 plaintiffs and witnesses who had testified in court about their knowledge about and observations of the defendant. The Court noted that 10 out of the 13 persons all were very familiar with the defendant and had either met him or observed him on multiple occasions both before and after the execution period and had seen him without wearing a blindfold on at least one occasion. All of them had also described the defendant in a way that corresponds with his physical appearance. Considered jointly, this made their identification of him credible. Furthermore, all had given credible accounts of their meetings with, or observations of the defendant, and of the acts that he had committed during the execution period. Some had mentioned him during published interviews after their release or had mentioned him and his acts in books that they had written after their release, which the Court considered further strengthened the credibility of their accounts. As such, the Court considered that the accounts of the 10 plaintiffs had a high evidentiary value. Amongst the acts that these plaintiffs and witnesses had witnessed the defendant commit were to read the names of the prisoners who were to be brought to the committee, escort prisoners to and from the committee, escort prisoners to the execution site and order guards to take them to execution.

The Court found that the accounts of 3 of the 13 plaintiffs were not credible and that, as a result, their accounts about the acts committed by the defendant were given low evidentiary value. As regards to one of the plaintiffs, the Court had found that there were several contradictions in his account and that two events that he had testified about were implausible. Regarding the other plaintiff, the Court noted that the plaintiff had changed a central detail in his testimony. The Court also noted that the plaintiff had only observed the defendant on a couple of occasions without a blindfold and that he had not met him personally, and that the risk of external influence was high in his identification of the defendant. The Court made the same assessment regarding the third plaintiff, who had also only observed the defendant on a few occasions prior to the execution period.

After reviewing the evidentiary value of the most central evidence, the Court found that, as a whole, the evidentiary value was convincing and that the evidence showed that the defendant had worked in an assisting role to the deputy prosecutor in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period under an alias and that the had committed the criminal acts that he had been charged with. The Court added that plaintiffs and witnesses who had been less familiar with the defendant had also provided information in their testimonies about the defendant as the staff member with the alias in Gohardasht prison and about seeing him in Gohardasht prison during the execution period in a way that binds him to the work of the committee.

Additionally, the Court noted that there are other circumstances that supports the evidence. The defendant had a motif to participate in the proceedings that followed ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa, while his role in the dadyar-office in prison made it natural for him to participate in executing the fatwa. He further had an obligation to participate according to the Iranian system. Conducting the executions was complex work which needed to be carried out urgently, which must have required planning, organization, and cooperation between several people. The evidence is further supported by the defendant’s behavior after the committed acts. The defendant had contact details to people with a connection to Gohardasht prison during the execution period in his phone and had sent text messages to such persons to invite them for holiday celebrations. Before his trip to Sweden, the defendant had deleted several such contacts from his phone. These circumstances were troubling for the defendant, the Court noted.

Lastly, the Court added that an alleged interview had been conducted with the deputy prosecutor at Gohardasht prison who in the interview had said that the defendant was his assistant in the 1360’s (1980’s) and that he had advised him not to travel to Sweden as the trip was a trap. Several plaintiffs and witnesses had said in their hearings that they recognize the voice and dialect of the deputy prosecutor on the recording of that interview. An analysis of the voice had shown that the person in the interview is likely the same person as the deputy prosecutor. According to the Court, the supporting evidence had some evidentiary value which strengthened the accounts given about the role and participation of the defendant in the criminal acts committed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

In conclusion, the Court found that the evidence consisted of several plaintiffs and witnesses who had experienced the same events in prison and whose accounts supported each other’s accounts. Their accounts correspond with the central pieces of the charge in so far it concerns the role of the defendant in prison and the way in which he participated in the acts. Their accounts were also supported by written evidence such as articles, books and interviews, and, as noted above, by the fact that the defendant had a motif, a role, an opportunity and an obligation to participate in the criminal acts, while his behavior before and after the criminal acts further strengthened the evidence. As such, the Court found that the evidence as a whole was robust.

On the basis of the evidence, the Court found that it had been established that the defendant, together with others, had committed the following acts:

• choosing which prisoners to bring before the “death committee”,
• bringing the prisoners to the main corridor and guarding them there,
• reading the names of prisoners who were being brought before the committee,
• leading them to the committee,
• reading the names of the prisoners who were to be brought to execution,
• ordering prisoners to stand in line to be escorted to the execution site,
• escorting prisoners to the execution site, after which the prisoners had been killed through hanging, and
• ordering and encouraging other perpetrators to participate in the acts.

Through the acts listed above, the defendant had participated in conducting the committee’s death sentences, which had been issued in a proceeding with did not fulfill the requirements of a fair trial under international humanitarian law, and had subjected a large number of MEK-prisoners to severe suffering by bringing them to experience severe fear of death as a result of the proceedings that the prison had in place due to the fatwa.

The Second Charge – Murder

The Criminal Acts

The prosecution had claimed that the defendant, together with others, and in his role as assistant to the deputy prosecutor or in any other position or role, had organized and participated in the executions by:

• choosing prisoners to bring before the committee,
• escorting these prisoners to the main corridor and guarding them there,
• reading the names of prisoners to be brought before the committee, escorting the prisoners and leaving written or oral information about the prisoners to the committee,
• reading names of prisoners to be brought to execution,
• ordering prisoners to stand in line to be escorted to the execution since, and
• escorted prisoners to the execution site, after which the prisoners were killed through hanging.

The Law

The Court first noted that the relevant provision was section 1 of Chapter 3 of the Criminal Code in its wording before 1 July 2009, which criminalizes murder. It further noted that Iran was bound by the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1988 and that its article 14 states the fundamental right to a fair trial, which entails the right to a fair and public proceeding by a competent, independent and impartial court, as well as a presumption of innocence, a right to a defense and a defense counsel and the time and opportunity to prepare one’s defense.

The Existence of a Second Wave of Executions and The Chain of Events

As previously stated, the Court noted that the acts in question formed part of large events in which many people have been involved in committing the criminal acts. As such, the assessment of the second charge, as with the first charge, was focused on establishing what the involved persons had done rather than trying to establish what each person had done on an individual level as it is the mutual acts that fulfill the elements of the crime.  

The Court then referred to the reports of the UN Representative of the 8 December 1988 and the Amnesty International report of December 1990, which the Court had also referred to when establishing the events that took place relating to the first charge in the indictment. Both reports described that a wave of executions had taken place during the summer of 1988. The Court noted that the content of the international reporting which had been made in close temporal connection to the executions had given a clear and consistent image of the chain of events, which meant that prisoners in Gohardasht who sympathized with leftist groups and who were not willing to publicly criticize the organizations they belonged to and who were considered as apostates were sentenced to execution.

The Court further noted that the content of the international reporting that is relevant for the charge had been supported by accounts given by witnesses who had testified in court about their experiences of being brought before the committee. Accounts given by other witnesses who did not themselves appear before the committee also confirmed that a second wave of executions, targeting leftist prisoners in Gohardasht prison, had taken place.

The accounts given by the witnesses about the chain of events surrounding the second wave of executions was considered by the Court to be credible. There were no reasons to question whether their accounts stemmed from other sources than their own lived experiences. No inconsistencies or unclarities had been revealed, the Court noted. 

The Court further noted that the image that appeared when reading the international reporting and the witnesses’ accounts together was a similar mutual chain of events as for the first wave of executions, with the difference that the examination by the committee during the second wave of execution was focused on political prisoners with leftist sympathies and whether these had abandoned their religious faith and could be considered as apostates. The witness accounts and the international reporting also showed that the committee consisted largely of the same persons during the second wave of executions, as for the first wave of executions.

That leftist prisoners were executed during the second wave of executions was also confirmed by accounts given by many plaintiffs and witnesses who had given their testimony in support of the first charge. These plaintiffs and witnesses had testified that leftist prisoners disappeared not to be seen again after being taken from their wards and having their cases processed by the committee. Witnesses had also testified that the belongings of missing leftist prisoners were gathered during the autumn that followed the executions to later be handed over to family members who were notified that the missing prisoner had died. These accounts were also supported by Amnesty International’s reporting at the time. This brought the Court to the conclusion that a large number of leftist prisoners in Gohardasht were executed during the relevant time period.

The Court further referred to a testimony given in court by a witness who had observed dead bodies stapled on the back of a truck during the time period that the second wave of executions took place, which the Court considered spoke in favor of the fact that executions were conducted in the way that the prosecution had claimed.

Additionally, a large volume of written evidence, apart from the international reporting at the time, confirmed the prosecution’s claims about a second wave of executions at Gohardasht prison. The Court specifically highlighted two books written by two different witnesses in 2015 and 2019 respectively, the report for the Abdorrahman Boroumand Center for Human Rights in 2010, the report of the Iran Tribunal’s Truth Commission in 2013 and an Amnesty International report from 2018.

The Executions were decided by the Political and Religious Leadership

The prosecution had claimed that the committee’s examinations during the second wave of executions was preceded by a decision some time before 27 August 1988 by the religious and political leadership in Iran. The Court noted that no fatwa had been issued concerning leftist prisoners and that there was no documentation of such a decision by the religious or political leadership of Iran. However, the committee’s modus operandi during the second wave of executions corresponded with its’ modus operandi during the first wave of executions which followed the issuing of ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa. The Court further noted that support could be found in the fatwa for the execution of apostates.  

The Court found that, considering Iran’s political system after the 1979 revolution and the supreme religious leader’s direct decision-making powers over of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government, it was likely that the religious and political leadership in Iran decided some time before 27 August 1988 that leftist prisoners in Iranian prisons who were not faithful Muslims and who were considered to have abandoned their Muslim faith should be executed. It was not likely, the Court noted, that the second wave of executions would have taken place without the mandate of the higher leadership.

The Execution of Prisoners without a Fair Trial

The Court established that the content of international reporting shortly after the mass executions took place, and the descriptions of the examinations by the committee that had been given by witnesses in court painted a clear picture of death sentences being issued without being preceded by a fair trial. The Court further noted that what had been established previously in the verdict, about the processing of cases within the Iranian Revolution Courts and regarding the first charge gave indirect support to its conclusion and to the accounts given by witnesses that have testified about the examination by the committee.

In conclusion, the Court found that it had been established that, following a decision by the religious and political leadership in Iran, a large number of political prisoners in Gohardasht prison whose ideological and religious beliefs were deemed to be contrary to that of the theocratic state of Iran were executed between 27 August-6 September 2022 after an examination by a committee to determine which  which prisoners to execute, which did not fulfill the basic requirements of a fair trial.  .

The Victims

The Court then moved on to assess whether the 26 persons who were listed in Annex C to the indictment had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

As with those executed during the first wave of the execution and who had been listed in Annex A, the Court considered that it was sufficient to establish that the persons were present in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period (27 Agust-16 September 1988) and that they had not been seen or heard from since, for it to be considered as established that they had been executed there during the relevant time period.

The Court first assessed whether six persons on the list in Annex C, who are family members of six different plaintiffs, had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 15 had testified that her brother, Victim C1, was imprisoned in 1983 for his membership in the Tudeh party. The victim’s father visited him in Gohardasht prison the last time in the beginning of the summer of 1988 and was notified in Evin prison later that autumn that his son had been executed. Plaintiff 15 had submitted a letter to the court which was sent from her brother in Gohardasht prison a few weeks before the execution period. Several witnesses had testified in Court that Victim C.1 had been in Gohardasht during the execution period and that he had been missing afterwards. The Court found that the Plaintiff’s account, together with the submitted letter and the witness accounts, established with enough certainty that the Victim C.1 was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 23 had testified that her brother, Victim C.2, was imprisoned in 1982 for his membership in the Marxists organization Rah-e Kargar. Her parents visited her brother in Gohardasht up until visits were suspended in the summer of 1988. In the autumn that followed the executions, her father was notified that her brother had been executed but was not notified where the execution had taken place. Three other witnesses had testified in court that they had been with Victim C.2 in Gohardasht prison during the execution period, that he was taken away from their prison department during the execution period to never be seen again. One of the witnesses had also noted this in a book that he wrote after his release. Four other witnesses had also testified that they had heard about his execution from other prisoners and one of them had noted the execution of Victim C2 in a book that he wrote after his release. The Court found that it had been established through these accounts that the victim was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 28 had testified that her brother, Victim C3, was arrested in 1985 due to his membership in the Marxist organization Rah-e Kargar, that he was moved to Gohardasht prison in 1987 and that she had visited him there for the last time before in the spring of 1988 before visits were suspended. Her family was notified at Evin prison that her brother had been executed and she had later learned from released prisoners that he had been executed in Gohardasht prison. Five witnesses had testified that Victim C3 had been executed in Gohardasht prison while two witnesses had testified that they had heard about his execution from other prisoners. Despite the fact that it had been recorded in an Amnesty International report from 2018 that Plaintiff 28 had said that her brother had been executed in Evin prison, which she had explained was incorrect, and that Amnesty International had reported in November 1988 that the execution of Victim C3 was imminent, the Court found that the witness accounts collectively established that the victim was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

Plaintiff 24 had testified that her husband, Victim C5, was arrested in 1985 due to his membership in a Marxist branch of the Fadaian and that her last visit with him took place in Evin prison in the end of 1986. She long thought that he had been executed there and had therefore said that he had been executed there during her hearing with the Iran Tribunal. She had later gotten in touch with released prisoners who had told her that her husband had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the summer of 1988. Nine witnesses had said in their court hearings that they either were with Victim C5 in Gohardasht prison when he was brought away to be executed or that they knew the victim and that he was executed there. One of the witnesses had also mentioned this in an article in a magazine in 2013. Several other witnesses had also testified that they had heard from other prisoners that Victim C5 had been executed in Gohardasht prison. The Court thus found that it had been established that the victim was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. The divergent account given by Plaintiff 24 before the Iran Tribunal did not incur reasonable doubt in that regard, the Court noted.

Plaintiff 25 had testified in court that her brother, Victim C6, had been sentenced to ten years in prison due to his connection to the Iranian Communist Association (Etehadi-e Kommunistha) and that he was placed in Gohardasht prison  in 1985. Their father visited him there for the last time in the summer of 1988 and was notified months later in Evin prison that he had been executed. Plaintiff 25 had later learned from released prisoners that her brother was executed in Gohardasht prison. Six other witnesses had testified that they met Victim C6 in Gohardasht prison and that he was missing after the execution period. The Court thus found that it was established that the victim was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. The fact that Iranian authorities had told the UN that Victim C6 had fled the country had been refuted by the witnesses’ accounts.

Plaintiff 12 had testified that her father, Victim C7, was arrested in 1984 when she was eight years old due to being politically active in a branch of the leftist organization Fadaian. She did not remember where her last visit with him took place, and her family was later notified about his death and given a death certificate that said that he had died of natural causes. She had submitted letters from her father, where the last one was sent from Gohardasht prison a few weeks before the executions during the summer of 1988. Three witnesses had testified that they had been in Gohardasht prison with Victim C7 and that he was missing after the executions. One witness had also written about this in a book that he published after his release. The Court thus found that it had been established, through the accounts of the witnesses and the plaintiff and through the submitted letters, that the victim was executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.  

The Court then assessed the evidence concerning the remaining 20 persons who were listed in the list of names in Annex C to the indictment. The Court divided the names in three separate lists, where the first list concerned persons for which there was comprehensive oral evidence proving their execution in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period, a second list where there was less oral evidence and a third list with weaker oral evidence.

Regarding the first list, consisting of 10 names, the Court considered that it had been established through the testimonies of several witnesses that the persons had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. Several witnesses had described how they had met those persons in Gohardasht prison before and during the execution period and that they were missing after the execution period. The information provided in their testimonies had been detailed and consistent with other testimonies.

The second list consisted of eight names, and the Court considered that the oral evidence regarding the execution of the persons on that list had not been as convincing as the first list, in the sense that not as many witnesses had spoken about them in their testimonies. However, some witnesses had provided detailed and concrete information about meeting these persons in Gohardasht prison during the execution period and that the persons had been missing after that. As such, the Court found that it had been established that the persons on the list had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period.

The third list contained the names of two persons who had been mentioned in hearings with witnesses during the trial, but where the information provided during the hearings had lacked the necessary precision and detail necessary, which meant that the evidentiary requirement had not been met. Victim C4 had been mentioned by two witnesses in their hearings, but none of them had met him and had heard about his execution from others. Similarly, only one witness had heard about Victim C26 and had written about him in his book after his release from prison. The Court found that the witnesses’ accounts were not enough to establish with the necessary degree of certainty that the two victims were executed in Gohardasht prison for criminal responsibility to be induced.

The Criminal Responsibility of the Defendant

The prosecution had claimed that the defendant had, in his capacity as assistant to the deputy prosecutor or in a similar position or role, together with others organized and participated in the executions by:

• choosing prisoners to bring before the committee
• escorting the prisoners to the main corridor and guarding them there
• reading the names of the prisoners to be brought before the committee, bringing the prisoners before the committee and giving written or oral information about the prisoners to the committee,
• reading the names of the prisoners who were to be brought to execution,
• ordering prisoners to stand in line to be escorted to the execution site, and
• escorting prisoners to the execution site where the prisoners were killed through hanging.

The prosecution had also claimed that the defendant had, together with other high-ranking officials, ordered or encouraged other perpetrators to participate in the executions by assisting him and other high-ranking officials in their acts by conducting the executions and that the defendant had executed the death sentences issued by the committee after a proceeding that did not fulfill the basic requirements of a fair trial.

The Court noted that almost every witness that had been heard throughout the trial had said that they had seen the defendant conduct a number of the acts that form part of the charge. The two witness accounts that were deemed to have a higher evidentiary value were from witnesses that were already familiar with the defendant prior to the execution period and who had observed him without wearing a blindfold. The witnesses had also provided reliable information about acts committed by the defendant and had been able to provide detailed descriptions of the person they claimed to be the defendant in Gohardasht prison in 1988 which corresponded with the defendant’s physical appearance. One witness was not as familiar with the defendant as others but had only seen him on a number of occasions without wearing a blindfold prior to the execution period. Yet, his identification of the defendant and his observations of the defendant collecting prisoners to bring to the committee on several occasions during both execution waves was deemed credible and given a slightly higher evidentiary value because he had later met the defendant in the dadyar office and had been informed there about his alias.

The accounts of five witnesses were deemed to have a lower evidentiary value either because they had met the defendant for the first time during the execution period, or because they were not familiar with the defendant and had not seen his face in connection to the relevant act or with a blindfold on, or because their description of him has been divergent to the description provided by other witnesses. Meanwhile, the accounts of two witnesses were deemed to have a low evidentiary value because they had not made own observations of the defendant in prison.

Witnesses had testified that they had seen the defendant bring prisoners to and from the committee and to the execution site and that they had seen him question prisoners about whether they would participate in a public interview or whether they would conduct their prayers, with the purpose of selecting persons to present to the committee.

The Court found, after having weighed together the evidence from the witness testimonies with the findings made under the first charge, that the evidence as a whole was convincing in support of the defendant having worked in Gohardasht prison under his alias during the relevant time period and of the defendant having committed the criminal in the charge. The Court further noted that while the information provided by witnesses who were not very familiar with the defendant prior to the execution period had less evidentiary value, those witnesses had also presented observations made of the defendant on several occasions during the relevant time period in a way which binds him to the committee’s work on the executions. Other witnesses had presented observations of the defendant which binds him to the role that the prosecution has claimed that he had.

The Court further noted that it appeared as natural that the defendant would participate in the executions also during the second wave of executions, due to his role in the dadyar office. The fact that he had contact details to persons with a connection to Gohardasht prison during the execution period in his cellphone, that he had invited some of those persons for holiday celebrations in recent years and that he had deleted several such contacts shortly before his trip to Sweden had also been considered in support of the evidence.

In conclusion, the Court found that several witnesses had experienced the same events in prison and that their accounts supported each other’s accounts, which in turn corresponded with the central parts of the charge in terms of the defendant’s alleged role in prison and the way in which he had participated in the proceedings which led to the executions of leftist prisoners. The Court further noted that the defendant had a motif, a role, an opportunity and an obligation to participate in the proceedings. Considering that there was additional evidence that supports the witnesses’ accounts, the evidence as a whole was considered as robust. The Court stated that, even if all accounts may not be independent of each other, as there is a risk that witnesses’ accounts have been influenced, the collected evidentiary value was still high enough for it to be established that the defendant, in his role as an assistant to the deputy prosecutor, together with others, had participated in the executions by:

• participating in interrogations of prisoners with the purpose of sorting out the ones to be brought before the committee,
• being present in the main corridor and side corridors in connection to the space where the committee conducted its examinations,
• moving and placing prisoners in those corridors,
• escorting prisoners to and from the committee, and
• being present in the room where the committee held their interrogations.

The Court concluded that by committing the above-mentioned acts, the defendant had participated in carrying out death sentences which were issued by the committee through proceedings which did not fulfill the basic requirements of a fair trial.  

Assessment of the Information Provided by the Defendant

The Court then moved to assess the information provided by the defendant against the statement of the criminal acts, in order to determine if anything that the defendant had presented weakened the prosecution’s evidence to the degree that the evidentiary requirement to prove the acts was no longer met.

Alibi

The defendant had claimed that the was on a leave during the execution periods due to his daughter’s birth on 29 July 1988 (7 Mordad 1367). The Court noted that although it did not question the defendant’s claim about his daughter’s birth, the defendant had not presented any evidence that confirmed that he was on a leave during the relevant time period.

The Court further noted that the situation in Iran during the summer of 1988 also spoke against the defendant’s claim. Iran was in a state of general mobilization as a result of operation Eternal Light which was launched by the MEK with support from Iraq on 26 July 1988. The country’s supreme religious leader ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa, likely on 28 July 1988, which directly involved the defendant’s employer, the revolutionary prosecution authority, and his working place in the prisons in Tehran and Karaj. Due to the fatwa, the defendant was obligated to appear at work. The fatwa instructed the assignment to be conducted immediately, and the Court noted that the volume of such an operation must reasonably have required that all available resources at the prisons was used. The Court thus found that it was unlikely that the defendant would have been granted a leave during such circumstances, also while taking into consideration the hierarchical structure in Iran with an obligation to obey the orders of the supreme religious leader. As such, the Court did not find that the defendant’s claim weakened the evidentiary value of the prosecution’s investigation.

Fabricated and Wrongful Information

The defendant had further claimed that the investigation against him was politically motivated and conducted with the purpose of framing him for having participated in ostensible crimes through constructed and false accusations. According to the defendant, the conspiracy had been built by political groups abroad that are in opposition to the government. He had further claimed that he had become a pawn on a political playing field and that he was being used to get at representatives of the Iranian government. His hypothesis was that the few persons that survived operation Eternal Light constructed a story when they got back to camp Ashraf that consisted in them claiming that all those that had been killed in combat had instead been killed in prisons in Iran.

The defendant had further pointed to unclarities in some testimonies, which the Court noted had, in all material aspects, been cleared up during the hearings that had taken place in court.

The defendant had also pointed to the fact that his name had not been mentioned in written accounts about the events at hand, while the persons who it had been claimed that the had committed the acts with had regularly been named.  He had further claimed that the witnesses that appeared in court were not independent and that there were personal relationships between the witnesses and that there were several erroneous facts in the testimonies apart from statements about his own alleged acts.

The Court found that is was not possible to draw any conclusions from the fact that the defendant’s name had not been mentioned in other contexts. The fact that witnesses and plaintiffs had described the same events did not have mean, as the defense had claimed, that witnesses and plaintiffs had consulted each other or influenced each other’s testimonies. It was not remarkable that several people had experienced the same thing, the Court noted. Rather, it was natural, considering that the accounts concerned prisoners who had largely been subjected to the same measures.

The defendant had further questioned the evidentiary value of the oral evidence as he considered that there were question marks about the origin of the accounts. The defendant had pointed to inconsistencies in the accounts, that plaintiffs and witnesses had been heard in different contexts previously and that the investigation was affected by that. The defendant had further noted that the trial had been live streamed in different media and that the witnesses and plaintiffs may have been influenced by or influenced each other.

The Court first noted that the fact that there were discrepancies between what a plaintiff or witness had said in court compared to during the preliminary investigation did not necessarily mean that their account was fabricated. There may be several circumstances that lead to such discrepancies, the Court noted, such as questions being asked in different ways, the interpretation being inadequate, or the information being recorded in an incorrect way. Furthermore, it is reasonable that a story changes over time as the basis of witnesses’ accounts are in fact changing recollections that the person is able to produce on the different occasions. That is simply how memory works, the Court noted. Witnesses and plaintiffs had also explained why new information had sometimes appeared during their court hearing which did not appear during their police hearings, or in interviews for reports, articles or media. The primary explanation had been that the persons had not been asked specifically about that piece of information or that their answers had not been recorded in full. The Court noted that plaintiffs and witnesses had tended to only answer the questions that they had been asked. Thus, the Court did not find that any concrete circumstance had appeared that suggested that plaintiffs and witnesses had been unduly influenced to wrongfully accuse the defendant. It had, however, appeared information that suggested that plaintiffs had encouraged others to step forward and participate in the judicial proceedings.

The Court further noted that the fact that persons who were familiar with the defendant and were present at the crime scene had not made observations about him there did not mean that the prosecution’s evidence was incorrect. Considering the extraordinary events that were taking place at the crime scene and that the plaintiffs and witnesses were wearing blindfolds, it was not remarkable that some of them had not noticed the defendant’s presence.

The Court also noted that the plaintiffs and witnesses had belonged to several different political groups which do not share each other’s political or religious values. Some persons are no longer members or sympathizers of their previous organizations, and there is strong antagonism between some persons and groups. Many had been familiar with the defendant prior to the execution period while others had not. Meanwhile, the investigation consisted of varying information from plaintiffs and witnesses, and most of them had shared their direct observations. Almost every plaintiff or witness, albeit with varying strength, had identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The situations in which they had made observations of him had varied, and in many instances their observations did not relate to the relevant acts but were of more general character and focused on the defendant as an employee at Gohardasht prison. If the investigation had in fact been fabricated by the plaintiffs and witnesses, the Court noted, it would have been reasonable to believe that the content of their testimonies would unanimously be focused on the defendant’s presence at the crime scene and his participation in the acts in the statement of criminal acts.

In conclusion, the Court found that there were no reasons to remark on the robustness and reliability of the investigation and that no concrete circumstances had been presented by the defendant which suggested that the investigation had been constructed or of any undue influence on the investigation by political groups. The defendant’s theory was not likely and thus did not affect the evidentiary value of the prosecution’s investigation.

Misidentification

The defendant had claimed that there may have been another person working in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period who used the same alias as him. In assessing this claim, the Court noted that any confusion with an alternative perpetrator could be excluded and referred to the extensive assessment that had been made of the evidentiary value of the plaintiffs’ and witnesses’ identification of the defendant. The Court found that this alternative hypothesis did not weaken the evidentiary value of the prosecution’s investigation.

Other Claims

The defendant’s explanation to why he had deleted the contact information of persons connected to the Iranian court system and to prisons such as Gohardasht from his cellphone prior to his departure to Sweden was that he did not want the person who he was allegedly visiting to find the contacts in his phone. In a hearing in court, the defendant had said that the person had used the defendant’s cell phone during his previous visits in Sweden and had bothered his friends by calling them up and bringing up political questions related to the court system. The Court considered the defendant’s explanation to be unreasonable and noted that it would not affect the evidentiary value of the prosecution’s evidence.

Conclusion regarding the Information from the Defendant

In conclusion, the Court noted that the prosecution’s evidence as a whole was considered to be robust. The evidence contradicted the defendant’s statements, which were not supported by any evidence in the case. As such, the Court noted that it had been proven beyond reasonable doubt that the defendant had committed the relevant acts.

Intent, Mode of Liability and Classification of the Crimes

Intent

The Court noted that the defendant had been aware that armed combat took place between Iran and Iraq/MEK and that there was an IAC between Iran and Iraq. He was also aware of the active participation of the MEK in this conflict together with Iraq. As such, he must have understood that this meant that the group became part of the IAC and, by extension, that the victims belonged to a protected group of persons under international humanitarian law.

As regards to his acts, the investigation had showed that he had acted with intent. He had participated in the killing of MEK prisoners entirely in accordance with the purpose mentioned in the fatwa, and as regards to the second charge, participated in the killing of sympathizers of different leftist groups who had denounced their Muslim faith.

Mode of Liability

The Court again noted that the events at hand involve several people and a number of acts where several people had cooperated and had different functions in the execution of the acts.  The Court’s assessment had therefore largely been focused on what the involved persons had done on a mutual level, as it is the collaboratively conducted acts that fulfills the elements of the alleged crimes. As regards to the defendant’s participation in the events, which on a mutual level constitute crimes, the Court noted that the defendant through his function in prison had participated actively in executing the criminal acts. The circumstances were such that the defendant may be considered to have participated in the criminal acts as a co-perpetrator in accordance with paragraph 2, section 4 of chapter 23 of the Criminal Code, even if he had not single-handedly fulfilled the elements of the crimes.

Classification of the Crimes

 The Court found that the criminal acts under the first charge were to be considered as crimes against international law (war crimes) in accordance with section 6 in chapter 22 of the Criminal Code. The provision further states that the crime is to be considered as severe if it has been perpetrated through a large number of different acts or if many people have been killed as a result of the crime. The Court noted that the defendant had participated in a large number of different acts which had affected many plaintiffs. The acts were committed during an IAC during a relatively limited time period and at the same place. Many people had been killed. Furthermore, the acts had been targeted against people with the same political or religious background. As such, the Court found that the acts should be considered as a severe case of crimes against international law (war crimes).

The Court noted that the second charge also concerned criminal acts where many people had been killed, among them the 24 persons in Annex C which the Court had established had been executed. The Court stated that the criminal act under the second charge was to be considered as murder in accordance with section 1 of chapter 3 of the Criminal Code in its wording before 1 July 1999.

Sentence and meeting out of the Punishment

The Court noted that the defendant had participated in a chain of events in which a very large number of persons who were protected under international humanitarian law were executed after a proceeding which did not fulfill the requirement of a fair trial. He had also actively participated in acts through which a very large number of people were executed due to their religious beliefs after a proceeding which did not fulfill the requirement of a fair trial.

The Court stated that the crimes were very serious and had a high penal value which meant that, even when considering that considerable time has passed since the acts were committed, the sentence could not be determined to anything but life in prison.

Damages

All plaintiffs had requested compensation for the psychological suffering that they had to endure as a result of the crimes, for which the legal ground is found in section 1 of the (Iranian) Law on Civil Responsibility from 1960 and paragraph 5 of section 3 of the Law on Diya from 1982. The requested amount corresponds to the value of one “diya” (blood money) as determined by the Central Bank of Iran in March 2021.

The Court first noted that the claim for damages by Plaintiff 29 and Plaintiff 18 were rejected as it had not been proved that their respective family members had been executed in Gohardasht prison during the relevant time period. The Court then noted that all other plaintiffs were entitled to damages by the defendant in accordance with the Law on Civil Responsibility due to the psychological suffering that he had cause them as a result of his criminal acts.

Each plaintiff had requested 4 800 000 000 Iranian rials (approximately 1 155 000 SEK) in damages. The Court noted that the purpose of the diya not only was to compensate a damage but to punish the person who had given rise to the damage, which was not compatible with the purpose of the Law on Civil Responsibilities. As such, the Court stated, the laws could not be used conjunctively as suggested by the plaintiffs. Applying the law in this way, the Court added, would result in a double punishment due to the size of the requested amount, which would be incompatible with the tenets of the Swedish legal system.

The Court further noted that it may search for guidance in Swedish rules on damages in the absence of Iranian jurisprudence about which compensation amount that should be granted for psychological suffering when applying the Law on Civil Responsibilities. Since the damages originated in 1988, it is the rules and principles that were applicable in 1988 that apply.

The standard amount of compensation for a close family member of a person that has been killed was 25 000 SEK in 1988. The Court considered, however, that the months of uncertainty about their family members’ fates, the fact that their burial sites had been and still are hidden and the likely impact of these circumstances on the psychological suffering of the plaintiffs who lost a family member to the executions means that they had suffered a larger damage than what was reflected in the standard amount and that they should therefore reasonably be entitled to 40 000 SEK each.

The Court further noted that the plaintiffs under the first charge who had themselves been imprisoned had also suffered psychologically as a result of the crimes. No medical assessment that detailed their psychological suffering had been submitted to the court, but the Court found that their testimonies and what had otherwise been established about the chain of events and the fear for their lives that had been invoked by the events meant that they were subjected to psychological suffering which was at least comparable to the plaintiffs who had lost their family members. The Court therefore found that they were each entitled to 40 000 SEK for their psychological pain. In the absence of any further information about their psychological state, a higher amount could not be awarded, the Court noted.

Special claims

The prosecution had requested the court to sentence the defendant to expulsion from Sweden.

The Court found that the defendant had been sentenced with particularly serious crimes and that he therefore should not be allowed to stay in the country. It further noted that the defendant was only visiting Sweden temporarily when he was arrested and that he does not have a strong connection to Sweden. The Court further found that nothing reasonably hindered his deportation to Iran (writers note: such as a risk of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment). As such, the Court decided on the expulsion of the defendant from Sweden.

Detention

The defendant shall stay in detention until the verdict has become legally binding.

__

A translated version of this report in Farsi can be found here.