

**SUBMISSION FOR THE COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION'S REVIEW OF SWEDEN DURING ITS 116TH SESSION, 17
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Sweden's Compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD)

Submitted by

CIVIL RIGHTS DEFENDERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	3
ARTICLE 2.....	4
GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS	4
General developments as regards racism and discrimination in Sweden	4
Worsened mediate and political discourse	6
General developments in the area of migration.....	11
General developments in the area of criminal policy	12
SPECIAL MEASURES FOR DISADVANTAGED GROUPS	13
The situation regarding the rights of Muslims	13
The situation regarding the rights of the Sami people	19
DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF ETHNICITY AND/OR RELIGION.....	21
Ethnic and racial profiling.....	21
DISCRIMINATION THROUGH LEGAL MEASURES	23
Preventative bans	23
Surveillance and the use of artificial intelligence	23
The increased use of coercive measures against children	24
RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 2	26
Suggested recommendations regarding the political discourse	26
Suggested recommendations regarding racial and ethnic profiling.....	26
Suggested recommendations regarding surveillance and the use of artificial intelligence	26
Suggested recommendations regarding the increased use of coercive measures against children	27
ARTICLE 4.....	28
HATE CRIMES.....	28
General developments with regards to physical hate crimes	28
Hate crimes against Afro-Swedes	29

Hate crimes against Muslims	30
Hate crimes against Sámi	31
Hate crimes against Jewish people	31
Application of hate speech legislation.....	33
RECOMMENDATIONS	34
ARTICLE 5.....	35
ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS	35
Enjoyment of economic, cultural and social rights for asylum seekers, migrants and non-citizens	35
Access to citizenship	35
Begging bans	36
RECOMMENDATIONS	37
Suggested recommendations regarding non-citizens	37
Suggested recommendations regarding begging bans	37

INTRODUCTION

1. The following report is submitted by Civil Rights Defenders, a Sweden-based international human rights organization with the mission to defend civil and political rights together with human rights defenders and to increase their security, capacity and access to justice. Through legal means and public advocacy, our aim is to hold states, individuals, and non-state actors accountable for human rights violations, and to advocate for the norms and values of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as well as other human rights standards in order to promote democratic societies committed to the safeguarding of human rights. The report has also been signed by Landsförbundet Svenska Samer.
2. The purpose of this report is to give input to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (the Committee) with respect to the Swedish state's compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (the Convention) ahead of the Committee's review of Sweden during its 116th session. Civil Rights Defenders submits this report in its capacity as an independent expert organisation working to promote and protect human rights in Sweden. The report reflects the organisation's long-standing work focusing broadly on combating racism and discrimination, with particular attention to developments in criminal policy, migration law and the situation of groups exposed to heightened vulnerability: migrants, Muslims, the Sámi people and people living in particularly vulnerable areas. These areas have been selected in light of Civil Rights Defenders' continuous and integrated work in these fields, encompassing legal assistance, strategic litigation, advocacy and public engagement, carried out in close cooperation and dialogue with affected communities.

ARTICLE 2

GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS

General developments as regards racism and discrimination in Sweden

3. Racial discrimination has continued to prove a significant problem for Swedish society, with the trend exacerbating rapidly in virtually all facets of private and public life. Between 2017 and 2024 the total number of complaints of discrimination received by the Equality Ombudsman (*Diskrimineringsombudsmannen*) increased from 2393 complaints in 2017 to 5182 complaints in 2024, which corresponds to a 116 percent increase.¹ Together with complaints concerning disability, the majority of complaints have concerned discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, which in 2024 made up 35 percent of all complaints.²
4. The statistics provided by the Equality Ombudsman do not paint the complete picture, however. The number of unreported cases remains, by the authority's own admission, high and correspond in the case of racial discrimination with a decrease in faith toward public institutions among ethnic, racial and religious minorities.³ Other publications have aimed to bridge this gap in knowledge through representative survey studies, such as the European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey, according to which 38 percent of respondents with Sub-Saharan African origin responded that they had experienced discrimination with regards to their ethnic or immigrant background (including, among other grounds, skin colour, ethnic origin, religion and or religious belief) in the 12 months before the survey, and 45 percent in

¹ Equality Ombudsman, *Statistik över anmälningar 2015—2024*, Rapport 2025:1, 2025, 28. Available at <https://www.do.se/download/18.6e7e84a8195b818c7f422d/1745466476219/rapport-statistik-anm%C3%A4lningar-diskriminering-2015-2024.pdf> [accessed 15 June 2025].

² Ibid.

³ Equality Ombudsman, *Förekomst av diskriminering 2024*, Rapport 2024:2, 2025, 34. Available at <https://www.do.se/download/18.41f45cb619387118a1815b/1734357601335/rapport-forekomst-av-diskriminering-2024.pdf> [accessed 15 June 2025].

the 5 years before the survey.⁴ Additionally, among the target group, roughly 50 percent perceived that discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or immigrant background was either very widespread or fairly widespread.⁵ Following a mass-shooting directed against a Swedish for Immigrants facility in Örebro in February of 2025—the deadliest mass-shooting in Swedish history, killing 11 people (10 of which had an immigrant background)—many Swedish nationals with foreign background expressed fear and concern that the shooting had been racially motivated, incensed by racist rhetoric having become normalised in the political and mediate discourse.⁶

5. Yet other studies have tried to capture the prevalence of discrimination by focusing not on the aggravated party, but instead by studying the perceptions of the discriminating party or other parties in the position to discriminate. According to a study conducted by PwC Sweden on behalf of the foundation Järvaveckan in 2025, among the 500 corporate executives in Sweden who were interviewed, roughly a third displayed a negative bias against job applicants with either African or Middle Eastern-sounding names during recruitment interviews, while 50 percent responded that they would not hire an applicant wearing religious symbols.⁷ Similarly, studies charting Swedish individuals' perception of minority groups such as Muslims, Afro-Swedes and immigrants in general, show a negative trend when it comes to racial and religious tolerance in Sweden. In a study conducted by the foundation Expo in 2022, when asked how they would feel about having neighbours or family members with a partner from different parts of the world, a third of respondents answered that they would be

⁴ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey: Summary of main results – SE*. Available at https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2019-eu-midis-ii-summary-results-country-sheet-sweden_en.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁵ Ibid. See disaggregated data available at <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/survey-data-explorer-second-eu-minorities-discrimination-survey> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁶ Alnahhal, S., Jakobson, H., "Är det vi som kommer att skjutas nästa gång?", *Dagens Nyheter*, 11 February 2025. Available at <https://www.dn.se/sverige/ar-det-vi-som-kommer-att-skjutas-nasta-gang/> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Kazmierska, N., "Invandrare i Örebro: 'Är så rädd'", *Aftonbladet*, 11 February 2025. Available at <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/1MeEOe/invandrarnas-oro-efter-skoldadet-i-orebro> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁷ Järvaveckan Research, *Näringslivet: Mångfald och inkludering 2025*, 2025, 23. Available at <https://jarvaveckan.se/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Jarvaveckan-Research-Naringslivet-Mangfald-och-inkludering-2025.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

“completely against it”.⁸ In the same study, 36 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that Islam constitutes a threat against Western civilisation.⁹ Meanwhile, when asked to estimate the proportion of the population they believe to be foreign-born and the proportion who are Muslim, respondents significantly over-estimated both figures while, in contrast, when the same question was asked with regards to the employment rate, the number was under-estimated.¹⁰ In a study published by Gothenburg University in 2025, applying for the first time ever findings from the longitudinal Diversity Barometer on Sweden, almost all respondents (99 percent) in 2022 believed that Islam clashed with human rights, a figure that had risen from 93 percent in 2016. In comparison, for all other charted religions—Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism and Judaism—the number ranged around 15 to 35 percent.¹¹

Worsened mediate and political discourse

6. The negative trend regarding discrimination and the perception of racialised minorities in Sweden exists concurrently with their increasingly negative depiction in Swedish media and political discourse, with 2022 marking a notable intensification linked to the Swedish parliamentary election in the parties' campaign rhetoric. Political parties, across the ideological spectra, frequently contrasted “Swedish values” with Muslims, immigrant and refugees, framing these groups as threats to social cohesion, security and the welfare state. Coupled with legislative and policy-oriented proposals explicitly designed in such a way to target ethnic, racial and religious minorities, such as the proposals on “security zones” and prohibitions against “separatism” and “Islamism”, the established parties' campaigns leading up to the election were distinguished by a discourse of antagonism, in which the “average” Swede, Sweden and “Swedish values” were contrasted to what was explained as its radical negation—“the Muslim”, “the Immigrant”, “the Refugee”, the Migrant”, the latter depicted as an existential

⁸ Expo, *Kampen om värderingarna*, 2022, 40 pp. Available at https://expo.se/wp-content/uploads/expo_migration/kampen_om_varderingarna.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Groglopo, A., Ahmadi, F. and Munobwa, J. S. (2025) ‘Unveiling Islamophobia: navigating its presence in Sweden’, *Cogent Social Sciences*, 11(1). doi: 10.1080/23311886.2025.2451129.

threat to the security and sustainability of the welfare state in the campaign speeches and the general political debates.

7. Rhetoric enunciating such an antagonism include Magdalena Andersson, party leader of the main opposition party, the Social Democrats, and then-Prime Minister of Sweden, proclaiming that she did not want to see any “Somali towns” in Sweden;¹² a statement made, in turn, as a response to criticisms levied against then-Minister for Migration and Integration, Anders Ygeman, proposing that the share of non-foreign inhabitants in any residential area be capped at 50 percent, and both in line with two of the party’s election strategies, which were to “eliminate segregation and crime” and “take back the democratic control over welfare”.¹³ Other examples of racialising discourse include when party leader of the Christian Democrats, and current Deputy Prime Minister of Sweden, Ebba Busch, commenting on the rioting that occurred in some urban areas following Qur’an burnings by far-right extremist Rasmus Paludan during Ramadan of 2022 with a call for Swedish police to use firearms to stifle riots and suggesting that the police should have inflicted harm on at least “one hundred Islamists”;¹⁴ then-co-spokesperson for the Green Party and Minister for Gender Equality and Housing, Märta Stenevi, proposing that women from a foreign background living in segregated areas be subjected to so called “family planning”, i.e. restrictions on their reproductive rights, in an effort to facilitate integration;¹⁵ the Liberal Party leader, later Minister for Integration and Minister for Employment, Johan Pehrson, proposing that children as young as two years old be tested on their proficiency of the Swedish language, suggesting further that they be forcibly removed

¹² Jakobsson, H., "Andersson kräver färre låsningar från de andra partierna: 'Lättare att bilda regering efter valet'", *Dagens Nyheter*, 9 August 2022. Available at <https://www.dn.se/sverige/andersson-kraver-farre-lasningar-fran-de-andra-partierna-lattare-att-bilda-regering-efter-valet/> [accessed 20 October 2025].

¹³ Lundborg, B., "Ygeman: Max hälften med 'utomnordisk bakgrund' i utsatta bostadsområden." *Dagens Nyheter*, 31 July 2022. Available at <https://www.dn.se/sverige/ygeman-max-halften-med-utomnordisk-bakgrund-i-utsatta-bostadsomraden/> [accessed 20 October 2025].

¹⁴ Torehammar, H., "Busch kritiserar polisen: Varför har vi inte minst 100 skadade islamister?" *Sveriges Radio*, 22 April 2022. Available at <https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/ebba-busch-kritiserar-polisen-varfor-skot-man-inte-skarpt> [accessed 20 October 2025].

¹⁵ Orrenius, N., "Mammorna i utsatta Skäggetorp delade sin vardag med MP-toppen," *Dagens Nyheter*, 17 April 2022. Available at <https://www.dn.se/sverige/mammorna-i-utsatta-skaggetorp-delade-sin-vardag-med-mp-toppen/> [accessed 20 October 2025].

from their homes should their results be inadequate, as well as promising that, “looking to France” and, in particular, the French law “to strengthen respect for the principles of the Republic” (“Loi confortant le respect des principes de la République”), on the basis of which over 700 Muslim organisations, schools, mosques and businesses have been forcibly dissolved, to prioritise the fight against “separatism”;¹⁶ the Moderate Party suggesting that children in segregated areas be forcibly tested for ADHD;¹⁷ as well as general proposals not limited to any one party but recurring as common themes throughout the election cycle, including on prohibitions against wearing the hijab in schools and at the workplace,¹⁸ escalating the “fight” against Islamism, political Islam or Islamic extremism; revamping the criminal justice system in order to fight “gang-related” or “clan-related” criminality, tightening citizenship regulations, slashing the rights for migrants and asylum seeker, as well as “speaking candidly about the harmful effects of mass immigration”.¹⁹

¹⁶ Göteborgs-Posten, “Liberalerna vill införa språktest för tvååringar,” 9 August 2022. Available at <https://www.gp.se/nyheter/sverige/liberalerna-vill-införa-språktest-for-tvaaringar-a0f1c84f-188d-4e4e-b914-008656a0774e> [accessed 20 October 2025].

¹⁷ Moderata Samlingspartiet i Region Stockholm, “Förslag: Snabbtest för ADHD i utsatta områden”, 12 August 2022. Available at <https://moderaterna.se/stockholm/nyhet/forslag-snabbtest-for-adhd-i-utsatta-omraden/> [accessed 20 October 2025].

¹⁸ Svensson, O., “Moderaterna vill utreda slöjförbud i skolan,” *Aftonbladet*, 23 August 2019. Available at <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/rAGVBe/moderaterna-vill-utreda-slojforbud-i-skolan> [accessed 10 October 2025]; Robert Hannah and Juno Blom, , 2022/23:1695, “Slöjor på Flickor” (Stockholm: The Consitutional Committee), 23 November 2022. Available at https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-och-lagar/dokument/motion/slojor-pa-flickor_ha021695/ [accessed 20 October].

¹⁹ Sveriges Radio, “Partierna till höger är överens om hårdare regler för invandrare”, 8 September 2022. Available at <https://www.sverigesradio.se/artikel/partierna-till-hoger-ar-overens-om-hardare-regler-for-invandrare> [accessed 10 October 2025]; Olle Lönneaus, “Plötsligt vill alla göra det svårare att bli svensk medborgare,” *Sydsvenskan*, 6 June 2021. Available at <https://www.sydsvenskan.se/sverige/plotsligt-vill-alla-gora-det-svarare-att-bli-svensk-medborgare/> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Aylott, N., Bolin, N., “A New Right: The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2022,” *West European Politics*, vol. 46, no. 5, 2023, 1049–1062. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2022.2156199>; Svensson, H., “Contested Belonging in an Election Year: The Case of Refugees Living in Sweden”, *Journal of Intercultural Studies*, vol. 45, no. 4, 2024, 706–721. <https://doi.org/10.1080/07256868.2024.2325955>; Rothstein, B., “The Shadow of the Swedish Right”, *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 34, no. 1, 2023, 36–49. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.0002>; Elgenius, G., Rydgren, J., “Frames of Nostalgia and Belonging: The Resurgence of Ethno-Nationalism in Sweden”, *European Societies*, vol. 21, no. 4, 2018, 583–602. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14616696.2018.1494297>.

8. The electoral success of the far-right Sweden Democrats, which secured over 20 percent of the vote in 2022, further underscores the institutionalisation of racist rhetoric within the political discourse. Leading up to the election, anti-racist organisations in Sweden reported a significant increase in the party's anti-Muslim and anti-Immigrant activities, including a radicalised rhetoric toward racialised minority groups, including by leading party figures such as party leader Jimmie Åkesson and then-secretary Richard Jomshof.²⁰ Among other initiatives Richard Jomshof, set out on an alternative, self-described “anti-Islamic campaign tour” running concurrently with the party's official campaign trail, the duration of which he visited a dozen of Swedish cities warning about “the threat of Islam”.²¹ Jomshof has routinely been criticised for making racist and Islamophobic statements, calling Islam “an abhorrent ideology and religion”, a “perversion of a religion”, “a bigger threat than Nazism and communism combined”, “incompatible with democracy and Western values”, describing Ramadan as a “delusion”, Muslims as “strangers”, the hijab a “rape on Sweden” and calling for politicians and journalists with backgrounds in Muslim countries to be removed from the country.²²
9. Following the 2022 parliamentary election, the newly formed right-wing government, consisting of the Moderate Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats signed an agreement with the Sweden Democrats to co-operate on policy areas including criminal justice reform and migration policy, giving the Sweden Democrats governmental influence and some executive power, in return granting the right-wing bloc a voting plurality in the parliamentary assembly. The so-called Tidö Agreement, more than a simple agreement of co-operation, also serves as a declaration of intent for the political programme implemented during the mandate period. Several of the provisions in the agreement engage in a discourse of framing social, economic,

²⁰ Lehman, J., “Ett radikaliserat SD går till val” (Stockholm: Stiftelsen Expo, 2022). Available at <https://expo.se/kommentar/ett-radikaliserat-sd-gar-till-val> [accessed 20 October 2025].

²¹ “Islamkritisk turné – vårt sätt att leva är värt att försvara | Richard Jomshof (SD),” *Riks*, August 26, 2022.

²² “Sverigedemokraten Richard Jomshof får kritik efter kommentarer om islam,” *Sveriges Radio*, 12 March 2021; Helena Zachariasson, “Islam värre hot än nazismen,” *SVT Nyheter*, 22 November 2012; 10 islamofobiska uttalanden från Richard Jomshof (SD),” *Dagens Etc*, 22 March 2021.

political and cultural problems as the result of an uncontrolled mass migration of refugees from African and Arab countries.

10. The political and media discourse since 2022 has largely mirrored the legislative developments initiated under the Tidö Agreement . One notable example includes when Jimmie Åkesson delivered a speech at the Sweden Democrat's annual party convention in 2023, in which he asserted that the Sweden Democrats were to pursue the immediate halting of all ongoing construction of mosques in Sweden as part of the party's formal political programme, as well as the demolition of all currently existing mosques which "contribute to Islamism".²³ Other statements implying an antagonistic strategy of politics include the Christian Democrats focusing their election campaign ahead of the 2024 European Union parliamentary election on the question of "shared values" within the union and explicitly targeting Muslims as especially problematic in this regard.²⁴ In an interview with Dagens Nyheter, Busch formally launched the party's election campaign by stating that "Islam must adapt, and those who are not prepared to adjust their practice do not belong in Europe or Sweden", arguing for the use of European Union funding to encourage those who "want to continue practicing decapitation", who "thinks it's right and proper" "to stone women who do not wear a veil" or "throw homosexuals off-high rise buildings for loving of the same sex" to move "back to Iran or Sudan".²⁵ As part of their European Union platform, the Christian Democrats also vowed to target foreign funding from "Islamist states" as well as "Islamist organisations" in Sweden financing their mosques. Responding to questions on whether the proposed policies would affect Christian communities, Busch added that, though there might be "isolated cases of deviations", the "major problem in Sweden is not the practice of Islam, [but that] we ... have a significant problem with the spread of Islam in Sweden".²⁶ The mounting list of antagonistically attuned

²³ Jimmie Åkesson, Speech at Sverigedemokraternas landsdagar 2023, *Sverigedemokraterna*, November 25, 2023.

²⁴ Olsson, H., "Ebba Busch vill att EU betalar för återvandring: 'Islam måste anpassa sig'," *Dagens Nyheter*, 28 May 2024. Available at <https://www.dn.se/sverige/ebba-busch-vill-att-eu-betalar-for-atervandring-islam-maste-anpassa-sig> [accessed 20 October 2025].

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ekman, J., Zachrisson Winberg, J., and Törnmalm, K., "Busch: 'Islam behöver anpassa sig till svenska värderingar'," *SVT Nyheter*, 29 May 2024. Available at <https://www.dn.se/sverige/ebba-busch-vill-att-eu-betalar-for-atervandring-islam-maste-anpassa-sig> [accessed 20 October 2025].

statements also include Paulina Brandberg, then-Minister for Gender Equality and Working Life, and responsible for the implementation of the Swedish National Plan against Racism, proposing that parents to children wearing an Islamic veil should be subject to coercive child welfare interventions as part of the governing parties efforts to investigate a criminalization of parents coercing their children to wear religious clothing.²⁷ Following this assertion, the Swedish Gender Equality Agency changed their policy to exclude pictures of children wearing a *hijab*, with general director Lise Tamm stating that such pictures are not consistent with Swedish gender equality policy and that “we should not sexualize little girls, and they should not have to hide themselves in that way”.²⁸

General developments in the area of migration

11. In recent years, Sweden’s migration policies have undergone a significant and restrictive transformation.²⁹ The Government’s approach increasingly frames migration as a societal burden, adopting a divisive rhetoric that risks undermining social cohesion and the fundamental principles of non-discrimination. A notable trend is the increasing conflation of migration with crime in political discourse, reinforcing narratives that justify substantial restrictions on the rights and living conditions of asylum seekers, migrants, and non-citizens.
12. Since the latest review of Sweden, legislative and policy measures have been introduced with the clear objective of both reducing immigration and encouraging repatriation, thus establishing a more exclusionary migration framework. These measures include the proposal for heightened requirements for obtaining residence permits and citizenship, reductions in social benefits for migrants, and provisions

²⁷ Sveriges Radio, “Paulina Brandberg (L): Slöja på riktigt små barn borde vara skäl för orosanmälan”, 7 September 2024. Available at <https://www.sverigesradio.se/avsnitt/paulina-brandberg-l-sloja-pa-riktigt-sma-barn-borde-vara-skal-for-orosanmalan> [accessed 20 October 2025].

²⁸ De Vivo, L., “Jämställdhetsmyndigheten slutar använda bilder på barn med slöja”, 10 June 2025. Available at <https://www.expressen.se/nyheter/sverige/jamstalldhetsmyndigheten-slutar-anvanda-bilder-pa-barn-med-sloja> [accessed 20 October 2025].

²⁹ See, generally, Hinnfors, J. & Jungar, A. C., *Migrationslagstiftning i Norden - Ett restriktivt skifte*, Delmi Policy Brief 2024:3, Delegationen för migrationsstudier. Available at <https://www.delmi.se/publikationer/rapport-2024-3-migrationslagstiftning-i-norden-ett-restriktivt-skifte> [accessed 20 October 2025].

requiring asylum seekers to finance their own reception. Particularly concerning is the proposal for mandatory reporting of undocumented individuals for certain authorities. These policy shifts have exacerbated challenges for non-citizens in Sweden while also increasing the risk and occurrence of profiling and hate crimes on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.

General developments in the area of criminal policy

13. In addressing recent developments in crime prevention amid heightened concerns over organised crime and fatal shootings, government responses have increasingly relied on short-term and repressive punitive measures that risk undermining human rights protections and the standards of rule of law. Moreover, several of the laws and policies adopted with the purpose of fighting crime risk exacerbating existing societal divisions and reinforcing institutional racism, thereby entrenching discriminatory practices.
14. In September 2019, the Social Democratic Government introduced a 34-point action plan to combat criminality.³⁰ The plan primarily emphasised the need for tougher punitive measures, including harsher sentencing regimes, expanded surveillance and the intensification of preventative interventions. The programme was premised on the assumption that criminal activity is predominantly concentrated in areas designated by the Swedish Police Authority as “particularly vulnerable”, based on socioeconomic indicators and the perceived degree of criminal influence within local communities. More than 70 percent of residents in such areas were either born outside Sweden or have both parents born abroad.³¹ According to studies conducted in Sweden, by constructing these communities as the principal source of criminality, the turn toward punitive regulation of marginalised communities has reinforced racialised assumptions and legitimised disproportionate policing and surveillance of racialised populations.³²

³⁰ Government Offices of Sweden, 34-punktsprogrammet: Regeringens åtgärder mot gängkriminalitet, (Stockholm: Ministry of Law).

³¹ The Global Village, Fakta för förändring: En rapport om Sveriges 61 utsatta områden, 2023, 18. Available at <https://jarvaveckan.se/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Fakta-for-forandring-%E2%80%93-Sveriges-61-utsatta-omraden.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

³² Nafstad, I., Parsa, A., “Tracing structural racism in Swedish policing: Laws, practices and technologies of criminalized difference, *Punishment & Society*”, vol. 27, no. 2, 338—359. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14624745241284530>.

This approach prioritises individual responsibility for crime over its structural determinants, such as socioeconomic exclusion and residential segregation, the continued neglect of which sustain cycles of marginalisation and violence.

15. In 2022, the formation of a new government under the Tidö Agreement, supported by the Sweden Democrats, marked a significant escalation in punitive criminal policy. The government's declared objectives in the area of criminal policy include a complete restructuring of Swedish criminal law with the aim of significantly expanding carceral policies, including the use of incarceration, alongside harsher penalties, expanded surveillance powers, broader grounds for deporting non-Swedish citizens and other measures which erode fundamental guarantees of due process, the rule of law and human rights protections. Under the Government's criminal policy regime, certain populations—particularly racialised individuals and residents in socio-economically marginalised areas—face an elevated risk of stigmatisation, wrongful suspicion and over-policing. Furthermore, opposition parties have not provided a counter-narrative to the government's framing of crime and criminality, leaving the public debate devoid of proposals that address structural factors. These developments occur concurrently with pre-existing discriminatory structures, which, according to the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (*Brottsförebyggande rådet*), manifest at every stage of the legal process.³³

SPECIAL MEASURES FOR DISADVANTAGED GROUPS

The situation regarding the rights of Muslims

16. In the years since the Committee's last the review, the already fraught situation with regards to the rights of Muslims, which face significant discrimination and stigmatisation in Sweden, has worsened. Research conducted since has revealed the increasingly disproportionate disadvantaging of Swedish Muslims in virtually all

³³ Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Diskriminering i rättsprocessen: Om missgynnande av personer med utländsk bakgrund [Discrimination in the Legal Process: On the Disadvantaging of Persons with a Foreign Background]*, Rapport 2008:4 (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2008). Available at https://bra.se/download/18.3433db6019301deaa6b825d/1731427797556/2008_4_diskriminering_i_rattsprocessen.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025].

sectors of public life—employment,³⁴ housing,³⁵ education,³⁶ social security and social services,³⁷ health care,³⁸ access to justice³⁹, and as targets of discrimination and hate crimes.

³⁴ Strinic, A., Carlsson, M., and Agerström, J., "Multiple-Group Membership: Warmth and Competence Perceptions in the Workplace," *Journal of Business and Psychology* 36 (2021): 902–20. doi.org/10.1007/s10869-020-09713-4.

³⁵ Ahmed, A. and Bandick, R., "A Field Experiment on Ethnic Bias in Public Housing Practices in Sweden," *Housing Studies*, vol. 40, no. 8, 2024, 1–21. doi.org/10.1080/02673037.2024.2374918; Ahmed, A. and Nsabimana, U., "Brick by Brick Bias: Arab Muslim Experience of Intersectionality in Housing," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 50, no. 18, 2024, 4522–44. doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2024.2366319.

³⁶ There exists to date no studies on the general level of educational attainment of Swedish Muslims though see Open Society Foundations, "Education," in *Muslims in the EU: Cities Report*, Belgium: Open Society Foundations, 2007, 19–23. Available at <https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/muslims-eu-cities-background-research-reports> [accessed 20 October 2025].

On other aspects related to schooling and education, see Bursell, M., "Perceptions of discrimination against Muslims. A study of formal complaints against public institutions in Sweden," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, vol. 47, no. 5, 2018, 1162–1179. doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2018.1561250.

³⁷ Eliassi, B., "Conceptions of Immigrant Integration and Racism Among Social Workers in Sweden," *Journal of Progressive Human Services*, vol. 28, no. 1, 2017, 6–35. doi.org/10.1080/10428232.2017.1249242

³⁸ Eriksson, L., Dudas, V., Carlbom, A., Essén, B., "Perceived Religious Discrimination in Healthcare" in Enstedt, D., Dellenborg, L. (ed.), *Culture, Spirituality and Religious Literacy in Healthcare: Nordic Perspectives*, London: Routledge, 2023, 90–107; Nkulu Kalengayi, F. K., Baroudi, M., Hurtig, A. K., "Prevalence of Perceived Discrimination, Determinants and Associations with Self-Rated General and Sexual Health, Healthcare Utilization and Self-Perceived Integration: A Cross-Sectional Survey of Migrants in Sweden", *BMC Public Health*, vol. 24, 2024. doi.org/10.1186/s12889-024-18160-2; Lundström, M., Wendt Höjer, F., *Erfarenheter av rasism i kontakt med svenska myndigheter och andra offentliga verksamheter – en kunskapsöversikt* (Stockholm: Forum för Levande Historia, 2021). Available at https://www.levandehistoria.se/sites/default/files/material_file/erfarenheter_av_rasism_i_konta

17. The negative trends affecting Swedish Muslims are further reflected in official statistics on complaints of discrimination submitted to the Equality Ombudsman, indicating persistent and growing patterns of discrimination. While the Equality Ombudsman received 146 complaints of discrimination on the basis of religion or other belief (*religion eller annan trosuppfattning*) systems in 2017, the number had risen sharply to 489 by 2024, reflecting a significant increase about 235 percent since the last review by the Committee.⁴⁰ As to the contents of the complaints, the Equality Ombudsman's annual report on the state of discrimination in Sweden, shows that discrimination against Muslims occurs in all sectors of public and private life, with the workplace and during school hours being among the most common areas where such discrimination occurs.⁴¹ According to the Equality Ombudsman, it is possible that at

[kt med myndigheter och andra offentliga verksamheter - en kunskapsöversikt.pdf](#) [accessed 20 October 2025].

³⁹ Olseryd, J., Wallin, L., Repo, A., *Islamofobiska hatbrott*, Rapport 2021:3 (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2021). Available at https://bra.se/download/18.5e0f78b192bd39b2322a52/1730099900013/2021_3_Islamofobiska_hatbrott.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025]; Schclarek Mulinari, L., *Randomly Selected: Racial/ethnic profiling in Sweden*, Stockholm: Civil Rights Defenders, 2017. Available at <https://su.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1376877/FULLTEXT01.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Schclarek Mulinari, L., *Race and Order: Critical Perspectives on Crime in Sweden* [PhD diss.], Stockholm University: Department of Criminology, 2020. <https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-178968>; Schclarek Mulinari, L., Keskinen, S., "Racial Profiling in the Racial Welfare State: Examining the Order of Policing in the Nordic Region", *Theoretical Criminology*, vol. 26, no. 3, 2022, 377—395. doi.org/10.1177/1362480620914914; Schclarek Mulinari, L., "The Spectrum of Repression: Swedish Muslims' Experiences of Anti-Terrorism Measures", *Critical Criminology*, vol. 27, 2019, 451—466. doi.org/10.1007/s10612-019-09462-8.

⁴⁰ Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, *Årsredovisning 2024 [Annual Report 2024]* (Stockholm: Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, 2025), . Available at <https://www.do.se/download/18.16a7b06f194b2d81742c4/1740143393367/DO-arsredovisning-2024.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2025]; Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, *Årsredovisning 2018 [Annual Report 2018]* (Stockholm: Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, 2019). Available at <https://www.do.se/download/18.277ff225178022473141e10/1661847704721/arsredovisning-2018.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁴¹ Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, *Förekomst av diskriminering 2023 [The State of Discrimination]* (Stockholm: Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, 2024). Available at <https://www.do.se/download/18.36cbb9ac1886717f72d1ef/1685702676115/rapport-forekomst-av-diskriminering-2023.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

least some of the sharp increase in discrimination against Muslims can be attributed to the rising prevalence of workplace policies prohibiting the wearing of religious symbols or clothing; a restriction that disproportionately affects Muslim women who wear the hijab.⁴²

18. In 2023, the Labour Court of Sweden considered a case concerning the discriminatory effect of such policies after a Muslim woman, represented by Civil Rights Defenders, filed a lawsuit against her former employer arguing that she had been subjected to direct and indirect discrimination on the intersecting grounds of sex and religion.⁴³ The employer, a private security and surveillance company, had ceased to assign the woman work shifts after the latter had started wearing the hijab, citing as reason its “neutrality policy” which barred employees from wearing visible religious symbols. The company argued that such symbols were inherently provocative and could therefore increase the risk of threats or violence against security personnel, maintaining that the policy was intended to ensure compliance with workplace environment legislation. In a judgement delivered in December 2023, the Labour Court sided with the employer, reasoning that despite the plaintiff’s evidence that no research demonstrated that the *hijab* as such posed an increased risk of violence or threats, it was self-evident that religious symbols may be perceived as provocative, and that because of the serious nature of the risks presented, an employer need only to demonstrate that the risk assessment underlying the policy was not completely unfounded, finding therefore the policy both legitimate and necessary. The decision was criticised for ignoring the burden of proof placed on the employer in discrimination cases.⁴⁴

⁴² Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, *Förekomst av diskriminering 2024 [The State of Discrimination]* (Stockholm: Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, 2025). Available at <https://www.do.se/download/18.41f45cb619387118a1815b/1734357601335/rapport-forekomst-av-diskriminering-2024.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁴³ Labour Court. *Judgment of 13 December 2023*, No. 71/23, Case No. B 50/22.

⁴⁴ Arrhenius, L., Ahlstrand-Oxhamre, K., “Flytta över diskrimineringsmål inom arbetslivet till allmän domstol”, *Lag & Avtal*, 19 February 2024. Available at <https://www.do.se/om-do/pressrum/aktuellt/2024/2024-02-19-flytta-over-diskrimineringsmal-inom-arbetslivet-till-allman-domstol> [accessed 20 October 2025]. Svenaesus, L., “AD-domen om slöjförbud – ett rättsligt haveri”, *Lag & Avtal*, 23 January 2024. Available at <https://www.lag-avtal.se/nyheter/lena-svenaesus-ad-domen-om-slojforbud-ett-rattsligt-haveri/4229976> [accessed 20 October 2025].

19. Muslim civil society organisations have also faced negative developments as regards their right to freedom of assembly, association and expression. Though hate crimes and physical attacks can explain part of the shrinking civic space for Muslims in Sweden, much of this development comes from the actions of state institutions.
20. One area especially targeted by institutional hindrances is Muslim organisations' access to public and foreign funding, as indicated by the European Union Fundamental Rights Agency's indicators on the shrinking civic space for organisations working with religious minorities.⁴⁵ One such obstacle to the equal and fair access to public funding is the law introducing a- so-called "democracy requirement" for civil society organisations and faith-based communities (FBCs), which was passed on 18 June 2024 and passed into force on 1 January 2025. According to the law, CSOs or FBCs will be prohibited from receiving public funding if they 'counteract' the democratic system of governance. CSOs or FBCs that are found to have violated any of these conditions might be further liable to pay back previously granted public funding retroactively.
21. The democracy requirement has been met with criticism, with many organisations expressing concern that the law will, in practice, solely or at least disproportionately target ethnic and religious organisations, especially Muslim civil society organisations and religious communities, and that this was the bill's true purpose.⁴⁷ Several of the ethnic and religious organisations consulted during the legislative process reported that they felt particularly singled out by the proposals and felt that the media's

⁴⁵ European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, *Protecting Civic Space in EU* (Luxembourg: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2021). <https://doi.org/10.2811/43436>.

⁴⁷ See, for example, Civil Rights Defenders, "Yttrande över demokrativillkorsutredningens betänkande Demokrativillkor för bidrag till civilsamhället (2019:35)", 2019. Available at <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/b9e50218e1ad4119bc16d18d28d86019/civil-rights-defenders.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2025]; Forum – idéburna organisationer med social inriktning, "Villkorad demokrati", 2019. Available at <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/b9e50218e1ad4119bc16d18d28d86019/forum---ideburna-organisationer-med-social-inriktning.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2025]; Islamic Relief, "Betänkandet (SOU 2019:35) Demokrativillkor för bidrag till civilsamhället", 2019. Available at <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/b9e50218e1ad4119bc16d18d28d86019/islamic-relief.pdf> [accessed 10 October 2025].

disproportionate focus on their activities had led authorities to closely scrutinise their organisations, in comparison with more lax oversight of other types of organisations.⁴⁸

22. Civil society funding has also been negatively affected by the increasingly negative political discourse surrounding racialised minorities. A notable example of the mutually reinforcing relationship between negative media depictions and summary political decision-making concerns the Muslim adult education association Ibn Rushd. In 2023, during a routine review of study materials, the association identified two books used in a small number of study circles that it considered potentially in conflict with the democracy requirement for state funding. Although there was no evidence that the books had been used in practice, Ibn Rushd proactively informed the Council of Popular Education (*Folkbildningsrådet*) and offered to repay the corresponding funding, representing approximately 0.04 percent of its total operations. Nevertheless, media reports framed the case as teaching children anti-Semitic content and corporal punishment, despite both Ibn Rushd and the Council denying these claims, resulting in the Ministry of Education, Mats Person, to publicly urge municipalities and regions to cut funding to the association, arguing that it was anti-Semitic, Islamist and against homosexuality.⁴⁹ Following Person's statements several municipalities and regions withheld further funding to member organisation of Ibn Rushd, culminating in the association's financial status plummeting,⁵⁰ to the point that the Council for Popular Education decided it lacked the organisational capacity required to receive further

⁴⁸ Ministry of Culture, *Demokrativillkor för bidrag till civilsamhället*, SOU 2019:35 (Stockholm: Government Offices of Sweden, 2019), 299. Available at <https://www.regeringen.se/contentassets/5670e1f1fc5c4ad0a228da27f03cef73/demokrativillkor-for-bidrag-till-civilsamhallet-sou-201935/>. [accessed 10 October 2025].

⁴⁹ TT, "Flera nobbar Ibn Rushd – kallas till minister", 12 December 2023. Available at <https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/bg0A2k/flera-nobbar-ibn-rushd-kallas-till-minister> [accessed 20 October 2025]. Klenell, J., "Utbildningsministern fick Tidö-feeling – vilda fantasier om Ibn Rushd och muslimer", *Arbetet*, 5 September 2024. Available at <https://arbetet.se/2024/09/05/utbildningsministern-fick-tido-feeling-havde-ur-sig-vilda-fantasier-om-ibn-rushd-och-muslimer> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁵⁰ Including the regions of Kalmar, Gävleborg, Kronoberg, and Skåne, and the municipalities of Malmö, Växjö, Oskarshamn, Helsingborg.

public funding in accordance with the state ordinance on grants for adult education.⁵¹ Because of the Council's decision, Ibn Rushd ceased operations in 2024.⁵²

23. Further, in 2023 the Swedish government reallocated all funding previously provided to organisations formed on an ethnic basis, so-called “ethnic organisations” (*etniska organisationer*).⁵³ Since the 1990s, such organisations had been eligible for targeted state funding, receiving a total of SEK 18.9 million since 2008. The government described the measure as a “phase-out of state subsidies”, justifying it on the grounds that “public funds set aside for integration measures must be used more efficiently and have clearer integration objectives” and that “besides the special conditions that apply to the five national minorities⁵⁴, the government sees no reason why funds should be allocated to organisations based on their members’ ethnicity. The then-Minister for Employment and Integration, Johan Pehrson, further explained that ethnic organisations contribute to segregation.⁵⁵ As a result of the measure, all 41 operating ethnic organisations in Sweden were left without state funding, effectively rendering them unable to operate and placed them at risk of imminent dissolution.

The situation regarding the rights of the Sami people

24. Over the past decade, Sweden has faced sustained criticism from international bodies for failing to fully safeguard the rights of the Indigenous Sámi people, particularly with respect to their political, cultural, and economic rights. While the Government has introduced several initiatives to improve the Sámi situation, these efforts have often lacked sufficient resources, resulting in minimal tangible improvements in the

⁵¹ Folkbildningsrådet, *Beslut om bidragsandel 2025—2027* (Dnr. 24/00046; 24/00015 (delvis)), 4 September 2024.

⁵² Ibn Rushd, *Pressmeddelande: Ibn Rushd studieförbund avvecklar studieförbundsverksamheten*, October 2, 2024..

⁵³ Ministry of Finance, Government presents Budget Bill for 2024 (Stockholm: Government Offices, 20 September 2023). Available at <https://www.government.se/press-releases/2023/09/government-presents-budget-bill-for-2024> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁵⁴ The five national minorities in Sweden are Jews, Roma, Sámi, Swedish Finns and Tornedalian.

⁵⁵ Pehrson, J., “Nu slopar vi statsbidraget till etniska organisationer”, *Dagens Nyheter*, 6 September 2023. Available at <https://www.dn.se/debatt/nu-slopar-vi-statsbidraget-till-etniska-organisationer/> [accessed 10 October 2025].

everyday lives of Sámi communities. Consequently, the human rights situation of the Sámi remains inconsistent with Sweden's obligations under international law.

25. A key factor in the persistent vulnerability of Sámi is the frequent contestation of Sámi land and reindeer herding rights, often under the guise of large-scale environmental or "green transition" projects. In several instances, the Swedish Government has framed the protection of Sámi lands as being in conflict with climate action, a language which exacerbates hate and discrimination against the Sámi people. In 2021, the Government created a Reindeer Land Committee and tasked it with proposing a new legal framework for reindeer herding, aimed at producing long-term sustainable solutions with the support of Sámi people. The Committee's work was met with extensive criticism however, leading the Government to dismantle in November 2024; a decision which severely undermines efforts to secure Sámi land rights.⁵⁶
26. With regards to Sámi land rights, though the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the Girjas Sámi community, affirming its exclusive right to control hunting and fishing within its traditional reindeer herding lands, the ruling has not had its intended practical effect.⁵⁷ Sámi communities seeking similar recognition as the plaintiff in the Girjas case instead report encountering repeated delays and additional requirements, prompting five Sámi communities to initiate legal action against the state. Meanwhile, contradictions between forestry legislation and Sámi property rights persist, perpetuating an ongoing economic and psychological burden on Sámi communities.
27. Sámi people are also disadvantaged with regards to their right to learn their indigenous language. Declining enrolment in Sámi-language education, combined with high barriers for teacher qualifications, has severely limited opportunities for Sámi language learning. While the Government has taken some steps, such as the 2022-2024 Action Programme for Minority Languages and School Funding Support, these initiatives are undermined by parallel measures that restrict teacher qualification, resulting in demand for Sámi-language instruction exceeding its supply.

⁵⁶ Ministry of Rural Affairs and Infrastructure, Regeringen avser avveckla Renmarkskommittén och tillsätta en ny utredning (Stockholm: Government Offices, 7 November 2024). Available at <https://www.regeringen.se/pressmeddelanden/2024/11/regeringen-avser-avveckla-renmarkskommitten-och-tillsatta-en-ny-utredning> [accessed 10 October 2025].

⁵⁷ Supreme Court of Sweden, Judgment delivered on the 23rd of January 2020, Case no. T 853-18.

DISCRIMINATION ON THE GROUNDS OF ETHNICITY AND/OR RELIGION

Ethnic and racial profiling

28. Since the Committee's last review of Sweden, the Swedish government has not taken any active measures to counter-act cases of racial profiling. Instead, the police have gotten greater powers to conduct stops and searches and surveil individuals while the accountability gap remains.
29. A 2023 report by [the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention] examined the accuracy of police suspicions when conducting searches for illegal narcotics. The findings revealed that police suspicions were least accurate when the suspect's mother was born in an African or Southwest Asian country and most accurate when the suspect's mother was born in a Nordic country. The report concluded that there are systematic differences in the proportion of the non-accurate suspicion of drug possession reports based on the suspect's ethnic background and that ethnic profiling could not be ruled out as a factor in these disparities.⁵ In the report, [the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention] states that the police lack guidance to prevent discriminatory profiling and that the accuracy of checks based on suspicion of drug offenses is lowest when police officers have initiated the suspicion, compared to guards or prison guards. The reality of being exposed to disproportionate controls on discriminatory grounds forces individuals to navigate through cities in a different way, sometimes even avoiding certain areas, in order not to attract the attention of the Police.⁶ A proportion of the population thus experiences, to a certain extent, a limitation of their freedom of movement.
30. In April 2024 new legislation was implemented, authorizing the establishment of stop-and-search zones, where police can search individuals and vehicles without any suspicion of a crime. The police can decide to establish one if, due to a conflict between groups, there is a significant risk of criminal activity involving shooting or explosions in the area. The condition for such a decision is also that "the zone is of particular importance for preventing or hindering this criminal activity". Children under the age of 15 are also subject to these searches. This legislation significantly increases the risk of arbitrary stops and searches. Given the lack of clear guidelines for law enforcement on conducting non-discriminatory searches, this legislation poses a substantial risk of exacerbating discriminatory policing.
31. The introduction of stop-and-search zones is particularly alarming considering the challenges victims of discriminatory profiling face in seeking legal redress. According to current jurisprudence, discriminatory profiling is not classified as a severe enough

offense to amount to police misconduct charges. As a result, reports of discriminatory profiling are routinely dismissed without thorough investigation. Meanwhile, the Discrimination Act does not explicitly prohibit discriminatory measures by the police. A government inquiry in late 2021, under the previous administration, proposed an amendment to the Discrimination Act to include such a prohibition and thereby closing a massive accountability gap. However, the new government, which came into power in autumn 2022 with support from the Sweden Democrats, has yet to act on this proposal. Given the Sweden Democrats' hostile stance toward the Discrimination Act in general, there are legitimate concerns that the government will not adopt the amendment and bring it before Parliament. Civil Rights Defenders and other stakeholders have repeatedly raised the urgency of adopting this proposal in meetings with government officials, yet no conclusive answers have been given regarding its future. Now that stop-and-search zone legislation has been in effect since April 2024, the need to implement this amendment is more pressing than ever, ensuring access to justice for those subjected to discriminatory law enforcement practices and aligning Sweden with its obligations under Article 2 of CERD.

32. Changes in Swedish migration policies have also resulted in an increased risk of racial profiling. In recent years, the police have been given expanded powers to carry out internal immigration controls ("inre gränskontroller" and "inre utlänningskontroller"), i.e., various types of identity controls conducted in non-border areas with the purpose of identifying undocumented migrants. Historically, these kinds of checks have been shown to disproportionately target individuals based on their racial or ethnic appearance rather than objective criteria.⁵⁸ Swedish police have justified this approach as natural given the purpose of the checks. Despite the well-documented risk of racial discrimination and profiling, no sufficient safeguards have been implemented to mitigate these concerns or to ensure effective accountability measures.

⁵⁸ See Hydén, S. & Lundberg, A., *Inre utlänningskontroll i polisarbetet – mellan rättsstatsideal och effektivitet i Schengens Sverige* [PhD diss.], Malmö: Malmö University Press, 2004; Schclarek Mulinari, 2017; Schclarek Mulinari, 2020.

DISCRIMINATION THROUGH LEGAL MEASURES

Preventative bans

33. A particularly concerning example of Sweden's turn towards an increasingly repressive criminal system, is a law that entered into force on 1 February 2024, which authorizes the Police Authority to impose preventive exclusion orders (or "stay-away bans") on individuals aged 15 and older from certain public areas, including their own neighbourhoods and residential zones, if the Authority determine that there exists a risk of gang-related activity involving firearms, explosives, or other serious criminal conduct that may threaten public safety. Since the measure is preventative in nature, it does not require that the person subjected to it be suspected or accused of any crime. Individuals deemed to be associated with criminal gangs or considered to be promoting criminal activity may be subjected to such bans for up to six months, with the possibility of electronic monitoring. Breaching the ban may result in imprisonment for up to one year.
34. Several civil society organisations, as well as public bodies, including the Equality Ombudsman, have raised serious concerns regarding the stay-away law, stressing its infringement upon the rights to freedom of movement and to private and family life beyond what can be considered necessary or proportionate.

Surveillance and the use of artificial intelligence

35. In recent years, a great amount of new legislation has been enacted regarding the use of secret and preventative secret surveillance measures, such as interception and surveillance of electronic communications, secret camera surveillance, bugging and secret data surveillance. Secret data surveillance is a new measure which was introduced through temporary legislation in 2020 and was recently suggested to be made permanent.
36. In 2024, the Swedish government proposed legislation significantly expanding law enforcement's capacity to conduct camera surveillance and lower the safeguards for such use for many other authorities by removing the permit requirement. The proposal also seeks to authorize real-time remote facial identification, based on AI, in public spaces for law enforcement purposes. If adopted, this measure would allow AI-powered facial recognition to be used to identify criminal suspects when using camera surveillance and search for missing persons.
37. While proponents argue that AI-enhanced surveillance enhances security, international experience demonstrates that such technology poses severe risks of

discrimination, wrongful detentions, and privacy violations. Studies from countries where facial recognition has been deployed reveal significant inaccuracies, particularly in identifying individuals from racialized groups. British researchers found that AI-driven facial recognition misidentified individuals in 81% of cases, leading to unjustified police interventions. Similar findings have prompted some jurisdictions to ban the use of AI for public surveillance due to its disproportionate impact on marginalized communities.

38. In Sweden, the risk of biased AI enforcement is especially concerning given the documented racial discrimination in policing practices. The introduction of AI-driven surveillance, without robust safeguards and accountability mechanisms, threatens to exacerbate existing discriminatory practices. The lack of transparency in AI decision-making processes further limits public oversight and legal recourse for those wrongly targeted.

The increased use of coercive measures against children

39. The government's approach to youth crime prioritizes a series of parallel, repressive legislative measures without first evaluating their effectiveness. This punitive shift sidelines the role of social services in favour of criminal law solutions, fundamentally altering how society responds to children at risk of criminal involvement.
40. In May 2024, a report was presented that proposes a system of so-called youth crime committees. The committee would be able to decide on crime prevention measures for children who are at risk of committing crimes. According to the proposal, such a committee should consist of a judge and two members from the Police Authority and two from the municipality. According to the report's proposal, the police would be able to refer children under the age of 18, with no lower age limit, to the committee if there is a risk that the child "will commit a serious crime". However, there is no requirement that the child should have been convicted of or even suspected of a crime. According to the investigation, the risk of the child committing a "serious crime" in the future should be assessed based on an overall assessment of the child's behaviour, living conditions, possible criminal behaviour and other circumstances. The vague definition of "serious crime" and the unclear assessment criteria mean that it is very difficult to predict whether, when and how the legislation may be applied. There is also a risk of stigmatization by children who are already living in vulnerable situations being singled out as potential perpetrators.
41. Another proposal under consideration is the introduction of curfews for minors, enforced through electronic monitoring. This measure is intended to prevent or deter

young individuals from engaging in criminal activity based on their association with environments where crime occurs.

42. However, the criteria for imposing such restrictions are deeply problematic, as they rely on vague assumptions about a child's surroundings rather than an assessment of its individual behaviour. The requirement that the child is in a context where criminal acts are committed and that there is thus a risk that the young person may become involved is problematic because value should be given to the circumstance that the child "resides in such an environment that there is a risk that he or she will engage in criminality". In practice, this could lead to children from socio-economically disadvantaged areas being subjected to surveillance and control simply because of their place of residence or social network, effectively criminalizing them based on their social and economic circumstances. There is also a real risk that children committing their first offence are treated differently in the assessment of electronic monitoring based on their family background and the assumption that these will ensure that the child complies with the specific regulation. The proposal also grants police the authority to return children violating curfews to their homes, a power previously reserved for interventions in extraordinary circumstances, such as when placing children into state care under the Swedish Care of Young Persons (Special Provisions) Act. Extending this authority to routine law enforcement blurs the line between child protection and policing, placing vulnerable children at greater risk of coercion rather than support. It also raises concerns about data collection and profiling. Although officers are not permitted to use force to check a child's identity, the investigation assumes that police will often have "prior knowledge" of the child in question. This approach risks institutionalizing surveillance practices that disproportionately target children from racialized and marginalized communities, reinforcing discriminatory law enforcement patterns already documented in Sweden.
43. The shift toward punitive control measures instead of supportive interventions contradicts well-established principles of child welfare and rights. Moreover, it risks further stigmatization of racialized children living in areas with a low socioeconomic status and thereby deepening institutional racism. Instead of further embedding coercive strategies into policy, the government should prioritize implementing the new Social Services Act, set to take effect in July 2025. This legislation emphasizes trust-building between individuals and government agencies, a crucial component in effective crime prevention. Until this approach is fully evaluated, the introduction of additional repressive policies should be halted to prevent further harm to children and communities.

RECOMMENDATIONS UNDER ARTICLE 2

Suggested recommendations regarding the political discourse

44. The Swedish government should reaffirm its commitment to combat hate speech and antagonizing rhetoric that targets ethnic, racial and religious minorities in political and media discourse, and when necessary, investigate and apply appropriate sanctions for such speech.
45. The Swedish Government should adopt and require by statute or binding parliamentary resolution a code for ministers, members of parliament and senior public officials which prohibits rhetoric that targets groups on the basis of ethnicity, race, religion or national origin or otherwise intensifies stigmatization and discrimination, and establish a system for sanctioning violations

Suggested recommendations regarding racial and ethnic profiling

46. The Swedish Government should give Swedish Police Authority a mandate and necessary funding to prevent discriminatory ethnic and racial profiling by developing guidelines and trainings for their staff on how to conduct non-discriminatory stop and searches, and by following up and evaluating possible ethnic profiling in their work.
47. The Swedish Government should introduce a prohibition against discriminatory measures by the police in the Discrimination Act.
48. The Swedish Government should ensure that immigration policies, such as the use of internal immigration controls, do not have the effect of discriminating against persons on the basis of race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.

Suggested recommendations regarding surveillance and the use of artificial intelligence

49. The Swedish government should conduct an independent assessment of AI surveillance technologies before expanding their use in law enforcement to evaluate risks of discrimination and wrongful identification.
50. The Swedish government should establish clear regulatory frameworks and independent oversight bodies to monitor AI implementation, ensuring transparency and accountability.

**Suggested recommendations regarding the increased use of coercive measures
against children**

51. The Swedish government should refrain from addressing youth criminality through repressive legal measures that disproportionately target children from socio-economically vulnerable areas and racialized children.
52. The Swedish government should prioritize implementing and evaluating the Social Services Act before introducing new punitive laws, ensuring a focus on preventive and supportive interventions.

ARTICLE 4

HATE CRIMES

General developments with regards to physical hate crimes

53. The prevalence of hate crimes targeting racial, ethnic and religious groups in Sweden has remained persistently high throughout the entire review period, remaining a significant challenge for Swedish law and policy to effectively address. Of all hate crimes committed in Sweden, xenophobic and racist hate crimes constitute the most common category, accounting for at least 50 percent of all reported hate crimes during each year of the review period.⁵⁹ Hate crimes directed against religious groups formed the second largest category, representing approximately 16 percent annually.⁶⁰

54. Because Brå, the authority tasked with maintaining national statistics on the occurrence and nature of hate crimes, changed its methods for data collection in 2020, it is hard to draw any conclusions as to how the frequency of hate crimes has developed during the review period.⁶¹ Among other changes, relative comparisons are obstructed since Brå before 2020 did not analyse the total population of hate

⁵⁹ Cf. Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Hatbrott 2018*, Rapport 2019:13, Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2019. Available at <https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2019-10-31-hatbrott-2018> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Hatbrott 2019*, Rapport 2020:13, Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2020. Available at <https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2020-10-28-hatbrott-2019> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Polisanmälda hatbrott 2020*, Rapport 2021:17, Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2021, <https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2021-12-08-polisanmalda-hatbrott-2020> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Polisanmälda hatbrott 2021*, Rapport 2022:17, Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2022, <https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2022-12-07-polisanmalda-hatbrott-2021> [accessed 20 October 2025]; Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Polisanmälda hatbrott 2022*, Rapport 2023:16, Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2023, <https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2023-12-07-polisanmalda-hatbrott-2022> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Polisanmälda hatbrott 2020*, Rapport 2021:17 (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2021). Available at <https://bra.se/rapporter/arkiv/2021-12-08-polisanmalda-hatbrott-2020-teknisk-rapport> [accessed 20 October 2025].

crimes reported to the police, instead drawing from a simple random sample of 50 percent of reported crimes annually and then extrapolated to a population level.

55. Despite the change of method, there exists indications to believe that the problem with hate crimes has risen, at least with regards to certain population groups. Civil Rights Defenders repeatedly receives accounts from racial, religious and ethnic organisations regarding experiences of increasing vulnerability, not least due to a harshened political climate in which racism has become normalised and institutionalised. These reports are corroborated by some in-depth studies published by Brå during the review period: on hate crimes against Muslims, Afro-Swedes, Sámi and Jewish people.

Hate crimes against Afro-Swedes

56. In 2022, Brå published an in-depth study of reported hate crimes with anti-Black motives.⁶² The results show, among other things, that anti-Black hate crimes primarily take a physical form, unlike other forms of hate crimes. Just over one-fifth of the cases reviewed in the study were classified as violent crimes, including such crimes as assault, murder, manslaughter and violence against public officials. Another fifth of violent crimes were so severe that the victims sustained injuries requiring medical attention. Crimes committed in public spaces were particularly violent.
57. Regarding the location of anti-Black hate crimes in Sweden, the study showed a wide variation in where the crimes occur, concluding that Afro-Swedes are at risk of victimisation in practically all situations. The majority (31 percent) of anti-Black hate crimes, however, occur in public spaces accessible to large numbers of people, such as streets, squares and in public transport. In these cases, the perpetrator is often unknown to the victims. A significant portion of anti-Black hate crimes further occur where the victims are regularly present, such as in schools, workplaces, asylum accommodations, or other service or public institutions.
58. A particularly important finding from Brå's in-depth study on anti-Black hate crimes is that such crimes have a close proximity to the political discourse and the broader societal context in Sweden. According to the study, the perpetrator expressed

⁶² Brottsförebyggande rådet, Afrofobiska hatbrott, Rapport 2022:7, 2022. Available at https://bra.se/download/18.366598ab19270941a1c18a2/1728991244993/2022_11_Afrofobiska-hatbrott.pdf [accessed on 20 October 2025].

“political dissatisfaction or societal criticism” in one tenth of the cases, including questioning why taxpayer’s money is used to support Afro-Swedes, references to “keeping Sweden Swedish” and while mentioning “a political party”. Though Brå does not specify which party is being mentioned in cases concerning hate crimes against Afro-Swedes, the references to “keeping Sweden Swedish” and to other radical nationalist organisations such as the Nordic Resistance Movement, ... Finally, the study discusses the consequences of hate crimes, finding that repeated exposure to various forms of anti-Black racism leads to long-term effects such as depression, sick leave and a sense of despair. Since anti-Black hate crimes can occur in virtually all contexts and environments, statistically, Afro-Swedes report living in a constant state of vigilance, exhausting them and furthering other medical complications.

Hate crimes against Muslims

59. In 2021, Brå published an in-depth study of Islamophobic hate crimes. The study found that Islamophobic hate crimes takes several forms, and are not limited to any particular places, times or perpetrators.⁶³ The study also found that there was a significant variation in the demographic variables of the victims of Islamophobic hate crimes, for example their sex, age or socio-economic status. Though the findings suggest that all types of Muslims are at risk of being targeted, visibility is an especially indicative factor for the onset of victimisation. Muslim women wearing the hijab or similar facial coverings as well as Muslim persons engaging in public debate are particularly prone to hate crimes. The study also indicates that non-Muslims are subject to Islamophobic hate crimes when they are perceived to be associated with Muslims or persons assumed to be Muslim or otherwise have Muslim-related characteristics. Such groups of non-Muslim subjects of Islamophobic hate crimes include religious representatives from other denominations as well as journalists, researchers or politicians who engage with questions regarding Islamophobia or the living conditions and rights of Muslims in Sweden.

60. The study further shows that seven percent of all Islamophobic hate crimes are committed against places of worship, for example a mosque. According to a census survey of all Muslim religious communities in Sweden, published by the Centre for

⁶³ Brottsförebyggande rådet, Islamofobiska hatbrott., Rapport 2021:3, 2021. Available at https://bra.se/download/18.1f8c9903175f8b2aa70762d/1622553459528/2021_3_Islamofobiska_hatbrott.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025].

Multidisciplinary Studies on Racism in Uppsala university, 67 percent of all Muslim religious communities reported that they had been attacked at least once since their foundation, with another 47 percent reporting that they had been attacked during the year of the study.⁶⁴ More than one fourth of mosques and roughly 15 percent of all other Muslim religious communities reported that they had been targeted by at least ten physical attacks during 2017 alone. Of the respondents, 90 percent perceived that there existed a current threat against their existence and safety.

Hate crimes against Sámi

61. Hate crimes targeting the Sámi people in Sweden remain a persistent and underacknowledged form of racialized violence, rooted in historical discrimination and ongoing structural inequality. In 2024, Brå published an in-depth study of racism against Sámi, which highlights that hate crimes against Sámi communities often arise from conflicts with the Swedish state and private sector over land use, reindeer herding rights and resource extraction.⁶⁵ The study also found that hate crimes against the Sámi people increase when Sámi rights are recognized or receive public attention as well as in connection with legal proceedings concerning Sámi rights.

Hate crimes against Jewish people

62. An in-depth study of hate crimes reported with anti-Semitic motives was published by Brå in 2025.⁶⁶ Distinctive features of anti-Semitic hate crimes, the study shows, include that their perpetrators are not segmented within one group of people but

⁶⁴ Gardell, M., *Moskéers och muslimska föreningars utsatthet och säkerhet i Sverige*, Uppsala universitet: Centrum för mångvetenskaplig forskning mot rasism, 2018. Available at <https://fifs.se/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Mosk%C3%A9ers-och-muslimska-f%C3%B6rsamlingars-utsatthet-och-s%C3%A4kerhet-i-Sverige-2018.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁶⁵ Wallin, L., Huuva, L., *Hatbrott mot samer*, Rapport 2024:5 (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet, 2024). Available at https://bra.se/download/18.403f39de192bd4311313040/1730122319145/2024_5_Hatbrott-mot-samer.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025].

⁶⁶ Brottsförebyggande rådet, *Antisemitiska hatbrott: Samtida erfarenheter från judiska församlingar och organisationer*, Rapport 2025:9 (Stockholm: Brottsförebyggande rådet). Available at https://bra.se/download/18.78730b7719712a9211d1a138/1748937561978/2025_9_Antisemitiska%20hatbrott.pdf [accessed 20 October 2025].

rather occurs across the entire population, cutting through different religions, secular groups, political positions and ideologies. Particularly, according to the study, anti-Semitism forms part of the ideological foundation of both radical nationalist and violent jihadist environment. The fact that antisemitism occurs in so many different contexts means that there are few places where people of Jewish background can move about without feeling fear or concern about being targeted. Victimisation especially affects Jewish individuals who display their Jewish identity, for example by wearing Jewish religious symbols such as a David star or a *kippah*. As a result, Jewish people in Sweden increasingly express fear of displaying their Jewish identity in public settings, some opting instead to unwillingly conceal it.

63. Following the attacks perpetrated by Hamas against Israel on the 7th of October 2023, the Swedish government commissioned Brå to research Jewish people's exposure to anti-Semitism in Sweden since the attacks took place. In their report, Brå found that between the 7 October and 31 December 2023, the Police Authority in Sweden received 1 283 hate crime reports of which Brå identified an anti-Semitic motive in 110 of them. This is a significant increase compared to the same period in 2022, when 24 reports with anti-Semitic motives were identified, corresponding to a 358 percent increase. Of the 110 cases of hate crimes identified, Brå counted that 22 percent had some sort of connection to Israel and Palestine. This includes, among other things, placards or statements in connections with demonstrations related to the human rights situation in Gaza with anti-Semitic content, as well as glorification of the attacks on 7 October or targeting Jewish individuals as being complicit in Israeli actions in Gaza based on their Jewish identity. Several other reports conducted in Sweden in the wake of the attacks corroborate that the Jewish population in Sweden as a whole experience a sharply increased sense of fear for their safety.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ See Judiska centralrådet, *Antisemitism i Sverige: I svallvågorna av sjunde oktober*, Stockholm: Judiska centralrådet, 2023. Available at <https://www.judiskacentralradet.se/single-post/svenska-judars-upplevelse-av-antisemitism-efter-7-oktober> [accessed on 20 October 2025]; Judiska ungdomsförbundet, *Vi är inte välkomna här: Judiska studenter och anställdas upplevelser av otrygghet och antisemitism på svenska universitet och högskolor efter den 7 oktober 2023*, Stockholm: Judiska ungdomsförbundet, 2024. Available at <https://www.jusungdom.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/09/Vi-ar-inte-valkomna-har-JUS-rapport-2025.pdf> [accessed on 20 October 2025]; Mattson et al., *Antisemitism i Sverige efter den 7 oktober: Upplevelser och konsekvenser*, Göteborgs universitet: Segerstedts institutet, 2024. Available at <https://www.gu.se/sites/default/files/2024-09/Antisemitism-i-Sverige-efter-7-oktober.pdf> [accessed 20 October 2025].

64. Despite the growing sense of insecurity among Sweden's Jewish population, only a small number of the reported incidents have resulted in criminal investigations or legal action.

Application of hate speech legislation

65. Though Swedish hate speech legislation, through the provision on incitement against a population group pursuant to Chapter 16, Section 8 of the Swedish Criminal Code, could serve as an effective mechanism for combating hate speech, the Swedish Police Authority and Prosecution apply an unduly restrictive interpretation of its scope, reserving its application for only the most explicit and extreme manifestations of hate. Consequently, many cases where it can be assumed that a court would find that hate speech has been disseminated, never receive judicial oversight. In particular, Swedish authorities show considerable unwillingness to address expressions of hate conveyed indirectly or through non-verbal means, such as symbols, for example. Moreover, authorities tend to operate under the assumption that only the immediate wording of a message is relevant for legal assessment, without taking into consideration how contextual factors may modify the intended meaning of an expression.
66. This issue became especially salient in light of the sustained Qur'an burnings campaigns that carried out in Sweden from spring 2022 until 2023. Though Qur'an burnings were carried out by far-right agitators in front of mosques and in neighbourhoods with a high concentration of Afro-Swedish, Muslim and other non-white residents with the explicit purpose of provoking people of a "non-Swedish background", and in connection with Muslim holidays such as *Eid* och *Ramadan*, Swedish Police failed to investigate the majority of cases with the motivation that the burning of the Qur'an merely constitutes criticism of a religion.⁶⁸
67. The Police Authority's failure to investigate the Qur'an burning cases is consistent with research on Swedish law enforcement's ability to address cases of presumed hate crimes. According to a study published in 2017 by Umeå University, in which actors within the legal system were asked to answer questions regarding their work against hate crime, several of the interviewed prosecutors expressed difficulties when

⁶⁸ See Civil Rights Defenders, Statement on Rasmus Paludan's latest Qur'an burning in Sweden, 1 February 2023. Available at <https://crd.org/2023/02/01/statement-on-rasmus-paludans-latest-quran-burning-in-sweden> [accessed 10 October 2025].

gathering evidence to prove agitation against a population group explicitly in cases where the messaging is relayed through the use of symbols.⁶⁹ The respondent prosecutors expressed frustration over the inherently ambiguous and context-dependent nature of symbols and their meanings, combined with a high burden of proof imposed on the prosecutor to demonstrate the relevance and meaning of such symbols in criminal proceedings. Beyond Qur'an burnings, which require knowledge of the historical and political significance of book burnings as a form of expression associated with violence against repressed minorities, other symbolic acts that may constitute manifestations of racism similarly evade judicial scrutiny. These include, for example, the killing of reindeer targeting Sámi communities, acts of sexual violence against women and LGBTQI+ individuals, and anti-Semitic statements disguised as power-critical, anti-Capitalist, or anti-Zionist commentary. Prosecuting such acts as hate crimes requires a nuanced and intimate understanding of specific forms of racism and their particular characteristics, a capacity that the Swedish Police and Prosecution lack and appear reluctant to obtain, resulting in sub-standard protections against real manifestations of hate crimes.

RECOMMENDATIONS

68. The Swedish Government should ensure that the provision on incitement against a population group is applied to all forms of hate speech, including indirect, symbolic, and non-verbal acts.
69. The Swedish Government should urge authorities, by clarifying the text of the statute on incitement against a population group, to explicitly consider context, symbolism and historical-political associations when assessing the relevance of potential cases of hate speech.
70. The Swedish Government should ensure that police and prosecutors have the necessary capacity on the diversity of manifestations of racism, including structural and symbolic forms, as well as intersectional discrimination affecting racialised, religious and ethnic minority communities.

⁶⁹ Granström, G., Åström, K., "Lifecycle of a Hate Crime: Country Report for Sweden", Umeå: Umeå university, 2017. Available at <https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-151428> [accessed 20 October 2025].

ARTICLE 5

ENJOYMENT OF ECONOMIC, CULTURAL AND SOCIAL RIGHTS

Enjoyment of economic, cultural and social rights for asylum seekers, migrants and non-citizens

71. In recent years, the Government has introduced several proposals that could hinder non-citizens and migrants from fully enjoying their economic, social and cultural rights. One of the most concerning proposals is the introduction of a mandatory reporting obligation (also known as the "snitch law"), according to which employees at certain state agencies would be required to report to the police if they suspect a person they encounter is residing in Sweden without legal permission.⁷⁰ While the current proposal exempts healthcare and education agencies, the fear of exposure and deportation may still deter undocumented individuals from seeking any public services, effectively undermining their access to fundamental rights.
72. In February 2025, an inquiry was launched to examine the feasibility of imposing fees for publicly funded interpreters.⁷¹ Such a measure could severely impact the ability of non-Swedish speakers to access essential services and could disproportionately affect those in vulnerable situations.
73. The proposed stricter requirements for permanent residency and citizenship could also create obstacles for non-citizens to effectively exercise their rights.

Access to citizenship

74. The Swedish Government has expressed a clear ambition to impose significant restrictions on access to residence permits and citizenship.⁷² Recent policy proposals include heightened requirements for granting permanent residence permits (e.g., passing a test in Swedish language and civics) as well as expanded grounds for

⁷⁰ See Vissa åtgärder för stärkt återvändandeverksamhet och utlänningskontroll (SOU 2024:80).

⁷¹ En översyn av vissa tolkfrågor (Dir. 2025:16).

⁷² See, e.g., [About the Government's prioritisation: Migration and integration - Government.se](#)

denying and revoking both temporary and permanent residence permits (e.g., due to "deficiencies in conduct" or statements that "threaten fundamental Swedish democratic values").⁷³ When it comes to citizenship, recent proposals include an extension of the residency requirement from 5 to 8 years, introduction of an income requirement, and stricter requirements for "orderly and honourable conduct".⁷⁴ Expanded grounds for revoking citizenship have also been proposed.⁷⁵ These proposals not only raise concerns about arbitrary decision-making and discriminatory application but also risk deepening social exclusion by making it harder for long-term residents to obtain full membership in society.

Begging bans

75. Since the latest review, a number of Swedish municipalities have introduced local ordinances effectively banning begging in public spaces, a development upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court in 2019.⁷⁶ Though ostensibly neutral in wording, these bans have in practice been directed at Roma EU Citizens, reinforcing negative stereotypes and deepening their exclusion from public life. Rather than addressing the underlying structural causes of poverty, homelessness and discrimination, such measures sanction destitution and stigmatise Roma people further. Moreover, the discourse surrounding these bans have often been marked by racialised undertones, with political and media narratives depicting Roma migrants as threats to public order, hygiene or security.

⁷³ See Kunskapskrav för permanent uppehållstillstånd (SOU 2023:25) and Skärpta och tydligare krav på vandel för uppehållstillstånd (SOU 2025:33).

⁷⁴ See Skärpta krav för svenskt medborgarskap (SOU 2025:1).

⁷⁵ See Några frågor om grundläggande fri- och rättigheter (SOU 2025:2) and Återkallelse av medborgarskap i vissa fall (Dir. 2025:51).

⁷⁶ Supreme Administrative Court, Judgment of 20 December 2018 in Case *no. HFD 2018 ref. 75*.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Suggested recommendations regarding non-citizens

76. The Swedish Government should remove obstacles preventing non-citizens from fully enjoying their economic, social, and cultural rights, particularly in the areas of education, housing, employment, and healthcare.
77. The Swedish Government should refrain from imposing financial barriers on essential services such as interpretation, ensuring that language access is not dependent on an individual's economic capacity.
78. The Swedish Government should reject mandatory reporting obligations for state employees, as such policies deter non-citizens from accessing essential services, foster a climate of fear and exclusion, and erode public trust in state institutions.
79. The Swedish Government should ensure equal access to healthcare by repealing any legal or policy measures that disproportionately limit access for non-citizens, including undocumented migrants, to preventive and primary care beyond emergency treatment.
80. The Swedish Government should ensure that particular groups of non-citizens are not discriminated against with regard to access to citizenship or naturalization.

The Swedish Government should recognize that denying citizenship to long-term or permanent residents can restrict access to employment and social benefits, in violation of anti-discrimination principles.

Suggested recommendations regarding begging bans

81. The Swedish Government should repeal municipal begging bans, assess their discriminatory effects and adopt national legislation that prohibits such ordinances.