EASTERN AND WESTERN GHOUTA SARIN ATTACK

INTRODUCTION

1. Chemical weapons attacks were conducted in the early hours of 21 August 2013 on Eastern and Western Ghouta in the Syrian Arab Republic (‘Syria’).

2. The attacks on Ghouta, with the nerve agent sarin, are the deadliest chemical attacks in the Syrian conflict.

3. Evidence collected in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, and over the last seven years, demonstrates that the Syrian government carried out the attacks.

4. This document summarizes portions of an evidentiary brief supporting a criminal complaint filed by the Open Society Justice Initiative, Syrian Center for Media and Freedom of Expression, Syrian Archive and Civil Rights Defenders on behalf of victims of the chemical attacks on Ghouta.

- First, this document details the use of chemical weapons on Eastern and Western Ghouta on 21 August 2013.

- Second, it analyzes evidence supporting attribution of responsibility to the Syrian government, and identifies specific persons alleged to have had a role in the chemical attacks.

- Third, it places the chemical attacks on Ghouta within the Syrian government’s broader strategy and deliberate violence against civilians in opposition-held areas.

- Finally, it discusses the use of chemical weapons in these attacks as a war crime and crime against humanity.

5. The complaint calls on the Swedish Police Authority and Swedish Prosecution Authority to investigate the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta as an international crime, and to pursue an arrest warrant against the suspected perpetrators.

THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS IN THE GHOUTAS

6. The chemical attacks on 21 August 2013 targeted two suburbs of Damascus. Eastern Ghouta, to the east of the Syrian capital, comprises a number of towns, including Ein Terma, Douma, Zamalka, Arbin, Harasta, Hammouriya, and Jobar. Chemical weapons struck Zamalka and Ein Terma. Conventional rockets were also used across Eastern
Ghouta in the hours after the chemical attack, including in Ein Terma, Zamalka, Hezzeh and Arbin. The town of Moadamiyah in Western Ghouta, to the west of the capital, was also hit by chemical weapons hours after the chemical attacks in Eastern Ghouta.

7. Eastern and Western Ghouta were under opposition control at the time of the chemical attacks. Opposition forces captured Eastern Ghouta in November 2012; pro-government forces started a siege of Eastern Ghouta in April 2013 and recaptured the area on 14 April 2018.¹

Timeline

8. The chemical attacks on Eastern and Western Ghouta took place in the early hours of 21 August 2013.² The hours preceding the chemical attacks had been quiet in Eastern Ghouta, without military activity.³ Witnesses report chemical strikes on Eastern Ghouta at 01.20h, 01.30h, 01.50h, 02.00h, 02.30h, and 02.39h.⁴ The first social media reports of a shelling on Eastern Ghouta at approximately 01.15h did not specify whether the shelling comprised conventional or chemical weapons; the first social media reports of a chemical attack were at approximately 02.45h.⁵

9. Temperatures fell between 02.00h and 05.00h on the morning of 21 August.⁶ These were ideal conditions for the dispersion of chemical agents. The air was moving downward allowing the heavier sarin to penetrate into lower levels of buildings where people would seek shelter.⁷

10. Eyewitnesses describe that the chemical rockets were different from conventional rockets, notably because of the limited sound they made on impact.⁸ Witnesses recall shouts of a chemical attack,⁹ and seeing numerous people falling to the ground despite the absence of visible injuries or blood.¹⁰ People in the affected neighborhoods were advised to seek refuge on the highest possible grounds, such as roofs of buildings, to minimize their exposure to the chemicals.¹¹

⁴ Information from witnesses.
⁵ Information from witnesses.
⁶ First UN Mission Report, para. 22.
⁷ First UN Mission Report, para. 22.
⁸ Information from witnesses.
⁹ Information from witnesses.
¹⁰ Information from a witness.
¹¹ Information from witnesses.
11. Heavy conventional bombardments on Eastern Ghouta closely followed the chemical strikes, often targeting the tops of buildings. People, who had sought refuge on rooftops to avoid the chemicals, were killed in the ensuing shelling, or were affected by the chemicals when they sought cover from the shelling inside buildings.

12. The Syrian government launched a ground offensive on Eastern Ghouta at approximately 06.00h on 21 August 2013.

Victims of the Attacks

13. The chemical attacks on Eastern and Western Ghouta resulted in more than a thousand deaths and thousands of injuries. The Violations Documentation Center in Syria documented 1017 deaths from chemical weapons in the Damascus suburbs on 21 August including 989 civilians, out of which 308 were women and 122 children.

14. At the impact sites, first responders and community members reported seeing a large number of individuals lying on the ground; many were dead or unconscious. Victims, medical staff and first responders reported that affected individuals presented the following symptoms: foaming at the mouth; yellowed and bluish skin; convulsions; frozen and pinpoint pupils; itching; blurred vision; hallucinations; vomiting; loss of consciousness; and difficulty breathing. The UN Mission and Human Rights Watch reported similar symptoms. These symptoms are consistent with exposure to nerve agents, such as sarin.

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12 Information from witnesses; the French Intelligence Report estimates that conventional air and artillery bombardments took place between 03.00h and 04.00h, National executive summary of declassified intelligence, ‘Cases of previous use of chemical agents by the Syrian regime: Chemical attack launched by the regime on Aug 2’, 3 September 2013, available at https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Syrian_Chemical_Programme.pdf (‘French Intelligence Report’), p. 4-5.

13 Information from witnesses.


15 French intelligence estimated a minimum of 281 confirmed deaths and a much higher toll of approximately 1,500 deaths based on the attack’s impact model, French Intelligence Report, p. 7; The United States estimated in a preliminary assessment that the chemical weapons attacks had killed 1,429 people, including 426 children, US Intelligence Report, p. 1; the British intelligence services estimated a minimum 350 deaths, British Intelligence Report p. 1; Médecins Sans Frontières reported that 3,600 people had treated for symptoms consistent with exposure to chemical agents at three hospitals it supported in the area, of whom 355 died, Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Syria: Thousands Suffering from Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by MSF’, 24 August 2013, available at https://www.msf.org/syria-thousands-suffering-neurotoxic-symptoms-treated-hospitals-supported-msf; Syrian Observatory for Human Rights confirmed at least 502 fatalities, Shashank Bengali, ‘U.S. toll for Syria higher than others’, Los Angeles Times, 4 September 2013, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/04/world/la-fg-syria-casualties-20130904.

16 Violations Documentation Center in Syria (VDC), Database.

17 First UN Mission Report, Appendix 4, p. 19.

18 Information from witnesses including witnesses who report lasting health impacts.


15. Casualties were taken to several medical facilities in the area; many of which became overwhelmed by the number of patients. Witnesses report areas in medical facilities littered with bodies of victims on the ground. Rescue treatment included stripping the victims of their clothing; rinsing their bodies with water; and administering atropine. First responders and medical personnel were affected by exposure to the chemical weapons as they transported or administered treatment to the victims. Witnesses report long-term effects of the attacks, including lasting physical impacts on their vision and psychological trauma.

**Impact Sites**

16. Several chemical rockets struck Eastern and Western Ghouta on 21 August 2013. The UN Mission operated under an extremely narrow investigation window and only visited five impact sites: two sites in Western Ghouta (Moadamiyah) and three sites in Eastern Ghouta (Ein Terma and Zamalka).

17. Other independent investigations examined a number of additional impact sites in Eastern Ghouta. Human Rights Watch found that eight rockets had hit four localities in Zamalka alone. The online investigative group Bellingcat analyzed three chemical impact sites in Eastern Ghouta, two of which had not been visited by the UN Mission. Witnesses identify other impact sites in Eastern Ghouta not visited by the UN Mission. SCM independently determined that 11 chemical rockets struck in Zamalka and two chemical rockets struck in Ein Terma.

18. Working with the Human Rights Center Investigations Lab at UC Berkeley School of Law, we used hundreds of videos of the impact sites to verify the locations of five chemical impact sites, and identified a putative sixth impact site in Eastern Ghouta:

- **Impact site C:** a rocket pierced through the roof of a five-story building and landed in the room below, visited by the UN Mission on 28 August 2013, at coordinates 33.521641, 36.352425.

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First UN Mission Report, para. 25; Human Rights Watch Report, p. 4; international humanitarian NGO Médecins Sans Frontières treated at least 3,600 persons for symptoms it said were consistent with exposure to chemical agents, Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Syria: Thousands Suffering from Neurotoxic Symptoms Treated in Hospitals Supported by MSF,’” 24 August 2013, available at https://www.msf.org/syria-thousands-suffering-neurotoxic-symptoms-treated-hospitals-supported-msf.

21 Information from witnesses.
22 Information from witnesses.
23 Information from witnesses.
24 Information from witnesses.
25 Information from witnesses.
26 First UN Mission Report, Appendix 5, p. 25.
29 Information from witnesses; Human Rights Watch confirmed in its investigation that a rocket had struck near the al-Kamal banquet hall and another by the nearby Hamza mosque, Human Rights Watch Report, p. 7.
30 Information on file with SCM.
31 UN Mission Report, Appendix 5, p. 25 and Appendix 6, p. 31; investigated as ‘Rocket 3’ in Bellingcat Rocket Analysis; UN inspectors’ visit of the site was recorded in the following video, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrmPdJhbxcA&index=2&list=PLPC0Udeo63T707pSBU2Leey2pVN03oRUX.
32 Coordinates by Bellingcat and Human Rights Center Investigations Lab at UC Berkeley School of Law. Rocket described by Bellingcat as “Rocket 3” in Bellingcat Rocket Analysis.
• Impact site D: an open field with rubble near impact site C located by al-Mahariq street and visited by the UN Mission on 28 August 2013, at coordinates 33.520399, 36.356026.

• Impact site E: a kitchen and balcony in an apartment building visited by the UN Mission on 29 August 2013, the coordinates are unknown.

• Impact site F: an empty open field at coordinates 33.520689, 36.357391.

• Impact site G: a rocket penetrated a residential building, pierced through the outside wall and landed on the adjacent street, at coordinates 33.525371, 36.362192.

• Putative impact site H: a rocket in rubble near the al-Tawfiq mosque, at coordinates 33.524241, 36.359544.

19. In Western Ghouta, a witness interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that seven rockets struck two areas of Moadamiyah on 21 August 2013. The two chemical weapons impact sites in Western Ghouta that were visited by the UN Mission on 26 August 2013 appear to have been caused by the same rocket:

• Impact site A: a rocket pierced the vegetal trellis of an apartment building’s backyard terrace and landed on the terrace floor; and

• Impact site B: the corner of the second floor of an apartment building to the east of impact site A and adjacent to it.

Munitions and Delivery Systems

20. The type of munition loaded with a chemical agent used in Eastern Ghouta was a variant of an unguided conventional artillery rocket alternatively described as a 330mm rocket based on the diameter of its stabilizing ring or as a 122mm rocket based on the diameter of its central tube. The warhead at the front of the rocket was equipped with

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34 First UN Mission Report, Appendix 5, p. 22 and Appendix 6, p. 31; the UN inspectors’ visit of the site was recorded in the following videos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mmp6wpDITyU, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4jx5vPvNE.
35 Coordinates by Bellingcat and Berkeley Human Rights Center. Rocket described by Bellingcat as “Rocket 1” in Bellingcat Rocket Analysis.
36 UN Mission, Appendix 6, p. 29.
37 Investigated as “Rocket 1” in Bellingcat Rocket Analysis and coordinates provided by Eliot Higgins; the impact site was recorded in the following videos: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qBKuVxggSj8&list=PLPC0Udeofof3T7prlh3qUZNFZun57tchD.
38 Coordinates by Bellingcat and Berkeley Human Rights Center. Rocket investigated as “Rocket 2” in Bellingcat Rocket Analysis.
39 The impact site was recorded in the following video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lb2RkYVW_Kw&list=PLPC0Udeofof3T79tH20yJ1A2c2rGP8O1D YU; Human Rights Watch Report, p. 7. notes that three rockets struck the al-Mazraat neighbourhood next to the al-Tawfiq mosque and next to the elementary school.
40 Coordinates by Berkeley Human Rights Center.
41 Human Rights Watch Report, p. 4.
42 First UN Mission Report, Appendix 5, p. 21.
a filling plug and carried the chemical load; its approximate liquid capacity was between 50 and 60 liters.\textsuperscript{45}

21. The munitions loaded with a chemical agent used in Western Ghouta were M14 artillery rockets, also known as 140 mm rockets.\textsuperscript{46} The approximate chemical capacity of the rockets was 2.2 liters.\textsuperscript{47}

**Presence of Sarin**

22. The UN Mission concluded that it had “collected clear and convincing evidence that chemical weapons were used also against civilians, including children, on a relatively large scale in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 21 August 2013.”\textsuperscript{48} The findings drew on interviews with survivors and medical personnel;\textsuperscript{49} chemical and medical samples taken from interviewees;\textsuperscript{50} and environmental samples from impact sites.\textsuperscript{51} Environmental samples collected by the UN Mission in Eastern and Western Ghouta were positive for sarin degradation products (DIMP, IPMPA, MPA, MPFA or a combination thereof).\textsuperscript{52} Other chemicals present in the samples included hexamine and hexafluorophosphate.\textsuperscript{53}

23. The Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Syria (“COI”) of the UN Human Rights Council, based on independently collected information, confirmed the UN Mission’s findings that chemical weapons, specifically sarin, had been used in Eastern and Western Ghouta on 21 August 2013.\textsuperscript{54}

24. Independently of the biomedical and environmental samples, several elements indicate the rockets carried chemical warheads, including the absence of large craters consistent with explosive loads; the absence of injuries on victims consistent with explosive loads or of severe burns consistent with incendiary loads; and the presence of filling plugs in the munitions.

25. The symptoms of the victims were widely consistent with exposure to a nerve agent, and specifically sarin, as detailed above.

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\textsuperscript{46} First UN Mission Report, Appendix 5, p. 26; Human Rights Watch Report, p. 5.


\textsuperscript{48} Final UN Mission Report, para. 109.

\textsuperscript{49} First UN Mission Report, paras. 25-26; Final UN Mission Report, para. 110.

\textsuperscript{50} First UN Mission Report, paras. 25-26; Final UN Mission Report, para. 110.

\textsuperscript{51} First UN Mission Report, para. 24; Final UN Mission Report, para. 110.


\textsuperscript{53} First UN Mission Report, para. 24; Final UN Report, para. 110.


Rockets Range and Launch Sites

26. The location of the launch sites for the rockets which landed in Eastern Ghouta has not been conclusively determined. The UN Mission determined upon analyzing the impact sites in Eastern Ghouta that the rockets used in Eastern Ghouta arrived from the northwest.55

27. Early assessments of launch sites supposed that the chemical variant of the 330mm rockets originated from Mount Qasioun, located over 9km from Eastern Ghouta.56 Information from insider witnesses and eyewitness suggest that at least some of the rockets fired at Eastern Ghouta came from Mount Qasioun.57 The US government intelligence claimed immediately after the attacks that the rockets had been launched from regime territory.58 Several sources highlighted issues with the US intelligence map that accompanied its report.59

28. Later assessments of the rockets estimated that the munitions modified to carry a chemical load would have had a range of approximately 2km.60 An approximate 2km range places the launch sites for the rockets that landed in Eastern Ghouta in the area between Qaboun and Jobar, to the north and northwest of the impact sites.61 The Air Force Intelligence Branch in Harasta could have been used as the launch point or a staging area for the attacks. The rockets could have been fired from government-held areas in close proximity to the impact sites,62 or from contested areas through mobile launchers attached to a truck.

55 First UN Mission Report, Appendix 5, p. 22.
57 Information from witnesses.
60 New York Times Study; Higgins, ‘Piecing together open source evidence from the Syrian Sarin attacks’; Higgins and Dan Kaszeta, ‘It’s clear that Turkey was not involved in the chemical attack on Syria’; the Head of the UN Mission Åke Sellström confirmed an estimated rocket range of 2 kilometers during a press conference following the publication of the final UN mission report, United Nations, YouTube, ‘Press conference on investigative team's report relating to the use of chemical weapons in Syria’, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5CFn9pWNKeI, 16:00-16:47.
29. The 140mm artillery rockets, used in Western Ghouta, had a minimum range of 3.8 kilometers and a maximum range of 9.8 kilometers.\(^63\) Analyses from The New York Times and Human Rights Watch suggest that the rockets which landed in Moadamiyah could have originated from the direction of the Mezzeh Military Airport or nearby base of the Syrian 4th Armored Division.\(^64\)

**PERPETRATORS OF THE ATTACKS**

30. US, French and British governments attributed the chemical attacks on Eastern and Western Ghouta on 21 August 2013 to the Syrian government.\(^65\)

**Characteristics Linking Sarin to the Syrian Government**

31. Characteristics of the sarin chemical agent deployed in Eastern and Western Ghouta link the chemical attacks to the Syrian government. First, the Syrian government’s chemical weapons arsenal included sarin.\(^66\) Second, the Syrian government conducted chemical attacks using sarin before 21 August 2013. French intelligence services stated that the Syrian regime had used sarin in limited attacks against the population prior to 21 August 2013: in Saraqeb on 29 April 2013 and in Jobar on mid-April 2013.\(^67\) Third, specific characteristics of the sarin used in Eastern and Western Ghouta indicate that the Syrian government committed these attacks.\(^68\) The samples collected and analyzed by the UN Mission from impact sites of the 21 August 2013 attacks, which tested positive for sarin, showed the presence of hexamine and hexafluorophosphate. Hexamine was declared by the Syrian government as part of its chemical weapon program after the attacks on 21 August 2013.\(^69\) Hexamine had not previously been associated with sarin and is specific to the Syrian government’s sarin manufacturing.

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\(^{64}\) Human Rights Watch Report, p. 6; Chivers, ‘U.N. Data on Gas Attack Point to Assad’s Top Forces’, indicating the one of the rockets could have been launched from Mezzeh Military Airport.

\(^{65}\) US Intelligence Report; French Intelligence Report; British Intelligence Report.


\(^{68}\) The COI determined that the sarin used in the chemical attacks on Eastern Ghouta and Western Ghouta on 21 August 2013 and on Khan Al-Assal on 19 March 2013 “bore the same unique hallmarks”, Seventh COI Report, para. 128; Ninth COI Report, para. 44.

process.\textsuperscript{70} Hexafluorophosphate has been linked to the Syrian government’s stockpile, including by the Joint Investigative Mechanism between the UN and the OPCW in relation to the sarin attack on Khan Shaykhun on 4 April 2017.\textsuperscript{71}

**Characteristics Linking Rockets to the Syrian Government**

32. The rockets deployed in Eastern Ghouta are also linked to the Syrian government. The Syrian government’s use of 330mm rockets has been documented before and after the 21 August 2013 attacks.\textsuperscript{72} The Syrian government also possessed the launchers likely used to propel the rockets on Eastern Ghouta.\textsuperscript{73}

**Alleged Responsible Units and Individuals**

33. As discussed above, the brief presents information on two possible launch sites for the Eastern Ghouta attacks:

- Early assessments of the rockets’ launch sites and information from insider witnesses and eyewitnesses suggest that the rockets fired at Eastern Ghouta came from Mount Qasioun. Mount Qasioun and the surrounding area is a strategic location for the Syrian government. It is close to the Presidential Palace, the Republican Guard 104th, 105th and 106th Brigades, the Special Forces base, and storage warehouses and laboratories from the Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC), the Syrian government agency responsible for the development and production of conventional and non-conventional weapons, including SSRC Institute 1000 and Branch 450.\textsuperscript{74} Witnesses report that they saw rockets launched from Mount Qasioun the night of 21 August 2013.\textsuperscript{75}

- Later assessments, which considered the short range of the munitions which hit Eastern Ghouta, placed the launch site of the attacks in government-held positions


\textsuperscript{71} 7\textsuperscript{th} JIM Report, para. 87.

\textsuperscript{72} Human Rights Watch Report, p. 12-13; Bellingcat, ‘Volcanoes in Damascus’; Higgins and Dan Kaszeta, ‘It’s clear that Turkey was not involved in the chemical attack on Syria’; videos of volcano rocket launches by pro-government forces are available here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8O7bhD1xW0Y&list=PLPC0Udeofo3T4TAtrDOq8E2H1tP03uOhKR.


\textsuperscript{74} See OSJI and Syrian Archive, Investigation Report on SSRC, October 2020.

\textsuperscript{75} Information from witnesses.
approximately 2km north of the impact sites.\textsuperscript{76} If this information is correct, the
team around the Air Force Intelligence Branch in Harasta could be a likely area for
the launch of the rockets,\textsuperscript{77} given the long-standing role of the Air Force
Intelligence in Syria’s chemical weapons program and their elite status among
Syria’s government security commands.\textsuperscript{78}

34. In Western Ghouta, evidence suggests that the rockets originated from the area around
Mezzeh Military Airport. Mezzeh Military Airport is in close proximity to the Air
Force Intelligence, a Republican Guard base, and the 4\textsuperscript{th} Division base.\textsuperscript{79}

35. Several individuals allegedly have had a role in the Ghouta attacks and should be
investigated:

- President Bashar Al-Assad: As President of the Republic and Commander in Chief,
  President Assad holds the highest responsibility in authorizing the attacks on
  Ghouta, which would not have taken place at minimum without his knowledge. An
  insider witness stated that Assad authorized the attacks, and Maher al-Assad
  subsequently ordered the attacks.

- Major General Maher Al-Assad: Assad is the brother of Bashar Al-Assad and de
  facto Commander of the 4th Division. He is one of the most influential individuals
  in Syria and he is one of three people in Syria, including the President, who has
  control over the deployment of chemical weapons. An insider witness indicated that
  the attacks were carried out on the personal orders of Maher al-Assad. His forces
  carried out a ground assault on Eastern Ghouta in the hours immediately following
  the chemical attacks. He has been sanctioned by various entities.\textsuperscript{80}

- Brigadier General Ghassan Abbas: Abbas is a senior officer with the Air Force
  Intelligence and Head of SSRC Branch 450, the main SSRC entity responsible for
  supporting the planning and execution of Syria’s chemical attacks. According to an
  insider witness, Abbas was present at the time of the attacks and oversaw the
arming of rockets with chemical warheads. He has been sanctioned by several entities, including specifically for his role in the chemical attacks on Ghouta.

- **Major General Ali Wanus:** Wanus is an attache officer between the Republican Guard 105th Brigade and the SSRC, and is alleged to be one of the key SSRC-affiliated individuals responsible for the use of chemical weapons in Ghouta. He has been sanctioned by several entities.

- **Brigadier General Yusuf Ajib:** Ajib is a Representative of the Presidential Palace and Head of Security for Branch 450. He has been sanctioned by the UK and EU for his role as Head of Security for the SSRC.

- **Major General Hamid Tahir Khalil:** Khalil was the Head of the Syrian Missile and Artillery directorate at the time of the attack, the entity responsible for the testing and use of the Syrian Arab Army’s artillery, rockets, and missiles. An insider witness indicated that Khalil attended and supervised the attacks. He has been sanctioned by the EU and the UK, including specifically for his role in the chemical attacks on Ghouta.

- **Major General Jawdat Salbi Mawas:** Mawas was a senior officer in the Syrian Missile and Artillery directorate at the time of the attacks. An insider witness indicated that Mawas attended and supervised the attacks. He has been sanctioned by the EU and the UK, including specifically for his role in the chemical attacks on Ghouta.

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82 EU, ‘List of persons and entities under EU restrictive measures over the situation in Syria’, 30 May 2017, available at [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/124083/list-persons-entities-EU-restrictive-measures-Syria-30052017.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/124083/list-persons-entities-EU-restrictive-measures-Syria-30052017.pdf) (‘EU Persons and Entities Sanctioned over Syria’), states “He has been involved in the proliferation of chemical weapons and the organisation of chemical weapons attacks, including in Ghouta in August 2013. He therefore shares responsibility for the violent repression against the Syrian population”; UK Sanctions List states “Involved in the proliferation of chemical weapons and the organisation of chemical weapons attacks, including in Ghouta in August 2013.”

83 US Sanctions Linked to OPCW-UN Findings; UK Sanctions List; EU Sanctions List; Australia Sanctions List; Canada Sanctions List.

84 EU Sanctions List.

85 EU Sanctions List; UK Sanctions List.

86 EU Persons and Entities Sanctioned Over Syria states “As a senior ranking officer of the Syrian Artillery and Missile Directorate, he is responsible for the violent repression of the civilian population, including the deployment of missiles and chemical weapons by Brigades under his command in highly populated civilian areas in Ghouta in 2013”; UK Sanctions List states he was “Responsible for the deployment of missiles and chemical weapons by Brigades under his command in highly populated civilian areas in Ghouta in 2013”.

87 EU Sanctions List; UK Sanctions List.

88 EU Persons and Entities Sanctioned Over Syria states “As a senior ranking officer of the Syrian Artillery and Missile Directorate, he is responsible for violent repression against the civilian population, including the use of missiles and chemical weapons by Brigades under his command in highly populated civilian areas in 2013 in Ghouta”; UK Sanctions List states he was “Responsible the
• Major General Adnan Hilweh: Hilweh is a senior officer with the 155th Brigade and possibly the Deputy Director of the Syrian Missile and Artillery Directorate. His senior position with the 155th Brigade at the time of the attacks is corroborated by an insider witness. An insider witness indicated that Hilweh attended and supervised the attacks. He has been sanctioned by the UK and the EU, including specifically for the deployment and use of missile and chemical weapons in 2013.

• Brigadier General Ghassan Ghannan: Ghannan was the Commander of the 155th Brigade and a close affiliate of Maher Al-Assad. An insider witness indicated that Mawas attended and supervised the attacks. He has been sanctioned by the EU and UK.

• Major General Talal Makhluf: Makhluf was the Commander of the Republican Guards 105th Brigade at the time of the attacks. SSRC chemical weapons were stored at the 105th Brigade’s warehouses. It is unlikely that Makhluf would not have been aware of or involved in the attack’s planning and execution. He has been sanctioned by various entities.

CONTEXT OF THE CHEMICAL ATTACKS

36. The chemical attacks on Eastern and Western Ghouta are part of a broader pattern of deliberate, indiscriminate and widespread attacks perpetrated by the Syrian government against civilians in opposition-held areas. Syrian Archive has documented 212 chemical weapons attacks between 2011 and 2019, of which at least five were sarin attacks.

37. The Syrian government has pursued a military strategy of punitive counterinsurgency and collective punishment against the civilian population in areas held by opposition forces. As a result, civilians have been the first casualties of the Syrian government’s repeated attacks. By some estimates, the indiscriminate violence led the share of civilian casualties to rise dramatically from 4% in 2011 to 48% in 2012.

38. Consistent with the Syrian government’s strategy of deliberately targeting civilians, the Ghouta attacks were not an isolated incident, but were part of a pattern of attacks using with chemical weapons or conventional weapons perpetrated by the Syrian government. Chemical attacks before August 2013 include the attacks on the Khan Al Asal

\[Equation\]

\[Equation\]

\[Equation\]

use of missiles and chemical weapons by Brigades under his command in highly populated civilian areas in Ghouta in 2013.”.

EU Sanctions List; UK Sanctions List.

EU Persons and Entities Sanctioned Over Syria states “As the Brigadier General of 155 and 157 Brigade, he is responsible for the violent repression against the civilian population in Syria, including through his responsibility for the deployment and use of missile and chemical weapons in civilian areas in 2013 and involvement in the large scale detentions”; UK Sanctions List states “Responsible for the deployment and use of missile and chemical weapons in civilian areas in 2013”.

EU Sanctions List; UK Sanctions List.

US Sanctions linked to OPCW-UN Findings; EU Sanctions List; UK Sanctions List


Schneider and Lütkefend, ‘Nowhere to Hide, p. 26-27 based on data from the VDC.
neighborhood of Aleppo on 19 March 2013,\textsuperscript{96} Eastern Ghouta in Jobar in April 2013,\textsuperscript{97} and near Harasta on 25 May 2013.\textsuperscript{98}

39. The pattern of violence against civilians also included the deliberate targeting of civilian infrastructure, particularly medical facilities. Medical hospitals in Ghouta were attacked close to the time of the chemical attacks. The Douma National Hospital was struck by a conventional rocket on 13 August 2013. The Al-Fatih Hospital in Kafr Batna was bombarded several times, including on 21 August 2013.\textsuperscript{99}

THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS ATTACKS WERE AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME

40. The use of chemical weapons on Eastern and Western Ghouta constitutes war crimes prohibited under international criminal law, including the war crimes of employing poison or poisoned weapons and committing acts of violence to life and person against protected persons. As such, they may be prosecuted under chapter 22, section 6 of the Swedish Criminal Code in its wording before 1 July 2014.

41. Swedish authorities have universal jurisdiction over these crimes in accordance with chapter 2, section 3 (6) of the Swedish Criminal Code in its wording before 1 July 2014.

\textsuperscript{96} Final UN Mission Report, Appendix 3.
\textsuperscript{97} French Intelligence, ‘Allegations of use of chemical weapons in Syria since 2012’, 6 April 2017, available at https://www.diplomatic.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/170425_-_national_evaluation_annex_-_anglais_cle81722e.pdf/\textsuperscript{98}
\textsuperscript{98} Information from witnesses.